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TO MY BROTHER AND MY FATHER
ABSTRACT
The thesis is about the development of small businesses in Russia with a 
focus on St. Petersburg. Any analysis on this sector is hindered by question 
marks over the reliability of the official data. While these point to a 
stagnation in the small business sector, surveys indicate a continuous 
growth in the share of the economy represented by new firms. How to 
reconcile these two sets of data is hard given the dearth of evidence. It 
seems, however, clear that even in Russia the emergence of new private 
firms has been an organic process which has been slower due to a variety of 
factors that have characterised the transition process: the strong influence of 
interest groups; the legislative chaos; the punitive taxation; the 
unpredictable economic environment; the scarcity of financing and the 
precarious state of large industrial firms. Mainframe small business theory 
can, instead, offer little explanation given the particular conditions of the 
transition from a planned to a market economy. By Russian standards, St. 
Petersburg has experienced a very large growth in the small business sector, 
despite the fact that the business environment in St. Petersburg does not 
differ from that in Russia in general and incomes per capita are close to the 
Russian average. This is in contrast to Moscow where the expansion of 
small businesses can be ascribed to the much higher income levels. In St. 
Petersburg the local administration has not been particularly business- 
fi-iendly, dispensing favours to its “cronies” and doing little to rein in 
bureaucratic abuses. Policy making in industry has been centred, in 
particular, on helping certain sectors deemed as priorities, but the efficacy 
of these measures is doubtful at best. Economic policies in St. Petersburg 
may be seen as being shaped by the mentality of a planned economy, 
reflected in the drafting of countless plans and measures, which have, 
however, largely remained unrealised. Little has, instead, been done to meet 
small businesses demands. Nevertheless, from the survey I undertook and 
from other sources small businesses in St. Petersburg seem to perform much 
better than in the rest of the country. The higher educational level and the 
“Western mentality” of the population has represented a fertile environment
for the emergence of entrepreneurship. The expansion of the small business 
sector has been boosted by the larger retail spending per head than in Russia 
as a whole due a variety of factors. This explains why growth has been 
particularly strong in the service sector. On the contrary, despite the wealth 
of scientific knowledge in the city, scientific firms have not developed to 
any great extent. The difficult environment for scientific firms is 
highlighted by the experience of science parks. Even if there are some 
success stories the average tenant firm struggles to survive due to the 
limited demand for scientific products.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
OBJECTIVES
This research is an original work on the development of small business in 
Russia with a focus on St. Petersburg. I am building on an established body 
of research on small business which has been carried out before in St. 
Petersburg by Webster and Charap in 1992 (survey of 100 private 
manufacturing firms), by De Melo and Ofer in 1993 (survey of eighty-six 
private service firms) and by the Leontief Center in more recent years. 
Concerning Russia in general many more studies have been carried out. 
The changes taking place in Russia have provided a myriad of opportunities 
for small business, so it is intriguing to find out why development has been 
so disappointing in contrast to the leading transition countries (Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic). Evidence from Poland has suggested 
that the main engines of economic growth have been the new private 
enterprises created from scratch. The development of the small business 
sector seems to have been an organic process once economic freedom was 
conceded, thus not requiring any significant help fi*om the state. Why does 
Russia differ? The unique factor about Russia is the weak role of 
entrepreneurs, even before the communist take-over, combined with a 
strong bureaucratic tradition. Is this adequate to explain its lack of 
dynamism or do other factors also have to be taken into consideration? The 
explanation may lie in a less business-friendly system of cultural rewards 
and sanctions, a less supportive government policy, the inadequacy of 
legislation, greater monopoly power, the absence of start-up finance, less 
developed informal networks, the more severe economic conditions, or the 
existence of substantial bureaucratic obstacles.
I have chosen to examine developments in St. Petersburg because it seemed 
to be one of the most appropriate places where small business could 
progress in Russia. St. Petersburg represents the most European part of 
Russia with a highly-educated population. It is a leading industrial centre
with a high share of high-technology industries, most of which formerly 
belonged to the military industrial complex. Several international 
programmes to promote entrepreneurship have been established in St. 
Petersburg. It is also one of the most liberal cities in Russia, having always 
returned pro-reform majorities since the first free elections in the early 
nineties. Even in Soviet times the city had a tradition of being strongly 
reformist and tried to follow its own path of development. Since the 1950s 
specific programmes were devised by local authorities to foster innovation 
in industry. For these reasons it is reasonable to expect that economic 
reforms would take root more easily in St. Petersburg compared with the 
rest of the Russian Federation, and consequently create a favourable 
environment for the development of entrepreneurship.
However, the lack of reliable information hinders the analysis of small 
business activity. In examining official statistics it is possible to identify 
several inconsistencies in the data. The interpretation of official data can 
sometimes be a hazardous exercise, requiring field work in order to provide 
a more reliable picture. A lot of effort was put in devising a questionnaire 
which could provide an adequate picture of the small business sector in 
Russia. This was initially intended to be distributed to individual 
entrepreneurs via an Italian researcher with contacts in St. Petersburg who 
promised to give me her assistance. Since after a while she lost interest in 
the project it became impossible to contact the requisite number of 
entrepreneurs without a base in the city. I therefore contacted organisations 
promoting small businesses. Despite the efforts in the end the replies were 
fewer than expected, but the number of firms they refer to is quite 
substantial. Even if this cannot be considered a representative sample, the 
evidence collected can, however, give useful insights into issues not 
covered by official statistics: in particular the origins of these small 
businesses, their main clients and markets, their purchases, etc. It was also 
deemed desirable to ascertain these organisations’ opinions as to the 
constraints facing the small business sector, opinions which do not 
necessarily correspond with those of small business owners themselves, and
to gather the information on the status of small businesses in the city which 
could be a clue as to why so fast small business has expanded. The evidence 
covers almost exclusively start-ups. More studies must be done to have a 
more complete picture of the new firms sector in Russia in order to compare 
the results of this research with analogous studies regarding other cities. 
Qualitative interviews were also utilised in order to obtain a first-hand 
account of the business environment within which small businesses operate. 
Interviews were carried out with many economic actors; not all are reported 
in the study, but nevertheless most provided useful feedback. The study of 
science parks is used to analyse how science firms are faring in St. 
Petersburg and to ascertain whether this structure is the most appropriate to 
foster the creation and development of small businesses.
The research is reported in eight chapters. Firstly, I analyse the changing 
role of small business in the economic structure, the main theories on 
entrepreneurship and the development of small business in Eastern Europe 
and in Russia. Those aspects of small business theory which are more 
appropriate in the Russian context are then assessed in this section together 
with the economic theories which may explain why entrepreneurship has 
not made much progress in Russia. The basis on which the new private 
sector started to develop in the Soviet economy, and the role it was 
expected to have in the command economy as opposed to the role it actually 
had is also examined. Secondly, I show which aspects of the business 
environment have encouraged or, more usually, discouraged the 
development of small business and how the government has addressed the 
issue of small business in the post-communist period. Have macroeconomic 
issues deflected its attention as in other countries? If in Western countries 
the efficacy of a focused policy on small business is subject to criticism, the 
state in post-communist societies has an important role to play in creating 
the conditions for small business development: the financial sector has to be 
reformed; there is a great need for consulting due to the lack of business 
skills such as marketing and finance; an appropriate legislative framework 
has to be put in place, etc. A comparison is also made between Russia and
the leading transition countries regarding the factors which explain the 
poorer performance of the economy and of the small business sector in 
Russia - the two are correlated. Thirdly, I examine the official statistics 
relating to small business and the different methods used to collect data. I 
critically assess their reliability at national and local level comparing them 
with other data, when it is available. The importance of the small business 
sector in the city will be assessed taking on board the drawbacks of the 
frequently contradictory data. Fourthly, the impact of the economic crisis 
on the present economic structure of St. Petersburg is reviewed. The legacy 
of the communist past implies that national problems are exacerbated in St. 
Petersburg because the economic structure was orientated towards the 
production of military equipment. This chapter includes sections on the city 
budget, local political developments, but the bulk of the chapter is devoted 
to local economic policies. Local administrations have faced exceptional 
difficulties especially at the beginning of the transition, when the federal 
government retreated from particular areas and they have had to address a 
wide range of new problems in a situation of severe economic depression. 
Chapter five deals with local policy in the small business field in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow. The policy of the local authorities can exert a 
powerful influence over the development of small business, because they 
own most of the premises and all the land, and have wide tax and other 
legislative powers. Why Moscow leads in terms of small business 
development is further analysed as well as the reasons for the significant 
growth in this sector in St. Petersburg. In the next chapter there is a report 
on empirical work, which I carried out in St. Petersburg, including the 
evidence collected on small firms from the organisations which were 
interviewed and the interviews held with different economic actors. 
Finally, a separate chapter is dedicated to the science sector and scientific 
entrepreneurship, as research and development occupies an important place 
in the St. Petersburg economy. St. Petersburg, together with Moscow, being 
one of the major centres of scientific innovation in Russia. The arguments 
covered in the chapter are the policies pursued by the Russian government 
and the St. Petersburg administration in this field, the development of
science parks in Russia and why scientific entrepreneurship developed so 
little despite Russia’s wealth of expertise. The activities of the science parks 
and innovation centre of the city are also assessed, in an attempt to 
understand the contribution provided by these establishments to the creation 
and development of science firms. The conclusion provides a summary of 
the main points of the research.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The sources of information which have been used for this research are:
• official statistics and unpublished reports edited by Goskomstat
• interviews and questionnaire replies
• conferences and seminars
• local and international press and literature
• Internet
• brochures of organisations active in St. Petersburg.
Documentation for the chapters on Russia and on small business theory was 
mostly obtained in libraries in Italy and Great Britain. In the last couple of 
years the Internet has acquired more importance as the information 
available has increased considerably. Some useful information on St. 
Petersburg can also been obtained from this source. More specifically, the 
electronic version of the “77ze St. Petersburg Times”, which has been 
available since 1994 and was one the very first magazines to appear on the 
Internet, the electronic magazines of the Russian Chamber of Commerce, 
and other magazines contained in the site dedicated to small business in 
Moscow have been especially helpful. Since the end of 1998 statistical data 
on small business can be obtained from the server of the Russian SME 
Resource Centre and from the SME support server established by the 
Leontief Center in collaboration with the administration of St. Petersburg. 
The latter tries to be like a “yellow pages” of all the services available to 
small businesses. I was given a proposal to write an article which was 
included in the news section of this server.
In order to write the chapters on St. Petersburg I made ten visits there to do 
fieldwork, but always for short periods, from one to three weeks. During 
these visits I met at least fifty people: representatives of science parks, 
associations of entrepreneurs, foreign firms, research institutes, the 
Academy of Science, foreign and Russian organisations promoting small 
business and also university professors, single entrepreneurs and members 
of the local administration. I have also been several times to Moscow to 
meet local researchers working in the small business field and the vice­
director of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Support 
and the Promotion of Entrepreneurship. He introduced me to a few people 
working in small business development in the administration of St. 
Petersburg and the Leningrad region. Qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews were held with most of the above-mentioned people, while in 
some cases these were based on the pre-prepared questionnaire. In these 
past years I have learned the Russian language sufficiently well to allow me 
to carry out the above-mentioned interviews, and required reading in the 
local press.
In Russia I also attended several relevant exhibitions and their 
accompanying seminars, as well as a conference on small business. The 
EBRD meeting held in St. Petersburg in 1994 gave me the first opportunity 
to establish some contacts. The exhibition “Small Business 1998” held in 
March 1998, the first of its kind in St. Petersburg, hosted most of the 
organisations promoting small business which are active in St. Petersburg 
and the accompanying seminars gave a panorama of their activities. This 
exhibition was repeated the following year. The attendance of the public 
has, however, been scarce. It was attended mostly by representatives of 
small business organisations rather than entrepreneurs. The exhibition 
“Innovation”, held in June 1998 at which many Russian science parks had 
stands, the accompanying congress “High technologies. Innovations. 
Investments-98” and the exhibition “American assistance to Russian 
entrepreneurship”, held in April 1997, were all especially useful. Topics
discussed in seminars were, however, usually too general as most of 
the speakers described in broad terms the operations of their organisations. 
The conference “Financial and Institutional Problems of Russian Small 
Entrepreneurs (regional aspects)” organised in Moscow in April 1997 
presented a Tacis-fmanced survey on small business in selected Russian 
regions.
In my early visits to St. Petersburg I had to dedicate one-two weeks to 
organising meetings in the city before departure. Initially, research was 
carried out to locate organisations and institutions dealing with small 
business, and a majority of these organisations were contacted, either by fax 
from Italy or directly by telephone in St. Petersburg. In order to maintain 
contacts with Russians I wished to meet again in later trips, I spent 
considerable time prior to each visit assembling useful information for them 
and trying to establish contacts in Italy on their behalf. The level of 
response to my faxes from foreign organisations was good though from 
their Russian counterparts it was very poor. Nevertheless, the majority of 
Russians agreed to meet me once contacted directly by phone. I managed to 
have meetings with several of the foreign organisations working in St. 
Petersburg and a few also agreed to fill in the questionnaire. I am 
particularly grateful to Ilya Karasev, of the USAID-sponsored organisation 
TUSRIF, who filled in the questionnaire on the basis of data referring to all 
the 326 firms he dealt with - a very-time consuming task.
Several interviews were held with the management of three of the four 
science parks analysed in the research. The fourth was visited during an 
organised visit for participants of the exhibition “Innovation”. Feedback 
was also received by carrying out informal discussions with the tenant 
firms. In particular the vice-director of the science park of the Technical 
University and his assistant spent many hours with me discussing science 
parks in St. Petersburg. A project for a seminar for science park directors 
was also worked out together with the Environment Park in Turin, the 
realisation of which depends on the obtaining of financing from the
programme Bistro-Tacis. Representatives of the local administration were 
contacted directly in order to have more detailed information about support 
programmes for small business and industry and these proved to be very 
collaborative.
Interviews with entrepreneurs were arranged with the assistance of the local 
magazine “Preprinimater Peterburga” and through other people I had met 
in St. Petersburg. The director and his assistant were also very helpful for 
the interesting exchange of ideas. Some of the firms could not, however, 
be contacted any more after the first visit. The arrangement of meetings 
with Russians was surely facilitated by the fact I was a foreigner and could 
be a useful vehicle for them to establish contacts with foreign partners or 
obtain useful information, but this was not always the case. Some agreed to 
meet me just in order to be useful for my research and I could not find any 
way to exchange the favour they did for me except with the promise that I 
would give them a copy of the research once it was completed. A few, 
instead, turned out to be of little interest for my research as they ended up 
speaking of how the project they had in mind could be interesting for 
foreign partners.
St. Petersburg has two main business magazines. Both have a small 
business section, although this is not included in every issue. The Swedish- 
owned "Delovoi Peterburg” (Business St. Petersburg) comes out three 
times a week and is one of the few not aligned with the local administration 
not being financially dependent on its support. The Russian-owned 
“Ekonomika i Zhizn’ (recently renamed Ekonomika i Vremia): Sankt 
Peterburgskii Regional’nyi Vypusk” (Economy and Life; St. Petersburg 
Regional Edition) is a weekly publication. There are other two business 
magazines Ç'Delo” and "EKO”) edited in St. Petersburg, but these are 
rarely found in the newsagents and have a very small circulation. In 
addition, the national daily ''Kommersant ’ Daily ” carries a local page on 
business in St. Petersburg three times per week. There is also a magazine 
entirely dedicated to small business, ‘Preprinimatel’ Peterburga” (The
Entrepreneur of St. Petersburg), which comes out once a week; and, 
although having the administration among its founders, it often takes an 
independent stance.
The magazine "PreprinimateV Peterburga” was a precious source of 
information reflecting the attitude and views of the local businessmen 
community. The other economic magazines published in St. Petersburg 
have also been useful especially with regard to the economic policy in the 
city. I have also made use o f "The Socio-Economic Situation in St. 
Petersburg. A General Overview” edited on a by-monthly basis by the 
Leontief Center and the "Vestnik Administratsii Sankt-Peterburga” 
(Bulletin of the Administration of St. Petersburg) published by the 
Administration of St. Petersburg also on a by-monthly basis. The magazine 
"Innovatsii” has provided information on the science park movement in 
Russia. Having known personally the editors I was asked to write an article 
on venture funds which I thought was a good idea in order to spread my 
name.
Official statistics were obtained from the Goskomstat offices in St. 
Petersburg. Goskomstat employees were, however, very secretive about the 
methods utilised to collect data and no useful information on this matter 
could be obtained from its staff. In Russian libraries other local and national 
magazines which I could not find in British and Italian libraries have been 
consulted. I also made use of research on small business in Russia edited by 
the Leontief Center in St. Petersburg, the Russian Independent Institute of 
Social and Nationalities Problems and the Institute for Private Sector 
Development and Strategic Analysis in Moscow. A lot of literature has 
appeared in the last few years on small business in Russia, but what is often 
missing is an analysis of data even if it is clear by analysing and comparing 
data that there are some incongruities. Data analysis has represented a 
serious problem as it is sometimes difficult to find explanations for these 
incongruities.
1. SMALL BUSINESS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION
The thesis is concerned with the development of small business in St. 
Petersburg and Russia as a whole since 1989. Small business has played an 
increasing role in capitalist countries, especially in innovation and in 
employment generation. It might, therefore, be expected that one aspect of 
the transition from a socialist to a post-socialist economy would be the 
development of small business. As an introduction to analysing the post- 
1989 development of small business in Russia the first section provides a 
brief assessment of how small business has fared in developed market 
economies in the last thirty years and the reasons underlying its changing 
importance in these economies. These can offer an insight as to the reasons 
why communist economies have not been able to maintain the pace of 
advanced market economies. This chapter also reviews the major issues 
raised in small business research (the interpretations of entrepreneurship, 
personality traits, creation of new enterprises, success strategies). A 
subsequent section considers how the private sector came into being in the 
Soviet period, whether traditional small business research can be useful for 
the Russian case and discusses the theories which can explain why this 
sector has not fared well in post-Soviet Russia, even though the main 
sources of market change expected to lead to small business growth were 
present in Russia. The increasing role of small business in Eastern Europe is 
also addressed with a focus on the manufacturing sector since 
manufacturing plays the most important role in economic growth.
1.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL FIRMS IN THE POST-WAR 
PERIOD
The importance of small firms in modem market economies has been 
reassessed in the last twenty years because there has been a reversal of the 
long-term industrial trend towards larger units in almost all industrialised
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countries. For a long time with the exception of a short period in the 30's, 
there had been an almost continuous development towards larger units and a 
higher concentration in the industrial structure.
For this reason until the 1970s the prevailing view was that small firms had 
a minor and diminishing role to play in the economy (Galbraith, 1956: 7-8; 
Berger, 1980: 88), because they were considered, as a rule, less competitive 
than larger establishments. According to Galbraith large firms exploiting 
economies of scale could perform better than small firms in every economic 
aspect - productivity, technological progress and job compensation. 
Servan-Schreiber (1968: 113) warned Europeans to heed the American 
challenge represented by giant corporations which were unrivalled in terms 
of dynamism, organisation, innovation and boldness. In order to compete on 
equal terms with the Americans he advocated the creation of large industrial 
units of a size similar with their counterparts across the ocean since only 
giant corporations are in a position to amass the necessary resources for 
innovation.
Indeed in the 1950s and 1960s the industrial policy of the advanced market 
economies tended to favour large units of production. It was believed that 
big firms were better at innovating because of the scale economies existing 
in research and development (henceforth R&D). Their size meant that they 
could also reduce the risks associated with R&D by diversifying into 
several research projects and were better able to sustain the high fixed costs 
involved. Finally, large firms were considered to be in a better position to 
exploit the results of their research efforts both because a well-known firm 
can more easily enter a new market and because synergies with other 
activities are better developed in large firms (Vossen, 1998: 89).
These opinions have been challenged especially since the 1980s when new 
evidence has shown the increasing importance of small firms. In the 1970s 
there was a marked revival of entrepreneurship in advanced market 
economies, which in the 1980s became more pronounced. New market
11
niches opened up giving the possibility for small firms to fill them. The 
absolute number of businesses witnessed a strong surge as did the number 
of self-employed. The 1985 Economic Report of the President of the United 
States identified the growth of small business as the engine of the economic 
surge in the first half of the 1980s in the United States (Acs, 1996: 45). 
The 1980s were also the period when the economic crisis in the socialist 
bloc dominated by huge conglomerates became more apparent. They were 
unable to take advantage of the new technologies. For Porter (1990: 125) 
innovation and entrepreneurship are nowadays at the heart of national 
economic advantage. Entrepreneurship contributes to economic growth 
through the formation of new firms and because of the innovative role it 
plays in economic life (Wennekers, Thurik and Buis, 1997: 21). High firm 
birth was found to be an important prerequisite, even if not a unique 
condition for economic growth. Studies on the correlation between start-ups 
and economic growth have demonstrated that while entrepreneurial activity 
is not a sufficient condition for economic development, economic 
development will not occur without entrepreneurial activity (Binks and 
Vale, 1990: 49; Reynolds, 1996: 11).
The declining importance of large corporations is attributed to the changing 
economic environment in many parts of the world, and specially in the 
industrialised countries. Piore and Sabel (1984: 183) have argued that the 
economic crisis of the 1970s was a consequence of the instability of 
markets, the anthitesis of the model of industrial development based on 
mass production. The economic stability that characterised the world 
economy up to the early 70's, more or less until the end of the Bretton- 
Woods agreement, was lost. Stable markets were necessary to allow the 
exploitation of mass production technologies used by large corporations. 
For Porter (1980) the shift from standardised goods usually provided by 
large firms towards more differentiated products and services which small 
firms are more capable of providing was a result of the rise in incomes. A 
much stronger demand evolved for higher quality and more differentiated 
services and products. The average life of a product - the product life cycle -
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shortened considerably. This favoured small firms which tend to be more 
responsive to market needs and more adaptable to change. Carlsson (1996: 
68-84) explains the shift to smaller firms as being due to the influence of 
two factors. The first is the fundamental changes which have occurred in the 
world economy since the 1970s: the intensification of global competition, 
the increase in the degree of uncertainty and the growth in market 
fragmentation. The second is the change in the character of technological 
progress. The cost of technology changed. With the advent of the micro­
computer, and micro-electronics, the small firm could easily purchase a 
computer. It is believed that the appearance of computer-based technology 
has allowed small companies to improve quality and productivity in 
comparison to the standardised mass technologies that had predominated 
earlier, thus opening up considerable entrepreneurial opportunities (D’ 
Andrea Tyson, Petrin and Rogers, 1994: 181). Scale economies are 
believed to have fallen in certain key industrial sectors (Karlsson, 
Johannisson and Storey, 1993: 6).
We can, therefore, say that there has been a shift in consumer demand and 
hence in basic business structures, and in some ways, this has favoured 
small firms. The previously held view that big is better for innovation was 
also reassessed. Link and Rees (1990: 30) came to the conclusion that, 
although large firms are more active in university-based research, small 
firms are more able to exploit their links with universities to generate 
innovations. They argue that the bureaucratic structure of large firms tends 
to obstruct innovative activity and slows down the process of launching 
new inventions in the market, while for Cohen and Klepper (1992: 793) 
even if large firms produce fewer innovations per dollar spent on R&D their 
innovations are on average of a higher quality. In effect, when innovation 
and patents filed are monitored being small seems to be an advantage. Acs 
and Audretsch (1987: 569) found the average innovation rate of small firms 
(calculated on the number of employees) to be 43% higher than that of large 
firms in 1982. They however, remarked that this does not imply that small 
firms are more innovative than larger ones. In their opinion, small and large
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firms are good at different types of innovation. In certain industries the 
small size represents an advantage in developing innovation. Small firms 
are better where economies of scale are not important and where they can 
exploit their flexibility and proximity to market demand. Large firms 
perform better in innovations which require economies of scale and a large 
team of specialists. For example, in computers and process control 
instruments small firms have demonstrated to be more innovative, while the 
opposite was true in the pharmaceutical preparation and photographic 
equipment industries (Acs, 1996: 31).
The shift in economic activity from large to small firms has been greater in 
manufacturing than in services or finance. In the United States between 
1976 and 1986 the share of employment of small firms increased in 
industry, but decreased in the other sectors and an analogous trend has been 
observed in most advanced market economies (Acs, 1996: 46). Over the 
period 1958-1968 in the United Kingdom the proportion of employment in 
industrial firms with up to 200 employees went down from 24% in 1958 to 
20.8% in 1968, but subsequently increased to 26.5% by 1983, while the 
productivity of this category of firms in terms of innovations has constantly 
increased since 1958 and in 1983 was 60% more than in 1958 (Monck and 
others, 1988: 42). Data for the years 1988-1993, referring to the EEC 
countries, point to a continuance of the trend towards smallness. The growth 
in employment has been particularly vigorous in micro enterprises, 
followed by small enterprises, while medium firms have lost workers and 
employment in large enterprises has remained on the same level (ENSR, 
1994: 12). There are, however, considerable differences regarding the 
importance of small and medium firms in the industrial world. Some 
countries have performed much better than others and even within the same 
country there are regions or sectors which have performed much better than 
others. Contributions of small and medium enterprises to GDP range 
from 34.9% in Germany (1988) to 61.8% in France (1990) (OECD, 1998a: 
20).
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In 1988 employment in small firms (with up to 100 employees) accounted 
for 45-60% of the total manufacturing employment in Italy, France and 
Japan, but only 18-28% in the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States 
and Sweden (Carlsson, 1996: 66) and regarding Germany and Sweden there 
is no indication that these differences are narrowing. In Italy, which already 
in the 1950s had one of the highest shares of employment in small 
manufacturing firms the trend has been upwards ever since, except for a 
very slight decrease in the 1960s. In Germany, which had one of the lowest 
shares in the 1950s, the trend was downwards till the 1970s and has 
subsequently stabilised. The United States, which had a share equivalent to 
Germany at the beginning of the 1950s (around 25%) witnessed an increase 
in the 1970s which became more pronounced in the 1980s, so that at the end 
of the 1980s its share was one and half times higher than the German one. 
Sweden represents an unique case since the shift to smallness has not 
occurred. Employment in small manufacturing firms crumbled in the 
1970s and had a negligible growth in the 1980s (Carlsson, 1996: 66). This 
might partly be due to the fact that it had a relatively high share in the 1950s 
(around 40%) - much higher than that of the United States, the United 
Kingdom or Germany.
The increase in importance of small business has prompted more attention 
to entrepreneurship fi-om policy makers, while in the past new business 
creation was thought to be rather unimportant generating mainly low value 
and transitory jobs. The emphasis was on attracting foreign investments and 
developing existing businesses (Deakins, Jennings and Mason, 1997: XII). 
The promotion of small business is justified by the externalities that this has 
on the economy: increased market competition, the considerable
contribution to innovation activity and the creation of new jobs. Small firms 
are also credited with creating much of the market turbulence that not only 
increases competition, but also provides a mechanism for regeneration 
(Beesley and Hamilton, 1984: 217-231). Four major areas of market failures 
are usually mentioned to justify the state’s small firm policy (Stanworth and 
Gray, 1991: 18):
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• the power of monopolies which impedes new entries into the market.
• the higher costs for small businesses in collecting and analysing 
information on market opportunities, sources of finance, etc.
• the fact that small firms are less able to diversify the risks and sustain 
the high initial costs incurred in the development of new products and 
innovation.
• the difficulty in obtaining finance.
On the effects of government policies in this area there is, however, ample 
debate. It is still not clear whether public policy can influence the factors 
which affect small business dynamics. The policies carried out in the 1980s 
in the United Kingdom were estimated by Storey (1994: 77) to have had 
only a relatively marginal impact, while the most powerful factors in his 
opinion were the structural changes which occurred in the economy, the 
high level of aggregate demand and the access to capital. This seems to 
confirm the view that given business opportunities, companies will emerge 
to take advantage of them. The role of the government would be simply to 
create an environment in which small business could develop, while 
refraining from a specific policy to promote entrepreneurship. However, for 
Eastern Europe where the market structures are emerging after decades of 
centralised economy there is a general consensus that a support structure is 
of fundamental importance (Brunner, 1993: 510; Gibb, 1993: 464; Arzeni, 
1996: 56). Brunner is convinced that government agencies have a vital role 
in establishing an effective network of support structures in the country.
1.2. MAIN ISSUES IN SMALL BUSINESS RESEARCH
The literature on entrepreneurship can be divided into 5 categories (Bull and 
Willard, 1993: 184) which will be analysed in the following pages:
• the debate on the definition of the word entrepreneur
• the study of the psychological traits of entrepreneurs
• the study of the influence of environmental factors on entrepreneurial 
actions
16
• the study of the creation of new enterprises
• the success strategies.
1.2.1. THE DEBATE ON THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
ENTREPRENEUR AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
A common definition of entrepreneurship and entrepreneur does not exist 
despite the fact that these terms have existed for two centuries. The 
definition, characteristics and role of the entrepreneur have been interpreted 
in different ways by countless scholars. In neo-classical economic theory 
there is little room for entrepreneurs. The logic of rational choice and 
perfect information means that the economy is characterised by an equality 
of price with marginal cost and therefore economic profits are absent. No 
single supplier or buyer can affect market functioning. This leaves no space 
for the initiative of the individual. However, this theory has not been found 
satisfactory by many scholars. Most of the theories on entrepreneurs 
assume that entrepreneurs recognise and act upon market opportunities, 
whose existence implies a state of market disequilibrium. This state of 
disequilibrium allows the exploiters of these opportunities to produce at a 
lower cost, while selling at the current price and thus earning a profit. It is 
impossible to list all definitions given in the economic literature. However, 
to summarise the different definitions, listed below are thirteen different 
roles which have been identified by Wennekers, Thurik and Buis (1997: 17) 
regarding entrepreneurs in the economic literature:
1. the person who assumes the risk associated with uncertainty (Knight)
2. the supplier of financial capital
3. an innovator (Schumpeter)
4. a decision maker
5. an industrial leader
6. a manager or a superintendent
7. an organiser and co-ordinator of economic resources (Babson)
8. the owner of an enterprise (Hawley)
9. an employer of factors of production
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10.a contractor
11.an arbitrageur (the Austrian school)
12.an allocator of resources among alternative uses (Hawley)
13.the person who realises a start-up of a new business (Gartner and Low 
and McMillan).
In general, each view encompasses some aspects of what entrepreneurship 
is. Some can be considered complementary, rather than competitive. The 
broadest definition encompasses any individual economic activity, even 
self-employment on a part-time basis and associates entrepreneurship also 
with existing enterprises. A first restriction can be to consider only full-time 
self-employment. A further restriction is to identify with this term only 
firms which create jobs for others. This definition can exclude family 
production firms and service activities such as restaurants. More restricted 
interpretations refer only to major changes in productive or economic 
activity as entrepreneurial. Another criterion refers to the growth rate: only 
enterprises with high growth rates can be considered entrepreneurial. In this 
section I distinguish between the main definitions which have been 
provided so far.
The definition of the entrepreneur as an innovator is linked to Schumpeter 
who identified entrepreneurship as “carrying out new combinations” 
(Schumpeter, 1934: 74). The entrepreneur takes advantage of technological 
changes to create new combinations of resources. It follows from this that 
the rate of entrepreneurship is determined by rates of technological change. 
Innovation and entrepreneurship have been inter-linked since Schumpeter. 
In his opinion (Schumpeter, 1947: 132) “the function of an entrepreneur is 
to reform or revolutionise the pattern of production by exploiting an 
invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for 
producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by 
opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, 
or by reorganising an industry and so on”, but as the entrepreneurial 
function is performed he ceases to be considered an entrepreneur. His
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definition is, therefore, quite narrow as the entrepreneur “loses his character 
as soon as he has built up his business”. In his conception the entrepreneur 
has a key role in the economy since he is the cause of economic 
development. The innovations produced by entrepreneurs are, if successful, 
a source of extraordinary profits for a temporary period of time. When 
imitators finally reduce profits margins this gives rise to reorganisation of 
production and the closure of inefficient, non-innovating firms. This process 
of creative destruction is, in the opinion of Schumpeter, the cause of the 
cyclical fluctuations in the economy.
Other theorists viewed the entrepreneur as somebody who takes risks and 
reduces uncertainty rather than as a creator of innovation. The entrepreneur 
is an individual who makes decisions in conditions of uncertainty. This 
condition of uncertainty and change makes the entrepreneur a key actor in 
the economy. Knight (as quoted by Low and MacMillan, 1988: 140) 
defined entrepreneurship as the ability to predict the future successfully. 
Similarly Hawley (1893: 478) considered the entrepreneur to be the 
individual who owns the output of an organisation and, therefore, endures 
the uncertainty of the output. In his conception ownership rights are a 
necessary condition for engaging in entrepreneurial activity since they allow 
the entrepreneur to make decisions regarding the co-ordination of resources. 
An opposite view is held by Babson (as quoted by Timmons, 1990: 5) who 
sees entrepreneurship as “the process of creating or seizing an opportunity 
and pursuing it regardless of the resources currently controlled”.
Kirzner (1982: 273) of the Austrian school considered the entrepreneur to 
be the individual who arbitrages imperfect information. He is more alert 
than the others in perceiving profit opportunities. His best known case for 
illustrating alertness is that of the arbitrageur who finds the opportunity to 
buy at low prices and resell at higher prices. For the Austrian school 
opportunities for entrepreneurial activity crop up continuously so that new 
combinations of resources can be arranged to fill market gaps and 
monopoly profits can be reaped temporarily.
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For the Austrians an entrepreneur is the founder of a new firm regardless of 
the fact that it is innovative or not, while for Schumpeter he is somebody 
who transforms inventions and ideas into economically viable entities 
whether or not in the course of doing so he creates or operates a firm. For 
the latter the entrepreneur causes change of factor allocation, while for the 
former he responds to a requirement for that reallocation. Recognising these 
opportunities entrepreneurs move the market toward equilibrium (Kirzner 
1982: 273-4; Mises 1949: 295) according to the Austrian school, while 
Schumpeter saw them as disequilibrators.
Another category of entrepreneurs is described by Leibenstein as somebody 
causing improvements of a gradual nature to existing products and 
processes. They are the agent of change themselves rather than responding 
to market signals, but in a more gradual manner compared with 
Schumpeter. He says that firms have a certain degree of inefficiency called 
X-inefficiency in the utilisation of resources inside the firm. The greater the 
X-inefficiency within an industry the greater the opportunities for 
entrepreneurs. In his opinion entrepreneurship is the ability to work smarter 
and harder than the competitors as firms do not necessarily fully exploit 
their production capacity (Leibenstein, 1978).
Another definition has been given by Cole (as quoted by Low and 
MacMillan, 1988: 140) who interpreted entrepreneurship as meaning 
purposeful activity to initiate, maintain, and develop a profit-oriented 
business, while Gartner (1985: 697) and Low and MacMillan (1988: 141) 
defined entrepreneurship as the creation of new organisations and new 
enterprises respectively. In the opinion of the latter entrepreneurship 
research must try to explain and facilitate the role of new enterprises in 
furthering economic progress. A larger and more detailed definition of 
entrepreneurship is proposed by Wennekers, Thurik and Buis (1997: 54) 
who describe it as: “the ability and willingness of individuals, both on their 
own and within organisations to:
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• perceive and create new economic opportunities (new products, new 
production methods, new organisational schemes and new product- 
market combinations);
• introduce their ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other 
obstacles, by making decisions on location, form and the use of 
resources and institutions;
• compete with others for a share of the market.”
Their definition encompasses not only persons who start a small firm, but 
also corporate entrepreneurs working in large firms. Similarly Drucker 
(1985: 20) considers entrepreneurship not confined to new business but 
connected with the nature of business activity. An existing enterprise can be 
entrepreneurial by creating something new.
In view of the great number of interpretations of the word entrepreneur, it is 
necessary to define the meaning used in my research. Entrepreneurs here are 
defined as creators of new firms. Special attention has been paid to 
innovation because of the importance of science in the St. Petersburg’s 
economy.
1.2.2. PERSONALITY TRAITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
There is ample literature on the entrepreneurial personality. Case studies of 
entrepreneurs have tried to identify certain traits which distinguish them 
from the rest of the population. The simplest theory suggests that it is the 
possession by individuals of certain traits which predispose them towards 
enterprising behaviour: powerful personalities, a strong need for 
achievement, the belief that they can determine their fate through their own 
behaviour (locus of control), a strong inclination towards risk taking. Other 
motivations for becoming an entrepreneur are thought to be the desire to be 
autonomous, have personal freedom (which as an employee is impossible to 
achieve), self-fulfilment, money and need for power (Huuskonen, 1993: 
44-46).
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Risk bearing or risk taking behaviour is considered a major aspect of 
entrepreneurship (Garland and others, 1984; Casson, 1995: 105). There 
have been a number of empirical studies on risk taking, but the results are 
frequently contradictory. Entrepreneurs have been often regarded as high 
risk takers, but more recent research has challenged this vision of 
entrepreneurs, saying that they resemble more or less the general population 
(Low and MacMillan, 1988: 147; Brockhaus, 1982: 47). According to Low 
and MacMillan (1988: 147) the entrepreneur can be seen as a moderate risk 
taker who has the capacity to minimise the risk in situations that others 
might see as highly risky, while the Durham Business School describes him 
as a calculated risk taker who assesses situations thoroughly and does not 
pursue options which he considers to have a small probability of success 
(Bridge, O’Neill and Cromie, 1998: 44). Equally contradictory is the 
evidence that there is a difference between entrepreneurs and other 
compared groups regarding the need for achievement and locus of control 
(Brockhaus 1982: 43-44; Gartner, 1985: 699; Sexton and Bowman, 1985: 
131-132). In fact, it is difficult to isolate some traits characterising the 
entrepreneurial population because some characteristics normally associated 
with entrepreneurs, like high need for achievement, could also be valid for 
successful managers, professionals and salespeople and because, as Gartner 
(as quoted by Low and MacMillan, 1988: 148) observed, there is probably 
as much difference among entrepreneurs as between entrepreneurs and non­
entrepreneurs.
Indeed, as emphasised by several authors there are completely different 
types of entrepreneurs depending on the sector in within they are involved. 
Using personality traits, researchers have tried to identify different types of 
entrepreneurs. The literature on entrepreneurial typologies mainly focuses 
on two typologies: opportunists and craftsmen (Chandler, 1983: 55; 
Davidsson, 1988: 101). Opportunists are, for example, the founders of new- 
technology-based firms, who are usually between thirty and forty years old, 
have at least one degree, are career oriented and achievement motivated.
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Craftsmen are, instead, as a norm single owner-managers, poorly educated 
with little or no managerial experience and little inclination towards taking 
risks. Their businesses tend to be less adaptable to change and to have lower 
growth rates, usually because they have no ambition to make them larger. 
They mainly carry out entrepreneurial activity in order to achieve 
independence and autonomy, while giving less importance to earnings. 
These are the most common typologies utilised, but other authors have 
distinguished more than two types. Dunkelberg and Cooper (1982; 4-6) 
identify the “craftsmen oriented”, the “growth oriented” and the 
“independence oriented”, while Stanworth and Curran (1973: 97-99) 
identify three categories, the first of which corresponds to the craftsmen. 
The other two are:
• the classical entrepreneur who starts a business attracted by the 
possibility of making large earnings without or with an element of 
growth.
• the managerial entrepreneur who sees entrepreneurial activity as a 
method to earn a good income and reach an higher social status. He is 
interested in seeking recognition for managerial excellence.
Another area of the research on personality traits has sought to find out 
whether there is a correlation between the personality traits associated with 
entrepreneurs and the success of their firms. Some authors have argued 
that personality factors are not sufficient for entrepreneurial success, but 
that entrepreneurial success is to a good deal correlated with experience in 
start-ups and/or in a relevant line of business. The importance of 
experience in the relevant field is corroborated by several studies (Roure 
and Maidique, 1986: 304; Cooper and Bruno, 1977: 22), while evidence 
that certain personality traits predispose people to entrepreneurial success is 
mixed. Some studies found a positive correlation between certain 
personality traits and firm survival while others did not find any 
(Brockhaus, 1982: 45; Cooper and Gascon: 1992: 309; Miner, Smith and 
Bracker, 1989: 559).
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Given the difficulty in finding common ground recently scholars have come 
to judge the search for entrepreneurial traits as rather unproductive^ 
(Ronstadt, Peterson and Vesper, 1986: XIV). In addition, the reliability of 
these studies has been put in doubt by Low and MacMillan (1988: 148) on 
the grounds that samples are rarely representative of the entrepreneurial 
population due to a bias towards successful entrepreneurs, and that the 
observed entrepreneurial traits may be the product of entrepreneurial 
experience. Although attempts to stereotype entrepreneurs have been 
largely discredited it has been recognised that entrepreneurial personalities 
have important influences on the organisations they create (Schein, 1983).
While the desire to create a business was assumed to be inherent in the 
individual in the earlier studies, further research has pointed to the 
importance of experience and culture in addition to personality and 
motivation (Birley, 1989: 9-10). One of the most comprehensive 
frameworks which takes into account the various factors influencing 
entrepreneurs’ decisions has been provided by Cooper (1981: 40). These 
factors have been divided into three groups:
• the entrepreneur, including the many aspects of his background which 
affect his motivation, his perceptions, and his skills and knowledge.
• the organisation for which the entrepreneur had previously been 
working, whose characteristics influence the location and the nature of 
new firms, as well as the likelihood of spin-offs.
• various environmental factors external to the individual and his 
organisation, which make the climate more or less favourable to the 
starting of a new firm.
Liles (1981: 41-43) argues that personality factors may be necessary 
conditions for engaging in entrepreneurial activity, but they are not 
sufficient. Whether individuals finally feel capable or not of starting a 
business depends on work experience matured, career stage and the 
perceived risks which are strongly correlated with family and domestic
 ^ This conclusion was based on a survey of researchers at the 1986 Babson College
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responsibilities. For this reason the life period which presents the greatest 
opportunities for entrepreneurial activity is between twenty-five and thirty- 
five years. The background of most entrepreneurs tends to be a family firm, 
the existence of entrepreneurs in the family (Du Brin, 1984) and/or work 
experience in small businesses. In almost all the studies carried out on the 
backgrounds of entrepreneurs it was found that their father or a close 
relative was also an entrepreneur. The experience of working in a small 
business or the example of close relatives helps to create in the person a 
favourable attitude towards entrepreneurship. Attitudes such as the personal 
conception of the risk involved in starting an activity are assumed to be 
influenced by the attitude of the group with which one identifies 
(Huuskonen, 1993: 45).
Bearse (1982: 92) also considers the culture of the community to be 
important for entrepreneurship. Some cultures are believed to be more 
entrepreneurial than others. McClelland (1961: 64 and 105) associates 
entrepreneurial activity and as a consequence economic growth with the 
frequency of achievement themes in the local culture. He, therefore, 
propounds that need for achievement is culturally acquired. He came to the 
conclusion on the basis of historical and cross-cultural studies that 
economic growth was correlated with the frequency with which 
achievement themes appeared in popular stories and literature especially 
those meant to be read by children. His findings point out that a high level 
of achievement imagery in children stories would translate into a period of 
economic growth in about three decades time. McClelland demonstrated 
the importance of achievement theory by comparing two groups: one which 
had received achievement motivation education and another which had not 
received it. The first produced a higher supply of entrepreneurs than the 
second group.
The importance of the culture of the community is emphasised by the 
existence of areas with a high level of entrepreneurship and areas with very
Entrepreneurship Research Conference.
25
little activity in this field. Research undertaken for Scottish enterprise 
concerning the low participation rates in entrepreneurship showed that one 
of the factors contributing to low entrepreneurial activity was the 
“dependency culture” due to the historical dependence of the population on 
a limited number of large employers (Deakins, 1996: 15). Wiener (1981: 
131) implies that the weaker economic growth in Great Britain compared 
with the other advanced countries can be at least partially emphasised by 
the different attitude towards entrepreneurship. While in the USA Henry 
Ford was a folk hero, in Great Britain successful entrepreneurs stirred little 
emotion. In the opinion of Birch (1987: 99-104) small business has a 
weaker role in Europe compared with the United States due to over­
regulation and to the fact that entrepreneurs have a lower rank in society 
than employees in large organisations and in government, while in the 
United States the dislike of authority plus the pragmatism of the society 
represents a favourable environment for enterprise creation.
The entrepreneurial climate may, however, undergo substantial changes 
over time. McClelland’s (1975) research on the need for achievement 
indicated large variations of this characteristic in societies over periods 
longer than ten years. A major shift in entrepreneurial values seems to 
have taken place in the United States in the early 1970s. This could be one 
of the reasons for the spurt in entrepreneurial activity taking place fi’om the 
1970s onwards. The annual survey conducted on college freshmen by the 
UCLA^ found a large variation of response between the period 1966-1972 
and 1972-1990 regarding the questions on the importance “being successful 
in their own business” and “being well-off financially”, while during the 
period 1972-1990 variations were much smaller in comparison with the 
previous period (Gartner and Shane, 1995: 290). The role of personality and 
culture in the formulation of entrepreneurship will be discussed in the 
Russian context in a subsequent section of this chapter.
 ^University o f California at Los Angeles
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1.2.3. THE STUDY OF THE CREATION OF NEW ENTERPRISES
While the previous approach looks at the influence of factors such as work 
experience, culture, motivation and personality on the creation of new firms 
other approaches look at the market conditions which favour new firm 
creation.
The industrial organisation approach looks at the effects that the structure of 
industry exerts in attracting and deterring entry. For industrial economists a 
supply of entrants is assumed to be given. Their interest is in which sector 
and under which circumstances entry takes place, which are the 
characteristics of market structure which facilitate or impede entry and the 
impact that entry has upon prices. Labour market economists, instead, 
analyse the creation of new enterprises as a decision exercised by the 
individual in the context of the labour market. They evaluate the relative 
importance of push-pull factors.
In general the factors influencing the creation of new enterprises are divided 
into two categories: push and pull. The first refers to environmental 
imperatives which force people to become entrepreneurs involuntarily such 
as the lack of alternative employment opportunities, while the latter indicate 
changes in industry such as a demand for additional goods and services, 
which create new market opportunities leading to higher levels of 
entrepreneurship.
In theory the greater the rate of industry change, the more opportunities are 
created in an industry and the greater the rate of entrepreneurship within the 
industry (Dean, Mayer and DeCastro, 1993: 53). Knight, Dowling and 
Brown (1987: 152) studying the automobile, semiconductor, vacuum tube 
and airline industries came to the conclusion that the creation of new firms 
is influenced by a variety of factors such as new technology, new markets, 
deregulation or shifts in government regulation, life cycles and
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environmental conditions, while Dean, Meyer and DeCastro (1993: 52) 
indicated 5 possible sources of market change:
• increase in demand
• modification in demand
• technology development
• new sources of supply
• political/regulatory change.
The effects of an increase in demand results in the creation of opportunities 
to capture the new demand. At the same time new entrants are also attracted 
by increased profit expectations as the additional capacity will affect prices 
less. The second type of change - a modification of products desired by 
consumers - creates new niches. It is commonly assumed that the larger the 
change in demand the greater the opportunities. Technological 
development is divided into product and process innovation. Product 
innovation can result in new niches or new industries while process 
innovation leads to more efficient methods of production making it possible 
to produce a given product at lower costs. A reduction in costs may also be 
achieved through the utilisation of new sources of supply. 
Political/regulatory change can be of minor importance (i.e. concession of 
higher or lower tax breaks for specific processes) or major significance, as 
in the case of de-monopolisation of an industry.
The outcome of these changes can be either the creation of new companies 
to exploit these opportunities, or a move by existing firms, or neither if no 
firms take advantage of these opportunities. The extent to which 
opportunities will be exploited depends on the relative strength of the 
constraints on existing firms due to their organisational inertia, and on the 
creation of new firms. The latter are called barriers to entry. Existing firms 
tend to be inertial in responding to change as the bureaucratic organisation 
that these firms usually have is not conducive to change. Stinchcombe 
(1965: 155) said enterprises have a tendency to become institutionalised and 
that the basic structures of organisations remain relatively stable in the long
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run. Barriers to entry to new firms are mainly represented by plant location, 
product differentiation, economies of scale and excess capacity (Dean, 
Meyer and DeCastro, 1993: 54). Other entry barriers can be government 
regulation, access to distribution channels and proprietary knowledge (Dean 
and Meyer, 1996: 114). Product differentiation has been described by Bain 
(1956: 216) as the strongest barrier to entry. It can be the result of the 
popularity of brand names, company reputation and control of favoured 
distribution channels. Advertising, which is considered to be an indicator of 
product differentiation, is believed to be a barrier to entry, the impact of 
which is in line with its intensity. The existence of significant economies 
of scale may entail that few potential entrants can find the necessary capital 
to produce at the minimum efficient scale. The result can be a highly 
concentrated market where the participants collude to thwart the activities 
of new-firm entrants (Dean, Meyer and DeCastro, 1993: 55). Excess 
capacity within an industry may deter entry because of the effects that a 
new entrant will have on price and profitability.
There are several studies analysing the relative strengths of these pull-push 
factors and the importance of the barriers to entry, but according to 
Audretsch (1993: 41) the major weakness of most studies is that they do not 
take into consideration new firm formation, but focus on net entry the 
difference between firm births and deaths or, if they focus on new entries, 
they do not differentiate new firm start-ups from all entrants. It is clear that 
a situation in which net entry is very small compared with the total number 
of entities can be the result of a large number of entries and exits. Dean and 
Meyer (1996: 123) -  one of the few who focus on new firm creation -, 
analysing a large sample of U.S. manufacturing industries in the 1970s, 
found that capital requirements and industry concentration were negatively 
correlated to the formation of new enterprises, while R&D intensity, niche 
dynamism and sales growth had a powerful effect on new firm creation. 
Little evidence was found that advertising and excess capacity represent a 
barrier to entry. According to their findings the positive opportunities 
represented by R&D intensity turned out to be stronger than the constraints
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represented by the capital requirement barrier. This supports the theory that 
the greater the changes the greater the opportunities and therefore the 
creation of new ventures. Two variables such as vertical integration and 
failure to invest in new capital which are usually associated with inertial 
behaviour of existing firms and therefore higher rates of new firm creation 
were found to have had this effect. Orr (1974; 65) came to similar 
conclusions regarding the impact of the various barriers to entry except for 
advertisement spending which according to his findings turned out to 
represent a strong barrier to entry, while on this point Vivarelli (1991: 222) 
agrees with Dean and Meyer. Audretsch (1993: 49) in another study did not 
find evidence of push factors in the creation of new manufacturing firms in 
the United States, which was found to be largely related to expectations of 
increased profitability. Daen and Meyer (1996: 128) also came to the 
conclusion that demand factors are the prime determinants of new firm 
formation in manufacturing industries, rather than push factors.
However, factors which are found to be of little significance in one country 
may be much more important in another and the same can be said of 
different industrial sectors (Karlsson, Johannisson and Storey, 1993: 14). 
Hence, rates of formation of new firms may vary considerably from one 
sector to another, from one period to another and from one country or 
region to another (Storey, 1994: 76)
In addition to the above-mentioned factors two more conditions can be 
identified as having a strong effect on the creation of new firms:
• resource availability
• networks.
The first mainly refers to the availability of different types of input 
resources: premises, finance and human. Finance, especially, is commonly 
regarded as critical for small business development (Gibb, 1993: 46), A 
major stumbling block for the concession of loans to small businesses is the
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request for collateral that many firms are unable to provide and the low 
inclination of bank managers to take risks.
Regarding the second point, the efficacy of networks is well documented in 
entrepreneurship literature. In theory, both the formal (banks, accountants, 
lawyers, associations) and informal networks (family, friends, business) are 
believed to influence the nature of the firm substantially (Birley, 1985: 
107), but while there is strong evidence regarding the second point, on the 
first point the evidence is weaker. Birley (1985: 113-114) in her study of 
start-ups in an American town found that informal contacts, mainly in the 
form of business contacts, are seen to be the most helpful in assembling the 
elements of the business. Family and friends are the most useful in local 
issues like the search for premises and employees, while formal sources are 
much less utilised. Only the bank was mentioned with regularity. According 
to Aldrich and Zimmer (1986: 20) social networks not only influence the 
decisions of the single entrepreneur, but also the total supply. Similarly 
Vesper (as quoted by Birley, 1985: 105) found that contacts are usually the 
main source of new firm ideas. This probably explains why areas with many 
small manufacturing firms usually have high rates of new manufacturing 
firm formation (Storey, 1994: 71). MacMillan (1983: 10-12) goes as far as 
to say that building contacts and networks is one of the most important 
factors affecting the success of any firm. The existence of networks of 
firms characterised by regular contacts and co-operation among themselves 
is thought to be one of the best ways to solve their problems. Different 
kinds of networks may originate among firms. A network can be horizontal 
- made up of similar firms who might share the R&D burden, the costs of 
expensive equipment, or take part in common projects - or it can be vertical, 
consisting of firms not necessarily of the same sector which, for example, 
carry out complementary activities in the development of a new product. A 
third kind of network is the knowledge network, aimed at solving common 
problems or exchanging market information (Arzeni and Pellegrini, 1997: 
28).
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The importance of mutual contact and collaboration is underlined by the 
development of industrial districts which are conglomerations or networks 
of many hundreds, sometimes thousands, of small firms in one particular 
industrial sector, in one industry, where these small firms concentrate in 
particular activities. In the opinion of Bianchi (1992: 100-101) the Italian 
model of industrial districts would be appropriate for the reconstruction of 
industrial sectors in Eastern Europe. These are characterised by extensive 
inter-firm division of labour, strong productive specialisation, frequent co­
operation and consultation between firms. Similarly, Silicon Valley 
continues to be a centre of innovation partly due to the fact that through 
inter-firm networks it is possible to spread the expenses and risks involved 
in developing new technologies and foster reciprocal innovation among 
specialist firms (Saxenian, 1991: 279). While the vertically integrated 
model of computer production dominated in the post-war period, in Silicon 
Valley nowadays firms are able to cope with the rise in costs of product 
development and the rapid technological change by remaining highly 
focused on their core business, facilitated by the possibility of relying on a 
network of suppliers. Problems regarding the development of new products 
are solved through collaboration among firms and their suppliers According 
to Saxenian (1991: 290) “technical expertise in Silicon Valley today is 
spread across hundreds of specialist enterprises which continue to develop 
independent capabilities while simultaneously learning from one another”.
1.2.4. SUCCESS STRATEGIES
Two theories are predominant in analysing the behaviour of firms: the 
strategic adaptation perspective and the population ecology perspective. The 
strategic adaptation perspective puts at the centre of its focus the capability 
of the entrepreneur to influence the nature of an organisation’s activity and 
its results. The success of individual entrepreneurs is, therefore, correlated 
with their decisions: the ability of the entrepreneur to identify opportunities, 
develop strategies, assemble resources and take initiatives. The focus of 
this perspective is the detection of the policies and strategies for the
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development of business and their ensuing translation into managerial 
action. A key success factor is believed by some researchers to be how 
quickly the entrepreneur can adapt and learn from the experience of dealing 
with his environment (University of Glasgow, 1983: 12). Although there is 
among the followers of the strategic adaptation perspective a wide variation 
in opinions (Timmons, 1982: 132) there are some recurrent themes that are 
considered to be the basis for entrepreneurial success: the importance of an 
entrepreneur with the capacity to lead, building a team with complementary 
skills, and a well made business plan.
While this theory was widely accepted in the past, the population ecology 
perspective recently has challenged some of its assumptions. This relatively 
new approach considers environmental selection procedures to be the most 
powerful determining factor in the survival of business organisations (Low 
and MacMillan, 1988: 142). This perspective views inertia as the dominant 
organisational characteristic and criticises the strategic adaptation school for 
overemphasising the capacity of an organisation to adapt to a changing 
environment. In their conception organisations which are well-adapted to 
their environment survive, while those which are less so tend to perish. The 
environment is, therefore, all important and there is little the entrepreneur 
can do. Some subsequent interpretations of this approach have conceded 
that the organisation can learn from experience, but still attribute a 
dominant role to the environment. As the focus of this theory is premised on 
the entire population of firms, it does not provide any practical advice for 
business executives. It tries to forecast the trend in industries on the basis 
of historical data sets. This theory has, however, been criticised for having 
little success in doing so. According to Bygrave (1993: 260) it has not 
been able to predict future births and closures in any industry. Its practical 
use in explaining economic changes seems therefore to be limited.
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1.3. THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE LATER PERIOD OF THE 
SOVIET UNION
Liberalisation of private economic activity was initiated by the law on 
individual labour activity adopted in 1986. This law was enacted in order to 
legalise family businesses, mainly in the service sector, but it had little real 
impact. A total of 168,100 people had exploited this opportunity by spring 
1988. The only kind of businesses allowed were restaurants, dressmaking 
and auto repair. The categories were, however, progressively enlarged 
during the following years.
The next step was the law on co-operatives approved in 1987. This law was 
aimed at students, housewives and pensioners in the field of consumer 
goods production and consumer services^. In theory, people who had 
employment could work in co-operatives only in their free time, as co­
operatives were not expected to lure away workers from their occupations 
in state firms. According to this law, common property rights were to be 
given to people sharing the same work obligations, while the hiring of 
employees was not contemplated, but the law was exploited by a much 
wider group of people in a much wider sphere (Chepurenko, Avilova and 
Pripisnov, 1995: 11). Already in 1987 co-operatives working outside the 
sphere of activity sanctioned by the law were appearing in the Soviet Union.
The aim of the law was to exploit the non-utilised resources in the Soviet 
system, especially to increase the provision of consumer goods which were 
in short supply in the Soviet Union, rather than being a first step towards a 
progressive liberalisation of economic activity. Co-operatives were still 
envisaged as an integral part of the socialist system. However, progressive 
liberalisation took place in the following years. While in the first period co­
operatives were permitted as a part of the existing system, from 1990 
onwards they became part of the drive towards the market. Some 
restrictions were removed as early as 1988, when co-operatives were
 ^For example: hair-dressing, dry-cleaning, household and appliance repair services.
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allowed to engage in any economic sphere. In the same year the law on 
enterprises came into force, allowing greater freedom to state managers. On 
1 January 1988, state enterprises became subject to some of the same 
market considerations that applied to private enterprises: profits, job 
performance, and decentralisation. Production targets were replaced with 
state orders, which were planned to cover less than half the production 
capacity, but still represented 75% of total output in 1990 (IMF, WB, 
OECD and EBRD, 1991, vol.2: 17). The law on lease holding in 1989 
opened the way for the purchase of state property; and by the decree of the 
USSR (no. 790 dated 8 August 1990) "On Measures for the Creation and 
Development of Small Enterprises", both individual and legal entities were 
allowed to start small enterprises and employ labour (with limitations) in all 
sectors of the economy. In 1991 the creation of companies with limited 
liability was also permitted (law "On Enterprise and Entrepreneurial 
Activity"). An effect of these laws was the creation of small spin-offs from 
state enterprises, as private firms enjoyed much more freedom of price and 
wage formation and less administrative control over their activities. Some 
spin-offs served to transfer funds illegally from state firms to private 
businesses owned by the management of state companies (Gibb, 1995: 3). 
Spontaneous privatisation was often carried out in a semi-legal manner and 
abuses were common. Managers and workers utilised state funds to set up 
new private ventures. State managers would lease at a price of their choice 
the equipment of the enterprise they managed to a co-operative that they 
helped set up. If officials in higher echelons of power were responsible for 
controlling the specific enterprise activity, they were brought into the co­
operative. A very easy way to make money was exploiting the price 
differences between the state and private sectors. As the setting of free 
prices was permitted in the non-state sector, while fixed prices were 
maintained in the state sector, a two-tier economy began to emerge. In 
October 1989 the Supreme Soviet forbade co-operatives from buying state 
goods with the purpose of reselling them and allowed local soviets to fix 
maximum prices for co-operative products, but these rules were relaxed in 
the spring of 1990.
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State policy towards co-operatives was ambivalent, characterised by 
forward and backward steps, due to the suspicion they aroused in large 
segments of the ruling party. Initially they were conceded a lower rate of 
taxation compared with state firms, but in the last quarter of 1988 taxes 
were raised, while since 1991 they have been taxed at the same rate as state 
firms. The law on co-operatives gave ample powers to local bodies which 
were charged with issuing licences necessary to carry out any activity. As 
the law stated what was allowed, implying that the rest was forbidden, these 
bodies had ample room for discretion. Local bodies often used their 
licensing power to restrict the number of workers in co-operatives, 
frequently establishing a regional maximum number of employees and 
refusing to issue licences. The frequent abuses committed did not help. Co­
operatives were accused of diverting supplies from the official channels and 
exploiting scarcities in order to charge very high prices. Their activity was 
deemed by many as the cause of the increasing shortages of goods, 
although, ironically, these shortages had been the very reason why they 
were sanctioned in the first place. They were also accused of breaching the 
socialist principle of full employment by making some workers redundant. 
In spite of the fact that they were intended to employ pensioners, 
housewives and students, they attracted skilled workers, thereby 
aggravating the labour supply problems of state firms. Despite all these 
difficulties, the environment for small business in the Soviet period had 
some favourable aspects compared with the later years. It was relatively 
easy to obtain bank loans, import competition was low, and many niches 
not filled by the state sector were open to exploitation. Most co-operatives 
received loans as start-up capital (Ivanova and Shashnov, 1991: 60). These 
advantages disappeared following the implementation of “shock therapy”.
Co-operatives, which had started to come to the market as early as 1987, 
enjoyed strong growth in 1988, 1989 and 1990. 1988 was a boom year for 
co-operatives, which by the end of the year employed 1,392,000 people, 
nine times more than twelve months earlier, while their number grew from
36
13,900 to 77,500 (Goskomstat, 1988: 178). In 1989 the number of co­
operatives grew two and half times to almost 200,000 and the number of 
people employed three and half times (Goskomstat, 1989: 193). Their total 
number reached 245,000 in 1990, employing slightly more than 6 million 
people (Goskomstat, 1991: 55). and accounting for 5-10% of GDP (IMF, 
WB, OECD and EBRD, 1991, vol.2: 17). They were particularly prominent 
in the Baltic Republics and Armenia. The share of employment in private 
firms (broadly defined, including enterprises using equipment leased from 
state firms) reached about 15% in 1991 (Hughes and Butler, 1993: 274). By 
1991, 11% of industrial workers worked for enterprises operating under 
leasing. They produced 13% of industrial output (Hughes and Butler, 1993: 
280). The great majority of industrial co-operatives originated from plants 
or work units in existing state enterprises (IMF, WB, OECD and EBRD, 
1991, vol.2; 18). About four-fifths are estimated to have been sponsored by 
state enterprises (Ivanova and Shashnov, 1991: 48). Only a negligible 
proportion of the co-operatives were created from scratch, and these were 
mostly service, rather than industrial firms (Ivanova and Shashnov, 1991: 
59). Co-operatives were mostly engaged in the production of consumer 
goods, housing construction, communal services and consumer services. In 
1990 manufacturing and construction formed 49% of total co-operative 
output (IMF, WB, OECD and EBRD, 1991, vol.2: 17), a percentage which 
has changed little in the small business sector in recent years.
The contribution made by co-operatives to the Soviet economy is hard to 
evaluate. Some were able to produce goods more efficiently than their state 
counterparts, while in some cases the creation of co-operatives served only 
to evade price controls and to award bigger salaries to their founders, 
without any change in production methods, and some had a detrimental 
effect on the economy as the managers sold off the main assets of the 
enterprise to enrich themselves. The expectation that co-operatives would 
fill the niches not served by state enterprises was not realised. The 
appearance of co-operatives did not bring about an improvement in the 
deficits of the Soviet economy which, instead, worsened. Presumably co­
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operatives played a part in this, by diverting scarce goods from state to 
private outlets. While they were designed to increase the supply of 
consumer goods to the population, most of their output was bought by other 
enterprises (87%), and only 13% by the population, as of July 1990 
(Ivanova and Shashnov, 1991: 31). In the end, the experiment with co­
operatives, instead of bringing about the results expected by the Soviet 
leadership, was one of the factors which accelerated the collapse of the 
planned economy. It did not provide a “jumping o ff’ point for the 
development of small business,
1.4. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING 
TRANSITION
In Eastern Europe the small business sector was very small in the 
communist period compared with advanced market economies, even if 
there was a thriving black economy, so a strong growth in this sector was 
expected once the planned economy had been dismantled. The 
entrepreneurial class was eliminated, along with the institutions of private 
property, when the communists ascended to power, and the bureaucracy did 
not allow the entry of new firms in order to maintain the centralisation of 
control over economic assets. The industrial structure was based on the idea 
of reaping economies of scale from the production of standardised 
products. Product differentiation was considered wasteful and contrary to 
principles of socialist equality. This resulted in a legacy of extensive 
industrial concentration with a excessive dependence on outmoded heavy 
industry. In contrast with the trend experienced in Western Europe, the 
share of manufacturing output accounted for by large firms continued to 
increase in Eastern Europe until the 1980s, while the small firms’ 
employment share was reduced to almost zero except in the few countries 
(mainly Poland and Hungary) where a small private sector was tolerated 
within the constraints of the planned system (Acs, 1996: 15). In 
Czechoslovakia small firms’ contribution to total industrial employment fell 
from 13% in 1956 to 1.4% in 1986 and the average number of employees
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per firm rose from 1,121 to 3,102 (Tschechoslowakei in Zhalen und Fakten 
reported by Sexton and Kasarda, 1992: 158).
TABLE 1.1
The share of small and medium enterprises in manufacturing employment
Country Year Small firms 
employment 
share (%)
Year Small firms 
employment 
share (%)
Change
UK 1979 30.1 1986 39.9 -t-9.8
West Germany 1970 54.8 1987 57.9 +3.1
USA 1976 33.4 1987 35.2 +1.9
Netherlands^ 1978 36.1 1986 39.9 +3.8
Portugal 1982 68.3 1986 71.8 +3.5
Italy^ North 1981 44.3 1987 55.2 +10.9
South 1981 61.4 1987 68.4 +7.0
Czechoslovakia 1954 13.0 1988 1.4 -11.6
East Germany 1986 1.1
Poland^ 1937 33.0 1985 10.0 -23.0
' a small and medium firm is defined as a firm having fewer than 500 employees, unless 
stated otherwise.
 ^these figures refer to firms with fewer than 100 employees.
 ^these figures refer to firms with up to 200 employees.
Source: Acs, 1996: 14.
Despite the key role small business was assumed to have in the
restructuring of the former planned economies (the absorbing of labour 
released by state industries, increase in market dynamism, the re-orientation 
and modernisation of the distorted économie structure, introduction of new 
technologies, etc.) the transition proeess in Eastern Europe has, however, 
been characterised by limited attention to the emergence of
entrepreneurship. In addition to their role in economic development,
privately owned businesses -  particularly micro and small-scale enterprises 
-  are also vital in helping establish new democratic principles and
institutions in the former communist world. Private enterprises ean provide 
the jobs and income for an emerging middle class that will help to sustain 
reforms. The emphasis of policy makers was mainly on macroeconomic 
issues - inflation, a convertible currency, a balanced budget - and issues 
such as foreign investment, privatisation and banking reforms. Even after 
the transition became well advanced, small business development has
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remained of secondary importance for policy makers in comparison with 
other policy areas (OECD, 1996b: 74). The boom in new business 
formation has taken place despite the absence of specific policies to 
promote it. In Poland the government policy has been based on a laissez- 
faire approach, refraining from taking active measures to stimulate new 
business formation. The legal environment in Poland was considered by 
Kondratowicz, Maciejewski and Morawski (1997, 100-101), on the basis of 
a survey conducted in 1993-4, “not conducive to starting and conducting 
business activity by small entrepreneurs. On the contrary, it generates by 
itself a number of important impediments to start-up and growth of SMEs.” 
They lamented the absence of an internally coherent, unified legal system 
that would integrate all legal aspects pertaining to small-scale economic 
activity, the overwhelming number of legal acts concerning small business, 
some of which are not even published and the limitation of economic 
freedom because of a continuous increase in the number of activities 
requiring an administrative permit. In addition, foreign exchange laws were 
judged to be too restrictive and the regulations excessive. Similarly, in 
Hungary tax procedures were still in 1999 over-regulated and bank 
financing for small firms insignificant (The Hungarian Economy, 1999: 4- 
5). As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, according to Benacek (1997: 
236), small business growth seems to lie more in the spontaneous 
motivation of the members of the population, rather than in the 
government’s macroeconomic and privatisation policy.
Due to the combined effect of privatisation and new business creation, the 
private sector underwent an explosive growth in the 1990s in the Czeeh 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, while growth was more restrained in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Russia. In the Czech Republic the private sector’s 
contribution to the GDP increased from 0.5% in 1989 to around 60% in 
1994 and in Poland and Hungary from 28% and 14% respectively to about 
55% in the same period (OECD, 1996b: 18). However, these figures can be 
considered only indicative. The deficiencies in statistical recording make 
the estimates of the share of the private sector in GDP or employment not
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fully comparable. There are ambiguities in the classification of activities as 
public and private. Firms undergoing privatisation have been classified as 
private before the conclusion of the privatisation process and no set eriteria 
were used to classify mixed companies as either state or private, even if as a 
rule this depends on whether the state share is more or less than 50%. 
Furthermore, statistical recording of private activity and in particular of 
small business, is insufficient, and a considerable share takes place in the 
black economy and thereby escapes detection. These deficiencies in the data 
partly cancel each other out, but it is impossible to say to what extent. 
According to Benacek (1997: 236) the booming development of the newly 
created firms in the Czech Republic would be seriously underestimated by 
the official statistics, accounting for something between 35% and 40% of all 
economic activity by 1993 instead of the official 26% and 30%.
In September 1995 the Czech Republic and Hungary had more firms 
relative to their population (68 and 51 respectively per 1,000 people) than 
the EU average (43) (Economist, 1996: 148), and the great majority of these 
were newly created firms. However, a considerable proportion of firms are 
inactive, and many are sole proprietorships which employ only the owner, 
while most of the remaining are tiny service and trading operations. As 
declared by Stark (1997: 39) concerning Hungary, “although the number of 
registered private ventures has sky-rocketed, many are dummy firms, tax 
evasion is pervasive, and many entrepreneurs (a majority in some 
categories) still engage in private ventures only as a second job”. The 
number of self-employed (outside agriculture) increased sharply as well, 
rising from 650,000 in 1989 to 1.4 million in 1994 in Poland (OECD, 
1996b: 30) and from 427,500 in 1990 to 807,000 in 1993 in Hungary 
(Borish and Noel, 1996: 35). However, a high level of se lf employment 
does not necessarily mean a healthy economy. It can be the result of push 
factors such as the steep rise in unemployment and the breakdown of the 
system of social security, rather than pull factors such as greater 
opportunities in economic activity.
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What is significant is the development of manufacturing firms which play 
the most important role for economic growth. The multiplier benefits of an 
expansion in the manufacturing sector are likely to be greater than of a 
similar growth in service sector activity (Smallbone and others, 1997: 227). 
Dertouzoz, Lester and Solow (1989) argue that despite the obvious 
transformation of economic activity out of manufacturing and into services, 
manufacturing remains the cornerstone of a modern industrial economy. 
Even if manufacturing’s share of total employment has gone down, its share 
in the GDP has remained almost unchanged. Considering that the 
manufacturing sector in the former socialist countries has had to pass from 
an highly monopolised structure dominated by huge conglomerates based 
on mass production methods and relatively inflexible production processes, 
to a more flexible production system, it is clear that the flexibility of small 
businesses makes them instrumental in fostering this passage.
Expansion in manufacturing has lagged behind the expansion in the service 
sector due, among other things, to the higher need for eapital in starting 
industrial ventures, and the fact that financial institutions have been very 
wary of financing such ventures. This is the main reason why the 
importance of small business has been played down by authors such as 
Scase and Stark. The first has argued that small businesses in Eastern 
Europe “appear to have little potential as vehicles for economic growth and 
for generating rational, capitalist forms of economic production, if only 
because small business owners overwhelmingly consist of proprietors rather 
than entrepreneurs. Even the latter are primarily orientated to short-term 
economic gain for the purpose of conspicuous consumption rather than 
investment for longer-term capital accumulation.”(Scase, 1997: 19). Stark 
sees most of the private sector growth being concentrated in the informal 
economy making Hungary similar to the Latin American countries
These opinions could have been valid at the initial stages of reforms, but as 
the transition has progressed subsequent evidence from the leading 
transition countries has suggested that the newly established private sector
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has been the main force behind the economic recovery in the manufacturing 
sector, at least in Poland (although growth has been slower than in 
services). However, even in the Czech Republic, growth has been strongest 
in small industrial firms, while the contribution of large industrial 
enterprises has decreased (Borish and Noel, 1996: 34). The share of the 
former in total industrial production has increased from 3.8% in 1991 to 
22.6% in 1997.
TABLE 1.2
The share of small firms in Czech industry (in %)
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Share in production 3.8 6.7 10.3 11.6 20.8 22.8 22.6
Share in employment 17.6 16.9 17.5 20.0 26.2 29.1 26.3
Source: official data reported by Bohata and Mladek, 1998: 168
The evidence from Hungary suggests that the industrial restructuring can be 
largely ascribed to foreign investment. Small businesses have been judged 
“to have now become, and are likely to remain, the engine of the eeonomy 
in the years to come” in Poland (Erutku and Vallee, 1997: 113) and the 
major success story of the 1990s in transition economies in general (Gibb, 
1995: 2). In Poland newly created firms contributed two-thirds of the 30% 
output growth in industry between 1992 and 1995 (Russian Economic 
Trends, April 1997: 5). A research project on small and medium-sized 
Polish private enterprises (outside agrieulture) came to the conclusion that 
“mostly new, post-1989 firms that should be considered the source of the 
private sector economic success and the seeds of the future. The role of the 
old small enterprises in the Polish eeonomic success of the 1990s must be 
critieally re-assessed and radieally scaled-down” (Kondratowicz, 
Maciejewski and Morawski, 1995: 96). Richter and Schaffer (1996: 8-12), 
analysing a World Bank survey of 439 industrial firms earried out in mid- 
1994 in Russia, found that new private manufacturing firms performed 
much better than privatised and state-owned enterprises. The former were 
growing rather than contraeting, operating at higher levels of capacity 
utilisation, expanding employment rapidly, and investing more. Among
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privatised and state-owned firms there was, instead, little difference. The 
authors, however, remarked that output growth in new Russian firms lagged 
significantly behind their Polish counterparts and the difference between 
newly created firms and privatised and state-owned firms in Poland was 
larger than that detected in the Russian survey. Another World Bank survey 
of 200 Polish manufacturing firms (Richter and Schaffer, 1996: 12) 
indicated that output growth in new Polish firms was 60% on average in 
1993, while in new Russian firms it was only 4%. For Russian privatised 
firms the corresponding indicator was a decrease of 19% which is close to 
the contraction in industrial output registered in 1994 in Russia. Riehter and 
Schaffer concluded that, although the importanee of newly established 
private enterprises in Russian manufacturing is not negligible, their 
importance is much smaller than in the other leading transition countries. 
Had Russian firms followed the same pattern of development as Polish 
small businesses, an upturn in industry should have taken place a few years 
after the beginning of the transition, but this has not been the case.
1.5. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN RUSSIA DURING TRANSITION
Russia and the other former communist states represented an unique 
opportunity for the study of entrepreneurship. Closed economies shaped by 
planners have been opened up to market forces. In theory, the changes 
which have oceurred in the Russian economy should have provided a 
windfall of opportunities for the creation of new enterprises. In Russia all 
the five sources of market changes indicated by Dean, Meyer and DeCastro 
have occurred, although the first (increase in demand) can be applied only 
to a limited number of goods given the economic crisis experienced by the 
country. This, for example, can be true for some upmarket products for 
which demand has increased due to the quick enrichment of a small 
segment of the Russian population. The demise of the command system 
also led to a change in demand. Russian eonsumers have moved away from 
the their poor-looking domestie products towards better looking, but not 
always better quality, foreign goods. The possibility of engaging in foreign 
trade without passing through central ministries allowed enterprises to
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acquire new technology abroad and find new sources of supply; and the 
political and legislative environment changed radically. In addition to 
these five sources of market ehange, other pull factors included the 
opportunities arising from the privatisation process and the presence of 
imbalances between demand and supply in the eeonomy.
As far as push faetors are concerned, a powerful factor, valid for the former 
Soviet Union as well as for the other former socialist states, has been the 
shrinking or closure of the large state-owned enterprises and the loss of 
prestige and income suffered by large segments of the population. The 
miserable salaries for highly-skilled workers such as scientists, doctors and 
university professors have been a strong incentive for engaging in second 
jobs or going into full-time self-employment. Second careers have often 
been pursued without quitting the previous occupation, either because this 
was tolerated by employers who were aware that this was the only way to 
keep the worker tied to the firm, or because it was useful for the would-be 
entrepreneurs to keep their contacts in their original occupations. Kuczi and 
Lengyei (1995: 78) identified as the main push factor in Russia the hope of 
raising ones' own living standard, rather than avoiding unemployment, 
whieh remained quite low when they carried out their survey in the mid- 
1990s. However, official unemployment has sinee grown substantially.
Up to now, the main benefieiaries of market changes have been foreign 
products. These changes have given rise mainly to speculative operations 
(import from abroad), rather than to the exploitation of the productive 
resources to meet this demand, even if there is evidence that in some sectors 
(food products and pharmaceuticals, for example) Russian firms have been 
conquering market shares in recent years. There has been both a strong 
inertia in existing firms, which were largely unable to reconvert their 
production capabilities, and strong constraints to the development of new 
firms.
According to Kollermeier (1992: 53) trying to understand the lack of
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dynamism by utilising the traditional theories of entrepreneurship and small 
business is misleading, since these theories are mostly based on relatively 
stable environments with abundant resourees and role models and therefore 
do not take into consideration the specific aspects of new venture creation 
in transition economies where resources are very scarce. He therefore 
implies that demand faetors were bound to have a much more restrained 
effect in the post-socialist countries, and that personality traits and 
environmental factors can offer little insight.
The personality traits of Russian entrepreneurs (need for achievement, locus 
of control, risk taking) are believed to be heavily influeneed by communist 
ideology, but the few authors, who have tried to make a comparison, found 
the personalities of Eastern and Western entrepreneurs to be remarkably 
similar. A study of Noelle-Neumann (as quoted by Kollermeier, 1992: 50) 
found the personalities of East and West Germans to be much less 
dissimilar than expected and Ageev, Gratchev and Hisrich (1995: 372) 
found Russian entrepreneurs to differ little from entrepreneurs in the United 
States. Their main personality traits were energy, independence, 
competitiveness and self-confidence. However, while Russian entrepreneurs 
may have a high level of self-confidence, believing that they can manage 
any area of business, they lack basic business skills (Radaev, 1993: 72). 
Experience is lacking in the transition countries, unless we consider also 
experience in the informal economy. Given the starkly different economic 
environment it is likely that the skills acquired by engaging in the informal 
economy of the socialist states cannot be very useful in setting up a new 
business in the emerging market economies. Even if the business culture is 
underdeveloped due to laek of experienee, a point to explore is whether the 
system of cultural rewards and sanctions in Russia counters or complements 
entrepreneurial motivation. If communist mentality still prevails 
entrepreneurs are likely to be viewed with suspicion as speculators who 
enrich themselves at the expense of the population. Soeiological studies 
have shown a rather positive attitude of the population towards private 
enterprises (Kuczi and Lengyei, 1995: 67; Radaev, 1993: 72; Blinov, 1998:
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229). Shiller, Boyko and Korobov (1991: 399) found Russians favourably 
inclined towards markets, in similar proportions to the populations of the 
United States, Germany and Japan. Research has shown that an abrupt shift 
in values has taken place since the beginning of perestroika. This has 
resulted in entrepreneurship being considered highly prestigious, even if it 
is not clear how many are ready to start their own business. According to 
the surveys conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion no 
more than 10% of the population actually declared themselves willing to 
have their own business (Kuczi and Lengyei, 1995: 67), but opinion polls 
carried out by the Russian Independent Institute in Deeember 1992 
indicated that 80% dreamed of private entrepreneurship and 28% were 
seriously thinking of starting their own firm (Chepurenko and Vilensky, 
1996: 65).
Why despite the favourable attitudes, did small business have a limited 
impact in Russia? Is the lack of experience enough to explain this? In 
reality, the reasons that can be put forward to explain why Russian 
entrepreneurs did not take advantage of market opportunities through the 
direction of productive activities are numerous. In some sectors foreign 
products have been able to establish strong barriers to entry by emphasising 
product differentiation through expensive advertising eampaigns, while 
Russian counterparts can afford only a very limited advertising budgef^. The 
fact that, under Russian law, advertising costs are tax-deductible only up to 
a maximum of 0.5% of total expenditures has not helped. Other reasons are 
liquidity constraints due to imperfect credit markets, and the same Russian 
mentality which tends to perceive Russian goods as being of lower quality 
compared with their Western counterparts.
The contribution of some authors can also be adduced to explain the 
disappointing growth of small business in Russia. Olson (1982: 72-73) 
argues that the existence of strong special interest groups in a eountry limits 
its ability to adopt new teehnologies and reallocate resources as a result of
4 Ninety per cent o f advertisement in Russia promote foreign products and services
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changing conditions, with the consequence that economic growth slows 
down. He notes that, historieally, eollusion tends to inerease over time in 
stable societies, until dramatic events such as war and revolution destroy 
these narrow interest groups. In order to avoid collusive behaviour he 
advocates cancelling special interest legislation and applying anti-trust laws 
to cartels and collusion. Adopting his line of thinking we can impute the 
poor performance of the Russian economy to the strong power of interest 
groups in Russian soeiety, whieh have, in effect, led to the concession of 
extremely favourable conditions for well-connected individuals and 
strongly influenced eeonomic policy, with the effect of discriminating 
against individuals with poor or no connections. For example, Boyko, 
Schleifer and Vishny (1993: 163) argue that the fear of competition among 
powerful state industries has often resulted in administrative barriers to 
entry against new firms in industry
Another explanation for the slow development of small business in Russia 
can be found in Baumol’s theory on the factors affecting entrepreneurship, 
which on certain points is similar to Olson’s. BaumoFs theory is based on 
the effects that the relative rewards for different types of economic activity 
have on entrepreneurial behaviour, and hence on economic growth. In his 
opinion the rules, not the entrepreneurs, undergo substantial changes from 
one period to another (Baumol, 1988: 1). The entrepreneur always plays a 
substantial role in soeiety, but that role is not always constructive. He 
asserts that “while the total supply of entrepreneurs varies among societies, 
the productive contribution of the society’s entrepreneurial activities varies 
much more because of their allocation between productive activities such as 
innovation and largely unproductive activities such as rent seeking and 
organised crime. This allocation is heavily influenced by the relative 
payoffs society offers to such activities. This implies that policy can 
influence the allocation of entrepreneurship more effectively than it can 
influence its supply” (Baumol, 1990: 893). Examples of rent seeking 
adduced by Baumol are the medieval wars over land and castles, lobbying
(Zhuplev, Konkov and Kiesner, 1998: 508).
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for legislation which protects an industry from competition, tax evasion and 
litigation over monopoly licences. No doubt in the Russian context this is a 
strong argument, and has also been emphasised by Nelson and Kuzes 
(1995a: 133-136). Vast fortunes have been amassed in Russia through rent- 
seeking (for example, illegal sale of precious raw materials abroad). The 
system has been frequently denounced by Russian entrepreneurs, who feel 
like hostages to the unlawful requests of state officials and criminal 
organisations. Russia and four other former Soviet republics have been 
given the highest rating for official corruption by the ""Economist's 
Intelligence Unit" (Louis Berger ..., 1998: 17).
A further possible reason can be traced to the absence or low development 
of supporting networks, which, in the opinion of Brunner (1993: 510), are a 
vital component for the development of the new economic structures of 
these emerging economies. Brunner criticises the emphasis given by policy 
makers to the privatisation of state enterprises, the solution favoured by 
neo-classical economists, who assumed the change of property to be 
necessary to make economic agents responsive to market signals. In 
Brunner’s opinion, this approach ignores the basie fact that market 
economies have evolved through a eontinuous process of trials and errors. 
For this reason, privatisation can have only limited success. He, instead, 
suggests an evolutionary strategy, based on the promotion of 
entrepreneurship, in order to facilitate the process of economic 
transformation in Eastern Europe. For this aim, the state must foster 
innovation through research and development aid, training and advisory 
eentres. An effective network of support struetures in the country is 
necessary to favour the “continuous reorganisation of industrial structures 
through a sequence of random trials by firms and systematic competitive 
elimination of errors” (Brunner, 1993: 508). The outcome of this process is 
the gradual emergence of growth centres in the domestic economy.
Until recently, in Russia formal networks have been hardly used. Banks 
tend to ignore new firms, consulting is mostly unaffordable and business
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associations reach a limited number of entrepreneurs. A sense of suspicion 
towards these organisations is prevalent among local businessmen. It is not 
clear whether this is due to ignorance of the role that the formal system can 
play, or to the poor efficiency of the formal system in responding to the 
needs of the entrepreneurs. In the first ease there is a strong argument to 
increase awareness of the kind of advice and help that formal sources have 
to offer.
In Russia, given the economic turmoil and the underdevelopment of market 
institutions, it greatly helps to take advantage of pre-existing informal 
networks, which can serve as a vehicle for business transactions. These 
networks reduce the cost of transacting by facilitating the development of 
high-trust relationships. For new entrepreneurs with few connections, it will 
take time to build a network of trusted partners since trust, the basic element 
determining the solidity of the link, usually evolves slowly.
The importance of informal networks explains the emergence of a specific 
group of Russian entrepreneurs: the former communists. Struthers, Young 
and Wylie (1996: 154) argue that even if in theory the Communist party 
might have served as a basis for business networking, in practice, this did 
not happen because the party was not known for developing high-trust 
relationships among its members, and because of the strong bias of party 
ideology against private business enterprise and the profit motive. In their 
opinion, higher educational institutions create more effective networks for 
new enterprise development in Russia. In practice, many of the early 
entrepreneurs came from the ranks of the communist party. 
Kryshtanovskaya (1994) found in 1994 that seventeen of the leading 
businessmen in Russia entered private business from the KomsomoP 
apparatus, which was one of the earliest sources of successful entrepreneurs. 
These created new firms, frequently utilising state resources rather than 
building new firms from scratch, and in developing their business were able 
to exploit to their advantage their wide network of established relationships
 ^Communist Youth League o f the USSR
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with high-ranking officials. This, for example, has allowed them to have 
access to financial resources through their contacts in the banking system or 
to receive contracts from local administrations. Many of the highly-placed 
bureaucrats remained in positions of power even after the downfall of 
communism, and the organisations they headed were converted in order to 
obtain a role in the market economy. For example, when pillars of central 
planning such as industrial branch ministries were dismantled, new 
organisations were created comprising most of the enterprises belonging to 
the former ministries. In Russia, unlike the Czech Republic and to a lesser 
degree Poland and Hungary, former communists were not removed from 
their positions, and this gave them an useful advantage in business. The 
continuous dominance by the same elite^ explains why collusion and rent 
seeking are so widespread. The situation may, however, have changed 
overtime with the continuous diminution of the influence of this former 
communist elite, as new economic actors slowly emerge.
1.6. CONCLUSION
Although the importance of small business has vastly increased, especially 
in the last thirty years, a unique trend of development in small business does 
not exist. Advanced market economies have experienced widely different 
developments and there is no indication that the differences are narrowing. 
The personality trait approach can offer some insights on what make an 
entrepreneur, but its assumptions cannot be generalised because 
entrepreneurs are a class with widely different features. Culture and their 
personal background are also assumed to exert an important influence on 
the decision to become an entrepreneur, but give little insight in the context 
of the post-eommunist economies. The personality trait approach, focusing 
on the characteristics of entrepreneurs’ personalities and motivation, and the
 ^ Huber and Worgotter (1998: 83) assert that “substantial empirical evidence concerning 
corporate structures and financial-industrial groups in Russia suggests that relationships 
forged under the planning system remain operative, especially in large scale industry”. 
They also cite evidence by other authors on this point, including Bim (1996: 477), who 
found that 73% o f managers interviewed admitted to owning firms that were either 
deliverers or suppliers to the firm they managed. See also Silverman and Yanowitch (1997: 
118-127) and Rnabe (1998) on the economic power of the former Soviet nomenklatura.
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approach centred on environmental factors can lead to the conclusion that 
policies to stimulate small business development are of little use. There is, 
indeed, conflicting evidence as to the efficaey of a small business policy, 
but in the former communist countries the scarcity of business education 
and the reluctance of banks to finance new enterprises all call for a state role 
in overcoming these difficulties. However, even with little state assistance, 
small business growth was a natural phenomenon which developed 
following the switch to the market. This process, which initially concerned 
mainly the service sector, has also spread to industry, especially in Poland 
and to a lesser degree in the Czech Republic.
In Russia, the development of small business has been slow, although the 
liberalisation of the market has resulted in countless opportunities. Already 
in the Soviet period, the policy of allowing private enterprises in certain 
business activities in order to increase the supply of scarce goods in the 
consumer sector has not produced the expected results. In fact, it may have 
exacerbated these shortages. Given the particular conditions of the economic 
transition small business theories are of little use when applied to Russia. 
The Russian business environment requires entrepreneurs who are able to 
cope with highly stressful conditions: a predatory state which sets unclear 
and constantly changing rules and makes law-breaking almost obligatory to 
ensure survival and the absence of penalties for non-payment. The diffusion 
of this latter phenomenon makes business relations risky unless one is able 
to work with trusted partners. This explains why previous members of the 
nomenklatura or managers, who could rely on personal relationships 
developed in Soviet times, had a distinct advantage, especially in the early 
years of the transition. Conneetions were especially important in the early 
years in order to obtain access to premises, equipment and inputs, although 
there is evidence that the market is slowly becoming more transparent. In 
addition to the above-mentioned reasons, entrepreneurship is conditioned by 
a scarcity of business skills, which is due to the laek of experience, and by a 
variety of other factors (limited access to resources, the stronger market 
skills of foreign manufacturers, lack of formal networks, collusion.
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monopoly power, bureaucratic obstacles, etc.). For this reason, faetors which 
have been found to influence the rate of creation of new firms have a limited 
effect in Russia. The lack of experience and business education, reflected in 
the weak basis (insufficient knowledge of the market environment, lack of 
preliminary study) on which a firm is created, ensures that the creation of 
new enterprises involves a long process of trial and error with a high 
turnover of firms.
Having discussed the strong influence of interest groups on policy making, 
the next chapter will examine the actual legislative framework as well as the 
specific measures on small business and factors commonly regarded as 
critical in Russia (sources of finance and crime).
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2. THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN RUSSIA 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the main features of the business environment which 
affect small businesses in Russia: taxation, the legal framework, 
regulations, macroeconomie framework, crime, sources of finance and state 
policy. Taxation is a recurrent theme in this research and will also be 
discussed several times in later chapters. The establishment of a fully- 
fledged market economy seemed to be a relatively straightforward task prior 
to the transition to the market, entailing the implementation of the 
appropriate laws. Instead, after almost a decade, legislation seems to serve 
the purpose of discouraging business, rather than providing a framework in 
whieh it ean prosper. This chapter has a large section on the tax system 
implemented in the post-Soviet period, which represents the biggest 
constraint on small business in Russia. For years a simplification of the 
system has been on the agenda, but to no avail so far. The variety of sources 
from whieh taxes are gathered and the lack of clear delineation of power 
have created a maze of overlapping legislation and an array of regulations 
with which a small business has to comply. Differing interpretations of 
legislation create the potential of disputes with tax authorities who have 
ample powers which are often misused. In the light of these developments 
the following section examines in more detail the legislative approach to 
small business of the Russian government. Despite the key role small 
business was expected to play in the economic transformation. East 
European countries have neglected this sector, by adopting a laissez faire 
approach. This section analyses how the Russian government has dealt with 
this issue, which was recognised at the beginning of the transition process 
as being of vital importance for economic recovery to take place. The 
various measures enacted by the federal government and their impact is 
discussed. Since the early transition years, laws have been passed to 
encourage small business development, and privileges conceded to selected 
activities. The programmes of small business support, which should have
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provided the guidelines for the small business policy, are described in 
detail. It is also explained why the state policy failed to produce the 
expected results. In addition to the legislative chaos, small businesses have 
to face widespread criminal activity and a highly unstable macroeconomic 
framework characterised, especially in 1992-1995, by high inflation and 
falling consumption. A section is also dedicated to the availability of 
finance. Commonly considered a critical factor in the development of small 
business, it is even more so in Russia, given the loss of savings by the 
population in the hyperinflation of 1992-3. Finally, I try to detect the 
reasons why small business has expanded more in the leading transition 
countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) than in Russia.
2.1. MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
The Russian transition was based on the shock therapy approach already 
implemented in Poland. The cornerstones of the reform strategy, which took 
effect from January 1992, were the eurtailment of the centralised supply 
system and the priee liberalisation which covered approximately 90% of 
retail prices and 80% of wholesale prices. The co-ordinating body of 
material supplies (the suceessor to the GOSSNAB) was finally dismantled 
in October 1992. State procurements continued to be placed only for 
agriculture produce, military equipment and a few other items. The 
liberalisation was to be accompanied by a restrictive fiscal and financial 
policy in accordance with the agreement reached with the IMF which set the 
customary limit for the budget deficit (5% of the GDP) and precise ceilings 
for central bank credit expansion as a condition to receiving IMF loans. 
Budget expenditures were cut by 10% of the GDP as the switch to the new 
system of taxation entailed a substantial decrease of total government 
revenues.
The liberalisation of priees is a necessary prerequisite for the economic 
transformation from plan to market. In economic theory the free interplay of 
demand and supply brings about the optimal allocation of resources. Prices
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which reflect the scarcity values of all goods provide the incentives for 
eeonomic decision makers to alloeate resources to the best possible use. In 
reality, price liberalisation is still not yet complete. Price controls are still 
used by local administrations in Russia as well as restrictions on the 
movement of loeally made goods out of the region (EBRD, 1998a: 186). 
The almost fivefold inerease in retail prices in the first quarter of 1992 
practically absorbed the monetary overhang, but while in countries such as 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic high 
inflation lasted for a short period - only Poland had annual inflation of more 
than 100% in 1990 - in Russia the achievement of macroeconomic 
stabilisation was derailed by the huge upsurge in credits issued by the 
Central Bank from the middle of 1992. In this way the burden of sustaining 
enterprises was shifted from the budget to the printing presses. The large 
budget deficits incurred between 1992 and 1995 were largely financed by 
money emission as they eould not be eovered by the domestic and foreign 
capital markets. Because of this in 1992-1995 Russia experienced very high 
inflation rates. Inflation peaked at more than 1,000% in 1992 and did not 
fall below 100% until 1996. Inflation was reduced in 1997, but picked up 
again after the rouble devaluation in August 1998.
Relative price stability is important because the information content of 
prices is assumed to be higher in a stable environment. For this reason 
monetary expansion must be kept within a range eompatible with the 
official objectives of growth, inflation and balance of payments. Several 
studies have emphasised that growth is positively correlated to low inflation 
as well as high openness to foreign markets (Easterly and others, 1994: 1; 
Fischer, 1993: 1). In fact, instability in the maeroeconomic framework in 
addition to reducing the efficacy of the priee mechanism, discourages 
investment and is likely to lead to capital flight. Consequently, it tends to 
diminish the level of produetivity and its rate of increase (Fischer, 1993). 
The effects of high inflation are to diseourage the population from saving, 
to prevent the banks from issuing long-term loans and to make enterprise 
managers reluctant to invest in new equipment. In fact, in a climate of
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uncertainty, managers tend to allocate most of the income to current 
consumption, while bank capital is usually invested in short-term 
speculative transactions and families prefer to purchase foreign currency or 
residential property, which are considered safer hedges against inflation. 
For these reasons investment is likely to fall to very low levels - even below 
replacement needs - leading to a progressive decapitalisation of firms and to 
a worsening of capital productivity. In effect, investment registered a very 
large decrease, accounting in 1998 at barely 20.7% of the analogous figure 
in 1991 and the output drop by far exceeded the expectations. GDP in 1998 
was 57.5% of its level in 1990, while industrial production was 43%. The 
share of services in GDP has, therefore, expanded and has exceeded 
industry since 1994. Personal consumption has, instead, had a divergent 
trend dropping by 41% in one year alone in 1992, rising by 11% and 10% in 
1993 and 1994 and dropping again slightly in the following years, except in 
1997 when it posted a small increase. Overall personal consumption has 
dropped more or less the same as GDP.
TABLE 2.1.
Main eeonomic indicators in Russia
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
G DP‘>
Industi'ial
-5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -3.5 +0.8 -4.6
Production.*^
Personal
-8 -18.8 -16.2 -22.8 -4.7 -4.0 +2 -5
Connsumption'^ 
Gross fixed
-41 +11 +10 -7 -1 +1.1 -5.5
Investment*) -41.5 -25.8 -26 -7.5 -18.5 -6 -9
GDP') 95 81 74 65 62 60 60.5 57.5
Ind. Prod. ') 92 74.7 62.6 48.3 46.1 44.2 45.1 42.8
Pers. Cons. ') 100 59 65.5 72.0 67.0 66.3 67.1 63.4
Gross fixed') 100 58.5 43.4 32.1 29.7 24.2 22.8 20.7
changes in percentages compared with the previous year; 1990=100; 1991=100
Sources: EBRD, 1998a: 225 and Russian Economic Trends, 1996, no. 3: 138; 1997, no. 4: 
66; 1999, no. 2: 101-102.
Russia was bound to be affected more than the East European countries by 
the downfall of the planned system due to the factors listed below, but the 
fact that the recession was so long points to the existence of eonstraints 
which will be discussed in section 2.8. These factors are:
• the slashing of military spending which represented an enormous burden
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for the economy. The valuation of the size of the military and defence 
sector during the last two decades of Soviet rule varies from 15% to 
30% of the GNP (Ericson, 1990: 15; Swain, 1990: 103). Even the lower 
figure was greater than the corresponding pereentage in the other East 
European countries and more than twice as much as in the United States.
• the economic structure was more centralised and distorted in the Soviet 
Union than in the other soeialist countries.
• the disruption of trade with the republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Caleulations based on input-output tables for 1987 showed that a 50% 
decrease in both exports and imports with all other republics of the 
Soviet Union would result in a 25% drop in national ineome for Russia 
(Daviddi and Espa, 1993: 13). The extreme division of labour within the 
Soviet Union made these economies much more dependent on each other 
than they would have been under a free market system. Different stages 
of production were intentionally located in different republics.
We can also presume that given the barriers to the mobility of capital and 
labour, and the scarcity of internal resources which can be earmarked for 
new investments, the liberalisation of foreign trade has exaeerbated the 
output drop in the consumer goods sector which, in general, fares poorly 
against Western goods. Russia is undergoing a regressive specialisation, as 
the revenues accruing from the export of its raw materials, instead of being 
utilised for importing much needed technology, are stashed abroad or used 
to import consumer goods which squeeze the domestie products out of the 
market. The deep crisis affecting the producer goods sector is due to the 
collapse of investment. The reduction of investment has made the industrial 
structure increasingly obsolete and outworn. Privatisation has still to result 
in an improved performance of the companies concerned. Up to end 1997 
privatised enterprises numbered 123,000, while wholly-owned state 
enterprises were down to 88,000 from 205,000 in 1992 (EBRD, 1997: 195). 
However, the state has retained large stakes in a great number of privatised 
enterprises.
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Considering the large output drop, unemployment has not increased as 
much as expected reaching 11.9% in 1998 (calculated according to the ILO 
concept). However, it is still continuing to increase in 1999 - it went up to 
14% in the first quarter of 1999 - in spite of the positive output trend, 
indicating that the process of reduetion of excess personnel has not yet been 
completed (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no. 2: 107).
A recovery set in just a few quarter after the August 1998 erisis whieh had 
been caused by the government’s default on its domestic debt. This 
provoked a chain reaction by which the major domestie banks, which had 
largely invested their assets in state bonds, rapidly became insolvent, 
paralysing the entire banking system. By the end of the year the rouble had 
lost two-thirds of its value leading to a spurt of inflation and to a sharp fall 
in real wages. Real wages in July 1999 were 36% lower than one year 
earlier (Russian Economic Trends, September 1999: 4). The
macroeconomic stabilisation achieved in the few years leading to August 
1998, which seemed to be a prelude to a turnaround in the economy, turned 
by September 1998 into a depression. However, this had a very uneven 
impaet. While services, which had boomed mainly in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and few other cities, were badly affected, the consequences of 
the crisis on the rest of the country were less dramatic. Even smaller banks 
(the vast majority of non-Moscow banks), having generally invested much 
less in state bonds, survived the crisis relatively unscathed. In the end, the 
erisis was shorter-lived than initially expected. The collapse of the major 
banks may have disrupted economic activity in the aftermath of the crisis 
and resulted in a considerable number of people losing their savings, but it 
did not have serious consequences for the Russian economy as the role of 
the banking sector in the whole economy was very small and the share of 
loans in total GDP was well below that in other East European countries.
The rouble devaluation had also some beneficial consequences. It partly 
redressed the distortions in an economy which was relying too much on 
imports and producing little by giving the opportunity to domestic
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manufacturers to fill the niches left open by foreign goods squeezed out of 
the market. Export-oriented sectors were also stimulated by the 
devaluation. For this reason the slump in industry was soon reversed. 
Recovery began in the second quarter following the crash. As imports 
declined by 50%, import-competing industries flourished, even if a shortage 
of domestically produced inputs did not allow domestic producers in several 
sectors (e.g., the meat industry) to reap the full benefits of the devaluation. 
Compared with July 1998 machinery production was 27% higher, textiles 
31% higher and food processing 18% higher one year later (Russian 
Economic Trends, September 1999: 4). Total industrial production was 
4.5% higher in the first seven months of 1999 compared with the same 
period of the previous year and rail freight, which ""Russian Economic 
Trends” (1999, no. 3: 20) describes as “the most robust measure of current 
industrial activity”, went up 15% in the last twelve months to July 1999. 
However, growth in industrial production has taken place without a 
corresponding increase in investments, and this casts doubts on whether it 
can be sustained in the long-term. Profits and cash flows have also 
increased, while barter and wage arrears have gone down. In addition, the 
improved performance of the economy led to a rise in federal tax revenues 
from 11% of the GDP in the first half of 1998 to 13.1% in the first half of 
1999 (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no. 3: 22).
2.2. TAX LEGISLATION
The basis of the tax legislation was laid in 1991, when a package of laws 
necessary to establish a market economy was passed by the Russian 
Parliament, but the countless additions and amendments to the tax 
legislation have made the situation so complicated that it is sometimes 
impossible for taxpayers to know whether they are complying with the law 
or not. There have been some minor fiscal reforms in the last few years, but, 
according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the tax system remains unstable, non-transparent and highly 
onerous for enterprises (EBRD, 1997: 197).
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Russia has a three-tier tax system consisting of federal, regional and local 
taxes. It does not have a tax code. Tax matters are regulated by laws, 
Presidential decrees and regulations, decrees and regulations of the 
government, documents of regional and local administrative bodies, 
normative acts of ministries and state departments and instructions, 
explanations and letters of the State Tax Service and the Ministry of 
Finance. The highest in the hierarchy are laws approved by the Parliament 
and the constitution. Subordinate legislation must conform to parliamentary 
laws. In reality, this is not always the case. As a clear separation of powers 
is often lacking, and these bodies often consider each other as competitors, 
the result is a maze of overlapping and contradictory legislation. In 1997 the 
tax system was regulated by about 2,000 legislative acts (EBRD, 1997: 
121).
Many federal tax laws are so vague and incomplete that they cannot be 
applied, but have to be supplemented by instructions and letters of the State 
Tax Service or the Ministry of Finance. The lack of an implementation 
mechanism is another common defect of Russian legislative acts. To 
implement these laws it is necessary for corresponding normative acts to be 
enacted. For this reason several laws which, in theory, should be enforced 
are never implemented. Keeping track of new legislation is a hair-raising 
task. There is a great number of newspapers and magazines - it is hard to 
say how many - which are entitled to publish federal and subordinate 
legislation of the Russian government and its agencies. To make matters 
more difficult, laws are sometimes published in a different magazine from 
where they are supposed to be published, and may even be applied before 
their publication.
Recourse to the tax inspectorate to obtain clarification is, particularly in big 
cities, of little use, as inspectors are in most eases very reluctant to provide 
information about new regulations. They may even conceal information 
about new taxes in order to extract large penalties or bribes. The problem
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with tax inspectors is that they are understaffed, ill-equipped, lacking basic 
equipment such as calculators and computers, and underpaid, receiving 
wages that sometimes are paid months later. This, coupled with the fact that 
tax officials have a high degree of discretion in applying penalties leaves 
ample room for abuse and corruption and a very uneven treatment of 
taxpayers. Tax officials are notorious for carrying out repeated raids on the 
same firm and are capable of driving thriving firms to failure. Under 
pressure to collect taxes they often act without taking into consideration the 
consequences of their actions, justifying them arbitrarily, in the knowledge 
that few cases come to court. Even if a document produced by one of the 
various sourees of legislation may not be legally enforceable, they might 
eonsider it effective (Antel, 1997: 1). Matters are not helped by the fact that 
their benefits are linked to a pool of collected funds. According to the 
Moscow office of Arthur Andersen this situation has become worse since 
the federal government has instructed local authorities “to ignore objectivity 
in taxpayer dealings and raise more revenues irrespective of reasonable 
legal, procedural or commercial business considerations which might 
inconveniently get in the way” (Antel, 1997: 3). Taxes can be collected 
unconditionally, for example, by withdrawing funds fi-om the bank account 
of an enterprise, without even informing the company concerned. This was 
done five million times in 1997 according to figures from the State Tax 
Service (EBRD, 1998a: 16). In accordance with the law the value of the 
funds expropriated may exceed by three-four times the sum of taxes in 
arrears due to the high incidence of fines and penalties. The size of the 
penalty does not depend on whether the tax violation was a deliberate act or 
originated from a misinterpretation of the tax law. Tax fines are very heavy 
even for minor offences. A common source of contention is the different 
interpretation of a law by tax bodies and firms’ accountants. However, the 
ambiguity in the legislation also enables many firms to exploit the 
widespread legal loopholes, encouraging them to operate at the limits of 
legality - itself imposing a further administrative burden on the tax 
inspectorate. For example, a tax had to be introduced to combat the habit of 
paying bank employees partly in highly remunerative bank deposits and soft
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loans. A 15% income tax was levied on personal accounts in which the 
interest rate exceeds the Central Bank's refinancing rate (the 15% applies 
only to the portion of the yield whieh exceeds the Central Bank rate). An 
analogous levy was introdueed on loans if the interest is less than 2/3 of the 
Central Bank rate.
Members of the Federation are free to establish taxes as the current 
legislation does not set any ceiling on the number of taxes whieh ean be 
introduced. The decree no. 2270 signed by the President on 22 December 
1993 ("On Several Changes in the System of Taxation and in the 
Relationship between Budgets of Various Levels") allowed local authorities 
to levy additional taxes at their will. This has resulted in a multitude of 
regional and local taxes on top of the fourteen federal taxes. There were 
approximately 150 regional and local taxes in 1995, according to an 
estimate of the Ministry of Finance (Pepelyayev, 1996: 42), some of which 
are very odd. For example, Chuvashia introdueed a tax on investment 
outside its border and Kursk one on production decrease. There are taxes on 
football teams, scientific expeditions, etc. Some regions have even enacted 
import and export tariffs on trade with other regions, in spite of the fact that 
this contradicts the constitution of the Russian Federation, which states that 
inside Russia it is forbidden to set up customs points, introduce tariffs or 
other obstructions to free trade (Boiarskii and Gavriliuk, 1996: 24). By the 
beginning of 1999 the number of federal taxes had increased to thirty, plus 
more than 170 local and regional taxes (CCET, 1998: 45).
In 1994 a firm had to deal with an average of fourteen federal, four regional 
and as many as twenty-two loeal taxes - in total up to forty different taxes 
(Sheppard, 1995: 191). The federal taxes which were levied in the whole 
territory of Russia in 1994 were:
• value added tax
• exeise duties
• tax from exchange activities
• tax on seeurities transactions
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customs duty
contributions for the replacement of the mineral raw-material hase 
payments for the use of natural resources
profits tax on enterprises (absorbing the tax on excess labour eost)
income tax on individuals
road fund taxes
levies on the cost of arms
government fees (or state duties)
tax on property inherited or received as a gift
levy on the use of the names "Russia" and "Russian Federation" in a 
corporate name.
The number is, however, constantly changing. In 1998 regional legislative 
bodies were allowed to introduee a tax on the sale of certain types of goods 
and services of no more than 5% of the sale price. The total number of taxes 
a eompany was subjeet to in 1998 varied from 40-50 (CCET, 1998: 45). 
Some of the corporate taxes are based on total revenues instead of profits, 
thus making the tax burden on activities with low margin extremely high. 
The profits tax was 35% (13% going to the federal budget and 22% to the 
local budget) until the end of 1993, when members of the Federation gained 
the right to increase their share of the profits tax from 22% to up to 30% for 
banks and insurance companies and 25% for enterprises in other sectors. 
The eeiling for the rate of the property tax was also raised from 1% to 2% of 
the assets value^ (Presidential decree no. 2270). In mid-1994 the local rate 
of the profits tax for the non-financial sector was brought back to 22% and 
in 1999 was further reduced to 19%. At the same time the federal rate was 
also reduced to 11%, making a total of 30%.
Even if the profits tax is nominally lower in Russia than in most of Western 
Europe, the method of assessing the tax base makes it higher. Taxable 
profits were boosted by the existence of strict limits on deductions for wage
* This is a tax on the annual average balance-sheet value o f fixed and intangible assets less 
depreciation, inventory, work-in-process, raw materials, supplies and prepaid expenses.
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costs up to the end of 1996 and by the lack of indexation of depreciation 
and inventories to inflation. Fixed assets and inventories were revalued only 
sporadically. In the presence of extremely high inflation, as between 1992 
and 1995, this meant that depreciation allowances were quickly eroded by 
inflation and taxable profits artificially boosted, especially in the years in 
which there was no revaluation. In addition, extraordinary items are not 
deductible and several items such as loan interest, advertising expenses, 
training costs and insurance premiums cannot be deducted in full. Interest 
on loans can be deducted at the central bank rate^. Gains and losses from 
foreign currency exchanges were excluded from the taxable base until the 
beginning of 1997. Thus a company’s taxable income may have little 
relation to its trading costs.
The only privileges accorded to enterprises are the possibility of deducting 
from the taxable income the expenses on capital investment and research 
(Presidential decree no. 2270) and a 50% reduction in the profits tax if 
disabled persons and/or pensioners make up at least 70% of the total 
number of employees. This has created a market of "staff ageneies" offering 
the disabled or pensioners at minimal cost to enterprises looking for ways to 
reduce the tax burden. At the beginning of 1997 amendments to the law 
"On Corporate Profits Tax" limited to 50% the deduction for capital 
expenditure.
According to a study carried out in the spring of 1994, taking into account 
all levels of taxation, from local to federal, an enterprise ends up paying 
about 80-90% of the reported profits in taxes (Avilova, Pripisnov and 
Chepurenko, 1996b: 13), and this percentage has not decreased in recent 
years. This is the rule, unless the firm is one of the many enterprises which 
receives tax privileges. A vast array of benefits is applied to specific types 
of economic activity or to specific enterprises. These may be rate reduetions 
on certain taxes, tax deferments or exemptions for a given period. The 
praetice of conceding tax privileges has been drastically reduced since 1992
^Most of these limitations will be removed if  the new tax code is approved,
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by the federal government, but is still widely used by local governments for 
activities deemed as priorities.
A new tax code was worked out in 1995-6 and presented to the State 
Parliament at the beginning of 1997. The main points of the code are:
• simplification of the tax system and removal of the inconsistencies in 
the tax legislation.
• switching some of the tax burden from enterprises to individuals. It is 
planned to broaden the tax base and lower the rates.
• a reduction in the number of taxes.
• a reduction in tax privileges. The power of regional governments in 
granting tax exemptions is restrieted, putting an end to tax competition 
between the regions.
• the prohibition of the retrospective enactment of the tax laws.
• the determination of the division of power among federal, regional and 
local authorities. All local taxes whose collection is admissible on the 
territory of Russia are listed, together with the maximum applicable 
rate.
• incentives for investment.
The first part of the tax code was approved in July 1998, while for the 
remaining parts there is no indication of whether and when they will be 
enacted. The first part sets the fundamental rules of the tax system and 
clarifies taxpayer rights, but does not cover the reforms in individual taxes 
suggested by the IMF, which are included in the remaining part of the code 
(EBRD, 1998a: 187). One of the main points of the first part is to delineate 
which taxes are admissible, but an amendment passed in April 1999 
allowed the introduction of any additional tax and increases in the rate of 
the existing taxes (Kochetov, 1999: 1).
Russia has one of the highest tax burdens in the world, but the burden is 
very unevenly distributed. In 1995 the income tax accounted for only 8% of 
total receipts, against an average of 29.7% in the OECD countries, while the
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profits tax accounted for 26% compared with 7.3% in the OECD countries 
(Sazhina, 1996: 22; Russian Economic Trends, 1996, no. 2: 22), in spite of 
the fact that just 17% of companies are estimated to pay taxes regularly and 
in full. At least a third publish no accounts and make no tax payment 
(Summers, 1997: 5). Industry, whieh in 1995 accounted for 34.2% of the 
GDP, supplied 52.2% of the tax revenues (Afanas’ev, 1996: 1). Because of 
the government’s leniency in dealing with large firms the 100 biggest tax 
debtors account for about 40% of the arrears to the federal budget (Russian 
Economic Trends, December 1997: VII). On the other hand, some of these 
firms (mostly utility providers) are owed a huge amount because their bills 
are often not paid^. Individuals are even less tax abiding: only seven 
million citizens filled in an ineome declaration in 1995 (Ryzhov, 1997: 1) 
and 95% fit in the lowest tax bracket of 12% (Shatalov, 1995: 10). The tax 
service does not have a single database of taxpayers; historical records - 
very incomplete - are kept on paper. Very low also are the revenues from 
the taxation of natural resources and excise taxes. The share of taxes in 
GDP has gone down from slightly less than 40% in 1993 (Russian 
Economie Trends, Dec. 1997: V) to 33.5%^ in 1997 (Russian Economic 
Trends, July 1998: I), which is less than in most European countries, but 
comparable to the levels in the United States and Japan. However, 
considering that 25% of the official Russian GDP is represented by the 
unofficial economy, tax revenues in reality make up about 40% of the 
official economy. Although the level of collection is respectable, the state is 
chronically short of funds when it comes to finance the various items in the 
budget, as the economic collapse has reduced the amount of tax revenues 
year after year. The gap in revenues is aggravated by the fact that a 
substantial proportion of taxes are paid in non-monetary forms (eommodity 
eredits, tax offsets and promissory notes) (EBRD, 1997: 197), and over a 
third of the revenues are collected by various off-budgetary funds where the 
eash is strictly earmarked for spécifié purposes (Russian Economic Trends,
 ^The tax agency believes that more than half o f these non-payments have in fact been paid 
into the personal accounts of the managers o f these firms (Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet 
Press, 1996, no. 41: 6).
This includes the federal and local budgets as well as the major extra budgetary funds, the 
only for which data are available.
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Dec. 1997: VIII).
2.3. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCTING 
BUSINESS
At the time of the various plans for a quick transition from planning to 
market in the late 1980s there was a widespread conviction among Russian 
economists that just importing the legal system in force in advanced market 
economies was enough to create a well-functioning market. In reality, the 
functioning of the legislative framework for the conduct of business is 
hampered by the limited trust of Russians for the law due to historical 
circumstances. Like tax officials, bureaucrats are renowned for interpreting 
the law at their will. A survey carried out in Moscow found that that 65% of 
its inhabitants believed that law enforcement in Moscow is dependent on 
the whims of officials rather than on the rule of the law (Golovachev, 1998: 
1). This kind of behaviour is facilitated by the fact that despite the 
relatively long period since the transition began, the legislative and 
normative basis for conducting business is in many fields still inadequate 
and unclear. The cornerstone of a market economy is deemed to be the 
presence of property rights, but property and contract laws in Russia are 
unclear and the legal recourse to courts to settle disputes or collect debts is 
of no use in most cases. By legal means there is no assurance that contracts 
will be enforceable and even if a company is able to prove a contract breach 
before a Russian court, the prospects of recovering damages are small. 
Russian courts are inexperienced in resolving commercial disputes, and lack 
many of the procedural mechanisms typically found in the West to enforce 
and protect legal rights. The courts’ power to enforce decisions, especially 
against government agencies, remains questionable. In a situation where 
contract breaches are an ordinary occurrence these legislative gaps represent 
a significant hindrance to economic development. A survey reported that 
violations of business agreements are experienced frequently by 41% of 
business managers and occasionally by a further 53%. Only 7% have never 
experienced this kind of problem (CCET, 1998: 20). The result is that
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organised crime is utilised to protect property rights. In addition to extorting 
payments for protection, Mafia groups provide legal services such as debt 
collection and contract enforcement. More than 50% of the entrepreneurs 
resort to informal methods (which include the use of security agents or 
criminal gangs) to settle business disputes (OECD, 1998b: 4).
Another main shortcoming of the Russian legislative system is the existence 
of several sources of legislation which give rise to conflicting regulations 
and make it difficult to keep up-to-date with the current legislation. Taking 
the year 1992 as an example some 1,727 decrees and 8,121 directives were 
issued by the President. The Congress of People’s Deputies issued fifty- 
nine directives and two laws, the Supreme Soviet 290 decrees and 112 laws, 
the chairman and the deputy of the Supreme Soviet sixty-six and twenty 
directives respectively, the Council of Nationalities seventy decrees. In 
addition approximately 40,000 laws, directives and regulations were issued 
by local authorities each week (Layard, 1996: 179).
Schleifer (1997: 23) argues further that the environment in Russia is not 
very business-friendly also because the incentives of local politicians do not 
encourage them to support private business, as in most regions they are 
appointed directly by the President. Therefore, they do not have to respond 
to a local electorate and according to Schleifer are often inclined to 
undermine private business since it could represent a future challenge to 
them. In his opinion they fear that once the private economy grows they 
will not be accepted by these new business elite. By contrast, in Poland, 
local officials are elected and are therefore more interested in promoting the 
well-being of their constituency. The business climate in Russia has, 
however, differed considerably from region to region depending on the 
attitude of local authorities. Whether elected officials have shown a more 
positive attitude requires more detailed research. As far as St. Petersburg is 
concerned, having an elected mayor has not resulted in more attention being 
given to small business until recently.
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In some regions the still widespread negative attitudes towards private 
entrepreneurs have resulted in a plethora of bureaucratic obstacles to the 
development of private enterprise. Local authorities have often ignored the 
tax privileges conceded to small firms and have required licences for certain 
activities, even if not required by federal legislation; they have made the 
registration of enterprises more difficult, hampered access to industrial and 
commercial premises, favoured certain firms in the concession of tax 
advantages and so on (Kabakov and Koscparmak, 1997: 45; Tsyganov, 
1997: 98). As local authorities control the supply of land and premises, they 
possess a powerful tool to restrict competition and personal connections are 
often necessary to have access to these. In 1996 anti-monopoly bodies 
initiated 489 lawsuits regarding the infringement of the competition laws 
(Tsyganov, 1997: 99). The law approved in 1995, “On the Introduction of 
Changes and Additions to the Law On Competition and Restriction of 
Monopoly Activity in the Market’" gave the Anti-Monopoly Committee 
ample powers to control the compliance of federal and local administrations 
with the competition law. This law prohibits local administrations from:
• introducing restrictions to the creation of new firms and forbidding the 
setting-up of specific kinds of businesses.
• granting unjustified privileges to specific firms, thereby placing them in 
an advantageous position in relation to other firms working in the same 
market.
The Committee, which acquired ministerial status in 1995, may impose 
fines, invalidate contracts and issue binding orders to state agencies and 
private companies (EBRD, 1997: 196). However, as far as St. Petersburg is 
concerned the effectiveness of this body has been very limited and the 
introduction of this law does not seem to have had any significant impact.
On the other hand, some local administrations have used a variety of 
measures to promote entrepreneurship: additional tax privileges, guarantees 
to financial institutions working with small businesses, rent on 
advantageous terms of buildings belonging to the municipality and the
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setting up of science parks, business incubators and consulting and training 
centres for small businesses. In recent years there has been a greater 
recognition among local administrators of the importance of promoting 
small business - as explained by Ioffe, the President of the Russian Agency 
for the Development of Small Business and by leading researchers in this 
field (Delovaia Moskva Segodnia, 1997: 4). For example, obtaining 
premises has become easier according to surveys (IPSSA, 1998: 72).
2.4. STATE POLICY TOWARDS SMALL BUSINESS
Small business was identified as a key factor in the recovery of the Russian 
economy in the initial stages of the transition. The state programme 
"Development of Reform and Stabilisation of the Russian Economy" (1993) 
identified small business as the main driving force of the market reforms as 
well as the basic instrument for the structural and institutional 
transformation of the economy. In reality, state support for small business 
development has been scarce and erratic, denoting the lack of a clear 
strategy in this field. The programmes of support for small business which 
have been in force since 1994 have suffered from chronic under-funding in 
addition to being inadequately implemented. In 1994-5 the federal budget 
allocated only 0.001% of total expenditure to small business support 
(CCET, 1998: 57).
Since 1991 small firms have been identified as a distinct target for legal 
regulation and legislation aimed at small business has been passed at federal 
and regional levels. The first document contemplating measures for the 
support of small business in the Russian Federation was the Regulation of 
the Council of Ministers no. 406 of 18 July 1991 - "On Measures for the 
Support and the Development of Small Enterprises^ in the Russian 
Federation" - which introduced profits tax exemptions, assistance in the 
supply of materials and machinery, and allowed for accelerated depreciation
 ^ A small enterprise was defined as one with an average of fewer than 200 employees in 
industry and construction, 100 in science and scientific services, fifty in other branches of 
the production sphere and fifteen in the non-production sphere and retail trade. Both full-
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(double the normal rate) in the first two years of a firm’s existence. 
However, the assistance in the supply has remained only on paper. Even the 
tax exemptions did not have much effect, since they were frequently 
ignored by the tax authorities. The Presidential decree no. 1485, dated 30 
November 1992, reiterated the concession to small enterprises of tax 
privileges and ordered the formation of banks and special funds for the 
promotion of entrepreneurship. These funds were charged with channelling 
centralised credit financing to small firms engaged in priority sectors 
(agriculture production and processing, consumer goods production, 
construction materials production and the construction of housing, social 
and environmental protection facilities). The Fund for Small Business 
Support and the Development of Competition, set up as a consequence of 
the decree of the Government of Russia of 1 April 1993, was subsequently 
designated as the main vehicle for providing financial support to small 
business. Initially, it was attached to the Anti-Monopoly Committee, but 
after less than a year it became an independent organisation with the name 
of Federal Fund for Small Business Support (hereinafter called the Federal 
Fund). Even prior to this date, some local governments had already created 
their own funds for small business support financed by privatisation 
revenues and/or additional local taxes - e.g., for extracting raw materials 
(Chepurenko, Avilova and Pripisnov, 1995: 22).
The first official document which spelled out the duties of the ministries 
and departments of the Federation in the field of small business was issued 
in mid-1993 (decree no. 446 dated 11 May 1993 - "On Primary Measures 
for the Development and State Support of Small Enterprises in the Russian 
Federation") (Tsyganov, 1995: 121). The co-ordination of state policy was 
entrusted to the Ministry of the Economy. In the Russian state, small 
business policy falls under the jurisdiction of Ministry of the Economy, the 
Anti-Monopoly Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the State Property 
Committee, the Committee for Industrial Policy and the Federal 
Employment Agency. All six bodies are represented in the Supervisory
time and part-time employees, as well as contract workers, are included in the figures.
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Council of the Federal Fund, but owing to the strong rivalry among them, 
there has been a duplication of work rather than a co-ordination and 
reciprocal exchange of information. One example refers to the ten or so 
draft laws on small business support, containing only marginal differences, 
which were drafted in 1993. This decree also widened the categories of 
newly established small enterprises benefiting from total exemption from 
the profits tax during the first two years of activity. The following sectors 
were included: food processing and production of medical equipment, 
medical preparations, items for medical use and equipment for disability 
rehabilitation. Exemption is granted on condition that earnings from the 
listed activities exceed 70% of the total revenues of the firm in question. 
Small enterprises were also entitled to make use of accelerated depreciation 
during their whole period of existence, rather than just the first two years. In 
addition, in the field of foreign trade it was decided to allot special export 
quotas to small businesses.
Some additional tax concessions to small enterprises were conceded by the 
Presidential decree no. 2270. Small businesses were exempted from the tax 
on property in the first year, and from the advance payment of the profits 
tax. Self-employed individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activity were 
also exempted from the value added tax. Another measure was the 
reduction of the profits tax by two-thirds for banks and insurance companies 
which grant at least 50% of their loans or receive more than 50% of their 
premiums from peasants, collective and state farms and small enterprises 
(excluding those engaged in wholesale and retail trading)^. This concession 
was, however, modified from 1 January 1996, when the reduction in the 
profits tax was lowered to 30%, and cancelled a year later (Poltorak, 1997: 
5). The Presidential decree also stated that small firms working in priority 
sectors would benefit from a reduced profits tax rate in the third (25% of the 
full rate) and fourth years (50% of the full rate) of existence, in addition to 
the total exemption in the first two years. In order to be entitled to these 
privileges, the revenues from these activities must represent more than 90%
 ^It is not clear whether this exclusion also applies to insurance companies.
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of the total income in the third and fourth years (70% in the first two years?) 
and the share of the charter capital belonging to state firms must not be 
higher than 25%. These benefits are not applicable to enterprises that were 
set up in place of liquidated enterprises and their branches. Enterprises 
which close down within three years (subsequently increased to five) of 
their creation, having exploited these tax concessions, are obliged to pay the 
profits tax in full for the period of existence, but how this measure is to be 
implemented is not clear. However, these rules are easily circumvented. It 
is possible to transfer employees and equipment to a new enterprise without 
formally closing the previous one in order to be entitled to four more years 
of privileges.
The difficulties faced by small firms in abiding by the tax laws prompted 
the approval of a simplified accounting method. Firms with up to fifteen 
employees have been given the opportunity of opting for a simplified 
system of accounting and taxation (federal law no. 222 of 29 December 
1995 "On the Simplified System of Taxation and Accounting for Small 
Firms") upon acquisition of a patent which can be granted only if the 
following conditions are satisfied:
• the firm must not have taxes or other payments overdue.
• it must have submitted previous profit and loss accounts within the 
period prescribed.
• the total revenues during the period of the year to the quarter preceding 
that in which the request has been forwarded must not be greater than the 
minimum wage multiplied by 100,000.
In order to obtain the patent an enterprise must apply to the tax inspectorate 
stating that it qualifies as a small enterprise in accordance with the 
legislative criteria. The tax inspectorate, upon verification of the documents,
? The law "On the Introduction o f Changes and Additions in the Law o f the Russian 
Federation On the Profits Tax o f Enterprises and Organisations”, which came into force on 
1 January 1996 raised from 70% to 90%, even for the first two years, the minimum 
proportion o f revenues coming from priority activities in order to be entitled to tax 
holidays.
74
issues a patent which must be renewed every year. For individual 
entrepreneurs the payment for this tax replaces the payment of the income 
tax. Firms which choose this system are obliged to pay only a quarterly 
tax in place of federal and local taxes (payments to extra-budgetary funds, 
customs duties, taxes on the purchase of auto vehicles and cost of licences 
are not exempted). Although passed as a federal law its precise 
implementation is managed by the local tax authority, which has the right to 
set the price for the patent entitling the firm to use the simplified system, 
and to apply either a profit rate not higher than 30% (10% must go to the 
federal budget), or a rate on the total turnover not higher than 10% (3.33% 
must go to the federal budget), or a combined system depending on the 
sector of the activity. This law does not apply to producers of products 
paying excise duties, financial institutions, insurance companies, investment 
funds, brokers, companies engaged in gambling and entertainment, and 
specific activities for which the Ministry of Finance has requested a special 
system of accounting. In practice, the limit of fifteen employees rules out a 
large percentage of industrial enterprises. Up to the first quarter of 1997 
only 53,000 enterprises had opted for this system, as its utilisation has some 
drawbacks. For example, by opting for this law, a firm loses the profits tax 
privileges conceded in the first four years of existence. Furthermore, it is 
not clear how to return to the standard system. The law also does not clarify 
how a firm with a supplier opting for this system has to deal with the 
payment of the value added tax. According to the law "On Value Added 
Tax" the VAT paid by a firm is to be calculated as the difference between 
the tax paid on purchases and the tax received on sales, but there is no 
reference to the case in which the supplier is exempt from payment of the 
VAT.
Despite the various laws aimed at small business promotion in the early 
transition years, the government was accused by representatives of 
entrepreneurial associations of at least ignoring, if not hindering, the 
development of entrepreneurship. Many of the measures contained in the 
laws designed to promote small business remained unapplied. The tax
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concessions to small businesses were frequently ignored by tax authorities 
(interview with Ioffe, Polyansky, 1996: 29). The total tax burden became 
very high for small and large enterprises alike, and bank loans became very 
difficult to obtain. Accounting also became very complicated owing to the 
enormous number of regulations, whereas under perestroika it was much 
simpler. Orlov, president of the Academy of Economics, argued that the 
state policy towards small business is in effect aimed at increasing state 
revenues and providing financial benefits for state bureaucrats, since the 
maze of regulations invites bribery (Nelson and Kuzes, 1995a: 136). 
Kivelidi, the director of the Council on Entrepreneurship, an independent 
think tank established by a Yeltsin decree, asserted that entrepreneurship 
seemed for the government only “an abstract idea and even dangerous. It is 
a threat to their existence” (Nelson and Kuzes, 1995a: 132). According to 
this line of thought the ruling elite which has taken advantage of 
privatisation to enrich itself would view with suspicion the appearance of 
new independent groups and attempt to stifle their development. This 
interpretation would be supported by the ambiguous policy of the state 
towards small business which has produced little beyond empty 
declarations.
Since 1995 a unified system of support for small business has been in 
operation. This system includes the State Committee for the Support and the 
Promotion of Entrepreneurship, the Federal Programme of Small Business 
Support, the Federal Fund for Small Business Support, the Regional Funds 
for Small Business Support and the Russian Small Business Support 
Agency. The State Committee for the Support and the Promotion of 
Entrepreneurship (hereinafter called State Committee) was formed 
(Presidential decree no. 563 dated 6 June 1995) in order to co-ordinate the 
activities of the ministries and agencies responsible for developing and 
regulating small business, and to guarantee the execution of state policy in 
this field. The main functions of the State Committee are:
• to propose new legislation.
• to draft and implement state policy and a federal programme for small
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business.
• to protect the interests of business people and listen to their opinions on 
different issues.
• to guarantee the effective utilisation of the funds earmarked for the 
support of small businesses.
• to attract foreign capital by means of agreements with small business 
bodies in other countries.
In addition it is supposed to provide the following services to small 
businesses:
• the organisation of training courses and assistance in import-export 
operations.
• providing information, consultation and financial support for the creation 
and management of small enterprises.
The Federal Fund is the financial instrument of the State Committee. It has 
the task of channelling the finances of the federal programme of small 
business support and taking part in the financing of regional programmes 
and other projects and initiatives aimed at supporting and promoting 
entrepreneurship. It can also invest in small firms or in infrastructures 
designed to promote small business.
The provision of consulting and the organisation of training for 
entrepreneurs has been entrusted by the State Committee to the Russian 
Small Business Support Agency. The Agency, initially founded in 1992 by 
the central government, with the support of the British Know-How Fund, to 
supply consulting and information services to small businesses, entered into 
agreement in 1994 also with the TACIS programme to finance jointly the 
opening of a network of Development Agencies for small and medium­
sized enterprises throughout the country. These Agencies are responsible 
for providing legal advice, marketing, audit and accounting consultation and 
promoting the use of leasing as a financing instrument for small enterprises. 
By the beginning of 1998 there were forty-seven such agencies in Russia.
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The outlines of state support for small business were established by the 
federal law no. 88 "On State Support of Entrepreneurship in the Russian 
Federation" which came into force on 20 June 1995. It indicates the main 
directions of small business support. Self-employed individuals also come 
within the scope of this law. The main points of the law are:
• in the first four years of existence a small firm is protected from any 
change of legislation for the worse. If legislation creates less favourable 
conditions for a small business than existed at the time of its creation it 
will not take effect.
• at least 15% of state procurements must be awarded to small firms.
• local authorities are prohibited from demanding additional conditions for 
the registration of a company beyond those required by federal law.
• the new criteria of definition of small business are stated (see section 
3.2). It is expressly declared that these conditions cannot be modified by 
local authorities.
• the creation of a network of science parks, leasing companies, business 
incubators and other infrastructures which favour the acquisition and 
development of modem equipment and technology by small firms is 
planned.
• assistance is envisaged in foreign trade, in the purchase of modern 
equipment and technology and in the training and retraining of staff.
• the government is obliged to submit every year to the parliament the 
Programme of Small Business Support. The parliament and all regions of 
the Russian Federation are obliged to implement this programme. If a 
region does not fulfil this requirement it will not receive financing from 
the Federal Fund.
The first Federal Programme of Small Business Support was approved by 
the Government of the Russian Federation on 29 April 1994 for the years 
1994-95 (decree no. 409 "On Measures for State Support of Small 
Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1994-1995"). The programme 
envisaged a wide range of measures aimed at supporting small businesses in
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line with the federal law no. 88 “On State Support...” plus the concession 
of loans and licences on favourable terms and loan guarantees. The priority 
areas are the same as already indicated in the decree no. 446 passed in 1993 
with in addition a general reference to industrial products and innovation 
activities. However, there are several gaps in the framework of the law. For 
example, the procedure by which small businesses can qualify for these 
loans is not specified. The financing of this programme was guaranteed by 
the allocation of 5% of the privatisation receipts and some budget financing, 
while the programme for 1996-97 stated that money could also be raised 
through the placement of bonds and other sources. Privatisation receipts 
have, however, turned out to be much lower than forecast. Budget financing 
was equally scarce. In total 20-25 million roubles ($4 million^) were 
allocated for the 1994-95 programme, 10% of the sum planned (CCET, 
1998: 54); an amount not sufficient to carry out the assigned tasks 
(Vilenskii and Maevskaia, 1995: 142). The federal programme for 1996-97 
adopted in December 1995 received its financing from the budget only in 
February 1997, which comprised just 35.7% of the planned amount 
(Vysokov, 1998: 1; Orlov, 1997: 132), in spite of the fact that the planned 
outlays had already been reduced from 800 to 386 million roubles 
(Korobkova, 1996: 1). The scarce consideration given to small business in 
the parliament is emphasised by the fact that, while the planned outlays on 
this programme were more than halved, funding to other programmes was 
increased (CCET, 1998: 56). Needless to say, many measures were never 
realised. Even the guarantees to the German bank Kredit Anstalt fur 
Wiederaufban^, which had made available fifty million marks for the 
support of small and medium-sized businesses, had to be cancelled. Also, 
measures which did not require financial backing, such as the reservation of 
15% of state orders for small businesses had not been implemented by 1998 
(Vysokov, 1998: 1). In any case, given the low payment discipline of the
 ^Calculated at the average exchange rate in 1997
 ^This loan was to be jointly guaranteed by the Russian and German government. The loans 
which were to be handed out by the Russian Small Business Bank were planned to amount 
to up to one million marks with a duration o f three years and an interest rate o f no more 
than 15% (Moscow News May 25-29 1996 10) Four areas were designed as the likely 
beneficiaries o f these loans: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladimir and Tyumen.
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federal budget, this measure does not look very attractive for small 
businesses. Neither was the concession of licences to small businesses made
easier.
Equally unrealised was the Presidential decree of 4 July 1996 "On Priority 
Measures of Government Support for Small Enterprises in the Russian 
Federation" which envisaged the transfer of a fiirther 150 million roubles 
($30 million) to the Federal Fund, and investments of the order of 500 
million roubles ($100 million) in highly effective industrial and innovation 
projects. This act was frozen following the strict fiscal measures approved 
after the elections of 1996.
Financial support for the small business programme has been progressively 
scaled down. In 1998 the assignation of 5% of the privatisation receipts was 
revoked. In the state budget for 1998 no resources were initially earmarked 
for the development of small business, and only through the influence of the 
new director of the State Committee were 100 million roubles ($10 million) 
finally assigned, but at the end they were not disbursed (Savchenko, 1997; 
Golubtsov, 1999: 5).
Despite the limited financing the state programme provided, by the 
beginning of 1996 local programmes had been adopted in most of the 
Russian regions (Blinov, 1998: 241-247), and Regional Funds set up in 
more than seventy. There is a group of regions (Moscow, Novgorod and 
Samara Oblast) which have a well developed structure for the promotion of 
small business. In another group the programmes have been implemented 
only from 1995-96 and financing has been low. St. Petersburg can be 
associated with this second group, while there is a third group of regions 
such Arkhangelsk, to the north of St. Petersburg, which have set up no 
structure at all (PredprinimateF Peterburga, 1998, no. 10: 7). In general, 
there is a tendency towards a decentralisation of responsibility for providing 
support to small businesses. The resources managed by the Regional Funds 
increased from 29.2 million roubles ($32 million) in 1993 to 240 million in
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1995 ($53 million) (Ermakov, 1996: 27), but in the absence of a law 
dictating the sources of financing of the local funds, these resources are 
dependent on the will of the local authorities. By law the Federal Fund 
should give to Regional Funds the same amount of financing allocated by 
local authorities, but this is not always the case.
In 1996 Federal and Regional Funds financed 2,680 projects for 310 million 
roubles ($61 million). However, the lack of accurate control procedures 
over the activities of the Federal and Local Funds has resulted in countless 
faults: ineffective allocation of resources, utilisation of excessively 
complicated procedures of selection of the projects and passivity in 
attracting additional resources (Ermakov, 1996: 27). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the attempts of the Regional Funds at self-sufficiency 
through rendering paid services met with little success. A TACIS 
programme aimed at training Regional Funds in implementing an efficient 
credit mechanism was launched in 1997 to address a lack of expertise in this 
field. Given both the long period of time it takes to evaluate projects and 
the small sums they award, these Funds have not proved very popular 
among Russian entrepreneurs. The applications received have not been 
numerous, but this is also because these programmes are very little-known 
among entrepreneurs. According to a survey only 13.9% of entrepreneurs 
were aware of the existence of the federal programme, 10.1% of the 
regional programmes and 5.6% of international programmes for small 
businesses (Avilova and others, 1997: 32).
An audit of the Federal Fund activities was carried out in 1997 uncovering a 
long list of failings. The Fund did not always follow the correct procedure 
when it conceded loans. They were often conceded not through open 
competition, but by the individual decision of the Fund officials, even when 
proper business plans were lacking. This resulted in a high percentage of 
defaults. In addition, the Fund overspent for the well-being of its workers 
by giving out interest free loans and paying more generous travelling 
allowances than those established by the regulations. It was also found that
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one-third of the Regional Funds did not spend money for the designated 
aims (Khrapova, 1997: 29). In total about 90% of the resources received 
from the state were not utilised correctly (Sokolovskaia, 1998b: VI). Even 
the banks did not utilise the resources received for the assigned aims. The 
bank SBS-Agro gave out loans to small businesses amounting to only nine 
million roubles out of the 150 billion received from the Federal Fund. The 
results of the inquiry were revealed in May 1997, but no measures were 
taken until April 1998, when the accounts of the Fund were frozen and the 
director was forced to resign. The new director of the State Committee has 
declared an intention to make the activity of the Fund more transparent. All 
new agreements will be publicised and past agreements will be reviewed. 
Loans will be conceded only through open competition. In any case it is 
planned to leave the concession of loans mostly to banks, while the Fund 
will provide guarantees to the banks entrusted with the concession of loans 
(Sokolovskaia, 1998b: VI). Eighty per cent of the resources are planned to 
be spent jointly with regions. The crisis of August 1998 has, however, 
thrown the Fund onto the verge of bankruptcy since it had invested its 
assets in the bank SBS-Agro, which went into receivership, and in the GKO 
state bonds which were frozen (interview with Khakamada, the director of 
the State Committee, Ipatova, 1998b: 16). The State Committee was 
unexpectedly abolished in the autumn of 1998 and its functions were given 
to the Anti-Monopoly Committee. The new aim of the government is for 
small business support to be carried out primarily at the local level. For this 
reason the Russian government has decided to omit all expenditure for 
small business support from the state budget. Given the ineffectiveness of 
state support its abolition will have hardly any detrimental effect.
The years from 1995 to 1998 were characterised by an attempt on the part 
of the federal government to establish a structure geared towards the 
promotion of small business, which has been shown not to be very 
effective. This structure has been seen by most entrepreneurs as just another 
layer of bureaucracy. As before, many of the measures contained in the 
Presidential decrees as well as in the state programme seem to have been
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just recommendations or declarations of intent, having never been realised. 
Some are so vague (for example, investments in highly effective industrial 
and innovation projects) that one wonders if there was a clear focus behind 
them. The fact that some measures have been continuously repeated without 
being put into practice casts doubts on the seriousness of the government’s 
intentions. A simplification of the tax system would be much more 
welcome as would easier access to finance and less bureaucratic 
interference. A step towards the simplification has been the approval of the 
new law on imputed revenues, which however has been criticised by 
entrepreneurs because it leaves the setting of the criteria for the 
determination of revenues in the hands of the local officials, thus giving 
them another tool of influence (Scimbireva, 1998: 2).
2.5. REGULATIONS
The regulatory regime is probably among the most difficult to manage in 
the world, even if recently the government has attempted to improve this 
situation and the number of activities requiring licences has been reduced. 
Starting and operating a business is much more complicated in Russia than 
in the leading transition countries. There are no standard procedures and 
regulations evolve constantly. A vast array of permits is necessary to start a 
business, and the interference of local bodies with business activity is a 
frequent occurrence.
Opening a business entails a lengthy process of registration and obtaining 
various approvals, certification and licences. In total, it is necessary to have 
permits from about fifty officials (BBC Monitoring ..., 1998, no. 545: 
WA/4). Registering a business takes an average of 2.7 months in Moscow, 
but “only” 0.7 months in Warsaw (Schleifer, 1997: 12). To start a firm it is 
necessary to open a bank account and to register with city authorities, with 
the tax office, statistical bodies and with the social welfare funds (Pensions, 
Medical Insurance, Social Security, Employment). Licensing is also a 
complicated and expensive procedure which is regulated by many
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conflicting legal acts. Following a Presidential decree issued in 1994, the 
number of activities subject to licensing was reduced to eighty-eight, yet the 
criteria for classifying activities as subject to licensing are unclear, and there 
are many discrepancies in federal and regional legislation. Certification is 
also required for a wide range of activities. About 75% of the products sold 
in Russia are subject to certification (Zakharenko, 1998: 3). The cost of 
licensing varied from $750 to $5,000^® in 1998, while for registration it was 
between $750 and $2,500, depending on the region, in 1994, and for 
certification between $500 and $2,500 in the same year (CCET, 1998: 51- 
52). It is clear that the total cost is a strong barrier to entry. Some 
improvements in this context have, however, recently occurred. In June 
1998 a Presidential decree was issued to remove administrative barriers and 
simplify licensing and certification procedures for private businesses. The 
decree is a recommendation to administrative bodies to reduce 
administrative barriers for entrepreneurs, but its effectiveness depends on 
what measures the government take to fulfil it. A first step was the 
approval, in 1998, of the law “Licensing Selected Types of Activity” which 
reduces the number of activities requiring licensing and the cost of licences. 
This law restricts licence requirements only to activities which can damage 
the rights, legal interests, morality and health of citizens and rules that the 
maximum charge for obtaining a licence cannot be more than ten times the 
minimum wage. It is also envisaged that the number of state bodies 
licensing businesses will be reduced, as now in addition to the federal 
ministries there is a large number of local bodies in charge of licensing.
Even during the day to day operations of the firm local bodies regularly 
interfere. According to a survey conducted in 1996, a shop in Moscow is 
subject to twice as many inspections as in Warsaw and is twice as likely to 
be fined (Schleifer, 1997: 12). Eighty-three per cent were fined during the 
course of the year. Another survey pointed out that a firm is subject to an 
annual average of three visits by controllers. Seventy per cent of the visits 
are carried out by just four organisations (fire-safety supervision, the tax
Calculated at the 1998 exchange rate before the depreciation o f the rouble in August
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inspectorate, the sanitary station and the police) (IPSSA, 1998: 60). Due to 
the ambiguity of legislation it is very easy for officials to find an 
infringement of the law. This continuous interaction with officials 
frequently requires the payment of bribes. Two-thirds of entrepreneurs are 
estimated to have been victims of extortion by bureaucrats. For twenty per 
cent this is a frequent occurrence (OECD, 1998a: 5). On average in Russia 
small businesses are said to pay at least $500 a month in bribes. More is 
paid at the beginning of their activity when the firm is registered. The 
tremendous level that corruption has reached among state officials is also 
recognised by senior ministries. The Interior Minister, Kulikov, admitted 
that he had been unprepared for the level of corruption existing in state 
bodies, particularly in his own ministry (Varese, 1997: 588).
2.6. CRIME
The great majority of businesses are believed to pay protection money: 
around 70% according to surveys (CCET, 1998: 24). The rackets are mainly 
interested in trading companies, rather than industrial firms, as profits are 
believed to be higher in this sector. In order to gain market intelligence, 
racketeers are said to have their men in the banks who inform them of the 
most significant transactions (Blinov, 1996: 41). However, to what extent 
criminal activity represents a constraint for small businesses is unclear. 
Even if, according to the surveys carried out, the racket is not considered by 
businessmen to be among the major problems they face (Chepurenko, 
Avolova and Pripisnov, 1995: 32; Radaev and others, 1995: 56; Voprosy 
Statistiki, 1995: 57; Leontief Center, 1998: 12), the reason for this seems to 
be the reluctance of entrepreneurs to speak about the problem. It seems, 
however, that it is considered much less of a nuisance than state 
bureaucracy, as racketeers are usually careful not to demand such a large 
proportion of a company’s p r o f i t s t o  cause the failure of the firm (unlike 
tax bodies), and provide a service - protection - that the police are unable to
1998.
According to one source (Babaeva and Lapina, 1997: 102), this is usually 10-15% of the 
real profits, not the profits shown in the official accounts, as racketeers use the real
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guarantee (Babaeva and Lapina, 1997: 101-102; Zhuravskaya, 1998: 56-7; 
Blinov, 1996: 41). For this reason they are not always seen as an entirely 
negative phenomenon. In recent years racketeering has gained some 
legitimacy with the appearance of more and more legitimate security firms 
offering this kind of service. This has also the advantage that expenses for 
protection can be deducted from the taxable profits. The racket is, 
however, only one part of the criminal world. A survey published in 1996 
showed that Russians considered crime to be the second most pressing 
problem after the price increases in the previous five years. Especially 
vulnerable are highly placed managers, a great number of whom have been 
murdered in contract killings. Eighty-three per cent of managers 
complained of having been subjected to coercion and threats.
2.7. SOURCES OF FINANCE
The lack of capital is even more of a hindrance for the creation of small 
firms than in Western countries due to the reasons explained in the 
introduction. The banking system inherited from the previous regime is still 
ill prepared to meet the financing needs of the private sector. In Russia, 
lending to the private sector was 10% of GDP in 1997^ ,^ while in other 
transition countries such as Poland and Hungary it was almost 40% 
(Russian Economic Trends, 1998, no. 1: 96), and it is usually short-term. 
Loans of over a year were until recently almost unobtainable by small 
firms 3^. Entrepreneurs, therefore, lack the necessary resources to expand 
micro enterprises into small and medium firms. At the same time interest 
rates are very high. For example, they ranged from 30% to 70% per year in 
1998, before the rouble devaluation, at a time when inflation was at about 
10% (Broadman, 1999: 22). For these reasons only a small, although 
growing, minority of entrepreneurs manage to receive loans from banks. On 
the other hand, less than half are estimated to have the capability to apply
accounts of a firm to calculate how much it can pay.
12
The figure refers to January-November 1997,
As o f 1 January 1996 the percentage o f long-term loans in the total value o f  loans in the 
Russian banking system was 5.7% (IPSSA, 1997b: 20).
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for bank loans. Therefore, they tend to rely on informal forms of financing, 
as only 15-20% of the costs of setting up a firm come from personal savings 
(CCET, 1998: 22). However, the situation is slowly improving. Various 
initiatives funded by foreign donors have demonstrated that financing small 
businesses can be profitable. Even if not all the international programmes 
have achieved self-sufficiency they can still be considered successful 
because the proportion of non-returnable loans has been very low and their 
example has stimulated in the last few years Russian banks in developing 
small business and micro-lending p r o g r a m m e s (Arnold, 1999: 41; IPSSA, 
1997b: 21), while before small enterprises could receive loans only from 
banks working in the context of EBRD and other international programmes. 
Although the crisis of August 1998 has led to a sharp fall in the concession 
of loans by the EBRD and to a rise in arrears for foreign currency loans this 
is due to the sharp depreciation of the rouble which made foreign currency 
loans three times dearer in the space of a month. The amount of loans 
conceded was, however, planned to be back to almost the pre-crisis levels 
by the end of 1999*  ^(Merkushev, 1999: 17).
2.8. FACTORS WHICH HAVE LED TO A SLOWER 
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL BUSINESS IN RUSSIA COMPARED 
TO THE LEADING TRANSITION COUNTRIES: AN ANALYSIS
The post-communist transition has been marked by recovery following a 
few years of depression in some East European countries (here called the 
leading transition countries: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and
IPSSA (Institute for Private Sector Development and Strategic Analysis) conducted in
1997 a research entitled “Comparative study of financial services available to micro and 
small business”. It (IPSSA, 1997b: 21) found that most banks positively evaluated the 
prospect o f granting loans to small businesses: 45.4% planned to increase the volume of  
loans to small businesses; 42.5% planned to maintain the current level; and only 10.1% 
planned to reduce it.
The EBRD provides small loans of up to $125,000 with maturities o f up to a maximum 
of three years and micro credits o f between $100 and $30,000 for an initial period o f 6-12 
months. Thirty thousands such loans had been disbursed by October 1999. The loans are 
given to small companies in the production and service sector. Companies must 
demonstrate both their ability to repay the loans and their sound management practices. 
Arrears on micro loans were 1% of the total before August 1998, but went up after the 
crisis and by October 1999 were 3.5%. Arrears on small loans were 2.8% before August
1998 and 9% in October 1999 (Merkushev, 1999: 17 ).
87
a protracted depression in the former Soviet republics and the Eastern states 
close to them geographically. The reasons underlying the different 
economic trends do not differ from the reasons for the differing 
performance of the small business sector. Small business development can 
be generally seen as an indicator of success in the economic transition. The 
best performing countries have witnessed a strong development of the small 
business sector. Poland had 2,000,000 small firms in 1997^ ,^ accounting for 
30% of its GDP and Hungary more than 500,000 with ten million 
inhabitants, while Kazakhstan had just 52,000, accounting for 7.7% of its 
GDP (OECD, 1998b: 3) and Ukraine had 136,000 registered private firms 
in 1998 (plus 3,000 co-operatives), a number which has been practically 
stable since 1994-5 (Smallbone and Welter, 1999: 14), indicating that, as in 
Russia, small business has stopped growing.
It has been argued that the countries which implemented the reforms more 
swiftly were the first to recover, while the slower countries to reform have 
fared worse. However, this explanation is only partially convincing and 
does not explain why in some countries the advocated reforms had much 
less effect than in others. In Russia there was a belief that simply laying 
down free market legislation and privatising state assets would quickly lead 
to a well-functioning market economy and a swift rise in living standards. 
One of the plans at the time of perestroika was recommending the switch 
from a command system to a market economy in 500 days. However, 
several years have passed and Russia is still not a proper functioning market 
economy. What has changed is that, despite the extensive privatisation 
carried out, industrial output has fallen by more than half. In Poland the 
industrial sector has performed mueh better, despite having been privatised 
much less. Not only has the new private sector been more vibrant, but 
former state firms have been able to restructure more than in Russia, where
The definition of small firm is not, however, uniform across all the transition countries. 
Statistical bodies in Poland define a small firm as having fewer than six employees and a 
medium-scale firm as one with 6-50 employees, so the terms small and medium firms 
broadly correspond to the Russian definition o f small firms. Poland’s figure probably 
refers to small and medium-sized companies, as defined by Polish statistical bodies.
the beneficial effects of privatisation are not very ciear^ .^
The absence of a stable macroeconomic environment - especially the high 
inflation experienced by Russia for several years and the budget deficits - 
has been used to explain the continuous economic depression. It is known 
that stability makes planning easier for firms, especially with regard to the 
timing of investment, expansion and innovations. High rates of inflation 
have a deleterious effect on manufacturing activities deterring long-term 
investments, while encouraging entrepreneurs to engage in activities with 
high turnover and a high profit margin (Smallbone and Welter, 1999: 9). 
However, even when Russia achieved a reasonable degree of stability in 
1996-1997 and 1998 up to the August crisis, with inflation down to almost 
single-digit figures, it did not experience any r e c o v e ry b u t  only a decrease 
in the rate of output fall, and small business did not grow. Considering bow 
much output bad fallen previously, this cannot be regarded as a real 
achievement.
The lack of an effective system of state support for small business and the 
limited financing provided to small businesses has been cited as another 
reason for the lack of small business growth. Entrepreneurs have bad to rely 
only on savings and borrowings from family and friends to finance the 
creation of their enterprises. The reform process has been based on 
aebieving macroeconomic targets and has given little attention to small 
business. However, the situation was not much different in the leading
Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993: 253) argue that also state industries in Poland have 
been able to carry out significant restructuring. On the impact o f privatisation in Russia 
there is disagreement among scholars. Jones (1998: 96), on the basis o f econometric 
work, concluded that the impact o f privatisation in St. Petersburg was quite weak. Sanches- 
Andres (1998: 252) found that the results of privatisation in the defence industry in terms 
o f production adjustment were small. Ickes and Ryterman (as quoted by Rutland, 1996: 32) 
also did not find any consistent difference in performance between privatised and state 
firms. Earle and Estrin (as quoted by Schleifer, 1997: 7) and Earle and Rose (1996: 11) 
found instead that privatised firms restructured much faster than state firms. A reason for 
the alleged slow restructuring process in Russian privatised firms might be the slower rate 
of managerial turnover. According to two different surveys in the Czech Republic 70% of 
the privatised companies replaced most o f their management between 1992 and 1995, 
whereas in Russia only 32% of the companies privatised in 1992-1993 had carried out 
changes in top management by 1995-1996 (Russian Economic Trends, 1998, no, 2: 50).
A growth rate o f 0.8% was registered in 1997, but negative growth would have been 
recorded except for the increase of 2% in the share o f the unofficial economy in GDP.
89
transition countries. None of them had a coherent policy for SME 
development, at least in the first half of the 1990s and financing for small 
businesses was scarce. As explained in section 1.4 the legal system was 
hardly condueive to growth, even if in the leading transition countries it 
compared favourably with Russia (EBRD, 1997: 17-81).
We can, therefore, affirm that small business does not require a focused 
policy to develop, but has thrived in some transition countries despite 
several constraints. Once eeonomic freedom is granted, people try to 
exploit the new opportunities and this gives rise to a new class of property 
owners, whose importance in the economy tends to grow year after year.
In order to understand why Russia has under-performed we have, therefore, 
to take other factors into consideration, although some explanations are not 
fully convincing such as:
• political instability
• diffusion of the protection rackets
• low social capital.
Political instability does not seem to be relevant for domestic entrepreneurs, 
otherwise we should have witnessed a burst of entrepreneurship following 
Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996; the re-election was much more important for 
foreign investors, who were encouraged by this to invest more in Russia. 
The danger of a return to a communist regime and a re-nationalisation of 
private property is not really contemplated by domestic entrepreneurs. The 
evidence on protection rackets being a serious eonstraint is blurred. More 
small businesses pay protection money than their Polish or Czech 
counterparts (Shleifer, 1997: 11), but as mentioned before there is no clear 
indication as to whether they represent one of the major constraints due to 
the reluctance of the entrepreneurs to discuss the matter. Low social capital 
could be adduced as an explanation for the poor performance of the 
economy. Putnam (1993: 181) has shown that the stock of social capital 
can explain why some countries or regions perform better than others.
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Social capital can be interpreted as the “existence of networks which link 
individuals or groups to information or credit or as a set of trusting social 
relationships which facilitate the development of productive 
activities”( 0 ’Brien and others, 1996: 4). However, Schleifer (1997: 17), on 
the basis of data from the World Value Survey, cannot find any substantial 
difference between Russia and the other East European countries in regard 
to the levels of trust in the society. Regarding the development of networks 
in Eastern Europe and Russia a comparative analysis is, instead, lacking. 
Russian entrepreneurs tend to be rather isolated!^. Few are members of any 
association and relationships among them are scarce, but how the situation 
differs in other East European countries is unclear.
Whether or not the supposedly lower development of supporting networks 
and the higher level of crime might have played a role in restraining 
entrepreneurship, the more convincing factors which differentiate Russia 
and the other former Soviet countries from the East European countries in 
this context are:
• The laek of historical roots and the longer period of communism in 
Russia compared with the other Eastern bloc countries. Private 
entrepreneurship in Russia has a weak tradition, as even before the 
revolution the principal entrepreneur was the state. In addition, seventy 
years of communist dictatorship have resulted in a lack of business 
experience, while where the communist influence has been lower and 
memories of the market economy were fresher entrepreneurship took 
root more easily. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary had a 
tradition of developed entrepreneurship before the advent of communism 
and some entrepreneurial activity was allowed to develop in Hungary 
and Poland during the eommunist period. Experience from other 
countries suggests that a number of generations are usually required 
before an effective entrepreneurial culture takes root, although some
Webster and Charap (1993: 57) found in 1992 that entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg 
tended to be isolated from each other, from the state sector and from the outside world. 
This fact has also been emphasised by Pechatnikov, the director o f a Business Development
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countries, such as Japan and South Korea, have successfully fostered 
entrepreneurship through a series of supportive policies. As far as 
Russia is concerned, even if nowadays creating a small firm is extremely 
popular^o (CCET, 1998; 93) and entrepreneurs are held in high regard 
fewer people are likely to have the resources to start an activity than in 
the other East European countries, the failure rate is very high (see 
section 3.2) and the number of firms growing large is lower^h This may 
be the result of the adverse conditions a small business has to deal with, 
but it is also a consequence of a lack of business skills, especially of 
primary market analysis. Russian entrepreneurs have high qualifications, 
but feel themselves in need of management and business knowledge 
(Babaeva and Lapina, 1997: 27-28). By contrast, entrepreneurs in the 
leading transition countries are believed to have higher business skills as 
a result of the fresher memories of a market economy and the more 
frequent contacts they had with Western firms in the communist period.
• The existence of larger bureaucratic obstacles (see section 2.5). It is 
more difficult to open a business due to the lack of a standard procedure 
of registration, licensing and certification with clear rules and the 
regulations a business has to comply with in its activity are very 
convoluted, especially for manufacturing enterprises. The evaluation of 
the national and local government detected in surveys has been negative 
in Russia as well as in the other former Soviet countries. Just 12-13% of 
the firms surveyed by Smallbone and Welter (1999: 10) in Moldova, 
Belarus and the Ukraine thought that governments were favourably 
inclined towards small businesses.
• Greater corruption which has a strong impact on businesses, almost all of 
which are obliged to bribe repetitively. A business is subjected to
Centre, in a recent article in a St, Petersburg newspaper (Belenkova, 1999; 2).
As explained in section 1.5, even if  creating a firm is very popular what is not clear is 
how many actually feel ready to start their own business.
For example, output in new firms in Poland was growing much faster than in Russia 
according to World Bank surveys carried out in 1993 in Poland and 1994 in Russia 
(Richter and Schaffer, 1996: 12).
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countless inspections and the attitude of officials is often to extract as 
much money as possible from the private sector. According to the EBRD 
the burden is especially heavy for small firms (particularly start-ups) in 
the former Soviet Union (Akin, 1999: 2). The state has shown little 
willingness to intervene. A tremendous amount of corruption has 
followed the communist downfall. The level of corruption has been 
highest in the states where the old nomenklatura was not wiped out, such 
as the former Soviet Union. Data referring to 1993 show that in Russia 
83% of the political elite were former communist party members 
compared with 30% in Poland (Shleifer, 1997: 21). Russia is rated 
among the most corrupt countries in the world. It came 47th out of fifty- 
four countries analysed by the University of Gottingen (Business Eastern 
Europe, 1996: 1). Similar conclusions have been reached by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit and by the DRI/McGraw Hill Risk Service 
(EBRD, 1997: 37). The culture of misappropriation of public funds is a 
tradition in Russia which seventy years of state socialism have helped to 
establish firmly. Such a culture is unlikely to disappear quickly, but it 
has been kept more in check in the leading transition countries, some of 
which, according to the University of Gottingen’s report, had a worse 
corruption record than Russia in the 1980s and nowadays have a much 
lower rating. Corruption has an adverse impact on economic 
development. Several studies have shown that it reduces investment, 
both domestic and foreign, and, as a result, stifles the growth rate (Tanzi, 
1998: 585-586). High levels of corruption also have a detrimental effect 
on tax revenues, undermining the capacity of the state to provide support 
to low income strata of the population, which in turn creates more 
political instability.
-The absence of the notion of the law seems to characterise worse 
performing countries, while in the leading transition countries there is 
more respect for legislation, due to more advanced legal traditions. A 
market economy functions if there is a widespread acceptance of the 
rules and these rules can be enforced when there is a breach, but the idea
93
that a law incorporates the acceptance of the people under its rule is alien 
to Russia. The lack of respect for the law in Russia has caused legislative 
chaos, effectively making it impossible to work and abide by the law. In 
spite of promises to simplify legislation, little improvement can be 
detected. The approval of the first part of the tax code, intended to 
simplify the tax system, has been diluted by subsequent legislation. 
Ukraine has the same problems as Russia: excessive and overlapping 
legislation, a high level of taxation and a large number of government 
bodies which can inspect private firms while businessmen are often 
unaware of the specific requirements of a given state agency (Pidluska, 
1998: I).
Taxation is also much higher in Russia and more confusing because of 
the legislative chaos. The tax burden is especially high for manufacturing 
firms.
Large industrial enterprises are in worse condition in Russia than in the 
leading transition countries. Taxation coupled with the high utility 
prices, exacerbated by the fact that Russian industry is highly energy 
intensive, leaves manufacturing firms with few resources to make 
investments and to carry on their normal business. Fraudulent practices 
have also played a part in starving firms of fiinds. One way this occurs is 
through transferring revenues fi'om the sale of a firm’ s most valuable 
assets as well as of its products straight into the personal foreign 
accounts of the firms’ managers^^. The payment crisis which has arisen 
means that in 1997 an enterprise received on average less than 20% of its 
sale revenues in cash, rather than in non-monetary forms of payment. 
The rest was composed of veksels (promissory notes), mutual off-sets 
and barter operations (Russian Economic Trends, 1998, no. 1: 92). The 
share of revenues represented by cash has subsequently risen to 35% in
As mentioned before, the tax office estimates that more than half o f the non-payments to 
utility firms are in effect paid into foreign accounts o f the managers o f these enterprises 
(Current Digest o f the Post-Soviet Press, 1996, no. 41: 6). How widespread this phenomenon 
is in other Russian enterprises is hard to evaluate, but there are frequent references in the 
press.
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#August 1998, and to 49% in February 1999, nevertheless less than half 
(Russian Economic Trends, May 1999: 6). Adding to all this the 
depressed level of demand, it is, therefore, very hard for enterprises to 
prosper. In other East European countries the role of large enterprises 
has been instrumental in fostering the expansion of small enterprise 
networks; but in Russia the poor economic condition of most large 
enterprises has meant that a major sales outlet for small businesses is 
almost absent. While, for example, in Slovenia many small industrial 
firms were suppliers of large establishments (Bartlett and Prasnikar, 
1995: 99), this option was scarcely available in Russia. Prospering small 
firms are, as a rule, oriented to the final consumer.
The general situation of instability in the country affects small 
businesses. An example is the collapse of a number of major private 
banks following the crisis of August 1998, which resulted in serious 
losses by depositors and paralysed eeonomic activity for a while, as these 
banks suspended their operations. Many depositors lost their life 
savings, as had happened in 1992 during the hyperinflation, since bank 
deposits were not indexed to inflation. Entrepreneurs complain of 
working without knowing what can happen the following day. A firm’s 
accounts can be frozen by tax inspectors without any warning; a firm can 
be fined for an amount several times greater than the original error, even 
if it is inadvertent; money can be lost due to fraudulent operations carried 
out by fictitious firms against which current legislation offers limited 
protection; and so on.
•  Even if in all transition countries start-ups have been overwhelmingly 
financed by the entrepreneurs’ own fiinds, more loans have generally 
been available to existing businesses in Eastern Europe, as Russia’s 
banking sector is still very small by international standards - much 
smaller than in the leading transition countries - and a very high 
proportion of domestic credit goes to the government and public 
enterprises (Russian Economic Trends, October 1997: V-VI). In
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addition, interest rates are higher in Russia^^. Only 15% of small 
businesses in Russia have received bank credits in recent years 
(Broadman, 1999: 22) and in the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus just 3%. 
In these three countries only 11% of small businesses had received 
external finance of any sort (Smallbone and Welter, 1999: 9).
The high income inequality which has arisen since the downfall of 
communism has meant that a middle class with the resources to start 
businesses has not emerged. High income inequality hampers economic 
growth not only because fewer people are able to start a business, but 
also because it reduces investment in human capital as the poor are 
unable to afford education and training. Income inequality has risen in all 
the transition countries, but the rise has been very small in Central 
Europe (which now has a level close to the OECD average), more 
pronounced in the Balkans and in Baltic states, and very striking in 
Russia and the Ukraine (Milanovic, 1998: 71). In Russia the Gini 
coefficient, a general measure of inequality, increased from 0.26 in 1991 
to 0.41 in 1994, according to state statistics, but independent bodies 
evaluate it to be higher^^. The Russian Centre for Public Opinion 
Research puts it at 0.46 in 1994 (Silverman and Yanowitch, 1997: 27) 
and the RLMS^^ at 0.48 in 1995, one of the highest figures in the world 
(Klugman and Braithwaite, 1998: 46). Economic reforms have greatly 
benefited a rather limited share of the population. Connections have 
allowed them to gain ownership of former state property and amass 
substantial wealth. While the communist nomenklatura was wiped out in
In Hungary real interest rates were about 10% in 1996 (Oakey, 1997: 38), and in 
Slovenia 10-15% in the mid-1990s (Marot, 1997: 57), but in Russia only loans in dollars 
are available at these rates, while interest rates on loans in roubles went from 30% to 70% 
per year in 1998 before the August crisis. In this period inflation was below 10% 
(Broadman, 1999: 22). The average cost o f a one-year loan from a commercial bank for an 
enterprise was 39% in August 1997 (Russian Economic Trends, October 1997: V).
The official data are based on the Family Budget Survey, which has been subjected to a 
certain amount o f criticism as being scarcely representative o f the total population 
(Klugman and Braithwaite, 1998: 41-42).
REMS stands for Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, a household survey carried 
out by Goskomstat with technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and 
USAID.
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the leading transition countries, this did not happen in Russia and the 
Ukraine. The wealthy have indulged in conspicuous consumption which 
has benefited importers of expensive foreign goods and in the main cities 
also the construction business, but they have not been inclined to invest 
in the domestic economy, preferring to send their wealth abroad. A 
large amount of money has left the country before and since the downfall 
of communism.
As Russians slowly adapt to the new market practices, a process of 
industrial restructuring is bound to take place, as the better managed 
enterprises expand. This is already taking place in some sectors (food, 
construction materials, pharmaceuticals), where domestic firms are winning 
market shares. The speed of this expansions hinges on how Russia will deal 
with the above-mentioned factors. Some improvements can be detected in 
the procedures for opening a business (new legislation has been approved) 
and in the availability of loans, but in regard to other matters there have 
been no changes in the second half of the 1990s; the same as in the first 
half. The political will to address them is lacking, and the poor performance 
in the December 1999 parliamentary election of the parties which claim to 
support the entrepreneurial class (Yabloko and Otchestvo) does not bode 
well for the future, but much depends on the next President given his 
extensive powers. Will the new president try to rein in corruption and give 
a cleaner image which can serve as an example to the country, will it be 
willing to simplify taxation and legislation? Will its economic policy be 
biased towards dispensing favours to connected figures? Another 
outstanding issue is how long will it take before small business takes a firm 
root also outside the major cities. Whole areas of Russia, which were 
dominated by state firms and farms now practically bankrupt, have little 
economic activity with the population surviving by growing its own food. 
The prerequisites for the growth of new enterprises are absent, and a way 
out of the current depression will take much longer in such places.
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2.9. CONCLUSION
Russia is still far from having a well-functioning market economy. The 
Russian tax system favours consumption over investment and is a serious 
impediment to growth. According to the Heritage Foundation, it is ranked 
117th out of a list of 150 in an index of economic freedom, which evaluates 
how countries score on a list of ten factors, including trade and taxation 
policy, level of privatisation, monetary policy, property rights, antitrust 
regulation and the size of the unofficial economy (Varese, 1997: 579). The 
business environment is rather hostile with a high incidence of arbitrary 
interference and corruption, especially among public officials. The 
constraints emphasised in this chapter affect all businesses, but they have an 
especially strongly negative impact on small business because of the 
disproportionate burden of complying with convoluted legislation which is 
impossible to abide by. The complications in tax legislation mean that a 
great amount of time is needed to deal with a never-ending set of problems 
with the constant risk of incurring heavy tax penalties and high costs in 
administrative personnel. The taxation system has regularly come at the top 
of the lists of factors constraining small business in the various surveys, not 
only because of the sheer amount of taxes, but also for the behaviour of tax 
inspectors, often characterised by the absence of a sense of fairness. The 
incomplete legislative framework is often ranked in second place (CCET, 
1998: 22). The flight of some foreign investors, even after investing a 
considerable amount of money^^, highlights the difficulties of the Russian 
business environment. The simplification of the tax system with the 
approval of the new tax code could make life easier, but this is unlikely to 
be a panacea as the successive amendments could erode the beneficial 
effects of the new code. Protection rackets, which have arisen because of 
the weakness of legislation, are also believed to place a high burden on 
small firms, but are not necessarily seen as a negative phenomenon because
give two examples: IBM closed its factory in Zelenograd in March 1996 just two 
years after it was opened, one o f the reasons being that the agreement with federal 
authorities to exempt components and parts from import duties was not respected; and 
Philipps sold to the regional government its factory in Voronezh for one rouble after having 
carried out considerable investments (Matveeva, 1999: 16).
98
they fill a gap that the state cannot. Evidence suggests that, unlike the state, 
these rackets seem concerned not to suffocate business activities with 
excessive demands.
As far as the state policy towards small business is concerned in the post­
communist period there has been a considerable discrepancy between words 
and actions. Little of what has been approved has been implemented. This 
has resulted in a lack of trust towards the state which is not viewed as 
credible. Ultimately, only the first programme of small business support 
received funding, but even the limited resources provided were largely 
ineffective. No real commitment has been shown by the state in improving 
business conditions for small firms. Conditions have become even worse in 
some areas (for example, taxation and availability of finance) compared 
with the late Soviet period. Some have claimed it was a specific policy to 
keep economic power in the hands of the former masters, but it is also 
related to the general chaotic state of the Russian economy. The efficacy of 
the tax concessions for small businesses is questionable, as they are open to 
abuse. Firms may re-register under another name once the period of tax 
benefits has expired. It would be more appropriate to simplify taxation and 
reduce the tax burden.
The reasons why small business growth was slower in Russia compared 
with the leading transition countries can be attributed to the less developed 
business skills, which are due to historical reasons. Another reason is that 
as summarised by Nellis (1999: 18): “Poor outcomes have been more 
pronounced where the post-transition state structures have been weak and 
fractured, allowing parts of the government to be captured by groups whose 
major objective is to use the state to legitimate or mask their acquisition of 
wealth”.
The actual development level of the small business sector in Russia and St. 
Petersburg will be analysed in the next chapter trying to assess whether the 
official statistics give the true picture taking into account the other sources 
of information we have.
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3. MEASURING SMALL BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
INTRODUCTION
Any research on small business in the transition countries has to examine 
closely the methodology used to produce statistics, given the ongoing 
process of adapting the system of statistical accounting from the old method 
to the new. For this reason, statistical methods may not be adequate to 
capture the new private sector which is emerging in these countries. The 
methods of collecting statistics are analysed first. Then I will comment on 
the figures on small business in Russia and in St. Petersburg, although the 
frequent changes in the method of calculation make it difficult to carry out 
such an analysis. I will critically assess the reliability of different data on 
small business, the available evidence on the origins of small businesses, on 
creation and failure rates, and the changes in the composition of this sector 
throughout the 1990s. Evidence on whether the process of stagnation is a 
real phenomenon or not is also assessed in addition to the results of surveys 
on the small business sector, which may offer some explanation on how 
small businesses are faring. In looking at St. Petersburg these wider issues 
will be discussed in a local context.
3.1. THE METHODOLOGY USED BY STATISTICAL BODIES TO 
ANALYSE SMALL BUSINESS
In the Soviet period statistical observation covered all enterprises, which 
had to report on thousands of indicators: not only financial data, but also 
production and technical indicators had to be provided on a regular basis in 
order to check plan fulfilment. Information on small enterprises belonging 
to the private sector has been collected by the State Committee on Statistics 
(Goskomstat) since the birth of the first co-operatives in 1987, but initially 
there was no single body specialised in collecting this information. Data 
on small business were collected separately by each branch department 
using their own specific methods. The different statistical forms used for the
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various sectors did not allow for an overall picture of small business, as 
most of the indicators varied from sector to sector (Alimova and other, 
1998; 29). Only some general indicators - absolute numbers, wage levels, 
employment structure - on all small enterprises were calculated by the 
Department of Labour and Wages. In 1993 a special department was finally 
established, charged among other things with providing data on small 
enterprises. At the end of 1995 this task was given to the newly created 
Department for Enterprise Statistics.
Because of several changes in the methodology which occurred during these 
years, data on small business* are hardly comparable. The methodologies 
used have been the following:
• from 1987 to 1990 the total number of co-operatives was collected.
• in 1991-1992 only newly created small enterprises and co-operatives 
were covered by statistical observations. State-owned firms were not 
taken into consideration as in the previous period.
• from 1993 to 1995 all small enterprises were included regardless of their 
ownership.
• from 1996 only enterprises considered small according to the definitions 
stated in the state programme of support have been included. In 
conformity with this law, farmers and individual entrepreneurs who are 
self-employed are also included in the small business sector, but, not 
being required to submit statistical reports, are not included in the 
official statistics.
The definitions stated in the state programme are:
• the share of charter capital belonging to legal entities which are not small 
businesses, to state, religious, social and charitable organisations and 
other foundations must be lower than 25%.
• a maximum of 100 employees in industry and construction (previously 
by law it was 200), sixty in science and scientific services (previously
* Russian statistical bodies identify small, but not medium enterprises, which are grouped 
together with large firms.
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100), fifty in public catering and other non-production spheres 
(previously fifteen) and thirty in retail trade and consumer services 
(previously fifteen)^.
The definitions stated in Russian law are not comparable with those 
normally used in most countries where there is a given limit to the number 
of employees regardless of the firm’ s activity and no limitation concerning 
the ownership of the charter capital. These definitions exclude a great 
number of firms considering that about 68-72% of the total number of firms 
in Russia are considered small businesses (IPSSA, 1998: 26), while small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) make up between 99% and 99.8% of all 
enterprises in the OECD countries^ (OECD, 1996a: 20). Notwithstanding 
the change of methodology from 1992 to 1993 the trend in the official 
figures altered little, while the change in 1996 has especially affected - in a 
negative direction - the figures concerning the total number of small 
business workers. Less clear are the effects on the total number of firms. 
According to a study carried out by the Institute for Private Sector 
Development and Strategic Analysis (1997: 53), the lowering of the limit 
concerning the maximum number of workers in industry and construction in 
1996 has excluded approximately 8% of the small industrial and 
construction enterprises previously included in the statistics. The new 
criteria have also excluded enterprises where more than 25% of the charter 
capital is owned by other enterprises which are not small businesses. On the 
other hand, the limit on employees in the other categories which in 1996 
accounted for 63% of the total number of firms was doubled or tripled and 
this has resulted in a significant number of additional establishments falling 
within the scope of the law. Having said this, it is clearly difficult to judge 
the effect of the new limits on the total number of small businesses counted 
by Goskomstat.
 ^ The limit on the number o f  workers is calculated taking into consideration the average 
number of employees during the year including employees in branches and 
representatives’ offices, contract workers and part-time workers (calculated on a pro-rata 
basis).
 ^Although the SME definition is larger, including firms with up to 500 employees, almost 
all the firms in this category have less than 100 employees.
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While statistical observation was conducted along sectoral lines in the 
Soviet period, a new form of statistical observation (form N 1 MI) came 
into use in 1993 (resolution of the Goskomstat dated 19 January 1993) 
which had to be compiled quarterly by all small enterprises with a 
maximum number of workers varying from thirty to 200 depending on the 
industrial sector. Small industrial enterprises were defined by Goskomstat 
as having:
• up to thirty workers in food and printing industries
• up to fifty workers in flour-mills, wood, paper, construction materials 
and light industries
• up to 100 in electric power, fuel and reprocessing of ferrous and non- 
ferrous metals
• up to 200 in machine building, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy and 
other industrial sectors.
The statistical form N 1 MI also applied to firms with fewer than fifty 
employees in construction and transport, thirty in science and agriculture, 
fifteen in retail, wholesale and public catering and ten in other activities. 
The parameters for industrial firms were changed for 1994 and 1995. A 
unified ceiling of fifty workers was defined regardless of the sector. As 
Goskomstat until 1995 used criteria for defining a small business which did 
not comply with the law, data on small enterprises not included within these 
parameters had to be extracted from the regular statistical forms, which 
varied according to the sector, and then, in order to obtain a complete 
picture of small business added to the figures regarding the enterprises 
covered in the form N 1 MI. The form N 1 MI contained forty-two 
indicators for all sectors of the economy, which were reduced to eighteen in 
1995, while, for example, industrial enterprises not falling within the scope 
of this form had to report on up to 6,500 indicators.
The most significant indicators of the form N 1 MI are:
• full-time workers
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• part-time workers
• contract workers
• consumption fund (with wage fund separated)
• total output (including VAT)
• gross profits / losses
• main assets
• capital investments.
This form did not contain any information on ownership shares eonceming 
firms of mixed property. For this reason, until 1996 a clear definition of the 
private sector did not exist in the statistical accounts and therefore statistics 
on the share of the private sector in the GDP referring to these years are not 
accurate. Usually a firm is considered private if the state share is less than 
50%, but in the Goskomstat classification of the forms of property such a 
distinction did not exist. Among the different classifications used there are 
the terms “mixed Russian ownership” and “mixed ownership with Russian 
and foreign participation”, which refer to companies with state shares 
regardless of the magnitude of this share. The amount of charter capital 
belonging to all the founders was included among the indicators of the new 
form of statistical observation “Information on the basic indicators of 
financial-economic activity of small enterprises” adopted in 1996 for all 
firms considered small by law (Ermilova, 1998: 4). Therefore, from 1996 
sectoral forms no longer applied to small firms.
In fact, the reforms in statistical accounting undertaken by Goskomstat to 
bring it into conformity with standard international methods entail a 
progressive phasing out of the sectoral forms. Yet, in 1997 there were still 
241 forms of statistical accounting at the federal level and 348 departmental 
forms, making a total of 589, but their number was slowly decreasing (by 
5% in 1996 and 11% in 1997). Of the 241 federal forms (IPSSA, 1997a: 
139):
• twenty-four are filled in by extra-budgetary funds belonging to federal 
and local bodies of executive power.
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• 180 are filled in by firms and organisations, depending on their sector of 
activity.
• thirty-seven are multi-sectoral, covering firms in different economic 
branches. Two of these contain basic indicators respectively for small 
firms and for joint-ventures and foreign firms.
From the beginning of 1998, Goskomstat has organised a new method of 
collection and processing of the basic statistical information. Four new 
forms of statistical observation were introduced: “Information on the 
production and dispatch of goods and services”, “Information on 
investments”, “Information on the financial situation of organisations” and 
“Information on the number of workers, wages and turnover of workers”. 
These forms apply to all enterprises, regardless of the sector they belong to, 
except for the third form, which does not apply to small enterprises. 
Therefore, it will be possible to compare data on enterprises working in 
different sectors. For large and medium firms the observation will be 
complete, while for small firms it will be by sampling.
Given the rapid increase in the number of economic entities in existence, 
selective observations of small enterprises began to be carried out quarterly 
in the second quarter of 1995, but only for those falling into the scope of the 
form N 1 MI. For these firms complete observations continued, however, to 
take place once in a year. The share of small enterprises included in the 
surveys varied in 1996 from 10% to 20% of the total, depending on the 
absolute number of enterprises in a given region. At the end of each year 
sample data are compared with data resulting from the complete 
observation and the data for the last quarter are adjusted so the average of 
the four quarterly surveys corresponds with the figure for the whole year. 
For this reason, data in the fourth quarter may differ considerably from the 
previous quarters. Thus, for example, the figures regarding the average 
number of workers in industry, the retail trade and other commercial 
activities in the fourth quarter of 1994 differ substantially from the figures 
from the first three quarters (IPSSA, 1997a: 56).
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Due to the low response rate - in 1994, for example, almost half of the 
enterprises avoided statistical reporting obligations - in order to fill in the 
gaps, since 1994 Goskomstat has also used data from the State Register of 
Enterprises and Organisations and tax statistics^ for recalculations, even if 
the information provided by these bodies is not always reliable. These in 
1994, on average, accounted for 30% of data collected, with variations from 
20% to 60% in the different regions and the following proportions in 
different sectors (CCET, 1998: 135): industry 36.5%, construction 28.4%, 
retail trade 59.5%, other consumer services 50.7%, science and scientific 
services 48% and in other sectors less than 25% (Alimova and others, 1998: 
30), Following the introduction of the rule which requires statistical 
reporting as a necessary precondition for reporting accounts to tax bodies, 
the rate of reply has, however, improved (CCET, 1998: 135).
The problem with data from the State Register is that it contains a 
significant proportion of inactive enterprises; and a great many of the active 
firms do not produce the items declared in their statute. Some of these may 
be "shadow" enterprises set up for the purpose of tax avoidance (Gibb, 
1995: 3). In order to fool tax authorities several shell firms are registered 
with municipal authorities, but not with the tax authorities or the pension 
fund. They may not be detected by tax authorities for a certain period of 
time, but, not having registered with the tax authorities, cannot open a bank 
account or become visible. Another reason for registering two or three firms 
in place of one is that, in cases where a firm has to close down following a 
tax inspection, the entrepreneur may continue to operate using another firm. 
According to the director of the Register of Enterprises of St. Petersburg, 
approximately 30% of firms are set up only to carry out one or two 
swindling operations. The compulsory re-registration of all firms, with 
deadlines varying from mid-1995 to mid-1999, because of the introduction 
of the new Civil Code which altered the definitions of certain types of
Each firm must provide some sort o f data to the statistical office, tax authorities, pension 
funds, employment funds, registration bodies and banks, but they are often deliberately 
inaccurate, either to avoid tax obligations and for the not ill-founded fear that information
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enterprises should have eliminated such inactive firms, but the compliance 
with this regulation has been low (Kontorovitch, 1998: 9). Because many 
inoperative firms are not liquidated, the share of registered enterprises 
which are estimated not to be operational is constantly increasing.
As most of the firms give answers in such a way as not to disclose their real 
profits, in the industrial sector, for example, Goskomstat matches data 
received from enterprises with indicators such as freight transport volumes, 
tax offices data and the results of its own market surveys in order to assess 
the real production levels (Aris, 1997: 19). However, as declared by 
Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1999: 511) that the methodology of adjustment 
has never been made public and it is unclear to what extent these figures 
reflect reality. Goskomstat has progressively increased its estimate of the 
size of the grey economy in recent years from 18% of GDP to 20%, then to 
22-23% in 1996 and 25% in 1997 (Boiko, 1997: 9; Khanin, 1997: 7), while 
at the end of the communist era this coefficient was just 4%^ (Economist, 
1995: 107). The sectors in which in 1996 unofficial sales had the lowest 
share of total sales were considered by Goskomstat to be industry - 11%, 
transport and communications - 9%, and construction - 8%, while the 
highest share was in retail trade - 63% (Aris, 1997: 19).
The official estimates of the informal economy are, however, probably too 
low. The same Goskomstat admits that it may be as high as 30% of GDP 
(Shul’ga, 1997: 50). A 1996 survey of industrial and commercial firms 
taken in equal numbers suggested that the average share of the unofficial 
sales was about 29% of the total revenues by the admission of the directors 
of the enterprises surveyed (Simachev, 1997: 21), while scholars’ estimates 
for the whole economy vary between 30% and 40% (Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda, 1996 : 98-99; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 1999: 3; 
EBRD, 1997: 74). Concerning small businesses an extensive survey on 
small business carried out between 1992 and 1994 by the Institute for 
Private Sector Development and Strategic Analysis (Voprosy Statistiki,
might end up in criminal hands.
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1995: 39), found that about a third of the output was unofficial. In this 
survey, the share of the unofficial economy was found to be quite uniform 
at 30-35% of the total in the different sectors considered (industry, 
construction, commerce, public catering and other services). These figures 
are very close to the previous survey which covered large and small firms 
alike. There are some estimates which point to an even greater share 
accounted for by the grey economy in the small business sector^, but most 
of the studies carried out suggest that the grey economy is between 30% and 
40% of the turnover (studies reported by IPSSA, 1998: 106).
The figures provided by Goskomstat regarding the total number of small 
firms refer only to active enterprises without foreign participation. Firms 
with foreign participation are eovered by a different form and are not 
included in the statistics among small firms. Data on the number of active 
firms are based on the surveys Goskomstat carries out. On the basis of the 
share of firms found to be inactive in the survey-based observations, the 
local statistical bodies estimate the total number of registered small firms 
which are operative (Kontorovich, 1998: 6).
In the opinion of the Institute for Private Sector Development and Strategic 
Analysis (1997a: 58), one of the major research centres on small business in 
Russia, the current statistical methods give only an approximate indication 
of the trend of small business development, rather than the true size of this 
sector. Statistical data are sometimes controversial and the method of 
recalculation used is not clear. Goskomstat’s statisticians themselves admit 
that the system of collecting and analysing statistical data does not allow 
them to follow with due precision developments in the private sector of the 
Russian economy (Alimova and others, 1998: 26-37). On occasions 
national and regional offices of Goskomstat have provided two different
 ^This share is added to the legal economy in the calculation of the GDP.
 ^ The organisers o f the second congress o f entrepreneurs affirmed that two-thirds o f the 
turnover is unofficial (Preprinimatel’ Peterburga, 1999, no. 26: 2). Similarly, Khakamada, 
the fonner head o f the State Committee for the Support and the Promotion of 
Entrepreneurship, estimates that 70% o f the turnover is not officially stated in the books 
(AmCham News, 1999: 2).
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sets of data on small business in the same region, as data sent to the 
headquarters in Moscow are recalculated using their own methods. For 
example, in the Tomsk region the number of small enterprises was 
estimated to be 4,356 in October 1995 by the regional branch of 
Goskomstat, while the official statistics of the Russian Federation indicate 
figures of 5,673 and 5,176 in June and December 1995 respectively 
(Radaev, 1997: 67). The difference of 15-25%, depending on the month 
referred to, is quite significant.
3.2. MEASURING SMALL BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN RUSSIA
As mentioned in the previous section, figures relating to small businesses 
should be taken with caution because information originating from state 
statistics, from bodies that register enterprises and from the tax service is 
very incomplete. Data on the number of firms is believed to represent the 
most reliable indicator concerning small business, while sales and profits 
are severely underreported in the official balance sheets. Sutherland (1997: 
10) argues that employment is underreported as well, but Alimova 
(interview), a leading expert in small business, did not agree. The total wage 
fund is, instead, more likely to be underreported as it heavily taxed^. 
However, as explained below even data on the number of small firms are 
questionable.
According to official statistics, the growth in small businesses was very 
rapid up to 1993, after which a stagnation, characterised by moderate 
variations, has set in. The number of small enterprises in operation rose 
from 268,000 in 1991 to 865,000 in 1993 and remained at more or less the 
same level until 1998% (Shulus, 1996: 70; Goskomstat, 1996e: 688; 
Goskomstat, 1998c: 8; Mazurova, 1999: 3).
 ^ About half o f the salary is, on average, paid unofficially according to the organisers of  
the second congress o f entrepreneurs (Predprinimatel’ Peterburga, 1999, no. 26; 2),
 ^ Although as mentioned before in 1991-1992 Goskomstat included only newly created 
small enterprises and co-operatives in the statistics these data refer to all enterprises 
considered small by law at that time.
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The puzzling fact is that the total number of economic units increased 
significantly in the same period, when, officially, small businesses declined 
or increased marginally. The number of enterprises rose by 56% in 1994, 
16% in 1995, 11% in 1996, 10% in 1997, and 6% in 1998 (see table 3.1.). 
Because of this, the share of small enterprises counted by Goskomstat in the 
total economic units decreased from 69.5% in 1993 to 29.9% in 1998. In 
1992 this percentage was as high as 92%. If in 1996 the divergence in the 
trend could in theory be attributed to the change in the criteria (although the 
effect of this is not clear, as explained in the previous section), the reason 
for the divergence in the other years is unknown. It is implausible that it is 
due to the creation of new large firms. It could be that these newly set up 
enterprises are partly owned by large firms and, therefore, do not qualify for 
the definition of small business or that the proportion of inactive small firms 
has increased dramatically since 1994, when aceording to Goskomstat they 
accounted for 28-32% of the total number of firms (Predprinimatel’stvo v 
Rossii, 1998; 54). Alimova shares this last explanation, affirming that most 
of the firms which cease activity are not liquidated as liquidation procedures 
are very cumbersome. Due to the poor enforcement of bankruptcy 
procedures many might survive in an embryonic state. In theory, keeping a 
firm open should entail the payment of a tax, but it is very difficult for tax 
officials to detect these firms. These points, therefore, require further 
research,
TABLE 3.1.
Number of small businesses and total number of firms
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
(A) Small 
businesses 266.7 560.0 865.0 896.9 877.3 841.7 861.1 868.0
(B ) Total 
no. o f  firms 314.2 609.0 1,244.9 1,946.3 2,249.5 2,504.5 2,727.1 2,901.2
% o f  A to B 84.9 92.0 69.5 46.1 39.0 33.8 31.6 29.9
The figures are listed in thousands and refer to the end of each year.
Sources for the total number o f firms: Goskomstat, 1998d: 342 and Statisticheskoe 
Obozrenie, 1999, no. 3:19.
Simple observation of enterprise numbers cannot explain the underlying 
cause of change. The increase in the early nineties may be the result of 
more new business start-ups or of longer survival times, while the
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subsequent stall may have been caused by a variation in one of these two 
phenomena. Unfortunately, no data are available on this matter. The little 
available evidence suggests that the survival rate is lower than in Western 
Europe, but it does not clarify whether it has lengthened or shortened during 
the course of the 1990s. Only one-third of the newly set up enterprises are 
believed to survive in Russia after the first year in the late 1990s - an 
unusually low share, if this data is reliable (Chamber of Commerce of the 
Russian Federation, 1998c: 1), - compared with a share varying from 76% 
to 92% in the Western European countries (Der Horst, 1996: 279). 
Similarly, the impression of a Western consultant working with small 
businesses is that 80% of firms fail in the first two years of existence 
(Holtmann, 1997: 8). However, it must be kept in mind that many 
companies in Russia are created just to realise a few operations, remaining 
aetive only for a short time. Confirmation of the extremely high failure rate 
in Russia seems to be evident in government statistics indicating that just 
5% of small businesses registered in 1991 were still operational in late 1997 
(Polonsky, 1998: 527). However, these data are not very reliable because 
some firms have never been operational and some may have re-registered. 
Basing an analysis of survival rates on business registers, therefore, gives 
inaccurate results.
Nor do we know how much of the increase in the early 1990s is to be 
attributed to the breaking up of large enterprises, rather than to the creation 
of new firms from scratch and how many of the existing businesses are new 
firms rather than privatised units. According to a large survey carried out in 
1992-1994, about one-third of private small enterprises were privatised state 
firms or spin-offs, 12% former co-operatives and 56% newly set-up firms 
(Voprosy Statistiki, 1995: 55), but by the late 1990s the picture must have 
completely changed in favour of new firms considering, the widespread 
creation of new firms and the high mortality rate of small firms (which 
might, however, be much larger for newly set up firms).
I l l
Overall the growth has been much less vibrant than in the leading transition 
countries. The hopes of the mid-1990s that 2.5-3.5 million small businesses 
would be in existence in a few years have not materialised (OECD, 1997: 
38). Poland, with 38 million inhabitants, had two million SMEs in 1997 
(OECD, 1998a: 3) and Hungary more than 500,000 with ten million 
inhabitants (Paradis and Rubin De Cervin, 1998: 20). The only exception 
refers to self-employed workers, the number of whom, in the initial years of 
transition, grew faster in Russia than in Poland, but this can be explained by 
the fact that their number was initially much higher in Poland than in 
Russia. In Poland there were 1,1000,000 sole proprietorships in 1990, 
while in Russia in 1992 there were a quarter of a million, which became
878,000 in 1993 and 2,689,300 in 1997, but for the tax authority their 
number is still larger: 3.5 million in the first half of 1997 (Piskotin, 1997: 
47). Ioffe (President of the Russian Association for the Development of 
Small Business) goes as far as saying that their real number is close to ten 
million^ (Delovaia Moskva Segodnia, 1998: 2). This, according to Ivanova 
(1998: 29), is a possible indication that many have preferred to be self- 
employed rather than setting up their own firm because of the easier 
registration procedures and fewer tax difficulties. In reality, according to 
REMS*** data referring to 1996, two-thirds of these work only on a casual 
basis. Their median income was just two-thirds of the subsistence 
minimum (Clarke, 1998: 79).
Between 1991 and 1995, full-time employment in small businesses 
increased from 5.4 million to nine million and self-employed workers rose 
by at least two million. Due to the change in the criteria, the number of full­
time employees fell to 6.2 million in 1996** and has remained at the same 
level up to the end of 1998 (Mazurova, 1999: 6). Adding also contract and
 ^ He does not specify on which basis this figure is calculated. For example, it is not clear 
whether he includes shuttle traders and those who sell their goods in the street.
*(* Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
** The changes in the criteria are likely to have reduced the number o f small business 
workers, as the categories for which the limit was reduced represented 60% of full-time 
employment in small business in 1995. In addition, the introduction o f limitations in the
charter capital has excluded an unknown number o f firms, thereby further reducing 
employment in the small business sector.
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part-time workers the total in 1998 was 7.4 million*^. Because of the drop 
in small business employment, its share of total employment has fallen from 
20.7% in 1995 to 12.9% in 1996 (Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998a: 5) 
and 12.5%*  ^ in 1997 (Goskomstat, 1998c: 7). The output of small firms*4 
grew by more than one-third between 1991 and 1996, while output in 
medium and large enterprises decreased by more than one-half (OECD, 
1997: 31), but the growth must have been confined to the early nineties, 
since the share of small business in GDP is estimated to have remained 
stable at about 10-12% in 1994 and 1995 and to have fallen to 7% in 1996 
due to change in the criteria. (Martyanov, 1996: 159; Vilenskii, 1996: 30; 
Voprosy Statistiki, 1996, no. 11: 29; IPSSA, 1998: 46).
Contrary to official statistics other sources give a much more positive 
picture of this sector. Babaeva and Lapina (1997: 21) estimate the total 
number of small business employees at twenty million in 1995, that is to 
say one-third of the labour force, including those who are officially 
employed in state firms or unemployed, but who are really engaged in small 
business activity instead. According to data from a survey carried out in 
five Russian cities, employment in new private enterprises grew from 0.6% 
of the total employment in 1987 to 5% in 1993, 12.9% in 1996 and 15.7% 
in 1998 (see table 3.2. on page 116). What is puzzling is that growth 
became more consistent after 1994 when officially the small business sector 
stopped growing. Half of the new private firms surveyed had been set up in 
the last three years. The same survey, using a different questionnaire 
indicated that the share of new private firms in total employment was 
18.4%*5 in 1998, or 20.6%, including secondary employment, which is
According to the Federal Employment Service 10-12% of workers had at least two jobs 
in 1994 (Clarke, 1998: 55).
These figures are calculated by adding to the number of full-time and contract workers 
the number o f part-time workers, considering the time effectively worked.
*4 The OECD refers to small businesses (both Russian and joint-ventures), whereas 
official data do not include the latter.
The questionnaire on work history has not been adjusted to take into account secondary 
employment. As explained by the authors (Clarke and Kabalina, 1999: 442), “The figures 
for 1998 (work history questionnaire) differ from those derived from the individual 
questionnaires above for a number o f reasons: the work history question was a single 
question, while the sectoral attribution above is based on analysis o f several questions;
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mostly unregistered. Also adding self-employment it would be 22.5% 
(Clarke and Kabalina, 1999: 429-433). The percentage varies around 25% 
and 30% in the large and relatively prosperous cities covered by the survey 
and between 15% and 20% in smaller cities. As one would expect, new 
businesses are heavily concentrated in trade and private services, which 
account for the majority of the employment, while industry accounts for just 
10%. Their estimate is that the share of the new private sector in the total 
GDP is between 15% and 20%, although they admit that it is a 
generalisation with little analytical v a l u e E v e n  larger shares are estimated 
in other studies, although there is a question mark over their reliability. The 
market share of the new Russian firms is estimated to have increased from 
18% in 1995 to 33.4% in 1997 by a study conducted by a consulting firm 
(Tirone Corporation, 1998: 58), but whether this research is trustworthy or 
not is uncertain*^. Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer estimated the new 
private sector to account for 23% of GDP in the former Soviet Union as 
early as 1995, compared with 42% in Eastern Europe, but the method they 
used raises some doubts according to the EBRD, which considered their 
findings more useful in showing the trend in this sector, rather than its size^  ^
(EBRD, 1997: 10).
around 400 people had left or changed their jobs between the 1 January and the date of the 
survey, and the latter data includes a number o f people, particularly pensioners, who 
completed the non-workers’ questionnaire but turned out to be still working.”
They consider that such “a generalisation has little analytical value since it obscures the 
diversity o f conditions between different regions and different types o f population centre” 
(Clarke and Kabadina, 1999: 434). This estimate is based on the fact that the main polling 
organisation in Russia - VTsIOM - shows a difference o f five percentage points between 
those employed in the new private sector in large cities and in the country as whole. They 
evidently consider the higher share to be more reliable than that indicated in their survey 
on work history.
Reading the book one does not get the impression o f a careful study. For example, in 
the table indicating the market share o f formerly state-owned and new Russian firms the 
respective shares are transposed (Tirone Corporation, 1998: 58).
Their estimate o f the new private sector is carried out by subtracting the share o f the 
initial private sector from the GDP’s share o f the total private sector in 1995 and making 
adjustments for the impact o f privatisation.
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TABLE 3.2.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
State/
privatised
99.2 98.7 98.2 97.4 96.0 95.0 93.7 91.3 89,1 86.7 84,1 80.7
New
Private
0.6 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.9 3.9 5.0 6.9 8.8 10.7 12.9 15.7
Self
Employed
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.6
No. of 
replies
3774 4703 4815 4965 5091 5203 5292 5384 5494 5596 5719 5867
1 January each year. Work history data from household survey (in %). 
Source: Clarke and Kabalina, 1999: 434
So, are Goskomstat data seriously underestimating the size of the small 
business sector? Why is the dynamism of new businesses not reflected in its 
figures? The reason might be due to three factors:
• the increasing contribution of new private firms is partly offset by an 
analogous downsizing of privatised enterprises. Privatised firms might 
reduce personnel, having been over-staffed when they were privatised, or 
many might cease activity altogether. There are no official data on small 
businesses classified by the origins of the firm, and even surveys 
scarcely cover this area. Looking at the sectoral composition of small 
business in industry, it seems clear that much is made up of privatised 
companies or spin-offs, as explained later. On downsizing we have some 
evidence from surveys, but it is too limited to allow us to reach any kind 
of conclusion'^.
• an increasing number of small business workers escape detection by 
statistical authorities through not being registered. According to the 
organisers of the second congress of entrepreneurs, 50% of small firms 
in Russia are not registered (PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1999, no. 26: 
2), but there is no indication whether this phenomenon has grown or not.
A survey conducted between 1992 and 1994 by IPSSA is the only one that 
distinguishes newly created firms from privatised ones. The economic situation of the two 
differ only marginally (Voprosy Statistiki, 1995: 58), while the results o f the few surveys 
on new firms conducted since 1994 differ substantially from those considering all kinds of  
firms (see chapter six). However, even if privatised firms are faring no worse than the 
new ones, they might still be reducing their personnel. Glisin and Rogachevskaia (1998: 
25-33-36) found that more firms in industry, construction and retail trade were planning a 
reduction of their employees than an increase. At least half o f the surveyed firms were 
privatised firms. It is impossible to give the proportion o f newly created firms because 
firms which changed owners were grouped together with the newly created firms.
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• some of these firms have become so large that they no longer qualify as 
small businesses. A breakdown per number of employees is provided by 
Clarke and Kabalina, but not a breakdown by number of employees and 
by sector. Therefore, it is not possible to say how many do not fit the 
definition of small business. It can only be assumed that larger firms 
mainly consists of industrial and construction companies where the 
limits are higher (100 employees), but this is only an assumption. On the 
basis of this, by a rough estimate, about one-quarter do not fit the 
definition. Excluding these and also those self-employed^o which are not 
counted officially among small business employees the share of the new 
private sector fitting the definition would be between 10% and 14% of 
the workforce.
This would mean that privatised enterprises would account for a minimal 
share of employment in this sector, as the small business share of total 
employment indicated in official statistics was 12.5% in 1998. At least, in 
industry former state firms seem to account for half of the employment (this 
would make 1% of total employment). However, having to rely only on 
conjectures without having more precise data we cannot provide a definitive 
answer to the above-mentioned questions, even if on the basis of these 
figures the fact that employment levels have been hovering around the same 
level since 19932' seems to be highly dubious. Therefore, there are reasons 
to believe that the small business contribution in official statistics has not 
been fully captured, even if the extent is unknown. Considering the low 
development stage as compared to the leading transition countries and 
advanced Western economies, it is presumed that this trend is going to 
continue.
The dynamism of the new private sector has hardly been discussed in the 
available literature. Almost all refer to the official small business data, 
occasionally commenting on the reasons which have led to the stall since
The share o f self-employment has been considered at 1% as this is more or less the 
share detected in Clarke and Kabalina’s survey in the smaller cities where the share o f the 
new private sector is estimated to be equivalent to the national average.
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1994. Vilenskii (1996: 36) has suggested that the stagnation indicated in 
the official statistics can be in part explained by the compulsory re­
registration in 1994 and 1995 of firms originally created under the Soviet 
regime and then of some categories of firms following the introduction of 
the civil code in 1995. As some of these firms were inoperative, they were 
liquidated, resulting in a reduction of the total number; however, as 
Goskomstat data refer to active firms only, this should not have had any 
effect. The near-completion of privatisation by the end of 1994 cannot be 
mentioned as one of the reasons of the stagnation as between 1993 and 1995 
state firms were included in the statistics and in any case the total number of 
privatised firms between 1992 and 1995 - approximately 122,000 
enterprises, including medium and large ones - was one-fourth of the 
increase of small businesses in this period. Kontorevitch (1998: 14) 
attributes the current stagnation in part to the exhaustion of the process of 
spin-offs from large state firms which led to a strong growth of small 
businesses in the early 1990s. Once transferring resources from state to 
private enterprises was made more difficult, seemingly after 1993, small 
business creation declined. This process, however, mostly involved 
industrial firms, which have always accounted for about one-seventh of the 
total number of small firms: therefore this explanation is not sufficient. It is 
possible that a worsening tax and regulatory climate may have resulted in a 
higher mortality rate of small firms. High taxes have been regularly 
mentioned by entrepreneurs as the main problem experienced since the 
early 1990s, but it is not clear if this problem has worsened over the years. 
Other problems, such as the hostility of local authorities, are believed to 
have improved (Delovaia Moskva Segodnia, 1997: 4). According to Benini 
(1998: 28), small businesses in Russia are supply-driven and do not respond 
to market signals because of the high segmentation and enclosure of the 
domestic market and because they suffer from a lack of a clear market 
analysis for the identification of niche markets. This would explain the 
initial boom in small business creation and the subsequent stall as these 
firms could not survive long. The available evidence suggests a high
2' As explained before the decrease in 1996 is due to the change in the criteria.
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turnover of firms. However, in the light of the recent data on the new 
private sector we can presuppose that Russia seems to be following the 
same path as the leading transition countries, where development has been 
an organic process; although for the reasons explained in chapter one and 
two, this process is slower than in these countries.
The low output per full-time worker - slightly more than $6,000 per year in 
1997 - indicates the low development stage reached by most of these small 
concerns. Even considering that real output might be larger by as much as 
30-40%, the figure is still very low. It was higher in communications 
($15,000), material supplies ($11,000) and trade and public catering 
($9,500), while in industry it was equivalent to the overall average (Russian 
SME Resource Centre, 1998c: 3/1).
In 1997, the highest percentages of workers employed by small business 
were in construction (39.3%), trade and public catering (35.2%) and science 
(35.9%). The percentages in industry (12.3%) and finance and insurance 
(8.3%) were close to the overall average (12.9%), while the shares of small 
businesses in transport (5.2%), health care (2.7%) and education, culture 
and art (1.2%) were very low (Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998a: 4). In 
agriculture it was 3.5% in 1996, but for reasons which are unclear there are 
no figures for the other years. The division of the huge state farms into 
smaller units owned by single farmers is clearly proceeding very slowly. 
The development of entrepreneurship continues to be restricted in the 
agricultural sector also due to the fact that legislation allowing the sale of 
agricultural land has not yet been approved in the parliament (EBRD, 
1998a: 195). A few regions have, however, recently approved legislation 
permitting the free sale of land in their regions (EBRD, 1998a: 186). From 
the following table what is noticeable are the large shifts in the percentage 
of branches such as science, which is not justified by the employment trends 
in small scientific firms. The only explanation would be that the number of 
people employed in this sector varies widely from one year to another 
which is unconvincing.
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TABLE 3.3
Share of workers employed by small businesses in each of the following 
sectors*
SECTOR 31/12/94 31/12/95 31/12/96 31/12/97
Industry 13.1% 19.4% 11.3% 12.3%
Agriculture 3.5%
Transport 5.5% 6.6% 5.2% 5.2%
Construction 78.0% 64.3% 35.9% 39.3%
Trade and catering 35.7% 35.2%
Health care, physical culture and
social security 4.1% 4.0% 2.2% 2.7%
Education, culture and art 2.7% 3.3% 2.0% 1.2%
Science and scientific services 51.1% 43.8% 29.2% 35.9%
Finance and insurance 9.95% 8.3%
Total 22.7% 20.7% 12.9% 13.2%
* The figures regarding the total differ slightly from those provided by Goskomstat. For 
some unknown reasons some years in a few sectors are left blank.
Source: Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998b: 1.
The structure of the small business sector is overwhelmingly private. While 
in 1991 just one-third of small enterprises were privately owned^^, and in 
1993 two-thirds (CCET, 1998; 32) private firms accounted for 84.2% of the 
total in 1994 and 1995 increasing to 90.5% in 1996, because of the 
exclusion of state and municipal firms, as well as enterprises where the 
share of capital owned by non-small-business entities is higher than 25%. 
Mainly for the same reason, the share of small business workers employed 
by private firms increased from 72.4% in 1994 to 85.6% in July 1997. The 
change has been particularly marked in industry -  from 58% to 81.2% - and 
in agriculture -  from 53% to 84.9% (Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998a: 
4).
The composition of the small business sector has changed little during the 
1990s. The proportion of small enterprises engaged in trade and public 
catering23 has varied between 43% and 49% of the total number of small
22 It is not specified which categories o f enterprise are considered privately owned. Are 
co-operatives and lease holds included in these figures?
23 Enterprises belonging to this category are engaged in retail trade (43% of the total 
number o f firms in this category in 1995), wholesale trade (39%), intermediary services 
for the purehase and sale o f consumer goods (more than 14%) and public catering (2.5%) 
(Voprosy Statistiki, 1996, no. 7: 64). Instead, according to Malinin (1996: 10) 
intermediary services for the purchase and sale o f goods are included in the category 
“general commercial activity for the functioning o f the market”, so it is not clear into 
which official category intermediary services fall. Malinin’s category also includes
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businesses, while the figure for small industrial firms has hovered around 
14-15% except in 1992 and 1993 and the figure for small scientific 
enterprises peaked at 7.5% in 1993 and progressively decreased to less than 
5% in 1998. More significant have been the variations in employment, but 
this has been to a great extent the result of variations in the criteria 
concerning the number of workers. The share of industry and construction 
combined fell from almost 60% of the total in 1995 to a little less than 50% 
in 1996, while trade and catering have increased their share from 25% to 
30%. Small firms in industry and construction are usually larger - eleven 
and twelve full-time workers on average in 1996 respectively -, while trade 
and catering firms employ half that number. Scientific firms are even 
smaller, but have the highest proportion of contract and part-time workers. 
These are often academics who divide their time between their university 
and the firm. In terms of output, trade and catering had a share higher than 
their employment share in July 1997 accounting for 36%, while industry 
(22.4%) and construction (21%) have a lower share. Various surveys have 
shown that small businesses are engaged in several activities, although the 
basic activity accounted for an average of 89.2% of their output in 1997 
(Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998d: 1). Manufacturing firms are more 
likely to diversify into trade than vice-versa (Voprosy Statistiki, 1995: 28).
In industry, small firms accounted for 8% of output in 1994 and 1995 
(Voprosy Statistiki, 1996, no. 7: 65; IPSSA, 1998: 46). As a comparison, in 
Hungary in 1993 (the same number of years after the downfall of 
communism) small private enterprises provided 14.5% of industrial output 
(Borish and Noel, 1996: 35), while in Poland new private enterprises 
(presumably small businesses) provided 22% of the industrial output as 
early as 1992 (Russian Economic Trends, April 1997: V). In 1995 more 
than a third of small industrial firms in Russia were involved in machine 
building and metal working, 17% in light industry, 12% in wood and paper 
and 10% in food processing. These sectors accounted for 26%, 16%, 13%
intermediary services for the purchase and sale o f shares and foreign currencies, plus 
marketing, advertisement, consulting and auditing services.
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and 19% respectively of those working full-time for small industrial firms 
(Voprosy Statistiki, 1996, no. 7: 65). These percentages changed little in the 
two following years (Goskomstat, 1998c: 25). The sectoral composition is 
clearly influenced by planners’ emphasis on heavy industry. This should be 
an indicator that a great deal of industrial small enterprises are either 
privatised or spin-offs from larger units, as one would expect low capital- 
intensive sectors such as light industry, building materials and food to 
develop faster than sectors such as machine building. In effect, more than 
half of the industrial employment in Clarke and Kabalina’s survey (1999: 
438) on the new private sector is in light industry or production of 
consumer goods although they include also spin-offs in their definition of 
the new private sector.
According to official statistics, small businesses were more profitable than 
the other firms in 1996, accounting for a quarter of total profits (Russian 
SME Resource Centre, 1998e: 2). However, data on profits are far from 
reliable due to the widespread practice of minimising taxable profits. They 
are also exporting more, since they account for 20% of Russia’s exports, as 
declared by the director of the State Committee (Khakamada, 1). Fewer 
small enterprises - 20% - were loss-making than enterprises in general - 
56% - in 1996, but there was a great variation between different regions. In 
the Jewish autonomous region, 60% of small firms were loss-making, in the 
region of Sakhalin 59% and in the Republic of Buriatia 50%, compared 
with only 4% in Tatar Republic and 6% in St. Petersburg (Chamber of 
Commerce of the Russian Federation, 1997: 2). Surveys, on their part, have 
given contradictory results on the status of small businesses. Some have 
pointed to a worsening environment for small businesses, while others 
painted a less depressing picture. In general, industrial small enterprises 
seem to be the category faring worst among small businesses. The OECD 
reported that surveys carried out in 1995 and 1996 found entrepreneurs 
increasingly frustrated and pessimistic (OECD, 1997: 136). Glisin and 
Rogachevskaia (1998: 34) found, instead, small retailers quite optimistic in 
1997 - 50% described their financial situation as satisfactory - in contrast to
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managers of small industrial and construction firms. A survey carried out in 
selected Russian regions (Avilova and others, 1997: 5) in the framework of 
a Tacis programme in January 1997 pointed to an aggravation of sales and 
mutual non-payment problems. Instead, the annual survey of the Centre for 
Economic Conditions found positive developments, at least among retailers, 
while construction and industrial companies, as a rule, survive only because 
of the enthusiasm of the owners. The diminution of the cash flow and the 
difficulties in attracting finances mean that only a minority of small 
industrial enterprises are able to make investments (VasiTchuk, 1997: II). A 
subsequent survey of small industrial enterprises by the same Centre 
revealed an even worse financial situation for this kind of firms. The main 
factors restraining their growth were a lack of working capital (in 75% of 
firms), high taxes (65%) and low demand (53%). Especially problematic is 
lack of payment by clients, which was indicated by 80% of the managers 
surveyed as one of the main problems, a considerably higher share than in 
previous surveys (Deikin, 1998: II).
What repercussions did the crisis have on the small business sector? What 
little credit had previously been available mainly through international 
programmes dried up, many importers of foreign goods were put out of 
business (including a great number of shuttle traders), and services catering 
largely for the new middle class suffered a dramatic fall in demand as the 
middle class had been hit hardest by the crisis. The effects of the crisis on 
the different categories of small businesses are, however, not very clear. We 
do not have much evidence as at the time of writing there is almost no 
research on small business covering the post-crisis period and the data are 
unavailable for the period after 1998. For this reason it is difficult to gauge 
its long-term effects. This aspect is beyond the scope of this work, which 
covers only the period up to 1998. It seems that firms in the aftermath of 
the crisis have cut down costs by reducing the number of contract and part- 
time workers, while retaining their full-time employees. In fact, the total 
number of full-time employees working for small businesses has barely 
changed, while the reduction amounts to 14% among all workers, inclusive
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of part-time and contract employees. While services are believed to have 
suffered the most from the crisis and industry to have benefited from it, 
statistical data on all the categories of small business workers point out that 
the number of people employed in services remained stable, while 
manufacturing employment has fallen by 17% and construction even more 
by 27% (Mazurova, 1999: 6). There has also been a reduction in 
investment, but the difference is not very significant (-3.5%) and cannot 
allow us to conclude that the financial situation of small firms has worsened 
(Ministry of the Russian Federation for anti-Monopoly Policy and Support 
of Entrepreneurship, 1999: 23).
3.3. MEASURING SMALL BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN ST. 
PETERSBURG
St. Petersburg has witnessed a continuous and, by Russian standards, 
exceptional growth in small businesses in contrast to the general situation in 
Russia where the number of small businesses stalled from 1994 onwards. In 
St. Petersburg the number of small businesses grew by over 1100% between 
1992 and 1998, while in Russia the increase was a mere 50% and threefold 
if we consider also the previous year. Even after the August 1998 crisis St. 
Petersburg entrepreneurs were found to be the most optimistic, as almost 
half did not forecast any reduction in output (Leontief Center, 1998: 10). In 
1997 the city surpassed Moscow regarding the concentration of small firms 
in relation to the population, which reached twenty-two for every 1,000 city 
residents, compared with 21.2 in Moscow, while the average in Russia is 
5.6. The average size of small firms in St. Petersburg is, however, among 
the lowest in Russia, just five full-time employees in 1998 compared with a 
national average of seven, and this explains why in terms of employment St. 
Petersburg still lags behind Moscow.
However, figures about small business in St. Petersburg are as 
contradictory, if not more contradictory than for the rest of Russia. There 
was a very big difference in the early 1990s between the data provided by
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tax authorities and the Goskomstat data which consider only active firms; a 
difference which has progressively decreased year after year. Goskomstat 
considered the number of active small firms to be just 9,697 out of the 
51,400 firms counted by tax bodies (18.9%) in 1992, 22,695 out of 84,600 
(26.8%) in 1993, 57,072 out of 88,000 (64.9%) in 1994 and 68,379 out of
110,000 (62%) in 1995. Data from registration bodies are instead more in 
line with the small business data, but in any case Goskomstat data referring 
to the early nineties seem to be an underestimation, as these would give a 
figure which is obviously too low. In 1992 St. Petersburg accounted for 
just 1.7% of all small enterprises in Russia with 3.3% of the Russian 
population, while in 1998 the corresponding share was 13%. Such a low 
level in 1992 is clearly absurd as small business is bound to be more 
developed in big cities and there is no objective reason why small business 
should lag so far behind in St. Petersburg in 1992. What is especially 
puzzling is the extremely low number of trade and public catering firms. 
Their concentration in relation to the population was one-fifth of the 
Russian average in 1992, but by 1998 it was four times bigger. Different 
privatisation policies cannot explain this as small privatised firms represent 
a negligible percentage of the whole number of firms. The total number of 
firms privatised in the city amounted to 3,962 between 1992 and 1996. The 
fact that more than two-thirds of all businesses are included in the small 
business statistics in 1997 - twice as much as in Russia - might indicate that 
figures on St. Petersburg have been overestimated compared with the 
standard procedure of calculating the number of small businesses in Russia. 
In the other Russian regions, including Moscow, the percentage resembles 
more or less the national average. Only in St. Petersburg is the percentage 
so much higher than the national average. Is it a sign that more small 
businesses which cease activity are liquidated or that fewer shadow firms 
are created in St. Petersburg compared with Russia? No data exist on this 
matter, neither could any of the people interviewed (including the person in 
charge for small business statistics in the St. Petersburg office of 
Goskomstat) give an answer. Data reported by Kabakov and Koshparmak 
(1997: 41), pointing out that 20% of the registered firms in St. Petersburg
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were inactive in 1996 are the only clue which seems to suggest that in the 
St. Petersburg’s register of enterprises the proportion of inactive firms is 
much lower than in Russia.
Small business growth can be better evaluated by analysing employment 
data. The share of small business (considering only those employed full­
time) in the total number of people employed has grown from 5.5% in 1992 
to 22.3% in 1997 and 25.5% in 1998 (Leontief Center, 1999: 10), double 
the comparable share for Russia in 1997 - 12.5%. In addition, there are part- 
time and contract workers who made up 13% of the total workforce in small 
business by the end of 1998, while at the start of the decade in 1990, 1991 
and 1992 they accounted for between 60% and 64% (Goskomstat, 1992; 2). 
There has been a big reduction especially in the number of contract 
workers, which in 1993 numbered twice as many as full-time workers, but 
have since kept decreasing so that in 1998 the proportion was one contract 
worker for every fifteen full-time employees in the small business sector. In 
1998 the total number of contract workers was 38,600 compared with 
369,183 in 1993. The decrease in the number of contract workers is 
according to the Leontief Center^^ (1998: 11) attributable to the strong 
reduction in state financing for industry, construction and science where 
these were mostly employed. However, the reduction of contract workers 
has been across the board and has been more than counterbalanced by an 
increase of full-time employees. It is thus probable that after a time these 
people have been recruited on a permanent basis.
24 The Leontief Center is the most important research centre in the economic field in St. 
Petersburg. It was set up by the local administration and publishes various literature 
together with the local administration such as the Budget o f St. Petersburg, the Strategic 
Plan, etc.
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GRAPH 3.1.
St. Petersburg: number of workers In the small business sector (In
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The rise in the number of full-time employees in the small business sector 
in St. Petersburg was eightfold between 1991 and 1998, while in Russia the 
difference was only around 15%. The pace of increase was slightly faster in 
Russia in 1992, but from then on St. Petersburg steamed ahead. 
Considering the period between 1994 and 1998 we have a reduction of 30% 
in Russia, while in St. Petersburg there was an increase of 72%. Only in 
1996 did small business employment decrease in the city, but this seems to 
be just a consequence of the change in the criteria used, as the number of 
small firms posted a strong increase (+29%) in that year. However, taking 
into account the other categories of workers, the growth appears less 
remarkable, even if still significant. The total number of workers employed 
by small businesses doubled between 1992 and 1998. If we consider also 
contract workers the share of small business in total employment would be 
27% in 1998 - still much lower than in Moscow, where the analogous 
percentage was 39%25 - and including part-time workers 29% (Goskomstat, 
1998d: 174-350). However, taking all part-time workers into account is not 
correct as only a proportion of the latter receives the majority of their 
income from this source. On the other hand, a sizeable, through hard to
23 It is often mentioned that employment in the small business sector in Moscow is more 
than 50% of total employment. For example, the Rossiiskii Ekonomicheskii Zhumal 
(1996, no. 3: 52) wrote that it was about 50% at the end of 1995, but the journal probably 
includes self-employed workers and those working unofficially in small businesses.
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quantify, number of workers officially employed by large enterprises work 
illegally in small businesses because they are on forced vacations or 
reduced working time, but these are counted among the personnel of large 
enterprises and others might be registered as part-time, but work full-time 
or not be registered altogether. The research firm Krona Korsinto (1997: 9- 
10) estimates that in 1996 25-27% of the population received the majority 
of their income from working in small businesses (defined as up to 100 
employees). Considering also medium businesses (100-500 employees) this 
percentage would be 60%. These figures are based on the fact that 
approximately 30-40% of the workers are believed not to be employed 
regularly. Taking into account that between 1996 and 1998 in St. 
Petersburg total employment in small businesses had further increased by 
20% the percentage of workers employed by firms with up to 100 
employees should have been around 30-32.5% in 1998, which is not very 
far from the levels registered between 1989 and 1991 in countries such as 
the United States (38.9%) and Canada (40.6%)^^ for firms with up to 100 
employees (OECD, 1996a: 21). An even higher figure was provided by the 
Leontief Center, which estimated that 42.4% of the workforce in St. 
Petersburg in 1998 was working for small businesses or was self-employed, 
but it is not clear on which basis this estimation was done (The Socio- 
Economic ..., 1998, no. 31: 4). The large increase in small business 
employment is presumably the main reason why unemployment rates in the 
city are three times lower than in Russia as a whole.
The dynamism of the small business sector is emphasised by the fact that 
small firms are also investing more than their large and medium 
counterparts. Thirty-one per cent of all capital investment was made in 1995 
by small firms, more than twice as much as their share of the economy 
(Goskomstat, 1996a: 5), while in Russia as a whole the proportion is the 
opposite. They accounted for 6.2% of total investment and 12% of the GDP 
in 1996 (Russian SME ...., 1998: 6/2).
26 Other percentages are as follows: Germany 45.6%, France 49.2%, Italy 73.5% Japan 
53.8% and the United Kingdom 49.1%.
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Another question mark is the share of city output accounted for by small 
businesses, which is not included among the data published by Goskomstat. 
A booklet published by the administration gave a figure of 10% for 1996, 
but according to the Leontief Center it was already 15% in 1994 (Oding, 
1995: 13). Hodachek (1998: 13), the deputy director of the Committee for 
Economy and Industrial Policy, mentioned a share of 32-35% (presumably 
for 1997), but variations in small business employment do not justify such a 
difference from 1994 data. However, considering the number of people the 
small business sector employs, Hodachek’s figure seems to be more close to 
reality. As a comparison, according to Hodachek (1998: 13) the small 
business share in the Moscow’s economy was 54%.
The effects of the changes in 1996 in the criteria utilised to define a small 
business are also puzzling. These changes have strangely penalised in St. 
Petersburg a category (trade and public catering) where the limit on the 
maximum number of employees was increased (yet employments^ in this 
category decreased by 21% in that year), while they have affected to a lesser 
extent two other categories such as industry (-11.3%) and construction (- 
12.9%) where the limit was reduced by half. This could be due to the fact 
that the restrictions introduced on the charter capitaE^ have excluded a great 
number of trade and public catering firms, while having much less effect on 
small enterprises in industry and construction. In 1995 state and municipal 
firms accounted for 4.9% of small business employment. A further 1.2% 
was accounted for by social organisations. These kinds of firms (state and 
municipal firms and social organisations) had a strong presence in science 
(19.4% of total employment), had a weight close to the average in industry 
(7.3%) and construction (8.1%), but were very weak in trade and public 
catering (1%). Also partly state-owned firms accounted for a low share of 
employment in trade and catering (8% compared with an average of 14%
22 From here on in this section when I refer to employment in small businesses I include 
only full-time employees.
2^  In order to be defined as a small business the share of charter capital belonging to legal 
entities which are not small businesses, to state, religious, social and charitable 
organisations and other foundations must be lower than 25%.
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for the small business sector in St. Petersburg). Therefore, the exclusion of 
state and municipal firms, social organisations and partly state-owned firms 
where the state had more than 25% of the charter capital has had only a 
minor influence on figures for employment levels in the small business 
category - trade and public catering. The only explanation is that there was 
a great number of small trade and public catering firms owned or partially 
owned by entities which are not considered small by law^ ,^ but on this 
matter no information is available. On the contrary, judging from these 
figures there must be very few small industrial and construction firms where 
medium and large entities have more than 25% of the charter capital. As 
many of the newly created industrial firms are believed to be spin-offs from 
large establishments it would seem that parent enterprises have maintained 
only a low or no share of the property of these spin-offs. What leaves one 
perplexed is that in Russia as a whole the change in the criteria has had the 
opposite effect to St. Petersburg. Small business categories such as industry 
and construction have been strongly affected, while trade and public 
catering much less so. This seems to be more logical, because it is more in 
line with the increases and reductions of the limits in the different sectors.
Since 1998 companies with foreign participation and wholly foreign owned 
companies have also been included among small businesses. These 
accounted for 3.0% and 1.1% of total employment respectively 
(Goskomstat, 1999: 163). Therefore their inclusion does not substantially 
alter the picture.
The growth of small business has been accompanied by a deep 
transformation in the composition of this sector. The first wave of small 
enterprises in St. Petersburg was concentrated in industry, construction and 
science which together made up 85% of small business employment while 
tiade and public catering had only a marginal role. In the first half of 1992 
scientific firms were the biggest sector accounting for 26.9% of the total
2^  In theory, there could be a great number o f small businesses partly owned by social and 
charitable organisations and other foundations, but given the fact that these entities 
accounted for a negligible share o f total small business employment in 1995, this can be
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turnover of all small businesses (Goskomstat, 1992: 2). Many of the firms 
belonging to these three sectors were presumably spin-offs from larger 
establishments or privatised units as the average number of employees was 
much larger than at present and has since progressively decreased. In small 
industrial, construction and scientific firms it was 21.1, 21.5 and 13.9 
respectively in June 1992 compared with 8.8, 8.2 and 4.1 in 1997.
By September 1998 among small businesses the biggest sector was trade 
and public catering with 269,700 full-time workers, almost twice as many 
as nine months before. Then in order of importance comes industry with 
103,200 workers and construction with 92,300 workers (Goskomstat, 1999: 
165). A doubling of employment in just nine months is mind-boggling. 
Maybe there was a revision of the numbers to take into account non­
registered workers, but the other sectors did not register such sharp 
variations. The share of employment of trade and public catering firms in 
total small business employment in the city went up from 31.1% to 46.6% 
in this period. The number of firms in this category has grown faster than 
in all the other categories and between June 1992 and December 1997 
increased by more than fifty times, while employment in this category has 
risen by twelve and half times in the same period, but taking into 
consideration the period from 1991 to September 1998 by fifty-five times. 
As a comparison, in Russia between the end of 1991 and the end of 1997 
the total number of small trade and public catering firms increased by about 
three times, the same ratio as the total number of firms.
Scientific firms are the sector whose importance has declined the most 
among small businesses. Their share in small business employment 
decreased from 17.9% of the total in 1991 to 2.9% in September 1998. In 
contrast they have continued to have a sizeable role in Moscow accounting 
for 13% of small business employment in 1997. Scientific firms kept 
increasing up to 1995 (by almost 400%) after which their number has 
marginally decreased, while the number of full-time employees has
excluded.
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remained stable since 1991 -  the only sector not to have posted an increase 
in employment -, but considering the restrictions introduced in 1996 it is 
clear that employment would have increased in the second half of the 1990s 
with unchanged criteria. Yearly employment variations in small scientific 
firms were strong and sometimes inexplicable. Employment decreased by 
26% in 1996 due to the change in the criteria, went up by almost 50% the 
following year and decreased again by 32% in 1998 (data referring to the 
period January-September 1998).
Employment in small industrial firms had a strong growth of four and half 
times between 1991 and 1995. Small businesses accounted for 18% of the 
industrial production in the city in 1995 employing 21% of the total 
workforce (Goskomstat, 1996a: 4). Another Goskomstat report indicates the 
share of small business output in industry to be 24%, including small 
businesses which are joint-ventures or wholly foreign-owned firms. These 
numbers compare very favourably with the rest of Russia, as the share of 
output represented by small industrial firms was 8% in that year (Voprosy 
Statistiki, 1996, no. 7: 65). After 1995 employment has stabilised, although 
as with scientific firms the more restricted criteria introduced in 1996 point 
out that some growth has taken place. The decrease in 1996 equivalent to 
11%, counterbalanced by an increase of an approximately equal amount the 
following year, is clearly the result of the variations in the criteria. If we 
compare 1996 data with 1995 data referring to private and partly state- 
owned enterprises the reduction was 4%. As the share of employment of 
industrial firms with between 100 to 200 employees - which from 1996 
onwards are no longer considered small businesses - is likely to be higher 
than 4% we can affirm that with unchanged criteria a large increase must 
have taken place. In effect, between 1995 and 1997 the number of small 
industrial enterprises grew by two-thirds.
The share of budget revenues provided by small business in St. Petersburg 
is very low, and has even gone down from 17% in 1996 to 12% in 1997 
according to data from the Committee of Economics and Finance
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(Peterburgskaia Zhizn’, 1998: 2), despite the strong increase in small 
business employment. This is in line with the Russian average which is 10- 
12%, but is much less than in Moscow -  50% in 1996 - and in other cities 
where small business had a strong development such as Samara where it 
accounted for about 30% of the city revenues (Piskotin, 1997: 46). Such a 
low share is puzzling considering that in Moscow their share of budget 
revenues broadly corresponds to their share in GDP and in employment. 
Also at the federal level the contribution of small business (15% of the 
revenues) is similar to their GDP and employment share. There are no 
structural differences in the composition of the small business sector to 
justify such a difference. The share of employment in trade and public 
catering firms in St. Petersburg was in 1997 not much different fi*om the 
national share and the same applies to industry and construction. One 
reason for the low contribution of small business could be that the 
profitability of small firms is much lower than in Russia in general and 
plummeted further in 1997. Alternatively revenue collection from small 
business may be less efficient in St. Petersburg than in other regions. 
However, St. Petersburg is the region with the second lowest share of loss- 
making enterprises. Only 6% made a loss in 1996 compared with a Russian 
average of 20%. Neither does it seem that the unofficial economy is more 
widespread than in the rest of Russia. According to a study by the Leontief 
Center (1998: 12), it would account for about 33% of the city’s GDP, which 
is roughly in line with the national figures. The highest coefficient is in 
retail trade, where it accounts for 69%. The share of revenues provided by 
the small business sector subsequently increased to 23.4% in the first half of 
1999 (Leontief Center, 1999: 2), but this was mainly the result of the 
introduction of the sales tax, according to Yeliseeva (interview), the person 
in charge of small business support in the St. Petersburg administration.
3.4. CONCLUSION
Small business statistics have many inconsistencies, such as the sometimes 
inexplicable variations of figures from one year to another. This creates
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doubts over the reliability of these figures. Officially small business in 
Russia has stagnated after a few years of swift development in the early 
1990s, remaining at a level which is well below that in developed market 
economies and also in the leading transition countries. Small business in 
Russia has expanded considerably only in a few large cities such as 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Even though there are strong question marks 
over the reliability of these data, and although the limitations of the Russian 
definition of small business means that data are not fully comparable, there 
is no doubt that the development has been more restrained in Russia than in 
the leading transition countries. Data on small business units are considered 
to be the most reliable indicator. However, data on the total number of 
enterprises suggest a marked dynamism even in the second half of the 
nineties. The strong increase of this figure may, however, be due to the fact 
that many firms which cease activity are not liquidated, but no definite 
conclusion can be reached on this matter due to the lack of evidence. What 
is stronger, however, is the evidence provided by employment data of new 
private businesses which, according to a recent survey, are increasing their 
share of total employment year after year. Therefore, the official stagnation 
in small business employment masks a dynamic new private sector. In 
theory, this might be offset by the shrinking of employment in small 
privatised firms and by the fact that some new firms might grow so large as 
to qualify no longer as a small business. The combined effect of these two 
factors might result in the total number of workers employed by small 
businesses remaining more or less the same. Unfortunately, due to the lack 
of evidence we cannot completely discount these explanations, but there is 
strong ground to believe that official statistics are not capturing the small 
business sector wholly. A feature of this sector is the high failure rate. As 
many firms are created out of the desire to exploit the new opportunities 
unfolding, but without a clear analysis of the market and the economic crisis 
has lasted much more than expected, they could not survive long.
Small business data in St. Petersburg have several incongruities as in 
Russia. It may be presumed that data referring to the early 1990s are
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underestimates, especially regarding service sector firms while concerning 
recent data it is unclear why the concentration of small businesses in the 
total number of firms differ markedly from the rest of Russia (Moscow 
included). However, employment data leaves no doubt that St. Petersburg 
has had a large growth in small businesses by Russian standards, even if the 
level trails substantially behind Moscow. The first wave of entrepreneurs 
was mainly concentrated in industry, science and construction, while the 
subsequent growth has been driven in a large part by the creation of service 
firms. With regard to the level of small business employment St. Petersburg 
is approaching the levels of some Western countries such as the United 
States and Canada. Despite the size of the small business sector in St. 
Petersburg, which is among the biggest in Russia outside Moscow, the 
share of tax revenues in the city budget generated by this sector are 
strangely the same as the average in Russia and no reasonable explanation 
can be found for this except that the data is not correct.
The next chapter provides an economic outlook of St. Petersburg in the 
nineties and covers the economic policy pursued in this period. It will be 
shown how the local administration has responded to the changing role 
which has been thrust upon it following the collapse of the planned system 
and in particular the kind of approach taken to the industrial sector: has St. 
Petersburg followed the hands off approach or has intervened heavily.
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4. ST. PETERSBURG
INTRODUCTION
The chapter will start with a brief review of the economic structure in 
Leningrad to explain the inheritance left by communist rule. I then analyse 
how St. Petersburg has fared in the post-Soviet period since it lost its role as 
one of the major defence centres in the Soviet Union. In the communist 
period, industry and scientific research, the main pillars of the local 
economy, were geared to military needs. Next I examine political and fiscal 
reforms. I will show how the role of the local government in the city has 
changed and how the government responded to the changes which thrust 
upon it a set of new responsibilities it had never previously faced. 
Government policy in relation to industry is subsequently discussed. Has it 
maintained a low profile in accordance with the shock therapy adopted in 
Russia or it has intervened strongly in the local economy? Did it try to 
create a favourable environment for local businesses? Have the old state 
enterprises maintained a strong leverage over the local government? Big 
enterprises have a vital role in spawning small firms. Therefore, the growth 
of small businesses will be greatly related to the well-being of the large 
establishments which dominated the industrial structures of the former 
communist countries. As many services and non-core production processes 
were internalised in these establishments, there is great potential for the 
creation of small businesses from large firms.
4.1. BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF LENINGRAD
St. Petersburg was founded as a capital and strategic city, but its favourable 
position and the developed transportation system represented by a network 
of canals connecting the city with the central and northern part of Russia, 
acted as a catalyst for industry in the nineteenth century. Under Tsarist rule 
the city also became an important educational centre, with the foundation of
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the Russian Academy of Sciences and several universities, and a leading 
financial centre hosting several foreign banks.
The advent of communism meant that the principles on which the city based 
its development - Russian window to the west and Russian financial centre - 
lost their importance. In addition, it lost its status of capital to Moscow and 
subsequently the status of the main scientific centre in Russia, as the transfer 
of the capital to Moscow was followed by the transfer of the headquarters of 
the Academy of Sciences. The emphasis of Soviet rule was to make St. 
Petersburg a major centre for the very industries which dominated the Soviet 
economy (machine construction, shipbuilding and other heavy industries) 
(Ruble, 1990: 15). From the 1950s onwards investment, employment and 
training were concentrated in high-technology engineering industry, as 
planners had assigned to Leningrad the role of a major centre for 
technological innovation. For this reason Leningrad-based research evolved 
towards applied research which could be more easily exploited by industry. 
The labour force employed in the science sector underwent a strong 
increase, especially between 1965 and 1975 when it almost doubled (Ruble, 
1990: 124).
Ever since the fifth five-year plan (1951-1955) there has been an attempt by 
the Leningrad authorities to encourage innovation through the institutional 
integration of R&D and production cycles (Ruble, 1990: 18) To foster the 
adoption of innovation, industries were amalgamated in industrial 
production associations, which under a single managerial unit combined 
factories, research centres and scientific facilities engaged in related 
activities. By 1978 these accounted for between 80% and 90% of the total 
output, whereas in the Soviet Union as a whole the share of these production 
associations was equivalent to half of the industrial output (Ruble, 1990: 
121). A stricter control of decision making was deemed necessary in order 
to overcome managerial resistance to innovation.
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The industrial production associations, which resulted in an even greater 
centralisation of industry, represented the opposite of Gorbachev's reforms 
for a higher decentralisation and were, therefore, progressively disbanded in 
the 1980s. A new campaign “Intensification 90” was launched in 1984, - 
almost a prelude to Gorbachev's campaign aimed at bringing Soviet industry 
onto a par with world standards. Unlike the earlier policy to promote the 
development of new technologies, the aim of this campaign was to oblige 
industry to absorb technology that already existed by breaking managers' 
resistance to innovation. A vast programme of automatisation and 
computerisation was envisaged to improve productivity. This programme, 
however, as well as the previous programmes failed to bring about the 
expected results. As acknowledged by the first secretary of the St. 
Petersburg communist party, Gerasimov, the introduction of technological 
innovation in the workplace turned out to be more difficult to attain than 
previously recognised by the architects of “Intensification-90”. A new 
paradigm, the concept of conversion, emerged in the mid-80’s, but it was 
unheeded until later in the decade, when military orders began to fall away. 
Conversion objectives were assigned, but the state provided negligible, if 
any, financing to restructure, leaving to each factory the burden of making 
the conversion from military to civilian output. For a city where defence 
enterprises had a major role it meant finding new models of development.
4.2. OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN ST. 
PETERSBURG
Leningrad was not greatly industrialised by Soviet standards. Among the 
Russian cities with more than one million inhabitants only Rostov on Don 
and Moscow had a lower share of employment in industry than St. 
Petersburg in 1990. The share of employment in industry accounted for 
33.1% of the total in 1990, while most Soviet cities had a share of between 
36% and 47%. The city accounted for 2.9% of industrial production in 
Russia in 1991, though it had 3.4% of the population (Sankt-Peterburgski 
Universitet Ekonomiki i Finansov, 1993: 60-66). St. Petersburg’s industry
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was dominated by the sectors which have been hit hardest by the crisis. It 
was largely defence-related, with a substantial presence of light industry. All 
major industries in St. Petersburg were linked to the military complex, but, 
as everywhere in the former Soviet Union, were also responsible for 
producing a substantial share of civilian goods.
Because of this the fall in industrial production was steeper than in Russia in 
general until 1996, which itself was characterised by a very steep fall. 
Industrial production decreased by 20.5% and investment by 16.2% in 1996, 
while local GDP dropped by 8.7% (Goskomstat, 1998b: 3), but the 
following year a substantial recovery began, while in Russia as a whole 
industrial recovery has been weak.
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A common feature of the years 1992-1996 is that regions producing more 
sophisticated outputs were in a more vulnerable position. The highest rates 
of decline were recorded in the central (including Moscow) and north-west 
regions (including St. Petersburg), which are the most developed parts of 
Russia, while West and East Siberia, regions abundant in natural resources, 
have suffered much less from de-industrialisation. Regions specialising in 
the extraction and processing of raw materials have few difficulties selling 
their produce, while the central and the north-west regions’ industries are 
not competitive in the world market. Industrial output in St. Petersburg
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amounted in 1996 to 30.8%^ of its 1990 level, while in Russia as a whole 
the corresponding percentage was 44%. The decrease was accompanied by 
deep structural changes. The share of military production in the city’s 
industrial output was down to 10% at the beginning of 1997 (Zhilinskaia, 
1997; 15). Light industry was almost extinguished by 1995, with a share of 
the local market of only about 10% (The Socio-Economic Situation in St. 
Petersburg. A General Overview, 1996, no. 23: 17). Output in 1996 was a 
mere 7.5% of its 1990 levels in this sector (The Socio-Economic ..., 1997, 
no. 25: 16), while in Russia as a whole the relative percentage was 13%. In 
St. Petersburg production of articles such as television sets, tape recorders 
and other radio engineering articles was decimated by foreign competition, 
falling in 1996 to between 2% and 9% of the 1990 levels (Bagrov, 1997; 
10). In the other economic sectors production levels in 1996^ stood at the 
following percentages of their 1990 levels (The Socio-Economic ..., 1997, 
no. 25: 16):
• food industry 61.1%
• electric power industry 58.6%
• construction materials industry 34.5%
• chemical and oil industry 34.3%
• machine-building and metal working 32.9%
• metallurgy 30.9%
• fuel industry 23.2%
• wood-processing and wood and pulp industry 14.6%
Due to the distortions in price levels in the old system, changes in the 
contribution of each sector to the total industrial output of the city do not 
necessarily reflect the differences between the output changes, but are
 ^ Unless otherwise stated figures on industrial production refer only to large and medium 
enterprises, as Goskomstat statistics are based on these categories o f enterprise. There is a 
disparity because not all the data are concurrent. Statistics for some topics are published in 
“one o f f  publications o f research centres and the city administration and are not included 
in official statistics.
2 Data for 1997 and 1998 are reported by Goskomstat (1998b: 11 and 1999: 10), but there 
are some inconsistencies with the data reported in the magazine “The Socio-Economic 
Situation in St. Petersburg. A General Overview” (see table 4.1 on page 155). For this 
reason the comparison covers the period only up to 1996.
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strongly influenced by the variations in relative prices. Between 1991 and 
1996, electric power increased its share of the city’s industrial output from 
4.8% to 22.2%, while the fact that its output fall was slightly less than half 
the average output fall in the city would have justified only a doubling of its 
share. This is the result of the fact that energy prices were very low in the 
Soviet period. For the opposite reason the contribution of light industry to 
the total industrial production of the city fell by more than the reduction in 
its production level should have justified. It fell from 17.3% in 1991 to 
2.8% in 1996. The change in the contribution of the food industry, whose 
share grew fi*om 11.8% to 18% in the same period, and of the main 
industrial sector in St. Petersburg - machine-building and metal works - are, 
instead, in line with their output variations.
TABLE 4.1
Share of industrial output 
(in current prices)
Share of 
employ­
ment
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1996
Electric Power 4.8 12.7 13.6 16.5 17.2 22.2 16.6 13.7 1.3 3.2
Machine Building/Metal 
Works 39.6 36.5 36.8 35.4 36.6 35.4 34.6 36.3 70.5 61.9
Food 11.8 14.7 17.9 19.8 18.4 18.0 26.3 28.8 5.2 7.8
Light Industiy 17.3 13.2 9.0 5.4 4.4 2.8 2.7 2.6 9.1 8.0
Chemical and Oil 5.2 6.1 4.6 4.8 3.5 4.1 3.9 2.0 4.0 4.1
Industry
Metallurgy 2.7 4.9 4.2 3.4 4.2 4.6 3.5 4.0 1.0 2.8
Wood-Processing and 
Wood and Pulp Industry 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.9 3.9
Construction Materials 1.8 2.4 3.3 4.0 3.0 2.7 3.5 3.3 1.9 2.0
Others 13.2 6.4 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 6.0 7.5 4.1 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 100.5 100.0 100.0
Source: Days o f Economics o f St. Petersburg page 3 and Goskomstat..., 1997b: 
There is a mistake in the years 1995 and 1998, as the total is not 100
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The share of industry in the total amount of investments fell from 34.3% in 
1991 to 20.9% in 1994 and increased slightly to 24.9% in 1996, while the 
share of transport has gone up from 16.9% in 1991 to 24.9% in 1996 
(Strateghiceskii Plan Sankt-Peterburga, 1998: 28) in line with the policies 
pursued by the Sobchack administration (1991-1996), which will be 
discussed in section 4.5. One positive sign is that exports increased from 
3.5% to 5.6% of total industrial output between 1994 and 1996. More than 
half of these exports are represented by machinery and equipment 
(Goskomstat, 1997b: 66).
In spite of the crisis it has experienced, local industry still provided 57% of 
the tax revenues of St. Petersburg in 1996 (City of Saint Petersburg 1996, 
1997: 17), employed 24.4% of its working population compared with
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33.1% in 1990 and accounted for 30.4%^ of the GDP (Strateghiceskii Plan 
Sankt-Peterburga, 1998: 27). The number of employees in manufacturing 
decreased from 458,300 in 1994 to 378,100 in 1996 (Goskomstat, 1997b: 
34-5; The Socio-Economic ..., 1998, no. 31: 24), a reduction of 18%, while 
in these two years output reduction has amounted to 30%. However, the 
number of industrial workers continued to decrease in 1997, amounting at 
the end of the year to 333,000, a drop of 11.9%, in contrast to the output 
trend (The Socio-Economic ..., 1998, no. 31:4). Local factories, despite the 
crisis, have been slow to reduce excess personnel. The share of city 
employment represented by light industry only decreased from 9.1% to 
8.0% from 1991 to 1996, notwithstanding the huge output fall 
(Strateghiceskii Plan Sankt-Peterburga, 1998: 28).
As can be expected, mixed and private companies had the highest 
productivity in 1996^ accounting for 58.7% and 29.7% of the city’s 
industrial output, while employing 50.8% and 25.6% of the total workforce 
respectively. Instead, state enterprises (in large part defence companies) are 
grossly overmanned since they turn out only 11.6% of the local industrial 
production, but employ 23.6% of industrial workers. Statisties on the share 
of private enterprises in total industrial production are, however, puzzling. 
Their share went up from 33.1% of the total in 1994 to 41.6% in 1995, but 
fell to 29.7% in 1996, lower than two years before, and then increased again 
to 37.4% in 1997 (Goskomstat, 1997b: 34-5; The Socio-Economic ..., 1998, 
no. 31: 24). The trend in the number of industrial workers employed by 
private firms is analogous. It is strange that such a big drop took place 
between 1995 and 1996 when privatisation was in full swing. This reduction 
has been compensated for by a growth in the share of enterprises of mixed 
property, while the share of state enterprises has continued to decrease 
through all the years considered.
 ^An official publication edited by the government o f St. Petersburg gave a figure of 33.2% 
as to the industry’s share o f the city’s GDP in 1996 (City of Saint Petersburg 1996, 1997: 
5). However, we will consider - 30.4% - being the same figure as the one provided by 
Goskomstat (1998b: 10).
“^ These numbers do not take into consideration small enterprises and joint-ventures.
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In spite of job losses in industry, official unemployment remained extremely 
low, at 1.9% in March 1997 (The Socio-Economic ...., 1997, no. 26: 3), and 
even decreased to 1.2% in March 1998. This is 2.3 times lower than the 
analogous figure for the whole of Russia (The Socio-Economic ...,, 1998, 
no. 32: 3). However, one must bear in mind that a great number of workers 
made redundant do not bother to register as unemployed because 
unemployment benefits are extremely low and, therefore, are not included in 
the statistics. Official figures fail also to take into consideration the number 
of workers who are employed, but are on forced vacations, and those on 
reduced working time. Fourteen per cent of the workforce in St. Petersburg 
was for some periods of the year on administrative leave in 1996, and 10% 
in 1997, while 6% were partially employed in 1996 and 3.8% in 1997 (The 
Socio-Economic ..., 1997, no. 31: 4). According to the rules of the 
International Labour Organisation unemployment was in reality 9.8% in the 
city by the end of 1996 (City of Saint Petersburg 1996, 1997: 6). In 
addition, many workers, although employed, are not paid: wage arrears in 
industry in St. Petersburg amounted to 386 million roubles ($60 million) at 
the end of May 1998 (Promyshlennyi Vestnik, 1998, no.5: 9), which 
corresponded to approximately 500,000 monthly wages. On average every 
industrial worker was due slightly more than one month’s wages in arrears, 
which is a very low figure compared with other parts of Russia.
1997 was a pivotal year for St. Petersburg’s industry. After five years of 
decline, total industrial output increased by 9% compared with 1996. 
Official data show that industrial production in large and medium 
enterprises rose by 8.1% (The Socio-Economic..., 1997, no.31: 13), 
suggesting that output increased more in small industrial firms. 1997 was 
followed by a year in which industrial production declined by 0.3% 
(Goskomstat, 1999: 3). However, this lack of growth was, to a large degree, 
the result of the economic turmoil following the decision of the government 
to stop servicing its debt. The food sector registered an increase in output in 
both 1997 and 1998 for the fourth year in a row, but the best performance in 
1997 was registered in the main industrial sector of St. Petersburg -
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machine-building and metal working - (an increase of 19.2%). However, 
this performance was not repeated the following year (a decrease of 6.2%), 
so it is not clear whether a widespread restructuring process is taking place 
in this sector. On the other hand, the downward trend in light industry 
continued, with a drop of 12.7% in 1997 (The Socio-Economic ...., 1998, no. 
32: 9) and 17.6% in 1998 (Goskomstat, 1999: 10). There was also a rise in 
investment of 4% in 1997 and 9% in 1998, but in 1998 they still amounted 
to only 33% of the 1992 level (Korotkova, 1998: 6; Rybakov, 1999: 8), 
which was itself much lower than the year before. The rise in 1997 was 
mainly due to the growth by 30% of foreign investment, which accounted 
for one-seventh of the total investments in 1997 (Zhelvitskii, 1998: 16), 
while in 1998 the growth in foreign investment was 12% (Rybakov, 1999: 
8). While in 1996 GDP contracted half as much (-10%) as the decrease in 
industrial output (-20%), implying that the output reduction in the service 
sector was “just” 5%, in 1997 industry fared better than services. The GDP 
contraction of 0.3% in 1997 (Goskomstat, 1998b: 3), despite the strong 
performance in industry, implies that services again contracted by 
approximately the same percentage as in 1996^. However, the fact that in 
1997 industry still accounted for 30.4% of the city’s GDP, the same figure 
as in 1996, despite the divergent trend in industrial and service sector 
performance (Goskomstat, 1998b: 10), suggests that there are substantial 
inconsistencies in the calculations of the respective figures. The contribution 
of industry has subsequently increased to 33.1% in 1998 which is line with 
its performance in relation to the total GDP in that year. What is strange is 
that in the official statistical booklet published in 1999 the share of industry 
in the city’s GDP for 1997 is different (28.7% instead of 30.4%) from that 
indicated in the official publication one year before (Goskomstat, 1999: 9). 
Has a revision taken place? If so, this would make 1997 data even more 
contradictory in view of what is said above.
 ^ This is a personal calculation based on the fact that industry accounts for about a third o f  
the city’s GDP. Strange as it may seem, Goskomstat statistics for St. Petersburg do not 
indicate output variations in the service sector. The data on retail turnover indicate a 
decrease o f 6.3% in 1997 and o f 13.6% in 1996 (Goskomstat, 1998b: 4).
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In the post-Soviet period diversification has been widespread in industrial 
enterprises, but success has been elusive for most. According to the 
Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy, 250 of the 1,000 large and 
medium industrial enterprises in the city, were actually bankrupt by the end 
of 1996 (The Socio-Economic ..., 1996, no. 24: 14). According to the 
official statistics, loss-making industrial enterprises in St. Petersburg formed 
30%6 of the total number of firms in 1996, compared with 29% in Moscow 
and 43% in Russia as a whole. This figure of 30%, however, seems very 
low. The fact that reduction in profits has gone hand in hand with the 
reduction in inflation arouses the suspicion that costs might have been 
underestimated due to low depreciation allowances because of an 
insufficient revaluation of capital assets relative to inflation. In 1994, when 
inflation was extremely high (although lower than in 1992 and 1993), profits 
decreased by 25.3% (City of Saint Petersburg 1994-1995, 1996: 101), but 
just 9.4% of manufacturing enterprises were loss-making, despite a 20% 
output fall that year in the industrial sector (The Socio-Economic..., 1995, 
no. 13: 9). In 1996 and 1997, when inflation was progressively reduced to 
nearly a single-digit^ figure, the total profits of industrial firms decreased by 
40% and by 39%® respectively compared with the year before (Goskomstat, 
1997b: 83; Goskomstat, 1998b: 67).
The situation is especially difficult for defence enterprises. The number of 
defence companies in the industrial sector in St. Petersburg is 190, but only 
70-110 are expected to survive (Bogorad, 1998a: 1; Bogorad, 1997: 1). 
Given the steep fall in defence procurements which is still continuing - the 
decrease in state defence orders in St. Petersburg in 1997 amounted to 14% 
(Bogorad, 1997: 1) - the only chance of survival for these enterprises has 
been to turn to civilian production. State orders for local enterprises began to 
drop in 1989, but the reduction became traumatic in 1992, when in a single
 ^ It must be remembered that several expenses are not tax deductible, so a balance sheet 
compiled for tax purposes may bear little resemblance to the real one.
 ^ In St. Petersburg inflation was 125% in 1995 (The Socio-Economic..., 1996, no.19: 9), 
21,8% in 1996 and 10% in 1997 (The Socio-Economic..., 1998, no.31: 7).
® This figure corresponds to the period January-November 1997 compared with the 
analogous period o f the previous year.
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year alone they declined by 57%, thus making conversion a matter of 
absolute priority (Whitlock, 1993: 21). At the beginning of the transition to 
the market, conversion of the defence factories appeared feasible, since a 
large quantity of civilian goods was already produced by these factories, and 
these were generally of better quality than the goods produced in the civilian 
sector. In Soviet times defence factories were favoured in the allocation of 
resources and, therefore, had more modem equipment. However, from 
1992 to 1996 defence industries in Russia registered a sevenfold decrease in 
military production and a threefold decrease in civilian production (Titova, 
1998: 2). Every second defence enterprise is on the verge of bankruptcy, as 
declared by the vice-president of the Parliamentary Committee on Industry, 
Construction and Transport (Chamber of Commerce of the Russian 
Federation, 1998a: 1). In 1997, on the basis of state procurements, work was 
assured for 900,000 workers, while the military-industrial complex 
employed 2.7 million people (Bogorad, 1997: 1).
Since 1992 these industries have had to cope not only with a significant 
decrease in defence orders, but also with the fact that actual state financing 
for these orders turned out to be no more than 30-40% of the amount 
allocated in the state budget (Kezling, 1998: 14). In 1997, for example, 
actual state budget expenditures were only 60-70% of the amount planned, 
and just 20-30% for defence expenditures (Most, 1998a: 44). Still lower is 
the analogous figure regarding conversion programmes which was 22.5% in 
1995, 11% in 1996 and 15.5% in 1997 (Titova, 1998: 2). In addition, the 
absence of indications on future procurement needs from the Defence 
Ministry has meant that defence enterprises have been at a loss to know 
which lines of military production to retain and how much capacity to 
convert to civilian production. The lack of payment by the state for its 
procurements has resulted in a growth in state debt to enterprises. For the 
period 1994-1997 state debts amounted to 16.5 billion roubles ($2.9 
billion^), more than the value of all the state orders for 1998 (15.3 billion 
roubles). By the end of 1998 this debt had reached 18.3 billion roubles
 ^Calculated at the average exchange rate in 1997.
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(Ivanova, 1999: 1). The state is, in effect, driving what was previously the 
most advanced sector of the Soviet economy to bankruptcy, as by law 
defence firms cannot refuse to fulfil military orders. Firms declining to meet 
military orders are fined 50% of the value of the order. Defence enterprises, 
for their part, owe the state two billion roubles in unpaid taxes ($200 
million) (Titova, 1998: 2). In mid-1998 the total credits of defence 
enterprises were 2.1 times greater than their debts (Izriadnova, 1998. 1). 
There was the Presidential decree no. 880 on the reimbursement of the debt 
of the federal government to defence enterprises, but it has not been 
fulfilled, as resources for this end were not allocated in the 1998 state budget 
(Malinin, 1998a: 8).
As far as St. Petersburg is concerned, state debt due for completed defence 
orders exceeded one billion roubles ($100 million) in 1998. The directors of 
the defence enterprises have proposed that the city government buy this debt 
at a 25% discount, but to no avail (The Socio-Economic ..., 1998, no. 32: 
10). Non-military production accounted for 59.8% of the total output of 
defence firms in St. Petersburg by 1997, though only a few of these defence 
enterprises have managed to restructure successfully. Conversion in 1998 
was under way in forty-eight defence enterprises, accounting for 10.2% of 
the city’s industrial output and 25.6% of the industrial employees. These 
numbers testify to the excess of personnel in defence factories, which in 
total employed 174,000 people in 1998 (The Socio-Economic ..., 1998, no. 
32: 9-10). However, being incapable of paying competitive wages, they 
have lost their most highly-qualified workers. Restructuring was made more 
difficult by the fact that until 1998 many of these firms had been managed 
by the Ministry of Economics. For this reason directors had limited 
managerial powers and had to wait for the approval by the Ministry for 
important decisions. An agreement between the federal government and the 
city of St. Petersburg was signed in 1998, giving the latter the power to 
manage these firms and carry out the restructuring programmes discussed in 
section 4.5.
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4.3. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ST. PETERSBURG
St. Petersburg has a federal status in accordance with the constitution of the 
Russian Federation. This means that St. Petersburg, like Moscow, has a 
status equivalent to that of the other eighty-seven subjects of the Russian 
Federation listed in the constitution. In the early transition years the power 
of local authorities was severely constrained by the lack of a clear division 
of jurisdiction between St. Petersburg and the federal authorities. An 
agreement on this subject, for which the previous mayor - Sobchak - had 
vainly campaigned for years, was finally signed by the Russian President 
not long after the election of the new mayor Yakovlev in 1996. The 
agreement gives St. Petersburg more powers in the local fiscal policy, in the 
management of city property and in the determination of the authority of 
local governing bodies and the procedure for their formation (The Socio- 
Economic ..., 1996, no. 21: 2). The city is divided into twenty administrative 
districts and five boroughs, the heads of which are appointed by the mayor.
This last prerogative has been seized upon by the legislative assembly in 
order to redress the balance of power between the representative power held 
by the city assembly, and the executive power which rests with the mayor's 
office and the government of St. Petersburg. The balance of power between 
the legislative and the executive authorities was reformed in 1993 by a 
Presidential decree in favour of the latter, shortly after the revolt of the 
Russian Parliament was quashed. This applied to both local and national 
authorities. The signature of the mayor became compulsory on legislation 
adopted by the city assembly before it becomes law and legislators were 
stripped of a salary (with the exception of the chairman and his two 
deputies). The clear intention of this last measure was that, obliging 
legislators to hold a full-time job would give them less time to dedicate their 
attention to the work of the assembly. The mayor acquired the right to veto 
legislation approved by the assembly, which could only be overruled by a 
two-thirds majority. St. Petersburg’s politics being rather divisive, the two- 
thirds majority is extremely difficult to attain. By contrast, the mayor's
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directives had to be sent to the city assembly for suggestions, but could not 
be invalidated, except by judicial process, a right previously held by the 
assembly.
In St. Petersburg the relationship between legislative and executive power 
has always been tense. As the elections for the assembly and the mayor are 
held at different times, the mayor is not assured of a majority in the 
assembly. Sobchak, who was elected in 1991 on a liberal p l a t f o r m - the 
first mayor of Leningrad not belonging to the Communist party - soon after 
his election moved his office from the building housing the city soviet 
(renamed the city assembly in 1994) to Smolni, the Communist Party 
headquarters. This was the prelude to his efforts to concentrate power in 
his own hands and emasculate the legislative assembly, while the soviet 
nomenklatura was largely absorbed in his administration. The very person 
who led the fight against party apparatchiks came to rely on the bureaucratic 
means of governance typical of the Soviet period. As early as November 
1991, Sobchak was calling for a new election of the soviet, even though 
both he and the soviet were pro-reform. Between his election and the 
disbanding of the soviet in October 1993, each overruled or ignored the 
actions of the other, generating a confusion over the validity of both the 
mayoral decrees and the soviet laws. More than 160 mayoral decrees were 
overturned by the assembly on the grounds that they violated the law, while 
the mayor purported that the soviet acts had no juridical force (Orttung, 
1995; 48). The majority of these disputes concerned the redistribution of 
property. The legislative assembly elected in 1994 also had a pro-reform 
orientation, but this did not bring about an improvement in the relationship 
with Sobchak, nor with the new mayor.
In order to restrict the power of the executive in January 1998, the 
legislative assembly approved the city charter, which was finally signed by
Since the beginning o f perestroika Leningrad has always been at the forefront of 
economic reforms and political changes in Russia. Leningrad was one o f the three cities 
which elected a democratic council in the municipal election o f March 1990. The name 
reverted to St. Petersburg in June 1991, following a referendum promoted by the mayor of 
the time - Sobchak.
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the new mayor, Yakovlev, a few weeks later, following the failure of his 
attempts to reverse the act. Already by 1996 St. Petersburg was the only 
subject of the Russian Federation without a formal charter of government. 
The charter of St. Petersburg represents the constitution of the city, which 
by law takes precedence over any other legal acts regarding St. Petersburg 
(The Socio-Economic ...., 1998, no. 31: 1). According to the Russian 
constitution, the charter can be adopted by the legislative assembly without 
the consent of the executive branch. The charter restricts the mayor’s right 
to rule by decree, modifies the status of the law-makers from part-time to 
full-time, prohibits lawmakers from working in business while in office and 
creates a new regional high court, called the Charter Court.
Under the previous system the executive branch had the right to approve 
laws with little or no legislative oversight, which created the conditions for 
widespread abuse of power. For example, some legislators were in charge of 
commercial enterprises which were very much dependent on favours from 
the City Hall. A ruling by the St. Petersburg municipal court declared the 
approval of the Charter illegal in July 1998, but the Russian Supreme Court 
overturned this decision, putting an end to the efforts of Yakovlev to 
invalidate the document. With the help of his allies in the assembly, he was 
trying to have approved a law which would reverse the powers established 
by the charter. The assembly itself is divided into two factions, for and 
against Yakovlev and this is paralysing any activity. Following the approval 
of the city charter, during the whole of 1998 there was a battle between the 
assembly, which did not approve legislation put forward by the mayor, and 
the mayor, who refused to sign the laws approved by the assembly. In the 
first half of 1998 he vetoed twenty laws. The liberal majority - twenty-nine 
seats against twenty-one pro-City Hall - returned in the last legislative 
election of December 1998 means that the city charter is probably safe, 
unless the divisions in the two liberal parties play into Yakovlev’s hands.
The election campaign was characterised by a barrage of attacks from the 
local media against the main liberal party, Yabloko, which strongly opposes
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Yakovlev, despite having supported him in the mayoral election in 1996 and 
despite having had one of his representatives as head of the Committee for 
Finance of the city government until early 1999. This party was even 
described in the main television channel of St. Petersburg as part of a 
Western plot to colonise Russia. Dirty tricks were utilised to weaken the re- 
election chances of the most vehement opponents of the mayor. They had to 
compete with candidates bearing their same name or the name of their party 
colleagues. These attempts, however, failed and most of the candidates 
targeted by this smear campaign were elected
In St. Petersburg most of the media are under the control of the city 
administration. Only a few newspapers are really independent and these are 
generally the newspapers owned by foreign investors. All the others - this 
means almost all Russian-owned newspapers - are owned by the city and/or 
subsidised by the city government or banks associated with it (Bershidsky^*, 
1998: 9). The few which are not pro-city hall are subject to strong pressures 
to align. For example, when a journalist from the political bureau of a 
weekly paper “MK v Pietere'' wrote critical articles about the mayor, he was 
fired, presumably under pressure from the local government, and similarly, 
when the second largest television station in St. Petersburg took a neutral 
stance in the conflict between the mayor and the assembly, its director was 
investigated by the tax authority. With regard to the main television station 
in St. Petersburg, one of the very first stations to take an independent stance 
in the times of perestroika, and for years respected for its impartial reporting 
which made it one of the most popular in Russia, is now firmly under the 
control of the administration and has lost much of its former popularity.
The city courts, like much of the local bureaucracy, are also aligned with the 
city administration, which has not lost a case since the election of Yakovlev, 
not least because he had increased funding for the city courts in 1997 despite 
the fact that the Russian constitution forbids local authorities from financing
Bershidsky, like Whitmore, writes for the St. Petersburg Times, a Dutch-owned 
newspaper which, like the Swedish-owned Delovoi Peterburg, is among the few 
newspapers in St. Petersburg which are not aligned with the city administration.
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legal bodies (Whitmore, 1998c: 77). Even if on paper Russia is a very 
centralised state with police, courts, prosecutors, tax authorities and 
privatisation bureaucracy under federal jurisdiction, in practice these bodies 
are dependent on local mayors, and, therefore, tend to be loyal to them. This 
makes it easier for Russian regional mayors to flout the law and civil rights 
without much risk. The decision by Yeltsin in 1995 to give them automatic 
seats in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian 
parliament, gave them immunity from prosecution. Many heads of the 
eighty-nine regions of Russia have become authoritarian, ignoring the 
constitution and violating democratic norms, fixing elections, putting media 
under their control and bullying the opposition. Even in a city like St. 
Petersburg, which is renowned for its liberal attitudes, the current mayor has 
been accused of using bribery and blackmail to gain votes in the legislative 
assembly and of keeping the press under an iron grip; and since his election 
rumours of criminal connections have dogged him (Withmore, 1998b: 8). 
The architect of financial stabilisation, Artem’ev (the head of the Committee 
for Finance since July 1996), resigned in January 1999, accusing Yakovlev 
of behaving like a dictator and doing nothing to rein in the influence of 
organised crime in the legislative assembly. He quite openly accused the 
mayor of colluding with organised crime, saying that criminal structures 
dictate the policy of the city, and lambasted the presence among Yakovlev’s 
allies of two deputies with connections in the criminal world. He mentioned 
malpractice in the city’s road fund and medicine procurement system, an 
issue already denounced by ''The St. Petersburg Times” (Withmore, 1999: 
2). One of these two deputies was arrested by federal investigators^2 for 
running a hit squad responsible for a number of sensational murders in the 
city. In fact, St. Petersburg has become known as Russia’s criminal capital, 
following a spate of high-profile contract murders, which began after the 
mayor fired the previous police chief for denouncing the influence of 
organised crime in the administration.
*2 The Interior Minister, S. Stepashin, has conducted a campaign against crime and 
corruption in several regions, resulting in the arrest o f well known officials.
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4.4. CITY FINANCES IN ST. PETERSBURG
The early post-communist years have been dramatic for city administrations 
in Russia. Not only has the economic crisis multiplied the demand for social 
support, and deprived the local bodies of much-needed revenues, but the 
withdrawal of the central state from many areas obliged them to take up new 
functions in times of tumultuous change. In Soviet times the role of the city 
government was limited. It was mostly confined to managing communal 
services, retail trade and housing. The control of local industry was largely 
in the hands of the federal government. In Leningrad in 1963 only 7.4% of 
industrial production, all in the sphere of light industry, was under the 
control of the city government (Cattell, 1968: 12). To make matters more 
problematic, from the beginning of 1992 a number of expenditures were 
shifted to the territories without a corresponding transfer of revenues. 
Fiscal decentralisation accelerated rapidly during 1992 and particularly 
1993. Due to the lack of a standard formula, revenue-sharing arrangements 
and the transfer of resources from the centre were mainly the result of ad 
hoc bargaining between the centre and the regions in these years. A 
standardised revenue-sharing system was finally devised in 1994, but has 
subsequently been changed on an annual basis.
The expenditures shifted to the territories included spending on social 
welfare (education, health care and family allowances), cultural activities, 
consumer price subsidies and subsidisation of the utilities. Also all the social 
services provided by large enterprises are planned to be progressively 
transferred to the local government. The city administration found itself 
obliged to provide maintenance for public housing, to finance all welfare 
facilities, to provide social security payments and to organise the supply to 
St. Petersburg of much-needed commodities, as in the Soviet era (cotton 
from Uzbekistan in 1994 and food from the Ukraine in 1995). The situation 
was especially critical in 1992 when a rationing system had to be introduced 
and the supplies of critical items such flour were sufficient for only two or 
three days (Sobchak, 1993: 59). The high cost of subsidising housing
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maintenance and public transport have placed a particularly heavy burden on 
the budget. In order to provide these services local governments had to 
secure an adequate revenue base, a completely new undertaking considering 
that taxation had been effectively unknown for three generations. 
Forecasting revenues was made more complicated by very high inflation and 
the slump in economic activity. Balancing the budget became an arduous 
task. Each year revenues turned out to be lower than forecast due to the 
collapse of economic activity, especially of industrial production, which in 
St. Petersburg provided the bulk of municipal revenues, while the 
contribution of “trade and other commercial i n d u s t r i e s ”  was very low - in 
1996, for example, just 12% of the total revenues (City of Saint Petersburg 
1996, 1997: 17) - indicating widespread tax evasion. Revenues from 
privatisation only partially compensated for these losses and after 1995 
became increasingly less significant. In 1996 privatisation proceeds fell by 
60% (City of Saint Petersburg 1996, 1997: 18). From 1990 to 1996 the 
city budget was always in deficit. There was a sharp fall of 34% in budget 
revenues in 1992. This was followed by an increase in 1993, due to the fact 
that the share of taxes remaining in the city increased, but the trend was 
reversed between 1994 and 1996. City revenues contracted by 20% in 
1994 (City of Saint Petersburg 1994-1995, 1996: 76), 11% in 1995 (Kudrin, 
1997: 427) and 17% in 1996 (City of Saint Petersburg 1996, 1997: 17). 
Meanwhile, the share of expenditures financed from the federal budget fell 
in St. Petersburg by a factor of 2.6 between 1990 and 1994 (City of Saint 
Petersburg 1994-1995, 1996: 103). To make up for the shortfall the city had 
to issue bonds and take loans from local banks. The budget deficit was 
equivalent to 16.5% of the revenues in 1993 (Holiman, 1997: 133), about 
40% in 1994 and about 2 4 %^  ^ 1996, corresponding to 5% of the city's
GDP (Artem’ev, 1998a: 4) with the result that the municipal debt grew to 
3,387 million roubles ($590 million) by 1997 (Whitmore, 1998a: VII).
Probably the author - the Leontief Center - refers here to retailers, wholesalers and other 
services.
These are the official figures. According to an estimation from the Leontief Center, in 
accordance with the internationally accepted system o f classification for revenues and 
expenditures, the real figure for 1996 was 36% (The Socio-Economic..., 1997, no. 25: 19).
168
However, the city finances never reached a state of disarray as in other parts 
of Russia. Pensions have always been paid on time.
One of the main tasks that the new mayor, Yakovlev, took on was to put the 
city finances in order. Soon after Yakovlev's election, the personnel in the 
city administration were reduced by about 30% and housing subsidies were 
halved. While in 1996 the inhabitants of the city paid for about 30% of the 
cost of housing repair and maintenance costs (The Socio-Economic ..., 
1996, no. 24: 17), this percentage should reach 100% by the year 2003. The 
reduction in housing subsidies, which doubled the cost of rent and utilities, 
caused widespread discontent in the city and almost toppled the mayor 
during his first year in office. 165,000 residents signed a petition sponsored 
by the communists to call a referendum on Yakovlev's rule. The electoral 
commission gave the go-ahead, but the petition was subsequently 
invalidated on a technicality. Housing maintenance, in a situation where the 
great majority of inhabitants cannot afford to pay market prices for heating 
and maintenance, combined with a city budget which does not have the 
resources to finance these services, is an explosive issue. Expenditures on 
housing and utilities in the 1998 city budget are planned to register a 40% 
reduction on the previous year (Whitmore, 1998a: VII), and are down to 
17% of total budget expenditures (Financial Committee of the St. Petersburg 
Administration, 1998: 37). By comparison, only a few years before, in 
1995, expenditures on housing and utilities accounted for 31% of the total 
(Financial Committee of the St. Petersburg Administration, 1998: 37).
On the revenue side more proceeds are expected from 1998 onwards through 
better management of the city's property. Revenues from municipal 
property, which accounted for about 2% of the city budget in 1993, are 
expected to rise to 25% in 1998, mostly due to increased rents of residential 
premises and stricter control on land which has been rented. Data on two 
districts of the city indicated that in 1997 up to half of the municipal land 
utilised was not paid for (Ekonomika i Zhizn’; Sankt Peterburgskii 
Regional’nyi Vypusk, 1998b: 6 ). Favouritism has been rife in the
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assignation of commercial buildings. In the past many commercial buildings 
belonging to the city were rented at very low prices to local entrepreneurs, 
who then sublet them for huge mark-ups. It was customary for Sobchak to 
issue personal directives allocating buildings to specific individuals and 
organisations without the knowledge and approval of the city soviet. The 
soviet on discovering these irregularities, would try to invalidate the 
directives, but it is almost certain that not all were discovered (Holiman, 
1998: 271). The month before he was assassinated - August 1997 - the 
city’s deputy mayor, Manevich, proposed to the city assembly a law which 
would radically modify the way in which the city let its municipal property. 
Rents would be brought into line with market prices, which would be 
determined according to the function and location of the property. An 
independent commission would monitor municipal lettings. This law is 
considered to be one of the main motives for Manevich's assassination. In 
spite of the assassination, the law on rents was approved in September 1997 
and came into force on 1 January 1998, but it is hard to say whether 
favouritism has ended. Manevich’s murder could also have been connected 
to the struggle for state assets. Privatisation has been riddled by abuses, for 
which, for example, the vice-director of the City Property Committee was 
arrested in 1993. Intimidation of bidders at auctions was widespread, and the 
criminal fraternity engaged in frequent reprisals against those who sought to 
minimise their influence: for example, the director of the Department of 
Privatisation was brutally beaten in 1993. As director of the City Property 
Committee, Manevich oversaw the privatisation process in St. Petersburg, 
and had criticised the local privatisation process in which city centre 
properties had been sold at extremely low prices based on rouble valuations 
from 1991. In 1997 shops in the very centre of the city were still being 
privatised at 1991 prices, that by this time were equivalent to just a few 
hundred dollars (Borisova, 1997c: 24). Before his assassination, Manevich 
prepared reforms to end this abuse.
A successful $300 million Eurobond issue (fully subscribed) was carried out 
in 1997 in order to restructure the municipal debt, which was mostly owed
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in municipal bonds at a high interest rate and, to a lesser extent, expensive 
short-term loans from local banks. This in turn gave them leeway to pressure 
the city government for special treatment. One-third of the debt in municipal 
bonds and the entire debt to the banks was repaid the day after the Eurobond 
subscription. Due to the rescheduling of its debt, servicing the debt of St. 
Petersburg fell from 14% of the budget expenditures in 1996 to 7% 
according to the draft budget of 1998 (Financial Committee of the St. 
Petersburg Administration, 1998: 37).
In 1998 St. Petersburg became the first Russian city to have a treasury 
system for public hinds. All the budget funds of the city were ordered to be 
transferred to the St. Petersburg branch of the Central Bank of Russia in 
September 1998 (Silina, 1998: 50). They were concentrated into a single 
account so that the treasury department can keep the city's monetary flows 
under control, whereas previously each committee of the city government 
had a separate account. A small number of authorised banks had been 
empowered since the early 1990s to hold budgetary accounts and service 
government payments for the St. Petersburg administration, as well as for 
the Russian government and for the administrations of the other eighty- 
seven regions and republics of Russia. This, which should have been a 
temporary measure until a treasury system for public funds was to be set up, 
turned out to be a long-standing practice which has allowed well-connected 
banks to make handsome profits. Handling a municipal or federal account 
assures a steady flow of funds at low cost and financial security for a bank. 
It was not rare for money allotted by the local or central administration for 
specific purposes to be delayed by these banks. In the highly inflationary 
years this meant having free funds which could be lent at very high interest 
rates.
In 1997 the city managed to collect 96.2% of the planned revenues and 
fulfilled 96.1% of the planned expenditures, much higher rates than in the 
previous years (The Socio-Economic ...., 1998, no. 32: 10). Total tax 
revenues in 1997 amounted to 30.7% of the St. Petersburg GDP, but 38.6%
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of all revenues went to the federal government (Goskomstat, 1998b: 64). 
Considering only the share of revenues going to the city, they accounted for 
18.8% of the city's GDP, almost 3% more than in the previous year, when 
the figure was 15.9% (The Socio-Economic ..., 1997, no. 25: 19). The 
deficit of the city budget was equivalent to only 5% of revenues. St. 
Petersburg is one of the twelve regions of the Russian Federation which are 
net donors to the federal budget, the others being mostly oil or gas 
producing regions. According to data provided by the city one-and a-half 
times more taxes are sent to Moscow than are spent by the federal 
government in St. Petersburg (Strateghiceskii Plan Sankt-Peterburga, 1997: 
22).
In 1998, according to preliminary data, revenues were 6.5% lower than 
planned due to the economic crisis, but a budget surplus was recorded. A 
deficit-free budget has also been approved for 1999 (Government of St. 
Petersburg-B: 1). St. Petersburg was the only region of the Russian 
Federation which posted a budget surplus in 1998 (Ekspert, 1999: 36). 
Ninety-five per cent of revenues collected in the first part of the year came 
in cash and just 5% in the form of promissory notes, a very favourable 
percentage compared with other regions. In some regions over 70% of the 
total amount of taxes is paid in kind rather than in money (Russian 
Economic Trends, December 1997: VIII).
As a result of the financial reorganisation, St. Petersburg was one of the few 
regions not to default on its debt. It was declared Russia's most 
creditworthy city by Goldman-Sachs and won praise from international 
credit rating firms such as Fitch and Standard and Poor (Sindelar and 
Withmore, 1999: 1). The question now is whether the same financial policy 
will be pursued following the resignation of Artem’ev in January 1999.
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4.5. LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN ST. 
PETERSBURG
St. Petersburg has been at the forefront of economic reforms in the Soviet 
and post-Soviet period alike, frequently devising its own policy of 
development. Large and medium scale privatisations were also conducted in 
a different fashion from the standard method utilised in Russia. The city 
was one of the four territories to be given special rights in the privatisation 
of firms under federal jurisdiction (Rutland, 1994: 1113). City authorities 
have exploited this by taking an active stance. The local Committee on state 
property is one of the few in Russia which has taken on the burden of 
developing plans for the privatisation of large industrial enterprises, 
sometimes rejecting those endorsed by enterprises' managers and workers. 
The Committee tried to limit the percentage of voting stock purchased by 
managers and workers. Privatisation for cash was encouraged. However, 
Holiman (1997: 275) suggests that this was often done to favour buyers of 
whom the committee approved of, regardless of suitability. In addition, a 
considerable amount of revenues from privatisation were never transferred 
to the local budget (Holiman, 1997: 277).
Small scale privatisation^^, which in Russia is under the control of municipal 
authorities, was carried out in St. Petersburg by selling small businesses 
mainly unconditionally and directly to worker collectives and individual 
investors or, in cases where specific employment or investment guarantees 
had to be complied with, through commercial tenders. As of 1 January 1997, 
small scale privatisation was almost completed as 97.2% of all small 
enterprises had been privatised (The Socio-Economic .... , 1997, no. 25: 
23).
In St. Petersburg, notwithstanding the different economic strategies pursued 
by the two mayors who ruled in the post-communist period, both have
In line with the federal law, small businesses - defined as having a maximum of 200 
employees and a capital value o f under ten million roubles at January 1992 prices - were 
privatised according to different rules from medium and large enterprises.
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striven to create a more business friendly environment than elsewhere in 
Russia by setting a profits tax which is among the lowest in the Russian 
Federation, introducing a limited (by Russian standards) number of taxes, 
and giving to privatised enterprises property rights on land and buildings, 
while the tax burden has been progressively switched to resources such as 
real estate.
In Russia property rights regarding land are still an area of great uncertainty. 
At first the privatisation programme gave enterprises the right only to lease 
the building and the land plot on which their premises stood. Subsequently, 
in July 1994 a Presidential decree allowed enterprises to purchase and sell 
land, but local authorities have been, as a rule, unwilling to comply with this 
decree (St. Petersburg being an exception). In practice the privatisation of 
urban real estate is left almost entirely to the discretion of local authorities 
(OECD, 1995: 81). Most of the 120,000 privatised firms do not own the 
land they occupy, or even have a clear lease agreement'^. They occupy the 
land under a Soviet era concept of temporary management which allows city 
officials to dictate how the land will be used and gives companies limited 
rights to sublet, sell or redevelop. Were the firms allowed to own the land, 
they could use it as collateral or contribute it to a joint-venture. Only a few 
regions (St. Petersburg, Samara, etc.) have taken matters in their own hands, 
taking the initiative to sell land. St. Petersburg was the first city in Russia to 
do so. In St. Petersburg privatised enterprises have been given the 
opportunity to buy the buildings they occupy and to become the owners of 
the land on which their premises stand. One of the main reasons for this 
was the expectation that the sale would bring additional revenues to the city. 
The privatisation of other state-owned land is not yet allowed. The sale and 
rent of land plots for privatised enterprises was regulated by the decree of 
the mayor of St. Petersburg no. 1049 of 19 October 1994. In 1996, 828 
privatised enterprises bought the land they occupied (City of Saint 
Petersburg 1996, 1997: 4) and in the first half of 1997 a further 700 
(lasinskaia, 1997: 6 ). However, the high prices, coupled with the precarious
Less than 1% of the land space occupied by these companies was privately owned
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situation of most industrial companies and the complexity of the procedure, 
has ruled out this option for most firms. Approvals are needed from a 
number of local bodies (the Committee for Town Planning and Architecture, 
the Committee for Land Resources and the Department of the State 
Inspectorate for the Protection of Historical Monuments), making the 
procedure difficult and time-consuming. In addition, the registration of the 
property deeds can take up to six months or a year after the sale has been 
concluded (lasinskaia, 1997: 6 ). A system for the registration of property 
deeds for land and real estate had to be implemented from scratch, since the 
Soviet Union had no land registration or survey system.
As far as local taxation is concerned, St. Petersburg maintained the portion 
of the profits tax going into the local budget at 2 2 %, even after the 
enactment of the law in 1993 allowing local authorities to increase it from 
up to 22% to up to 30% for banks, brokers, insurance companies and 
companies engaged in intermediary services and transactions^"^ and up to 
25% for all the other categories of enterprises. The portion of the profits tax 
going into the local budget was subsequently reduced to 21% in 1995 and 
20% starting from 1997, following the approval by the city assembly of the 
law "On Some Issues of Taxation in the Years 1997-1999" (10 November 
1996). For banks and the other aforementioned entities, it has stayed at 22%. 
As a comparison, the profits tax in Moscow was 22% and 30% in 1995. 
However, the surrounding region - Leningrad - has set even lower rates of 
the profits tax in an attempt to entice the city’s companies to relocate in the 
region (Zatsepin, 1997c: 9). From 1999 the local profits tax in St. Petersburg 
is to be lowered further to 19% - this time the decrease was dictated by 
federal law - while no change is foreseen for the higher rate and according to 
a local draft law it will be reduced to 18% in 2000 and 17% in 2003. The 
main purpose of the law "On Some Issues....” was also to reduce the 
number of tax privileges for specific enterprises, which are very costly for 
the local budget, but whether tax concessions have, in effect, decreased in
according to statistics of the State Property Committee (The St. Petersburg Times, 1996).
An intermediary is considered to be an agent who receives a commission for deals 
concluded among other parties rather than a trader.
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the following years is unclear. It must be kept in mind, however, that the 
lower rate of the profits tax in St. Petersburg compared with the other parts 
of Russia represents only a partial benefit because many business expenses 
remain non-deductible and the sheer amount of taxes makes the total burden 
very high, notwithstanding St. Petersburg’s restraint in the introduction of 
taxes. Of the twenty-one local taxes which by law local bodies were allowed 
to introduce, St. Petersburg had introduced only thirteen by 1995 (Ipatova, 
1996: 10).
In addition to the profits tax the main taxes are the tax on housing and socio­
cultural facilities and the road tax, both at 1.5% of the sales revenues (VAT 
e x c l u d e d ) t h e  latter is 0.11% for retailers and wholesalers. The are also 
taxes on wages of Russian employees, such as the contribution towards 
educational institutions ( 1 % of total wages and salaries) and the payments to 
various social welfare funds (accounting for about 40% of total wages and 
salaries); a tax on business property of 2% of the property value, etc. These 
rates were equivalent to the standard rates in Russia in 1997, but the road tax 
was reduced to 1% starting from 1 July 1997 and the contribution towards 
educational institutions was cancelled in the following year, as envisaged by 
the law “On Some Issues...”.
Following the Soviet downfall the city lost its importance as a defence 
centre, raising fears of a progressive de-industrialisation, and new strategies 
for the future of the city had to be devised. The favourite strategy in the 
early 1990s envisaged the transformation of the city into a free economic 
zone with favourable legislation on foreign investment. At the time this was 
seen as a possible panacea for the economic problems plaguing the city. It 
was naively believed that foreign investment would flood into St. 
Petersburg as a consequence of the advantageous conditions set up in the 
city, which was to become the window to Russia for investors anxious to 
exploit the opportunities created by the economic transformation. The city
The tax on housing and socio-cultural facilities and the profits tax can be decreased by 
the amount spent by an enterprise on health, education, culture, sports centres and 
kindergartens up to a maximum of 5% and 6% respectively.
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was to revert to the functions it had prior to the revolution when it was an 
international business and financial centre. Leningrad was declared a free 
economic zone by a Degree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation 
on 14 July 1990 "On the Creation of Free Enterprise Zones". However, this 
project did not go any further. The idea of granting tax concessions and 
special customs conditions to such a big city did not prove viable. The idea 
of a free economic zone was, therefore, reduced to a strategy for selected 
areas, as stipulated by the new programme for the socio-economic 
development of the city called "St. Petersburg-2000", prepared in 1993-94 
by the Committee on Economic Reform of the city administration and the 
Leontief Center. Thirteen sub-zones were planned with different functions; 
customs, warehousing, production, services, R&D. The advantages offered 
by these encompass reduced tax rates, a simplified customs regime and more 
flexible currency regulations. There is a fundamental difference from the 
free economic zone concept in the other parts of the world, which consists of 
a purpose-built area set up to accommodate firms under given conditions. St. 
Petersburg FEZs are set up on the basis of concrete projects agreed between 
the local government and the prospective residents, as the realisation of a 
standard FEZ would entail the expenditures of an amount of resources that 
the city could not afford. These projects are financed by initiators of the 
zones, who in exchange receive tax concessions for a given period of time. 
Initiators can be both Russian and foreign legal entities and Russian and 
foreign individuals. The department in charge evaluates the projects and 
proposes the tax concessions to be granted, within its own share of the tax 
revenues. The most important factors taken into consideration are the 
increase in industrial production and budget revenues that these zones are 
forecast to bring about in the coming years. If these commitments are not 
fulfilled, the resident enterprises must refund the privileges they received.
The first three FEZs began to function in 1994. The export-oriented sub­
zone Pusckinkaia is dedicated to the production of construction materials 
and household appliances. The customs sub-zone Severnia Verf consists of 
premises for cargo storage and handling and processing of import-export
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goods. The customs sub-zone Gavan, based in the exhibition complex 
Lenexpo, has as a sphere of activity the realisation of exhibitions and the 
storage and processing of export-import goods. In 1995 a fourth sub-zone, 
Polustrova, was set up, which has a wider profile of activity: the 
construction of customs, industrial and commercial infrastructure and the 
carrying out of commercial and industrial activity (Nikiforov, 1995: 4). 
Eleven additional zones in the city were approved in 1996 by the Committee 
for Economy and Industrial Policy. By the end of 1997 the first three zones 
to come into existence had created more than 700 jobs, attracted investments 
of more than $13.2 million and paid $4.1 million in taxes (Government of 
St. Petersburg-A: 12). As a result, despite the relative success of these zones, 
FEZs have ended up having only a marginal role in the city’s economy, 
contrary to the enthusiastic expectations of the early 1990s.
Making St. Petersburg an international business and financial centre, 
however, remained the main objective of Sobchak, the mayor who governed 
from 1991 to 1996. The development of advanced banking, transport, 
customs, telecommunications and tourist infrastructure was planned, but 
given the financial difficulties of the city this was impossible to realise 
without a substantial contribution from outside capital. St. Petersburg, 
despite handling about 30% of imports and 20% of exports of the Russian 
Federation (Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies, 1996: 10), has a 
transportation system in great need of improvement, plagued by long queues 
at border points, poor roads, inadequate and very expensive port facilities, 
etc. It is common for Russia-bound cargo ships to be unloaded in Finland 
and the goods transported by road to Russia. The most significant 
investment projects carried out during Sobchak’s tenure were the 
modernisation of the international airport, the improvement of the railway 
route between Moscow and St. Petersburg and the road connections with 
Finland and Poland, but other projects such as the construction of a new 
harbour had to be mothballed for lack of finance.
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International events were organised such as the Goodwill Games and the 
annual EBRD meeting at which several projects were presented to foreign 
investors, but ultimately these events turned out to be a drain on the scarce 
resources hardly justified by the results. The EBRD declared St. Petersburg 
to be their top priority in Russia, which led to the financing of some projects 
in real estate and banking and to the restructuring of a few local industries 
(Katz, 1994), but overall the total amount of foreign investment was very 
disappointing, considering the great expectations, and fell substantially 
below the amount received by Moscow. The attempt to transform St. 
Petersburg into a banking centre also failed, despite the setting of a profits 
tax for financial institutions much lower than in the rest of Russia. All the 
major Russian and foreign banks are concentrated in Moscow. At the end of 
1996 there were 844 commercial banks registered in Moscow, and only 
fifty-six in St. Petersburg (Strategic Plan for St. Petersburg, 1998: 22).
The new mayor, Yakovlev, elected in mid-1996, changed the approach of 
the city government declaring that the first priority was to revive the city’s 
industry by exploiting the high-technology potential of the defence sectori^. 
The transformation of St. Petersburg into a strategic financial and business 
centre still ranked as a priority, but below the revival of local industry. 
Unlike his predecessor, he placed less emphasis on foreign investment given 
the disappointing inflow of foreign capital in the first half of the 1990s. He 
favoured a more interventionist approach criticising the policy of his 
predecessor whereby industry was left to develop with little involvement 
from the local government (Deviatevoi, 1999: 4).
The guideline for the new economic policy was established by the 
“Programme of Stabilisation and Subsequent Development of the Economy 
of St. Petersburg in the Years 1997-2000”, while the long-term strategy for 
the city was spelled out in the “Strategic Plan for St. Petersburg”. The first 
was worked out by the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy in
The revival o f industry exploiting the technologies of the defence sector has been a 
popular catch phrase which, however, provides few indications on how this will be 
achieved.
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1996, then headed by D. Sergeev, ana the second by the Leontief Center 
together with the city administration and tW main business and scientific 
organisations of St. Petersburg in 1997. A total of 168 organisations 
participated in the formulation of the Plan. Fourteen commissions were 
formed to analyse the policies to be approved, and in the end 2 1 1  proposals 
were selected.
The main difference is that the programme puts the emphasis on the revival 
of local industry. In particular, it envisages restructuring the defence 
complex and the reorganising of the shipbuilding enterprises - the three 
major shipbuilding firms of the city are planned to be merged (Korotkova, 
1997a: 1) -, while the plan stresses the need for the integration of St. 
Petersburg into the world economy.
The Strategic Plan approved on 1 December 1997 lists a long set of 
measures which if implemented should, in the expectations of the plan’s 
formulators, result in the creation of 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  new jobs, an increase in the 
real income of the population of not less than 15%, an increase of three 
years in life expectancy and a rise in budget revenues of not less than 2 0 % 
in real terms, though it is not specified when all this will take place and how 
these figures were calculated (Strategic Plan for St. Petersburg, 1998: 103). 
Future spending in the city budget should be in line with the priorities 
established in the plan. The main objective of the plan is “the development 
of St. Petersburg as a multifunctional city integrated into the Russian and 
world economy and providing a favourable environment for life and 
economic activity”. It particularly emphasises the strengthening of St. 
Petersburg “as the major Russian centre for contact between the Baltic Sea 
region and the North-West of Russia” (Strategic Plan for St. Petersburg, 
1998: 5) and aims to transform St. Petersburg into the most important 
transport and commercial hub connecting Europe and Asia^o. Following the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union, Russia lost half its ports and St. Petersburg 
remained the only major Russian port on the Baltic Sea, except for
20 Some o f the expectations are clearly far too optimistic at the present stage.
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Kaliningrad, which is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania. In 
order to enhance the development of St. Petersburg as a transport centre 
there are plans to build a ring road around the city, to reconstruct the sea and 
river ports and their terminals, to build a Helsinki to St. Petersburg highway, 
to create additional free economic zones, etc. An advantageous taxation 
system will be conceded to goods in transit (Zatsepin, 1997b: 9). It is 
expected “the switching to St. Petersburg of no less than twenty million 
additional tons of cargo out of the total volume of Russia’s foreign trade 
[and] the development of related industries” (Strategic Plan for St. 
Petersburg, 1998: 103), which sounds very optimistic considering the dismal 
reputation of the port. High port fees, excessive bureaucracy and 
inefficiency do not make the port competitive with those of nearby 
countries. Despite the emphasis of the local administration, St. Petersburg is 
not developing as a transport centre. From 1992 to 1996 freight turnover 
decreased more than the corresponding decrease in production, while in 
1997 it was stable and in 1998 declined (-3.9%) (Travin, 1998: 5; 
Goskomstat, 1998b: 3, 53; Goskomstat, 1999: 3).
The plan envisages the creation of a “maximally” favourable business 
environment “which stimulates economic growth and becomes the main 
factor in attracting resources and investments to St. Petersburg” (Strategic 
Plan for St. Petersburg, 1998: 45). The plan’s proposals are to reduce the tax 
burden for industry, to eliminate constraints on business creation, to 
implement an anti-monopoly policy, to provide incentives for investment 
and to create equal conditions for all economic entities by eliminating 
privileges and exemptions.
For example, licensing procedures were designed to be made simpler and 
more transparent (Strategic Plan for St. Petersburg, 1998: 6 6 ). In effect, a 
single licensing body was finally created in St. Petersburg in 1999, while 
before various local administrative bodies had the power to grant licences 
and the different practices of these bodies, coupled with differing methods
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of calculating fees, greatly complicated the process of applying for such 
licences.
To assist the industrial sector, the Plan foresees the organisation of 
retraining programmes for management and the sale of state-owned shares 
to strategic investors (Strateghiceskii Plan Sankt-Peterburga, 1998; 50) - a 
rather unoriginal position, reflecting the hopes of the early 1990s that 
foreign investors would restructure domestic industry - as the poor 
competitiveness of many industrial enterprises is attributed by the Plan to 
technological backwardness and weak management. Support is also 
envisaged for the creation of financial-industrial groups, which are seen by 
the plan’s formulators as a method of favouring growth in the industrial 
sector (Strateghiceskii Plan Sankt-Peterburga, 1998: 50), in the conviction 
that by linking enterprises and banks, exchanges will be facilitated and 
resources reallocated among them, helping each firm to stay afloat.
Some points of the Strategic Plan, such as the “transformation of St. 
Petersburg into a centre of higher education for all regions of Russia, the 
CIS countries and a number of developing countries, and into the major 
international centre for study of the Russian language and culture” (Strategic 
Plan for St. Petersburg, 1998: 103), seem to be, however, merely 
declarations which do not envisage a clear set of measures to achieve their 
targets.
Financing for many of the projects advocated by the Strategic Plan is 
currently lacking, but the city haa created a guarantee fund of 1.3 billion 
roubles ($230 million at the 1997 exchange rate), which can cover bank 
loans aimed at investment projects corresponding to the priorities 
established by the Programme of Stabilisation and the Strategic Plan. The 
guarantee can be up to 50% of the total investment. About 300 requests for 
guarantees were received in 1997 (Fedorov, 1997: 2). Tax concessions^^
2^  This law allows firms to deduct from taxable profits sums used for investment in both 
the production and non-production spheres, and also the interest paid to the bank for loans 
used for capital investments. The deduction applies only to the portion o f taxes going to the
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were also introduced for investments oi more than $5 million (law approved 
by the city assembly on 8  July 1998). In addition, the mayor was relying on 
the state acting as guarantor for some projects in order to receive loans from 
European banks at a lower interest rate. A decree on this matter was 
expected to be issued by the President (Zatsepin, 1997b: 9), but the 
effective insolvency of the Russian state has ruled out this option.
The Plan hopes that the investment programme of St. Petersburg for the 
years 1998-2001 will be realised in part by foreign investors. However, 
problems such as corruption and red tape, which are rife in the city, need to 
be tackled in order to attract a sizeable amount of foreign capital. The 
Leningrad region^z^ surrounding the city, has taken advantage of the poor 
reputation of St. Petersburg and has been selected by a number of foreign 
investors such as Philip Morris, Caterpillar and Ford, since the local 
government there is renowned for being more business-minded and making 
business decisions faster than in St. Petersburg. St. Petersburg is highly 
centralised. All important decisions are made by the city government, but 
the enforceability of such decisions is sometimes a problem. In the 
surrounding region the administration is more decentralised, leaving the 
towns with more autonomy and less bureaucracy.
The Programme of Stabilisation devised in 1996 went into considerably 
more detail on the city’s industrial policy than did the Strategic Plan. 
According to the Programme, the local administration must take an active 
role in selecting industrial firms to assist. The target is to reach by the year 
2000 6 8 % of the level of industrial production recorded in 1991 (98% for 
consumer goods) (Sergachev, 1996: 8 ). These industrial firms are to be 
given priority in the allocations of municipal procurements, especially those 
belonging to the food processing, light industry and construction material 
sectors. According to a law proposed to the legislative assembly in 1999 the 
city administration should be legally bound to buy domestic goods if their
city budget (Promyshlennyi Vestnik, 1998: 9).
22 While the city o f Leningrad changed its name to St. Petersburg in 1991 the surrounding 
region has retained the old name.
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price is not 15% higher than analogous foreign produce (Davlitsarov, 1999: 
2 ). Only 25% of the municipal procurements went to city enterprises in 
1998; the plan was to increase this share to 50% in 1-3 years and to 75% 
afterwards (Government of St. Petersburg-C: 2). All municipal
procurements were planned to be assigned through open tenders, following a 
mayoral resolution dated 22 May 1997, however, this resolution has not 
been enforced. Measures to make the assignation of procurements more 
transparent were finally undertaken in late 1998 when a regular bulletin of 
the city procurements was first issued (Davlitsarov, 1998: 1), but according 
to Artem’ev, the head of the Committee for Finance until January 1999, 
almost all tenders continue to be assigned without any competition 
(Kotsiubinskii, 1999; 4). The director of the Committee for Economy and 
Industrial Policy who replaced Sergeev, Klebanov, in charge from 
December 1997 to June 1999^2 , has continued the realisation of the 
programme of stabilisation^^; however, it is now clear that the stated 
objectives relating to production levels will not be achieved. The 
programme has been accused of being unrealistic by both the directors of the 
“old guard” industrial enterprises and the representatives of the liberal wing 
(Arkhipov, 1998: 67), while the government attributes the improved 
performance of industry in 1997 and 1998 to the measures undertaken in the 
context of this programme (Klebanov, 1999: 2), measures which will be 
analysed in the following pages. However, as discussed later it seems more 
likely that factors other than this programme have influenced the output 
trend.
In addition to the Programme of Stabilisation and the Strategic Plan, some 
sectoral programmes have been or are in the stage of being implemented in 
St. Petersburg, while many other programmes have been planned, but never 
realised. A programme for the reconstruction of the light industrial sector 
was devised by the city, with a budget of 500 million roubles ($100 million) 
in 1996. In half of the fifty-eight enterprises belonging to this sector the
22 In June 1999 Klebanov was called to serve in the Russian government.
2^  ^He declared in 1998 that seventy-six o f the ninety-two primary measures envisaged for 
the second half o f 1998 had been realised (Klebanov, 1999: 1).
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purchase of “modem equipment” wiui nnanced^s, but despite this assistance 
these enterprises have continued to be financially weak, failing to produce 
enough circulating capital to buy the necessary raw materials (Bogorad, 
1998a: 1).
An inter-regional programme for restructuring textile industries in North- 
Western Russia, called North-West Textiles, has secured financing of 800 
million roubles ($160 raillion^^) from the federal government to be given in 
the form of loans, but the money has not yet been disbursed^?. This 
programme is a pilot project within the framework of the federal programme 
“Russia’s Flax Complex Development”. A financial-industrial group is to be 
established in the area, encompassing firms cultivating flax, flax- 
manufacturing industries of the area, textile and clothing factories, scientific 
institutes and machine-building industries. However, this programme has 
not been well received by the directors of the clothing industries, who are 
sceptical of the effectiveness of uniting such a long production cycle under a 
single management. In their opinion, such a big corporation runs the risk of 
being unmanageable (Zhelvitskii, 1997b: 15).
The formal adherence to shock therapy has, in reality, masked a diffused 
reliance on administrative methods at federal and local level, deriving from 
the continued conviction that the state has an important role to play in the 
economy. Plans for the modernisation of various sectors are frequently 
elaborated. For example, the State Duma speaker Seleznyov declared the 
necessity of uniting industrial enterprises in the sectoral support funds with 
the aim of developing and carrying out targeted programmes of 
modernisation of the priority sectors through the concession of investment 
credit, tax advantages and equity participation from the state (Nevskoe 
Vremia, 1999: no.35). As far as St. Petersburg is concerned, an Industrial 
Support Fund under the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy has
25 It is not clear what the author means by modem equipment, and there is no indication 
whether the finance was in the form o f loans or grants.
26 Calculated at the average exchange rate in 1996.
27 Financing from the centre to the regions consists not only o f transfers for the poorer 
regions, but also o f special development programmes.
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been active since 1994, with the responsibility for “arranging and financing 
priority research and production programs and projects intended for the 
introduction of advanced domestic work-outs [technologies], production of 
new competitive products, optimisation of the industrial structure” 
(Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy, 1). Local governments in 
Russia are lobbied frequently by industrial firms since the majority do not 
have the resources to make investment, or even, often, to pay workers and 
therefore frequently request assistance. Thirty-five point six per cent of 
industrial companies in Russia are considered bankrupt^^ (Strategic Plan for 
St Petersburg, 1998: 21). In Russia industry is suffocated both by high 
taxation and the costs of electricity and cargo transportation, which are set 
high to counterbalance the subsidised costs of domestic electricity and 
passenger transport. In St. Petersburg in 1996, industry accounted for 57% 
of the local tax revenues, but only 33% of city’s GDP (City of Saint 
Petersburg 1996: 1997: 5-17), and while as a norm the unit cost for 
electricity is higher for private consumers than for industry, in Russia it is 
the opposite. Electricity tariffs for industry are 50% higher than in Finland 
(interview with Klebanov, Griaznevich, 1998: 3). This, coupled with the 
high energy intensity of many local industries, has meant that in some 
factories the share of energy and heating in total production costs reaches 
50-70%29 (Kezling, 1997: 6 ). In addition, the massive non-payment crisis 
has starved enterprises of liquidity.
In Russia the central and local governments have provided financial support 
to the industrial sector through a variety of channels: tax benefits, directed 
credits and investment grants. However, there is little evidence that 
subsidies are aimed at sectors with long-term comparative advantage. In 
industry subsidisation has been aimed at regionally dominant industries in 
crisis, or at sectoral interest groups (Freinkman and Haney, 1997: 7), while
2^  Even if it is not indicated, this figure probably includes only medium and large 
enterprises as official statistical data refer to these.
29 It must be noted, however, that in Russia companies can avoid paying their electricity 
and heating bills as power cut-offs are rarely carried out. To keep the electricity companies 
from shutting off power supplies, the government makes up for their missing payments 
with a tax credit.
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support for newly created firms lias been limited (Halligan, Teplukhin and 
Wilier, 1996: 118). Unusually, exemptions have often been set by 
Presidential decree and frequently apply only to individual companies, but 
since 1992 this practice has decreased. In general, there has been a reduction 
in subsidies from the central government since 1992, which has been 
accompanied by an increase, although much smaller, in subsidies from local 
authorities. Subsidisation of the Russian economy at federal level was 
estimated to be equivalent to between 41.5% and 55% of GDP in 1992, 
10.7% and 17-20% in 1993, 5.8% and 7-8% in 1994 and 2.2% and 1.6% in 
1 9 9 5 3 0  (Freinkman and Haney, 1997: 5; Halligan and others, 1996: 111) 
remaining primarily to support agriculture and the coal industry, while 
subsidies from regional budgets were estimated to be 5.2% of GDP in 1995. 
Subsidies increased from 26% of total regional expenditures in 1992 to 36% 
in 1995 (Freinkman and Haney, 1997: 5). Despite the reduction in subsidies 
the category “national economy” - mostly subsidies - continued to represent 
the largest item of expenditure in the consolidated state budget. In 1997, for 
example, it accounted for a quarter of the total expenditure and 8 .2 % of the 
GDP. Approximately three-quarters of this was spent by local and regional 
budgets. In reality, subsidisation is larger than these figures suggest, as 
support by local authorities has been granted mainly through implicit 
subsidies which are not reflected in the budget such as tax benefits, 
preferential utility prices, favourable rates of asset lease and to a lesser 
degree through directed credits and investment grants. The main recipients 
have been housing, agriculture and public transportation rather than 
industry. In the period from 1993 to 1995 housing made up 60-65% of the 
total subsidies given by local authorities, agriculture 15% and transportation 
7-8% (Freinkman and Haney, 1997: 5). In 1997 housing still made up about 
half of the total amount of subsidies at federal and local levels combined. 
Although 80% of the regional subsidies are directed at consumers 
(Freinkman and Haney, 1997: 8 ), these subsidies are disbursed not directly 
to the final consumers, but to enterprises. Enterprises not belonging to the 
aforementioned sectors have also received financial support, but regarding
20 The first figures are reported by Freinkman and Haney, the second by Halligan and
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the amount of this financial support the documentation is sketchy. As 
support is provided in a variety of forms and from different sources - from 
the budget and from extra-budgetary funds - it is difficult to obtain a 
complete picture.
In the 1998 budget of the city of St. Petersburg, subsidies are the largest 
item o f expenditure, representing 27.6% of the total (Financial Committee 
of the St. Petersburg Administration, 1998; 19). These are mostly in the 
form of grants which are conceded to subsidise the purchase of foodstuffs, 
agricultural raw materials, fuel and other goods in selected firms, to finance 
public transportation, to compensate enterprises and organisations obliged to 
sell their products at fixed prices established by the authorised state body, to 
reimburse housing organisations for losses, and for other non-specified 
purposes. No indication is provided as to the amount of subsidies going to 
industry. For this reason it is difficult to obtain a precise view of the 
industrial policy carried out by the city administration. In addition to 
conceding grants, the industrial policy of St. Petersburg was carried out by 
lowering the tax rate in spheres of activity whose development was deemed 
to be a priority and by granting tax deferments and soft long-term loans to 
selected businesses. However, the systematic shortfall of budget revenues 
compelled the administration to cancel some of the planned subsidies every 
year. In 1996, for example, the shortfall of revenues was about 25% at local 
level, compared with 30% at federal level (Zatsepin, 1996: 2), The law "On 
Tax Advantages" approved by the legislative assembly on 28 June 1995 
lowered from 2 2 % to 18% the profits tax for several branches of the food 
industry2 i and for health, education and cultural enterprises (Biznes-Shans, 
1995: 15), on condition that the profitability of the interested company is not 
higher than 30% of the total turnover, and that the money saved by the 
lowering of the tax rate is used for investment in machinery and equipment. 
The intention of the administration is to promote the production of goods of 
primary necessity in order to make St. Petersburg more self-sufficient. Tax 
deferments to the value of sixty-two million roubles ($14 million) were
others.
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given in 1995 to sixty-seven enterprises, mainly belonging to the defence 
complex and to light industry. In particular, tax deferments have been 
conceded to large firms threatened with bankruptcy in order to keep them 
afloat. About the same amount was estimated to be forfeited by the city 
budget through the reduction of the tax rates for selected activities, as 
explained above, according to the deputy director of the Committee for 
Economy and Finance (this Committee was subsequently divided into two; 
the Committee for Finance and the Committee for Economy and Industrial 
Policy) (Steschenko, 1996: 4). Light industrial enterprises also received 
loans for 22.5 million roubles ($5 million) in the same year, but the efficacy 
of these loans seems to have been limited. The financial situation of these 
enterprises has not improved, since their tax debts have increased. Not a 
single rouble had been repaid by April 1997 (Zhelvitskii, 1997a: 20).
The most significant measures taken by the administration of St. Petersburg 
in 1996, 1997 and 1998 were as follows (Motyl’kov, 1996: 5; Government 
of St. Petersburg, 1998: 8 ; Promyshlennyi Vestnik, 1998, no.5: 9; Klebanov, 
1999):
• agreements with seventeen other regions of the Russian Federation were 
signed by the St. Petersburg administration in order to revive trading 
(Strategic Plan for Saint Petersburg-monitoring). These involve an 
exchange of industrial products made in St. Petersburg with grain, meat, 
raw materials and semi-manufactured products. For example, St. 
Petersburg has sent Tataristan fertilisers and turbines in exchange for oil 
and petrochemical products.
• energy tariffs were regulated in order to keep in check their continuous 
rise.
• food and food processing enterprises were helped in solving the problems 
connected with the purchase of raw materials and the modernisation of 
equipment in the biggest enterprises of this sector (Xlebni Dom and 
Petmol) was fmanced^^.
Firms producing butter, meat and non-aicoholic beverages, dairy industries and bakeries. 
It is not specified whether it was a grant or a loan.
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• a State Investment Company was set up whose main aim is to carry out 
selected investments in “high profitable projects” in light and textile 
industries.
• a mutual clearing of payment arrears among industrial firms (in 1996 
amounting to about 160 million roubles- $31 million) was carried out 
every year to ease the liquidity crisis.
• tax postponements of 49.5 million roubles ($10 million) in 1996, 77.1 
million ($13.5 million) in 1997 and 61 million ($6.1 million) in 1998 
were conceded.
Given the scale of the output fall in city industry such measures are of 
limited effectiveness, but on the other hand the city had to balance the need 
to help local industry with the financial constraints of the local budget. 
According to the director of the Committee for Economy and Industrial 
Policy, Sergeev, in charge fi’om June 1996 to December 1997 these last two 
measures permitted a saving of 1,500 jobs in 1996 (Korotkova, 1997a: 1). 
The Committee also stresses that the measures undertaken in the food 
industry have brought about an increase in output, but fails to mention the 
results, if any, of the subsidies conceded to sectors such as light industry, 
where the output drop continues year after year (Malinin, 1997: 37). Some 
of the measures, such as the assistance provided to large food firms through 
the delivery of subsidised meat, have been criticised by small businesses on 
the grounds that it makes it difficult for small firms to compete with their 
larger counterparts (Delovoi Peterburg, 1999: 16-17). Attributing the 
production increase in the food industry mainly to the measures undertaken 
by the administration is a little simplistic. As this sector has been one of 
those favoured by foreign investors in the city, and the better performing 
enterprises are those which attracted them, the opinion of the committee 
seems to be groundless. In effect, a concrete vision seems to be lacking. 
Concessions were firequently given on an individual basis without a 
transparent mechanism of evaluation. The main financial newspaper in St.
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Petersburg ( “Delovoi Peterburg"-^) has remarked that subsidies conceded in 
1995-1996 have brought about neither an increase in tax revenues nor more 
employment in the firms concerned, while tax arrears in these firms have 
increased (Zhelvitskii, 1997a: 20). In its opinion the city policy regarding 
light industry has been based on the principles of supporting virtually or 
potentially bankrupt firms (Zhelvitskii, 1997b: 15). In an article in one of 
the most popular Russian financial magazines ( “Delovye Lyudi*’) the author 
pointed out that in St. Petersburg all the measures to support industry have 
entailed satisfying the requests of the most influential directors through the 
concession of advantages to selected industrial enterprises (Arkhipov, 1998: 
67). As declared by Ostrovsky, a lawmaker who chairs the Legislative 
Assembly’s Committee for Economic Reform, (Whitmore, 1997a: 2) 
recipients have often been monopolies and inefficient large-scale 
enterprises.
For their part industrialists have long accused the local administration of 
doing too little to halt the decline in production. The previous mayor, 
Sobchak, in particular is accused of not having had a strategy to prop up the 
industrial sector at a time of exceptional difficulties, but to have taken only 
isolated measures while concentrating his efforts on trying to transform St. 
Petersburg into a major financial centre (Alekseeva, 1996: 1-2).
Following the break-up of the command system the large manufacturers of 
St. Petersburg created the Union of Industrialists and Businessmen to 
maintain long-standing economic ties between enterprises between 
enterprises and provide mutual help. Because of this, in 1992, despite the 
insolvency of many enterprises, deliveries continued as before because of 
the desire to maintain the, but in 1993 and 1994 with the deterioration of the 
economy, more and more decided that they could not afford to follow these 
rules, and stopped abiding by them. The result was that after a few years 
this organisation lost its original functions and acted mainly as a lobby 
spurring the government to solve the most pressing problems affecting the
A Swedish-owned newspaper, one of the few local newspapers not aligned with the city
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industrial sector: mutual non-paymenc as well as non-payment from the 
state, competition from foreign products, lack of resources to carry out 
investments, etc. (Interbridge, 1998: 8 ). The Union covers all sectors of the 
economy, though it is heavily represented in the military-industrial complex. 
It mainly represents the “old guard”. It has more than 100 members and 
declares itself to represent industries accounting for more than 80% of the 
total industrial output of the city in 1997, in addition to banks, insurance 
companies and commercial institutions (Days of Economics of St. 
Petersburg, 1997: 5). Feeling alienated from the political parties, 
industrialists of St. Petersburg created their own party, “Industry of St. 
Petersburg”, to contest the legislative election of December 1998. This party 
has among its members more than 2 0 0  directors of industrial, construction 
and transport enterprises, employing more than 260,000 workers. The main 
objectives of the party are the approval of laws on city procurements and on 
the promotion of investments, stricter control of the city’s expenses and 
utility tariffs, and an increase in customs duties for foreign products 
(Malinin, 1998b: 1). However, they failed to win any seats.
The concession of subsidies was curtailed at the end of 1997 under pressure 
from the Committee for Finance, and in the 1998 city budget expenditures to 
support industry as well as commimal services and energy were reduced, 
while spending for education, culture and social services was increased 
(Klebanov, 1999 1). Data from this Committee showed that of all 
enterprises receiving tax postponements only 10-15% could pay taxes back 
when the period of postponement had elapsed. The new head of the 
Committee for Finance - Artciu ev - has criticised in particular the 
groundless concessions for monopolists (PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1999, 
no.7: 2). The scarce benefits for the industrial sector of the measures 
envisaged by Sergeev led to his replacement by Klebanov, the managing 
director of one of the biggest industrial firms in St. Petersburg, LOMO. 
Klebanov is the man credited with increasing LOMO’s export revenues 
from $80,000 in 1992 to $16 million in 1996, and retaining 65% of the
administration.
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Russian optics market (Whitmore, 199/a: 2), however notwithstanding this, 
LOMO remains heavily in the red.
Klebanov promised to terminate any subsidies for ineffective industries, to 
introduce tax holidays for foreign investors and to create a favourable 
economic climate in order to stimulate domestic production as stated in the 
Strategic Plan. His policy aims at tackling general problems such as high 
utility tariffs, investment and tax policies rather than devising sectoral 
approaches (interview with Klebanov, Malinin, 1998a: 8 ). The concept 
underlying the tax policy in 1999 is to reduce the tax burden for producers 
and to increase it for consumers. The tax on housing and social-cultural 
facilities owned by enterprises was cancelled in 1999, along with some 
duties, while a sales tax of 5% was introduced. The concession of subsidies 
to industrial firms is to be linked to concrete plans of restructuring of the 
concerned enterprises.
The strategy to reform manufacturing enterprises in the city has been spelled 
out in the "Concept for Reforming the Manufacturing Enterprises of St. 
Petersburg”, which was approved by the Committee for Economy and 
Industrial Policy in 1998. Enterprise directors have to submit a restructuring 
plan to the committee. If the plan complies with the conditions set by the 
city, an agreement is signed between the government of St. Petersburg and 
the enterprise and the latter is awarded certain privileges'^ which may take 
various forms: complete or partial tax concessions; rescheduling of debts 
owed to tax bodies, extra-budgetary fimds and monopolists; city 
procurements; municipal guarantees, etc. (The Socio-Economic ..., 1998, 
no. 34: 13). Tax liabilities and arrears can be rescheduled over 5-7 years. 
As Klebanov argues, it is important to create the conditions at local level so 
that fiscal debts can be paid over 5-10 years, rather than request immediate 
payment from industries which do not have the resources to pay them back 
(Press Centre ..., 1998). Similarly, at federal level a rescheduling, or even in 
some cases a writing-off, of current tax debts is being discussed (Russian
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Economie Trends, 1998, no.l: 95). fhe impact on the city budget of 
conceding tax privileges is to be offset by a reduction in capital investment, 
which in 1998 represented 12% of the budget expenses (Rubtsov, 1998: 4). 
Restructuring may involve splitting the enterprise into two or more units 
under a holding company, selling off excess property, or incorporating the 
enterprise into an existing holding. The potential for desegregating large 
firms into small units is great in the former socialist states, as many of these 
companies have been built without a market logic or employing vertical 
integration even if it was inefficient. They have many auxiliary services 
which could be contracted out and often turn out a great deal of different 
products which bear little or no relation to each other. There are, therefore, a 
great deal of production processes which are likely to be underutilised 
because they were set up under communism in order to assure the 
availability of the necessary inputs to the enterprise where they are located, 
given the unrealibility of the supply system. For this reason it makes sense, 
according to the Committee, to divide them into separate firms, each 
concentrating on a specific activity. Various large industrial enterprises in 
St. Petersburg had already been divided along divisional, factory or 
departmental lines before the programme was adopted, but the results of this 
process so far in St. Petersburg have not been generally successful, as the 
equipment is old and these enterprises usually lack the financial resources to 
make new investments. For instance, the Kirov factory, one of the Soviet 
Union’s leading defence firms, created in 1993-94 about seventy financially 
independent entities, but some had to be subsequently reunited as they were 
unable to stay afloat. Notwithstanding the not always positive outcomes of 
this process, the creation of small enterprises out of large units can be seen 
as a necessary step to allow the profitable parts of an enterprise to survive 
and to permit firms to concentrate on their core business without being 
burdened by too many side activities. Evidence from the Czech Republic 
indicates that the firms created out of large establishments do not generally 
outperform their parent state enterprises, but nevertheless the performance 
of the latter is improved by this process (EBRD, 1998a: 142).
These privileges conceded apply only to the proportion of taxes going into the local
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The “Concept” foresees also the possibility of setting up innovation centres 
in the non-utilised premises, following the example of the large instrument- 
making manufacturer Svetlana. Various kinds of tax advantages and other 
concessions will also be given to the small enterprises spun off from these 
units (Pinchuk, 1999: 9; Donskaia, 1998: 5). According to the 
administration, one of the main objectives of these restructuring plans is a 
reduction in company overheads, which greatly contribute to the difficult 
financial situation of many firms. A company’s capacity, property and 
buildings have to be rationalised according to the level of demand for its 
products. In order to favour this rationalisation, according to a draft law, any 
profits from the sale of non-utilised equipment will not be liable for 
taxation. Nowadays in St. Petersburg only 30% of industrial capacity is 
utilised in the production cycle (interview with Klebanov, Sliusarenko, 
1998: 14), but capital assets are taxed even if they are not used in the 
production process. Otherwise, if a buyer is not found, it is possible to 
remove from taxable assets the non-utilised industrial capacity for a duration 
of three years, following the approval of a law in 1998. The premises will be 
sealed and energy supply interrupted. In this period the city and the 
enterprise will look for investment to restart production (Zatsepin, 1998a: 
4). According to the “Concept”, social assets are also to be given away. For 
example, in 1998 the industrial enterprise Igiorskie Zavodi set up five 
independent firms, transferring to them its social assets, and also transferred 
eleven hostels to the city (Trexobizkaia, 1998b: 9). The government will 
control the fulfilment of the conditions agreed which must include the 
regular payment of a “decent” wage to employees, the possibility for the 
displaced workers to find employment in the new spin-off firms or in other 
places and the conservation of the scientific and technological potentiaP^ of 
the enterprise (Nevskoe Vremia, 1998, no. 232 and 1999, no. 60: 1). By 
early 1999, thirty-five firms had expressed an interest in this programme, 
which has also been endorsed by the Union of Industrialists and
budget.
How it is ascertained whether an enterprise has maintained its scientific potential 
following the restructuring is not clear.
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Businessmen, but the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy 
estimates the total number of enterprises in need of restructuring at about 
180-200, especially defence enterprises (Ostiakova and Orlov, 1999). 
Among the participating firms are some of the biggest enterprises of the city 
belonging to the machine-building, light industrial and defence sectors. 
However, progress in this programme has been slow. The paperwork needed 
to be completed before being entitled to participate in the programme is very 
cumbersome, and enterprises are strongly advised to avail themselves of the 
assistance of one of the consulting firms suggested by the Committee for 
Economy and Industrial Policy, which entails additional expenditure. This 
might explain why just seventeen firms had submitted their business plans 
to the city authorities for approval by December 1999. The plans were 
intended to be discussed by mid-December 1999. At the beginning of that 
month the first firm - a plywood factory - received financial aid in the 
framework of this programme (Shcherbakova, 1999c: 11). The amount is, 
however, not very significant ($60,000 of tax exemptions in the course of 
three years), considering that the business plan foresees the expenditure of 
$7 million for the plant’s restructuring.
Regarding municipal enterprises, restructuring plans are to be devised by a 
council for restructuring which has been in operation since 1998 as part of 
the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy (Bogorad, 1998b: 9). At 
the instigation of Klebanov a special council for the restructuring of defence 
enterprises is also to be established in the administration of St. Petersburg, 
as the local government has succeeded in obtaining firom the federal 
government the power to manage: enterprises which have remained federal 
property36 in order to carry out its restructuring plans (Pinchuk, 1998: 7; 
Rybakov, 1999: 8 ). Klebanov’s strategy is to spin off from defence 
enterprises the parts which are not utilised for military production and to 
group them together with the military section under one holding company.
The presence o f the state in defence enterprises is still strong. In 1996 37% o f the total 
output o f the defence industries in Russia was accounted for by state firms (Kezling, 1997: 
6). As a comparison, in St. Petersburg the share o f state firms in the total industrial output 
was 11% in the same year.
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Debts and credits with the state arising from the fulfilment of state orders 
are attributed to the military section, while the remaining debt of the firm is 
rescheduled so that new enterprises are not burdened with excessive debt 
(interview with Klebanov, Malinin, 1998a: 8).
Another measure envisaged by Klebanov is the more widespread utilisation 
of bankruptcy procedures, the aim of which must be to liquidate 
unprofitable parts of an enterprise and render support to the parts which can 
be saved, thus avoiding its complete closure. According to Russian law, a 
firm declared bankrupt by the arbitration court can be either reorganised or 
put into liquidation. Under the reorganisation alternative, the management is 
replaced, tax debts are frozen and social assets are transferred to the local 
government. If the situation does not improve the firm is finally liquidated 
after eighteen months, although the arbitration court can extend this period. 
At the end of 1993 a non-judicial procedure was also created to deal with 
insolvency in state-owned enterprises and joint-stock companies in which 
the state owns at least 25% of the shares. A Federal Bankruptcy Agency was 
set up with the power either to liquidate the company or to continue the 
activity for a given period. However, bankruptcy has involved only a limited 
number of enterprises (Russian Economic Trends, 1998, no. 1: 93). Firms 
have little incentive to initiate bankruptcy procedures, because the low 
priority accorded to private sector claims makes it unlikely that any assets 
remain after satisfying privileged creditors, and because court decisions are 
often not implemented. The state and the regions have also been very 
reluctant to start bankruptcy procedures against enterprises which have 
defaulted on their tax obligations, intervening only when the situation has 
left no more hope of saving the enterprise concerned. On the other hand, 
payment arrears being so widespread, the strict application of bankruptcy 
procedures would cause a mass closure. A new bankruptcy law, effective 
since 1 March 1998, was approved to increase the application of bankruptcy 
procedures, and has resulted in a tripling of the number of bankruptcy suits. 
Even so, the proportion of firms placed in bankruptcy has remained much 
lower than in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Russian Economic Trends,
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1999, no.l: 81), since the new law has not modified substantially the order 
in which creditors^? are to be paid.
4.6. CONCLUSION
In St. Petersburg the fall in industrial output was greater than in Russia as a 
whole because its industrial structure was largely made up of sectors which 
have suffered the most in the transition to the market. The chaotic state 
policy towards defence enterprises has severely obstructed the conversion to 
civilian production. The financial stabilisation of the city has made huge 
steps forward since the appointment of Artem’ev as head of the Committee 
for Finance. He set up a treasury system reducing the influence of 
commercial banks, two deficit-free budgets were passed, and the municipal 
debt was restructured. His resignation casts doubt on the continuance of this 
policy. The legacies of the planned economy have left a strong imprint on 
the strategies used in the economic policy of the post-Soviet period at both 
federal and local levels. A Strategic Plan has been devised to set the long­
term strategy for the city economy. However, the plan seems sometimes to 
comprise the sum of the recommendations of all the partners involved 
without stating clearly how some of the objectives will be achieved, bearing 
close resemblance in some respects to an old five-year plan. Industrial 
policy in St. Petersburg has been shaped by a central economy mentality. 
The free market culture has not yet fully taken root. The administration of 
St. Petersburg has maintained a strong role in the economy, even after the 
dismantling of the planned system, partly because the large enterprises, in 
particular, continually clamour fur support which could allow them to 
overcome the crisis. Lobbying for preferential terms is still very common. 
An industrial policy is often criticised on the ground that officials are 
viewed as easy prey to corruption and lacking the competence to administer 
it, but on the other hand the poor financial state in which enterprises find 
themselves puts pressure on local governments to aid home-grown industry.
According to the new law the order is; 1) court costs and payment o f costs incurred since 
the start o f  bankruptcy proceedings 2) personal injury claims 3) wages 4) collateralised 
claims 5) debts to budget and extra-budgetary funds 6) uncollaterised claims.
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In Russia industry has been penalised by the tax system as well as by the 
high prices of utilities, which make business hardly profitable. Thus the 
requests for concessions may be seen as a method to establish fairer rules of 
the game. Managers too, having worked under a different system, often lack 
the competence or are overwhelmed by financial hurdles. For this reason, 
the administration has, not unreasonably, co-opted prominent managers as 
successive heads of the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy to use 
their supposed expertise in solving the problems of local industry. Having 
said this, it is difficult to judge how effective the policy has been so far. 
Bodies of the city administration keep formulating plans either for the whole 
economy or for a selected sector, many of which have remained largely 
unrealised, as they often seem to have little basis in the local reality. These 
plans seem to be just an expression of interest. It is not clear under which 
criteria loans to local industries were granted. In the absence of detailed data 
on the distribution of subsidies, a clear picture of the industrial policy 
carried out by the city is hard to obtain. However, following the 
appointment of Klebanov, St. Petersburg is taking a more practical 
approach. The concession of subsidies is linked to the fulfilment of the 
concrete plans for the restructuring of individual enterprises, but this 
programme is progressing slowly due to the cumbersome procedure needed 
to qualify for these subsidies.
The administration has also retained a significant role in promoting co­
operation with other members of the Federation, signing agreements to 
exchange locally-made products for the produce of other regions, as in 
Soviet times. The administration has been particularly active in assuring to 
the city an adequate supply of food products. The reason for the 
involvement of local bodies in intra-Russian trade may be linked with the 
difficulties of doing business with other regions in the absence of clear 
property rights within Russia. Entrepreneurs complain of being defenceless 
in cases where the counterpart does not fulfil the term of the contract.
Following the overview of the local economic policies, the next chapter will 
focus on the small business policy that the local administration carried out
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and compare it with that carried out in Moscow in order to detect the main 
factors which explain the large growth of small business in the two cities.
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5. SMALL BUSINESS PROMOTION IN ST. PETERSBURG AND 
MOSCOW 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will outline the measures taken by local administrations in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow towards small business and the business 
community’s attitudes towards their policies. A review of the federal policy 
towards small business is not sufficient, because the economic policy of 
local administrations has a strong influence on small businesses: a 
substantial share of the taxation burden is determined by local bodies, as 
well as the rent of premises, the majority of which are owned by local 
governments. They also have considerable autonomy in implementing laws 
and regulations. As emphasised previously, the attitude towards small 
business has varied greatly in Russia from local administration to local 
administration. Some regions have not even implemented mandatory federal 
legislation on small business let alone offered any measure of support, 
while others have taken matters into their own hands and devised their own 
policy to promote it. This chapter will consider how St. Petersburg has 
acted in this context. The experience of St. Petersburg is then compared 
with Moscow to understand why Moscow is leading in terms of small 
business development.
5.1. SMALL BUSINESS PROMOTION IN ST. PETERSBURG
Small business development has been of secondary importance compared 
with other policy areas under the two administrations St. Petersburg has had 
in the post-communist period. Little was done before 1996, when two laws 
on small business and the first city programme of small business support 
were approved. In the same year the government of St. Petersburg also 
created the Small Business Council (mayoral resolution of 7 May 1996) 
composed of specialists in this area with the aim of advising the city 
administration on small business development and acting as a liaison
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between small enterprises and authorities. This Council, which is located in 
the headquarters of the government of St. Petersburg, is made up of several 
sub-committees, each engaged in different areas: a sub-committee which 
represents the administrations of the various city zones, one which deals 
with foreign economic relations, one with financial policy, one with 
legislative matters and one with leasing activities. The sub-committee on 
foreign economic relations is charged with favouring the implementation of 
international programmes and attracting funds to the city. The sub­
committee on legislative matters was the author of the new law on the 
revised simplified system of taxation and accounting and has drafted a law 
on leasing to small businesses, while the sub-committee for leasing 
activities is entrusted with promoting the concession of leasing to small 
businesses and setting up a leasing company dedicated to small business 
(Ponomareva, 1997: 18). As of 1998, there were about ten leasing 
companies in St. Petersburg, three or four of which work with small 
enterprises, but the standard interest rate of 30% per year on dollar- 
denominated leases rules out this option for all but a few. For this reason, 
the demand for leasing has not been very high. Enterprises which have 
resorted to leasing are mainly firms working in the food and transport 
service sectors, which are doing well.
The first of the two laws on small business adopted in 1996 was the federal 
law "On the Simplified System of Taxation and Accounting", which 
requires that analogous laws be enacted by local authorities in order to be 
effective at local level. Individuals and legal entities which opt for this 
system (to be eligible they cannot have more than fifteen employees) have to 
pay an unique tax equivalent to 10% of gross revenues plus the patent, the 
cost of which depends on the sector of activity. For wholesalers and retailers 
gross revenues are defined as the total mark-up on goods sold. The law, 
however, did not prove very popular. Only 193 small businesses and thirty- 
two private entrepreneurs out of 39,000 firms and 30,000 individuals 
eligible for the simplified system (Borisova, 1997b) purchased patents in 
1996, since they are generally considered to be too expensive. A patent in
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St. Petersburg cost up to April 1998 between $2,100 and $8,500, depending 
on the sector of activity. The number of participating firms increased only 
slightly by the end of 1997 to 280 (Petrova, 1998: 1), For this reason 
amendments to the law were approved in April 1998. The tax rate was 
reduced from 10% to 6.66% and patents were made free of charge for 
companies, while for individual entrepreneurs the cost was reduced by a 
third. The simplified system has become especially advantageous following 
the introduction of the sales tax (5% of the revenues) and the imputed 
income tax in 1999 because those opting for this system are exempted from 
them. These new taxes have been introduced to compensate the losses in 
regional budget revenues deriving from the new revenue sharing criteria set 
by the federal government*. This has led to a sharp rise in the number of 
firms opting for this system which reached 12,500 by April 1999 
(PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1999, no. 15: 4). However, this law is unlikely 
to prove very popular as long as its main shortcomings (the low limit on the 
number of employees; the impossibility of establishing the amount of VAT 
in the total cost of goods bought from enterprises opting for the simplified 
system; and the lack of a mechanism to allow firms to return to the normal 
system of accounting) are not corrected by federal legislation. Another 
problem is that about half of the entrepreneurs in St. Petersburg do not know 
of its existence (Nepomiashchaia, 1997a: 2).
The second law on small business approved in 1996 was the law no. 137-48 
"On Measures of State Support for Small Entrepreneurship in St. 
Petersburg" endorsed by the legislative assembly of the city on 6 November
1996. It states that up to 1% of the city budget must be earmarked every year 
for the support and development of small business; in other words not 
providing any absolute minimum to be allocated each year. This law also 
states that from 1998 (subsequently postponed to 1999) the share of the 
profits tax and the property tax going to the local budget is lowered by 50%
* In 1999 the share o f the income tax, o f the VAT and o f the profits tax going into local 
budgets was lowered.
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in the first two years of activity for small firms in the industrial sector, on 
the condition that this activity represents at least 70% of their total turnover.
The first programme for the support and development of small business was 
approved by the city authorities in 1996 for the years 1995-1996% with a 
budget of 11.5 million roubles ($2.3 million^) (Chas Pik, 1997: 2). Such 
programmes are worked out by the Committee for Economy and Industrial 
Policy which is responsible for devising the city policy on small business. 
The North-Western Regional Fund for Small Business Support (hereafter 
the North-Western Fund) was entrusted by the Committee for Economy and 
Industrial Policy with the execution of the programme. Following the 
foundation of the State Fund for the Development of Small Business in St. 
Petersburg (hereafter the S.F.S.P.) in June 1996 this responsibility was 
transferred to this fund. The reason for the existence of two state 
organisations for the development of small business, both of which strive to 
be the effective contractors of the small business programme, is that one is 
favoured by the city Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy (the 
North-Western Fund) and is actually located in the offices of the local 
administration, while the other (the S.F.S.P.) is favoured by the legislative 
assembly. About 60% of the resources of this programme were meant to 
be used to provide preferential loans not only to finance enterprises, but also 
projects which should promote the development of the small business sector 
in St. Petersburg, such as the creation of an information centre and a centre 
of legal aid for entrepreneurs. (Kiselev, 1996: 20). In theory, half of the 
resources should have been provided by the city and the federal budget on 
an equal basis, while the rest was expected to come from the Fund of 
Employment and from bank loans. In practice, the only financing came 
from the city and it amounted to 4.5 million roubles ($900,000) instead of 
the 11.5 million budgeted (City of St. Petersburg 1996, 1997: 20) and this 
amount was made up entirely of promissory notes (Shabalina, 1998: 4). As 
this expenditure was not considered to be a priority it was included in the
% The realisation o f the programme was due to begin in 1995, but it was approved by the 
city government only in 1996.
% Calculated at the 1996 exchange rate.
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budget cuts to keep the deficit in checK. No federal financing was given 
due to the fact that financing from St. Petersburg for 1996 was disbursed in 
1997 at a time when the change of the director of the Federal Fund for 
Small Business Support effectively immobilised its activity. Similarly, no 
financing was obtained fi*om other sources.
The city financing of 4.5 million roubles disbursed in 1997 was given to the 
S.F.S.P. on a grant basis, while the North-Western Fund received a loan of a 
similar amount. In order to increase the amount of financing available, the 
S.F.S.P. planned to utilise future financing to set up a guarantee fund instead 
of directly financing projects. An agreement was reached with various banks 
that for every rouble of guarantee the banks would give loans for four 
roubles, but it was never implemented as the S.F.S.P. practically ceased to 
be operational in 1999 due to financial difficulties (Shabalina, 1998: 4). 
Even before that the activity of the S.F.S.P. had been strongly criticised by 
the deputy director of the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy. 
The Fund was accused of not having a clear conception of its aims despite 
having being operational for a few years and of having spent more for its 
support than for the intended purposes (PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1999, 
no. 13: 3). The S.F.S.P. should in theory carry out a wide range of activity 
aimed at promoting small business in the city (see pages 227-228), but its 
activity has been limited to taking part in various exhibitions, enabling 
several small enterprises to display their products at a very low cost, 
organising a number of training courses and conceding a few loans 
(Lazarev, 1998: 14). Less than a third of the financial resources received 
by the Fund were spent for the intended aims. It financed just five projects 
in 1998. Moreover, loans to small firms were conceded without a proper 
evaluation of the business plans submitted and a proper control of how the 
firm used the financing. As a result, they were largely not returned"* 
(Shabalina, 1999: 5; Likhotkin, 1999: 17). Because of all this, the revenues 
fi-om its activity amounted to only 12% of its expenditures making the Fund 
almost completely dependent on state financing. Contrary to expectations, it
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was also unable to attract any external financing. Cumulative losses 
amounted by mid-1999 to half of its assets. Despite its financial dependence 
the S.F.S.P. repeatedly tried to hinder any control over its activity, and its 
head refused to step down despite being dismissed by the Committee for 
Economy and Industrial Policy. The impasse terminated when the S.F.S.P. 
ran out of financial resources and effectively closed down.
Objections have also been raised to the activities of the North-Western 
Fund, which has not publicised how it utilised the resources allocated to it 
by the city, even refusing to clarify this issue to a business magazine in St. 
Petersburg, thereby infringing the law “On the Means of Mass Information” 
(Kiselev, 1997c: 11). Most were probably spent in salaries and travelling 
expenses (interview with Yeliseeva). Therefore, it can be said that, as at 
federal level, the small business support funds in St. Petersburg have proved 
unable to fulfil the assigned tasks and have been found guilty of gross 
mismanagement. In order to avoid future cases of malpractice, the 
Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy is striving to set clear rules 
which each organisation receiving money from city coffers has to respect. 
The number of centres promoting small business will probably be reduced in 
order to exercise better control over their activities and to avoid having 
organisations with overlapping functions. In addition to these two funds in 
the city there are a large number of centres involved in small business 
promotion, but some are almost inactive due to the lack of financial 
resources. By early 1999 in the city there were about seventy centres 
claiming to support or represent small business, but only thirty were really 
operational and the great majority lely for their survival on the support of 
the local administration. The others only exploit the claim to a promotional 
role in order to receive rent advantages or are wholly non-operational 
(Delovaia Panorama, 1999: 8; Delovoi Peterburg, 1998: 5). Despite the 
existence of so many organisations the number of entrepreneurs who are 
members of one of these is very limited. According to research carried out
"* This would confirm what said by the entrepreneurs that loans were mostly conceded in a 
non-transparent way.
206
by the Leontief Center, 94% of them are not members of any association 
(Leontief Center, 1999: 13).
The Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy itself has been accused 
by the Small Business Council (Delovoi Peterburg, 1997b: 2) of setting up 
funds in order to attract resources for the support of such structures, rather 
than with the aim of providing assistance to the categories these funds are 
supposed to help. The creation of funds for support of small business, 
agriculture, industry, etc. has been a favoured activity of the various bodies 
of the city administration, but the results are hardly visible. As a rule, these 
funds spell out a wide range of initiatives, plans and programmes which 
mainly remain unrealised.
The most active organisations on behalf of small business in the past few 
years have been business support centres and funds established by 
international donors. They have been the only realistic source of financing 
for small businesses and have also provided international experts for a 
considerable number of assignments. They offer in-house consultations on a 
short-term basis, business advice, loans, and equity finance to small firms. 
These organisations include the Citizens Democracy Corps (CDC), the 
Center for Citizen Initiatives, International Executive Service Corps, the 
Business Collaboration Center^ and The U.S. Russia Investment Fund 
(TUSRIF), all financed by USAID; the Small Enterprise Equity Fund 
(SEEF) and the Russia Small Business Fund, both set up by the EBRD; the 
Russian Technology Fund, founded by the EBRD in partnership with other 
foreign and Russian organisations, che St. Petersburg Foundation for SME 
Development financed by TACIS; the British Executive Service Overseas, 
financed by the British government; and many others. Consulting 
organisations offer their services for free or at very low rates, but in the near 
future they will have to be se lf financing, as the financial support from 
USAID and other bodies is decreasing or even stopped. For this reason their 
survival is in doubt. Among the programmes whose survival is in doubt is
 ^This center has been closed down,
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the credit programme of the Russian Initiative of Self Employment (RISE) - 
managed by the Center for Citizen Initiatives - which is based on the 
experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. RISE gives micro loans 
both to entrepreneurs starting up, upon completion of a free-of-charge 
training programme, and to existing businesses with no more than ten 
employees. By statute, over 60% of participants must be female. Non­
performing loans have been relatively few (four out of sixty), but profits 
from the micro loan activity do not cover the expenses incurred. The main 
problem, according to the loan co-ordinator of RISE, is the difficulty in 
finding suitable projects. Because of this, just sixty projects were financed 
in 1997-1998, when in order to break-even it would have been necessary to 
finance fifty projects in a single year. More successful was another RISE 
initiative, “the Apparel Innovation Center”, which is in fact a business 
incubator geared to the production of clothing and accessories. In the 
middle of 1996 a total of eighty-eight people were working in the centre, 
which was fially occupied and managed to become self-sustained. As far as 
the other American organisation - the CDC - is concerned, its assistance to 
small businesses in Western Russia was described as very valuable in an 
assessment carried out by a consulting organisation on behalf of USAID, 
and the programme providing volunteer consultants as a moderate cost, high 
impact programme (Carana Corporation, 2000: II).
Unlike the above organisations, the funds have always worked on a self- 
financing basis, with strict eligibility criteria for the concession of loans. 
Grants, if given, were received by these funds only at the beginning of their 
activity. The problem is that the interest rates required by these funds are 
very high^ and for this reason are not affordable by the majority of firms. 
The high costs can be explained by the expenditures incurred not only in the 
eligibility determination process, but also in following the firms’ activities 
after the concession of loans. Funds officials, usually, visit the client 
monthly in order to assess the situation, a duty which is not always easy, 
given the clients’ fears that some information might end up in the tax office.
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In 1997 about ten million roubles ($1.7 million) were allocated in the St. 
Petersburg budget for the development of small business, but this sum was 
not disbursed, as it was again cancelled due to budget cuts. The programme 
for small business support in 1998-2000 has been given the status of a law 
for the first time, requiring approval by the legislative assembly. The 
amount of resources planned to be set aside is unprecedented. In the draft 
law submitted to the legislative assembly, financing amounts to 5.12 million 
roubles ($510,000) in 1998, 76.87 million in 1999 and 79.53 in 2000 
(PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1998, no. 15: 6) and an equal amount should by 
law come from the Federal Fund for Small Business Support. Almost half of 
the resources are to be given on a loan basis with strict controls over their 
use (PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1998, no. 16/17: 4). However, this 
programme was approved only in May 2000 on the day of the inauguration 
of the second term of the mayor of St. Petersburg, but financing was cut to 
twenty-seven million roubles for the year 2000. The reasons for the long 
delay in the approval of this programme are linked to the struggle in the 
legislative assembly between the pro- and anti-mayor factions. The main 
criticism of the law, in addition to the lack of trust in the city bureaucrats to 
implement this programme effectively, is the fact that the programme is 
considered to be of secondary importance compared with other issues such 
as the excessive tax burden and the high rents for the city premises 
(PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1999, no.9: 2).
In the plans of the city administration this programme should lead in three 
years to an increase in the number of workers in small businesses of 60- 
80,000, a 4% increase in the share of industrial output represented by small 
firms, and a growth of the analogous share regarding scientific activity of 
6% (Eskin, 1998a: 143). The share of small business in the city’s GDP 
should reach 25% and in the total tax revenues of the city 20%. How these 
figures were calculated has not been publicised. They probably just 
represent the expectations of the city administration. The programme is
 ^For example, the interest rates applied by Petrovskii Bank are 16% for 3-year small loans
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aimed mainly at firms working in the industrial sector, and in R&D. It has 
four main directions:
• development of support infrastructure
• investment support through the concession of guarantees, the creation of 
specific funds and the development of a system of leasing equipment.
• information support.
• improvement of the legislative environment
The main measures envisaged in the programme are the realisation of a 
programme for the development of innovation activity based on the creation 
of a network of innovation centres, science parks and business incubators 
(68% of the total financing); the provision of investments and loans for 
small firms - especially spin-offs from large enterprises - (12% of the total); 
the establishment of consulting agencies in different areas of the city and 
the creation of an information centre where, for example, entrepreneurs can 
be informed about market trends (9%); and the improvement of the 
legislative framework for small business (2%)%. Regarding the last point the 
creation of a mechanism to let city property to small businesses on 
favourable conditions and the allotment of a given share of city 
procurements to small businesses are envisaged. A few consulting 
agencies, called Business Development Centres, have already been set up as 
part of the state programme for small business support. These are non- 
profit-making organisations which offer consulting at reasonable prices, but 
have to be self-financing in order to survive, as support from the local 
administration has come mainly in words rather than actions (lundina, 
1997: 1). One of the most successful was the Business Development Centre 
of Vasilieski Island which in 1997 had more than 1,500 regular clients on 
its books (Kiselev, 1997b; 22). This centre had, however, to close down in 
mid-2000 when the new head of the district where it is located cancelled the 
rent agreement the centre had signed with his predecessor.
of up to $125,000 and 20-21% for 1-year micro loans of up $30,000.
% There is clearly a mistake in these percentages, reported by C. Eskin the deputy director 
o f the Committee for Economy and Industrial Policy of the St. Petersburg acininistration, 
as they do not add up to 100 (Delovaia Panorama, 1999;' 8).
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The measures contained in the programme for small business support have 
found a moderately positive response among entrepreneurial associations, 
which, however, complain that they have not been consulted in spite of the 
promise to discuss the programme with them. In particular, in the opinion of 
Pastukhov, the President of the Union of Entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg, 
the programme does not tackle some of the major problems affecting small 
businesses such as the difficulty of repaying loans in hard currency after the 
threefold devaluation of the rouble (Ipatova, 1998a: 14).
Some of the measures indicated in the 1998-2000 programme had, however, 
already been included in the previous programmes, but have remained 
unfulfilled. For years local authorities have planned to allot industrial and 
office premises to new entrepreneurs and to give them the opportunity to 
rent and buy these premises at advantageous prices, but nothing has been 
done (Nikiforov, 1996a: 4). Considering that most of the premises are in 
state hands it is clear that local authorities have a very powerful tool to 
promote entrepreneurship. The unavailability of premises is in many 
regions one of the major obstacles to the development of small businesses, 
the other problem being that entrepreneurs are often uncertain as to how 
long they can remain in rented premises. Legally it would be possible to 
extend the lease to up to forty years, but local authorities have generally 
been unwilling to make rental agreements for more than five or six years 
and have also proved ready to cancel the agreements, if a third party offers 
better conditions, even if this entails breaking the law.
The concession of guarantees and the promotion of leasing had also been 
proposed, but not implemented for several years. A guarantee fund for the 
concession of loans to small enterprises was called for by the mayor in mid-
1997. He signed the resolution "On a Guarantee Fund of Support for Small 
Business in St. Petersburg". This resolution was in reality a 
recommendation to the Committee for Finance to concede to the North- 
Western Fund a five million roubles loan ($860,000) designed to form a
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guarantee fund (Peterburgskii Koraniercheskii Kur’er, 1997, no. 13, 2), but 
no financing has been yet provided for this guarantee fund as well as for the 
city leasing company for small business created in September 1997.
Has the rather limited activity pursued by the city administration had any 
positive effect? The activity of the Small Business Council has hardly been 
noticed. As declared by Khod’ko (Peterburgskii Kommercheskii Kur’er, 
1997, n.7: 1), the chairman of the sub-committee on foreign economic 
relations, its contribution has been minimal. Apart from elaborating a 
revised simplified system of taxation and accounting which became law, its 
activity has resulted in a few proposals^ which have remained unheeded. 
Legislation is usually approved by the governor without the active 
involvement of the Council (Pastukhov, 1998: 23). Because of this the 
Council has practically stopped being operational (Gavrilov, 2000: 2). The 
two funds have both mismanaged the resources assigned and have provided 
only a token assistance to small business. Similarly, the measures proposed 
by the city administration have largely remained unimplemented. A ftirther 
indication of the erratic city policy towards small business is the fate of the 
Business Development Centre of Vasilieski Island. Therefore, it can be said 
the development of the small business sector has taken place despite lack of 
interest by the local administration.
The economic policy pursued in St. Petersburg towards the small business 
sector has been strongly criticised both by the entrepreneurial class and by 
the political parties which are closer to it. According to a local 
representative of the national part)' Yabloko the policy pursued had by mid- 
1997 brought a strengthening of the process of monopolisation (Korotkova, 
1997b; 6). In his opinion, high registration fees, tax burdens and the rent 
increase for commercial premises have stifled the creation of new 
enterprises and made the survival of the existing ones difficult. In addition.
® The council has proposed the creation o f a marketing research centre, the creation o f a 
guarantee fund for small enterprises managed by the North-Western Fund, a congress to 
celebrate the ten years since small enterprises were allowed in Russia, the promotion of 
leasing and franchising and the realisation o f a city programme to foster entrepreneurship 
among young people in 1997-1998 (Predprinimatei’ Peterburga, 1997, n. 22: 4-5).
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he remarked that the introduction oi me new procedure for setting the rent 
of commercial premises does not protect entrepreneurs from abuses by city 
officials. The method only fixes standard rents, and the use of a higher or 
lower coefficient (in relation to the location and type of the building) 
depends on the decision of the official in the district’s City Property 
Committee. Well-connected entrepreneurs are said to have been able to 
obtain much better conditions. Some of them have obtained premises at a 
nominal cost, tax deferments, city orders or exemptions fi-om inspection. 
Cases of abuse of power and other anti-competitive practices should, in 
theory, be sanctioned by the State Anti-Monopoly Committee for the 
Development of Entrepreneurship, which is entrusted with investigating 
these matters, but it has so far not proved very effective. In an overview of 
the St. Petersburg Anti-Monopoly Committee, Sahlas and Reshetnikova 
(1997: 66) described it as “to date unable to fulfil completely its assigned 
tasks”.
The entrepreneurial class has been equally critical of the administration. 
The resolution of the second congress of the entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg 
in November 1997 affirmed (PredprinimateT Peterburga, 1997, no.23: 5) 
that; “The level of small business development (in St. Petersburg) 
occupies one of the last places in Russia. This is to a considerable extent the 
result of the attitude of the administration and of the legislative assembly 
towards the problems of entrepreneurship. In St. Petersburg there is no 
legal stability, legal documents are approved without the necessary legal 
expertise and without evaluating the social and economic consequences of 
their realisation; a unique legal space does not exist as territorial bodies of 
the administration introduce their rules and additional charges. The 
malpractice of the departments in charge of registrations, supply of 
information, licences, supervision and control over small business is 
continuing. There are no normative documents establishing the order and 
the deadline for taking decisions, the responsibility of the departments and 
officials infringing the rights of entrepreneurs and causing to them material 
and moral losses.”
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One of the problems is the lack of a mechanism to enforce local laws on 
small business. The majority of taxes and other regulations affecting small 
business are open to the subjective interpretation of government officials. 
For example, territorial branches of the tax authority continued to ask for 
the payment of the patent to companies opting for the simplified system of 
taxation and accounting, even after the approval of the law which made 
patents free of charge (Predprinimatef Peterburga, 1998, no. 12: 3).
In reality, the data give a different picture, as already explained in chapter 
three. Small business in St. Petersburg is expanding very quickly by 
Russian standards, even if its level still trails behind Moscow and the 
leading transition countries. The criticism at the congress was aimed at the 
lack of interest shown by the local administration in improving business 
conditions and in reining in the frequent abuse of power by bureaucrats who 
see small businesses mainly as a source of personal revenue. According to 
the participants of the congress, in the administration of St. Petersburg, a 
structure sufficiently competent to cope with the problems of small business 
does not exist.
Similarly, the President of the Union of Entrepreneurs of St. Petersburg, R. 
Pastukhov, declared that not even one of the problems indicated in the first 
congress of the Union held in 1997 has been tackled by the city 
administration and that the situation for small and medium firms has 
worsened ever since. He complained that neither the city legislative 
assembly nor the city administration are attentive to the problems affecting 
small businesses (Kirillova, 1999: 3).
In spite of the existence of numerous associations of entrepreneurs, their 
interests have scarce political representation at the regional level. The 
association representing the greatest number of entrepreneurs (1,500 in 
1998) in St. Petersburg is the Union of Entrepreneurs, which accepts only 
small and medium-sized businesses. The Chamber of Commerce comes a
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distant second with 850 associates of any size (as declared in their 
brochure). Associations assume an important role in the transition process, 
serving as a source of information for private firms (on legislation, business 
partners, etc.) and practical help for the creation and management of a 
business, but in Russia entrepreneurs have been reluctant to join 
organisations claiming to represent them, being generally sceptical of their 
usefulness.
Only during the last few years can a more focused attention on small 
business be detected. A positive sign is the creation in 1999 of a single 
licence chamber in St. Petersburg where entrepreneurs can obtain all the 
information on this matter without having to refer, as before, to the 
countless bodies in charge of licensing (Laverycheva, 1999: 5). The mayor, 
after having ignored the second congress of the entrepreneurs of St. 
Petersburg, intervened at the third congress in October 1999, pointing to the 
vast increase in resources earmarked for the small business programme as 
proof of the dedication of the current administration to the sector. In view of 
the forthcoming elections, to be held in the year 2000, he can not afford to 
ignore a sector whose weight in the local economy is growing year after 
year. However, unless the measures indicated in the programme are 
effectively implemented the main problems affecting small business in the 
city will remain untackled.
Having now examined how the local administration has dealt with small 
business, the following section provides an overview of how Moscow has 
fared in this respect and how the Capital differs from St. Petersburg, in order 
to explain the greater development of the sector in Moscow.
5,2. SMALL BUSINESS PROMOTION IN MOSCOW
Moscow is the leading city in Russia in terms of small business 
development. Thirty-nine per cent of the workforce was employed by small
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businesses in 1997* (Goskomstat, 1998d: 174-350). Half of the revenues of 
the city budget are derived from small enterprises. In the last few years, as 
declared by Luzkov the mayor of Moscow: “1,200,000 Muscovites have 
been released by big enterprises and, considering the fact that the 
unemployment rate in Moscow is zero^°, all of them must have found 
employment in small businesses” (Predprinimatel’ Peterburga, 1998, 
no. 1/2: 6).
This phenomenon can be attributed to two factors: the far greater wealth of 
Moscow, and the active policy of the Moscow government in promoting 
entrepreneurship. Moscow enjoyed a higher standard of living compared 
with the rest of the Soviet Union even in the communist period. It was 
favoured in the distribution of goods. The gap in living standards between 
Moscow and the rest of Russia has become still more pronounced in the 
post-communist period. A study undertaken between 1992 and 1995 by the 
Expert Institute showed that Moscow was the region with the highest 
income levels and highest rates of income growth (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 
1996: 44) and this process is still continuing: in 1995 real monetary 
incomes in Moscow were 3.5 times higher than in the country as a whole, 
while in 1997 they had become 3.8 times higher (Goskomstat, 1998d: 210). 
A concrete example of the gap in living standards between Moscow and the 
other parts of the Russian Federation is indicated by the fact that in 1996 
Moscow provided 31% of the revenues in the federal budget 
(PredprinimateF Peterburga, 1998, no. 1/2: 6), with only one-fourteenth of 
the Russian population.
 ^ This includes full-time permanent workers and contract workers, but excludes part-time 
workers.
Official statistics on unemployment in Russia include only those who are registered in 
the unemployment offices. Low unemployment benefits mean that a large number of  
unemployed persons do not register themselves. The official unemployment rate in 
Moscow was 1% at the end o f 1996, much lower than the rate for Russia as a whole. 
Instead, according to the ILO concept it was 5% in March 1996 which is considered to be 
a level o f full employment (OECD, 1997: 40). In Russia as a whole the unemployment 
rate according to the ILO concept was 9.6% in 1996 (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, 
n o .l, 104).
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Concerning small business support, the legal base for the support of 
entrepreneurship in Moscow was introduced in the years 1993-1995. 
Moscow was the first region in the Russian Federation to approve a law on 
small business, and the amounts allocated to its programme for small 
business support surpass by far those in other regions. The Moscow 
government has earmarked 971 million roubles ($98 million^i) for the years 
1998-2000 for the development of small business (PredprinimateF 
Peterburga, 1997, no.24: 2). The necessary criteria for the receipt of support 
from the local administration are listed in the law “The Basis of Small 
Entrepreneurship on Moscow” (approved in June 1995) which supplements 
the federal law on state support of entrepreneurship '
According to the local legislation financing for this programme must not be 
less than 0.5% of the revenues of the city budget and, not less than 5% of 
revenues from the privatisation of municipal property. The main objectives 
of the programme for the years 1998-2000 are to promote the leasing of 
entire production complexes and commercial premises and to expand 
international contacts and co-operation through specialised exhibitions for 
small businesses, while the main measures already realised in the 
framework of the past programmes are:
•  the compulsory letting on advantageous terms in all city districts of some 
of the buildings, equipment, industrial and office premises, and other 
property belonging to federal and municipal authorities. Open 
competitions for the purchase of buildings are also regularly organised 
for small business owners exclusively. For this purpose, by law, 
territorial bodies of the government of Moscow are obliged to set aside a 
given portion of state property to be privatised and of buildings
 ^1 Calculated at the average exchange rate in 1998.
This law differs from the federal law on these points:
• the ceiling regarding the number o f workers is increased to 200 for industrial 
enterprises and construction firms, to 100 in other sectors o f material production and 
sixty in the service sector.
• small businesses must be included in a special register of small enterprises held by the 
local administration in Moscow.
• the basic activity must correspond to one o f the priority sectors established by the city 
administration.
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confiscated from landlords who acquired them illegally. Research has, in 
fact, shown that the high costs of renting business premises in Moscow is 
one of the main factors hindering the development of small business. 
Fifty per cent of the inactive small enterprises cannot operate because 
they cannot afford premises, and 50% of those in operation do not have 
fixed premises (Mali Biznes Moskvi, 1998: 4).
• a business incubator has been set up in almost all city districts. While in 
1994 there were only two business incubators in Moscow, neither of 
which had been founded by the city government, this number has risen to 
sixteen by the beginning of 1998 (Egorov, 1998: 27).
• the Moscow Leasing Company (MLC) was established in 1993 with the 
sole aim of leasing different kinds of equipment to small businesses 
(mainly to firms working in the industrial sectors prioritised by 
Moscow). Up to 1996 total financing amounted to more than seventy 
million roubles - $13.7 m illion(lundina, 1998a: 7). The MLC claims a 
high repayment rate, having had only two cases of non-payment in the 
first two years of its work (IPSSA, 1997a: 39).
According to a survey carried out in Moscow in 1995-6 (covering 106 small 
firms) as much as 15% of small businesses had received some sort of aid 
from the local administration, although in one-third of the cases it was 
simply a tax concession such as the reduction of profits tax. The most 
common type of aid was the rent of premises at favourable terms (this 
applied to 6% of the firms surveyed) which means that about 12,000 firms 
in Moscow have benefited from this - a remarkable figure (Voprosy 
Statistiki, 1996, no .ll: 44).
To what extent the policies pursued by the Moscow administration have 
been beneficial to small business is an open question. From research 
undertaken so far, the role of the Moscow government as a champion of 
small business does not emerge very clearly. A survey conducted in 1996 
pointed out that the conditions for business in Moscow have not improved 
according to more than half of its entrepreneurs (Business Collaboration
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Center, 1998: 1). Only 12% belicycd that the conditions had improved 
considerably. Thirty per cent said that the conditions were not very good, 
but at least there were some positive c h a n g e s The Moscow government 
does not seem to have been capable of reducing bureaucratic complications. 
Licensing requirements in Moscow were seen to create significant barriers 
to entrepreneurial activity in the city by the director of the State Anti- 
Monopoly Committee’s Moscow branch (Nelson and Kuzes, 1995b: 113), 
In mid-1994 the department of the city administration devoted exclusively 
to licensing entrepreneurial activity had more than 1,000 employees 
(Nelson and Kuzes, 1995b: 112), and still in 1999 it was necessary to obtain 
the permissions of dozens of authorities to open a business (Korenevskii, 
1999: 2). Even if we concede that the policy has had beneficial results it is 
only one of several factors which make small business so developed in 
Moscow and the standard of life there much higher than in the rest of 
Russia. There are a variety of reasons for this gap in living standards: much 
of the foreign investment in Russia has gone to Moscow^^; privatisation has 
favoured Moscow-based entrepreneurs (especially the members of the 
oligarchy who once boasted control of half of the Russian economy); all 
the major banks are based in Moscow; some major companies with factories 
throughout Russia have their headquarters in Moscow and pay a substantial 
amount of their taxes to Moscow. The exceptional development of small 
business in Moscow, by Russian standards, seems to lie, therefore, more in 
its high level of wealth, rather than in any government policy. This has 
resulted in a significant development of the service sector which accounts 
for 85% of Moscow’s GDP compared with 65% in St. Petersburg^^ 
(Hodachek, 1998: 12), Over the period 1992-1994 Moscow has led in new 
service growth and has greatly surpassed the other regions in this respect
Calculated at the average exchange rate in 1996.
No date was given for when the comparison was made. Presumably it was made with 
the previous two-three years.
For example, in the years 1994-1995-1996 the city o f Moscow attracted 28.3%, 50.7% 
and 40.4% of the total foreign direct investment received by Russia (OECD, 1997: 127).
I presume that the author was looking at 1997, having written the article in 1998, 
although it does not mention any date. In reality, services in St. Petersburg GDP accounted 
for 60.8% of its GDP in 1997, but Goskomstat also included taxes - 8.8% - in its 
calculation (Goskomstat, 1998b: 10). As taxes are not usually included in GDP, excluding
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(see table 5.1 on page 220). The same pattern was found in 1997 suggesting 
a continuous trend. By 1997 Moscow accounted for 27% of the country’s 
retail trade with 7% of the population (Russian Economic Trends, January 
1998: 5). Small business in manufacturing has, instead, lagged. By 1996, 
15% of industrial output in Moscow came from small firms (Finansy, 1997: 
38), which is less than the share accounted by small businesses in St. 
Petersburg. This is a disappointing figure considering that the decrease in 
production in Moscow exceeded the Russian average between 1992 and 
1995 (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1996: 54; Van Seim, 1998: 610).
5.3. CONCLUSION
An enormous task was faced by the city administration after the downfall 
of the command system. A whole set of new problems had to be tackled and 
this is likely to have deflected attention away from small business. A clear 
commitment from the local administration to improve the situation has, 
however, been absent. It has so far done very little to support this sector, 
merely approving mandatory federal legislation and the programmes of 
small business support which have, however, largely remained 
unimplemented. Like the industrial policy pursued in the city, various 
committees have been set up to advise the government and a lot of different 
measures have been proposed, but most have not yet been applied. No 
concrete effort has been made to ease the main problems affecting small 
businesses in the city (the high cost of premises, the difficulty of obtaining 
loans, the high level of taxation, the bureaucratic racketeering, etc.). The 
only positive steps have been the revision of the law on the simplified 
system of taxation and accounting and the creation of a single licence 
chamber. The level of finance allocated to small business programmes was 
up to 1998 well below the ceiling set by the law (in 1998 it was 0.05% of 
the budget expenditure^'^), but nevertheless it has, in large part, not been
taxes the contribution o f services would account for about 67%, which is close to 
Hodachek’s figure.
This calculation was based on figures provided by the publication Budget of St. 
Petersburg for 1998 by the Committee for Finance o f the St. Petersburg administration, 
page 12.
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disbursed. Only in the last two years (i998 and 1999) can a greater attention 
towards small business be detected, probably in view of the forthcoming 
election. The allocations for small business development have been greatly 
increased for 1999-2000. These, however, were approved by the legislative 
assembly only in May 2000 and only for that year and were reduced by 
about two-thirds.
Despite the non-implementation of the small business programme, the 
objectives set out in this programme for the years 1998-2000 in terms of 
small business employment had already been achieved by 1998. Having 
said this, it is reasonable to ask what may have caused small business to 
develop so strongly in the city, despite the city having an income which is 
much lower than Moscow - only slightly higher than the Russian averagers _ 
and despite the lack of support from the local administration. In Moscow 
the growth of small business seems to have been largely the result of the 
high level of wealth, while the positive effects of the govemment policy are 
not very clear. One question mark concerns the reliability of these figures as 
impressionistic evidence would appear to suggest a higher standard of 
living in St. Petersburg, than that officially stated. Apart from this, the 
factors which may explain the great expansion of the small business sector 
in St. Petersburg are mainly:
• The high educational level of the population and their “Western 
mentality”, which makes them more prone to engage in entrepreneurial 
activity.
• The presence of a small, but relevant, by Russian standards, middle 
class. The population is characterised by a high proportion of 
pensioners with very low incomes, which means that there is a sizeable 
share of the population with higher than average incomes, who have 
money to spend on non-essential goods.
• Spending in the city economy is boosted by the presence of a sizeable 
foreign community - about 12-15,000 people (Economist Intelligence
In 1997 average incomes in St. Petersburg were 8.3% higher than in Russia as a whole 
(Goskomstat, 1998d: 210).
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Unit, 1999: 15) - and a steady influx, of tourists, as well as workers from 
the surrounding region.
• The proximity to the West has favoured the establishment of foreign 
chains and the influx of foreign investment, which feel it cannot ignore 
the second largest city in Russia and has set up its own shops. In the 
years 1994-95-96 St. Petersburg attracted two or three times more 
foreign direct investment per capita than the country as a whole (OECD, 
1997: 127).
This explains why retail trade per capita was between 26% and 50% higher 
than in Russia as a whole in the years 1995-1996-1997 (Goskomstat, 1998d: 
585), and why small business growth has been mainly concentrated in trade. 
Data referring to 1992-1994 indicate that St. Petersburg was one of the 
leading entities in Russia, as far as new service growth was concerned, even 
though still far behind Moscow in this respect (see table 5.1). 
Notwithstanding the vitality of the small business sector, the St. Petersburg 
economy has not performed any better than the country as a whole, due to 
the poorer performance of the industrial sector (see table 5.2.)i^.
TABLE 5.1.
Growth in the service sector 1992-1994
Top performers
Moscow 4-54.2%
Adygeya 4-23.1%
Perm 4-21.6%
St. Petersburg 4-19.5%
Sverdlosk 4-18.0%
Moscow Oblast 4-13.3%
Samara 4-13.1%
Average in Russia 4-7.4%
Source: Goskomstat data reported by Bradshaw, Stenning and Sutherland, 
1998:153.
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TABLE 5.2. 
GDP trends
1995 1996 1997 1998
St. Petersburg -6% -10% -0.30% -1.80%
Russia -4.7% -4.0% +0.8% -5%
Sources for St. Petersburg; Goskomstat, 1996g: 1; Goskomstat, 1997e: 4; 
Goskomstat, 1998b: 3; Goskomstat, 1999: 3
Sources for Russia: Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no. 2:101 and EBRD, 
1998a: 225
The next chapter will examine how entrepreneurs are affected by the 
business environment in St. Petersburg, giving a first-hand account of small 
business activity from the interviews I carried out and from questionnaire 
replies.
Before 1995 we do not have data on St. Petersburg’s GDP, but only on different sectors 
(industry, retail trade, etc.)
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APPENDIX: MAIN ORGANISATIONS WORKING WITH SMALL 
BUSINESSES IN ST. PETERSBURG
RUSSIAN ORGANISATIONS:
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
Address; Pr. Prosveshcheniia 62, 194292, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 591 3234 
Director: Naum Pechatnikov
The centre was created in the framework of the programme “District as an 
indivisible economic structure”, whose target is to create an infrastructure of 
support for small business in the city districts. In the district where it is 
located the centre has nine branches where entrepreneurs can receive a range 
of services, from assistance in registration to the selection of personnel The 
centre has three basic directions:
• the “Visit-club”. Both firms and individual entrepreneurs can become 
members and receive a range of services at an advantageous price.
• an educational centre where teaching and training in various aspects of 
entrepreneurial activity takes place. Here there are also seminars in the 
fields of information technology, management of personnel, advertising, 
public relations, marketing, management, taxation and preparation of 
business plans.
• Centre for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship which provides the 
following services: evaluation of investment projects, legal services, 
registration of firms and preparation of foundation documents according 
to legal requirements, account keeping, etc.
COMMITTEE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE POPULATION 
Address: Proletarskii Diktatury 1, 193060, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 276-2704 Fax: (812) 276-1003 
E-Mail: chair_work@gov.spb.ru
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Webpage: http://www.sme8upport.leoiitief.ru/ffamru3.htm
In mid-1997 the Committee opened a consulting centre where unemployed 
people willing to set up a firm can obtain free advice. The Committee also 
assists them with loans, training in the basics of entrepreneurial activity and 
the preparation of business plans. There is also a specific programme aimed 
at helping the unemployed create new businesses with unutilised premises 
and idle equipment. Workers dismissed from enterprises can receive support 
from this committee to restart unusued plants. The Committee claims that 
there are successful examples of workers who managed not only to re­
establish, but also to modernise enterprises, and in time to sell to foreign 
markets (Gruzinova, 1998: 2). In total, during the five years the programme 
has been in operation, 24,000 consultations have been provided and 
assistance has been given in the establishment of 741 enterprises which have 
led to the creation of 1,400 jobs (Department of the Federal Service for the 
Employment of the Population of St. Petersburg).
NORTH-WESTERN ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT UNIONS 
Address: Ul. SmoFnogo 3, room 1-11, 193311, St. Petersburg.
Tel/Fax: (812) 110 0061 
Representative: Galina Sedova
Webpage: http://www.smesupport.leontief.ru/framru3 .htm
This association has nine credit unions as members with a combined 
membership of 535 people. Six more credit unions with a total of 140 
members are in the process of joining the association. The aim is to develop 
and co-ordinate the activities of the credit unions in the region, to liaise with 
other similar Russian and foreign associations and to strengthen the 
economic and social status of the credit unions in order to enable them to 
obtain more financial resources for distribution. Seminars are regularly 
organised for its members concerning the various aspects of the activities of 
credit unions.
225
NORTH-WESTERN REGIONAL FUND FOR SMALL BUSINESS 
SUPPORT
Address: Pr. Voznesenskii 16, room 424,190000, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 319 9393.
General director: Vladimir Mikailovich Steniaev
The Fund was set up in 1994. It is a non-profit-making organisation in 
which the state owns 57% of the capital. It was founded by the Committee 
for the Employment of the Population, the Anti-Monopoly Committee 
Committee for the Development of Entrepreneurship, the Social 
Organisation “Green Cross” and the North-Western Agency for the Support 
of Entrepreneurship and Investments. The Fund lists among its aims:
• the analysis of business projects and the search for investors.
• the realisation of domestic and international leasing.
• the realisation of initiatives aimed at attracting domestic and 
international investors, including competitions and exhibitions.
• consulting and market research.
• the realisation of international activity, including participation in 
international programmes and agreements.
• the realisation of the Federal Programme of Small Business Support.
STATE FUND FOR THE PROMOTION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Address: Pr. Izmailovskii 14, 198005, St. Petersburg.
Tel: (812) 112 6604 Fax: (812) 325 5110 
General director: Irina Pronina
The State Fund was established by the city administration in June 1996, but 
ceased to be operational in 1999. Before it was shut down it had, in addition 
to its main office, two branches in different city districts. The fund was 
divided into three sections: financial, information and innovation-marketing.
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The main declared aim of this organisation was the realisation of an 
effective system to provide financial resources for small business from 
different sources. The other aims indicated include the organisation of 
training courses for entrepreneurs, the promotion of innovation activity, the 
participation in the creation of consulting and information centres for small 
businesses, the financing of conferences on scientific research, the provision 
of consultation on business planning, legal and information services, 
searching for partners in Russia and abroad, and so on.
ST. PETERSBURG CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
Address: Ul. Chaikovskogo 46-48, 191194, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 273 4896 Fax: (812) 272 6406
Head of the section for the promotion and development of entrepreneurship: 
Liudmila Ivanova.
Webpage: http://www.spbcci.ru
The St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry is a non-profit- 
making private organisation. It is the oldest Chamber of Commerce in 
Russia, having been founded in 1921. It is also one of the largest in the 
country, though small by international standards, having about 850 members 
among big and small enterprises in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, 
up from 340 in the 1980s (not really a great achievement considering the 
large increase in the number of firms in this period). Sixty-one per cent of its 
members are small firms with up to 100 employees (Shapovalov, 1999: 2). 
By late 1998 it had established coxitacts with 300 chambers of commerce 
worlwide and had signed cooperation agreements with thirty-two of them. 
Throughout the year seminars and business meetings are organised. Besides 
this, the main services provided by the chamber are:
• consulting in foreign trade, evaluation of real estate and equipment, 
assistance in the registration, preparation of business plans, market 
research and search for partners in Russia and abroad.
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• information on exhibitions in Russia and abroad, selection of the most 
important legal documents, diffusion of information on its members and 
their commercial offers in Russia and abroad. It has a large reference 
library freely available for its members. In 1996 a computerised database 
of business offers and requests of foreign firms was created. By mid- 
1999 this had about 3,000 offers.
• oral and written translations.
• organisation of training courses mostly of an advanced nature for the 
employees of the member firms. For this purpose it has created the 
Foundation for Business and Professional Training.
• the resolution of disputes through the Arbitration Tribunal which has 
been operative since 1994.
ST. PETERSBURG FOUNDATION FOR SME DEVELOPMENT^^ 
Address: Pr. Izmailovskii 14, 198052, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 325 8351, 251 7677 Fax: (812) 112 6607 
General director: Sergei Alekseevich Balanev 
Webpage: http://www.fbd.spb.ru
The St. Petersburg Foundation, one of the first organisations for small 
business support established in Russia, was set up in the framework of the 
TACIS programme in 1995 and is one of the most complete business 
consulting organisations in St. Petersburg, having acquired considerable 
expertise. It is a non-profit-making organisation which invests all its profits 
in its development. Since 1990 the Foundation has been included in the 
registry of consulting firms for the PHARE and TACIS programme, 
allowing the foundation to submit tenders to the PHARE and TACIS 
projects. It already takes part in several international programmes to foster 
international cooperation, such as Europartneriat, Enterprise (Agrinord, 
Leather), Eurolink, Joint Venture Programme (JVP). More than 200 firms
This organisation, although set up in the framework o f the TACIS programme is 
currently staffed exclusively by Russians and therefore has been included among the 
Russian organisations.
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from St. Petersburg have taken part lo these events. The Foundation is a 
member of the largest SME support network in Russia, which includes fifty 
regions and cities, and it is also the representative in Russia of the “Bureau 
de Rapprochement des Enterprises”. The services provided by the 
Foundation can be divided into three areas:
• consultation such as assistance in doing business in Russia, legal and 
customs information and searching for Russian and foreign partners.
• market research.
• training. The range of courses includes introductory courses for new 
entrepreneurs such as how to register a company in St. Petersburg, 
courses for recently set up businesses such as business planning and 
business development strategy, and more advanced courses such as 
human resource management and international marketing.
ST. PETERSBURG UNION OF ENTREPRENEURS 
Address: Ulitsa Baltiiskaia 24, 198095, St. Petersburg.
Tel/Fax: (812) 252 1006, 252 0150 
President: Roman Pastukhov
The Union was established in late 1997 by fifteen organisations, one of 
which is the Union of Entrepreneurs of the Kirov district (1,000 members at 
that time), one of the first associations of its kind in Russia established ten 
years before (Kiselev, 1997e: 6). Currently it has offices in three districts of 
the city, but it is planning to open new ones in four more districts. They 
claim to be the biggest organisation of this kind not only in St. Petersburg, 
but in the whole of Russia (Solomakhin, 1999; 2). The Union is one of the 
founders, together with the city administration, of the journal 
“Predprinimatel’ Peterburga” (The Entrepreneur of St. Petersburg). The 
main tasks of the Union are legal defence and lobbying on behalf of its 
members in state bodies and the provision of free consulting and training. 
Free consulting is offered daily in the field of taxation, accounting, legal 
matters, loans issues, securities, insurance and the creation and registration
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of the firm. Various courses are organised both for entrepreneurs starting up 
and for the personnel of small firms. Recently several sections have been 
created (medical, marketing, retail trade, public catering, transport, 
construction) to meet better the specific requirements of particular sectors. 
In addition it has also a section for international contacts.
FOREIGN ORGANISATIONS:
BRITISH EXECUTIVE SERVICE OVERSEAS (BESO)
Tel.; (812) 312 1361 E-mail: enews@infopro.spb.su 
Representative: Jean Millington 
Webpage: http://www.beso.org
BESO, created in 1972 by the Confederation of British Industry and by the 
Institute of Directors, is a development agency which offers professional 
expertise to organisations in less developed communities worldwide that 
cannot afford commercial consultants. It has more than 3,650 experts in its 
database. In Russia it provides consultants for small and medium Russian 
firms, especially producers of food and consumer goods. More than 250 
placements have been made. The assignment of the consultant lasts from 
one week to three months. The expenditures of the Russian firms are 
minimal: only the transport costs to and from the work place, food and 
accommodation for the consultant, and translation services.
CENTER FOR CITIZEN INITIATIVES (CCI)
Address: UL Azroromnaia 4, room 307, 197348, St. Petersburg. 
Tel.: (812) 394 7004, 394 0659 Fax: (812) 394 7355 
Webpage: http://www.ccisf.org
This organisation runs the following programmes in St. Petersburg:
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1. Russian Initiative For Self-Empioyment (RISE)
Address: Ul. Drovyanaya 6/8, 198103, St. Petersburg.
RISE has three main programme activities
• Business Education Programme. Every month workshops and seminars 
are organised for would-be entrepreneurs. A training programme lasting 
seventy hours is offered. The areas covered are marketing, human 
resources management, financial management and legal issues pertaining 
to business registration.
• Credit and Leasing Programme. The participants in the training course 
are entitled to apply to a small seed loan or equipment lease. If the 
business plan is approved they receive a first loan of up to $5,000 and 
once this is returned they can receive a larger loan of up to $20,000.
• Business Incubator for the Production of Clothes. After the completion 
of a training programme participants have access to fully equipped work 
spaces of varying sizes. State-of-the-art equipment is also available. 
Tenants can attend seminars led by local and Western experts and read 
various trade publications kept in the fashion library. Consulting on all 
major aspects of the clothing business is also available.
2. Productivity Enhancement Programme
This is aimed at promoting the production of consumer goods and 
increasing productivity. It includes an intensive training programme in 
the United States for 23-28 days.
CITIZENS DEMOCRACY CORPS (CDC)
Address: Pr. Nevsky 25, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 346 7706 Tel/Fax: (812) 346 7811 
Webpage: http://www.cdc.org
This is a private non-profit-making organisation created in 1990 on the 
initiative of the former U.S. president G. Bush. It administers the 
Entrepreneurial Business Services (EBS). The EBS focuses its assistance on 
the development of Russian small and medium-sized businesses by placing
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qualified American volunteers. Tne transfer of skills firom American 
volunteer organisations to their local Russian partners is also envisaged, so 
the latter can continue to provide American business services even after 
USAID support is terminated.
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE SERVICE CORPS (lESC)
Address; 13-Liniia 14, 193124, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 118 1946-7-8 Fax: (812) 118 1949 
Regional director: David Kerry 
Webpage: http://www.iesc.org
lESC is a private non-commercial organisation financed by USAID with 
more than thirty years experience in 120 countries of the world. In its 
database it has more than 13,000 experts who until recently held high 
positions in large American companies. In Russia it assists domestic firms 
by placing experienced consultants with them for an average period of three 
months. The client firm usually has to pay only for the accommodation of 
the consultant and for a translator. In Russia by early 1998 it had performed 
more than 820 assignments.
RUSSIA SMALL BUSINESS FUND
Address: Micro and Small Loans Office, Naberezhanya Kanala Griboedova 
25, office 15, 191186, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 311 6231 Tel/Fax: (812) 314 5558 
E-mail: st-petersburg@rsbf.ru
Webpage: http://www.ebrd.org/english/opera/Country/index.htm
This fund, launched in 1994, had by the year 2000 made more than 26,000 
loans amounting to $350 million. It provides both micro-loans firom $100 to 
$30,000 for a period of one to twenty-four months to enterprises with a 
maximum of twenty employees and small loans of up to $125,000 for a
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period of one to thirty-six months to firms with up to eighty employees. 
Concerning the number of employees there is, however, no strict limit. All 
over Russia the Fund has a ratio of arrears of only 1.8% for micro loans and 
2.8% for small loans (arrears are counted from the first day of the delay in 
paying back). Overall, repayment levels account to 99.8% (EBRD, 1998b: 
23). Preference is given to existing and profitable firms. Loans to new 
firms are quite rare. In this case the condition is that no less than one-third 
of the total resources necessary for the creation of the firm must come firom 
the firm’s own funds. In St. Petersburg the Petrovskii Bank has run this 
programme since March 1995. Up to 1999 it had given 187 small loans and 
1,083 micro loans for a total of $33 million. It is estimated that 2,500 jobs 
have been created with the loans conceded (Leontief Center, 1999: 34). In 
1999 the KMB Bank, where the EBRD has a majority stake, also joined this 
programme in St. Petersburg. In that year it gave 1,200 loans for a total of 
$18 million.
SMALL ENTERPRISE EQUITY FUND (SEEF)
Address: Pr. Lermontovskii 7, 190009, St. Petersburg.
Tel.: (812) 114 2632, 1143181 Fax: (812) 325 6337 
General director: Jonathan Carr 
Webpage: http://www.seafweb.org
This fund has branches only in St. Petersburg (this also covers the Leningrad 
region) and Nizhny Novgorod. It provides a combination of debt and equity 
financing of up to $500,000 (as a rule buying a minority stake) to small 
businesses employing up to 150 people in the industrial and service sectors. 
The businesses must be private and in existence for not less than 2-3 years. 
Technical assistance is also provided, as the aim of the Fund is to increase 
the value of the company and to re-sell its stake after a period of three to 
five years back to a partner (the preferred solution) or on the market. In 
order to be considered firms must be Russian-owned, have a successful track 
record and have significant competitive advantage in their industry. The
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areas in which the Fund has concentrated its investments are light 
manufacturing, including printing, packaging, knitwear, welding equipment 
and food production such as mini-bakeries and bread factories.
THE U.S. RUSSIA INVESTMENT FUND (TUSRIF)
Address: Ul. Italianskaya 5, office 53. 190000, St. Petersburg.
Tel: (812) 315 7035 Fax: (812) 315 8264 
Vice-president: Ilya Karasev 
Webpage: http://www.tusrif.ru
TUSRIF is a private investment fund which provides loans, investments and 
technical assistance to privatised Russian enterprises of any size as well as 
to Western firms and joint ventures working in Russia. It was set up in May 
1995 by merging the Fund for Large Enterprises in Russia and the Russian- 
American Enterprise Fund. It has been initially funded by the U.S. 
Congress through grants from USAID amounting to $440 million. The fund 
has offices in New York, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, 
Yekaterinburg, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. TUSRIF also has a Small 
Business Lending Programme which operates through a network of Russian 
banks. In its five years of existence the Fund has invested more than $200 
million in thirty big firms and more than 2,000 small firms (Delovoi 
Peterburg, 2000: 5).
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6. SIVIALL BUSINESS IN ST. PETERSBURG: EVIDENCE FROM 
QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS AND INFORMATION PROVIDED BY 
ORGANISATIONS W HICH COMPLETED THE QUESTIONNAIRE
INTRODUCTION
The dearth of reliable data makes field work essential to gain a more 
accurate picture on small business in today’s St. Petersburg. Organisations 
dealing with small businesses were asked to complete a questionnaire in 
order to have a picture of the firms they work with. Although they are not 
fully representative of the small business population in St. Petersburg, they 
can nonetheless provide interesting information on data not covered by the 
official statistics (export propensity, origin of purchases, etc.). By 
comparing these results with surveys covering the entire population of firms 
one can estimate how much the sample is representative. Interviews were 
also carried out with a variety of economic actors (entrepreneurs, 
representatives of organisations promoting small business, academics and 
local officials). The interviews did not follow any precise pattern, but 
rather a free discussion concentrating on the most interesting topics which 
arose. The names of the entrepreneurs interviewed have been replaced with 
aliases. This section analyses the most relevant aspects (starting up, 
financing, relations with the public administration, taxation, operations, 
markets and performance) which were raised in the interviews.
6.1. EVIDENCE FROM  QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS
6.1.1. METHODOLOGY
Several interviews were conducted in the period August 1997-October 1998 
with individual entrepreneurs and representatives of organisations 
promoting small businesses, some of whom were met two or three times. 
The aim of the interviews was to delineate the main factors affecting small 
business in St. Petersburg and to see how small firms coped with adverse
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conditions. With entrepreneurs the üiscussion focused on their experiences 
as business owners, investigating in depth the most interesting points which 
arose in the course of the discussion. Representatives of the organisations 
were asked to fill in a questionnaire. Those who declined were nevertheless 
interviewed in the hope that they may supply useful information about 
working with small businesses. The seven major areas that were covered 
are analysed in the following sections, which also include the replies to the 
questionnaire pertaining to these areas. These include the start-ups process, 
the three major problems indicated by entrepreneurs (financing, relations 
with public administration, taxation), the firms’ organisation and the market 
outlook for small firms. Interviews with the following entrepreneurs and 
representatives of organisations (those who filled the questionnaire are 
listed in section 6.2) were carried out:
• T. B. general director of Fitolon, a scientific-industrial company. It was 
founded by a former director of a textile company in 1992 together with 
a group of researchers in medicine in order to unite their skills: her 
capacity as a manager and their competencies in the field of chemistry 
and the technology of production of medical-preventive preparations 
from herbs. The purpose of the firm is to manufacture medicines 
patented by them. At the beginning they also did research for other firms 
and with the earnings from this activity they were able to finance the 
production of their own medicines, which are derived from seaweed. 
They own fifty patents and among the staff have five researchers. Their 
clients are mostly chemist shops and to a lesser degree hospitals, as 
hospitals have limited resources to buy medicines. About 25% of their 
sales are in St. Petersburg and the rest in over thirty cities in Russia. It 
would be very difficult for them to export even to nearby countries such 
as Belarus and the Ukraine because the documents required by customs 
are very complicated. Soon after our interview their products should 
have become available in Israel and Egypt, since joint agreements had 
been reached with local firms for the production of their medicines in 
these countries (December 1997).
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E. C., general director of Melp, a scientific-industrial company. The firm 
was created to produce a device which removes oil from dirty water, but 
it has subsequently turned to the production of medical equipment: a 
low-temperature gas sterilizer of medical products. The production of the 
latter was started in 1997 as they received the certificate of conformity 
issued by Gosstandart (the standard authority of the Russian Federation). 
Melp is the only manufacturer of this kind of equipment in Russia which 
has the advantage of being ecologically clean and safe. Only the engine 
is produced in house, while the remaining parts are manufactured by 
other small firms. Their economic situation is very difficult since their 
main clients, hospitals, have seen the municipal allocations decrease year 
after year^ with the result that they can hardly afford to buy any new 
equipment. For this reason they do not have the money to obtain the 
certificate also for the other 4-5 products they designed. Each certificate 
costs $10,000. (June 1998).
S. H., general manager of Slavia, a publishing house, set up in October 
1990, specialising in prestigious art books. It is the official publisher of 
the catalogues for the exhibitions held in the Hermitage. In 1997 Slavia 
published twenty books regarding the Hermitage or exhibitions taking 
place in the Hermitage and seven books on other subjects. While their 
earlier books were in Russian with resumes in foreign languages they 
have now moved on to publishing directly in different languages, since a 
considerable share of their clients are foreign tourists. In the 1996 book 
exhibition in Frankfurt agreements were signed with publishers from 
Italy, France, Germany, United States, Japan, Poland and Portugal for 
the sale in these countries of a book on the Hermitage prepared by 
Slavia, and for other joint projects. They have also published a book on 
painting with an Italian publishing house (December 1997).
O. L., general director of Acvasviaz, a company set up in 1991 which 
develops, produces and delivers security signaling systems. It works in a 
potentially lucrative market: theft-proof devices and anti-fire equipment.
 ^ The city budget has allocated 5 million roubles (slightly less than $1 million) in 1998 to 
buy medical equipment. This means one rouble (16 cents) per citizen, while in order to
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Since the former were unknown in the past their demand is bound to 
expand greatly in the future. The same applies to the demand for the 
latter which has become compulsory by law for a factory. Despite the 
potential the company is in dire financial straits (December 1997, March 
and June 1998).
M. M., general director of Gefest, a furniture producing firm, one of the 
first co-operatives to be set up in the city in 1988 (December 1997).
T. P., director of BMN Peterburg, an advertising agency created in 1992, 
which is also the official information centre of the St. Petersburg 
Association of Professional Stock Brokers. Ms. T.P. is the representative 
of “Business Week” in St. Petersburg as well. The agency, unlike the 
majority of agencies in St. Petersburg, offers a wide range of services, 
from simple tasks such as the design of logos, visiting cards and small 
advertisements to a complete set of marketing initiatives. Their clients 
have included important institutions such as the Russian Centre of 
Privatisation, the Property Fund of St. Petersburg, the Russian Institute 
of Radio Navigation and several banks. The staff is currently made up of 
twenty people, but was reduced in 1996 due to financial difficulties 
(December 1997).
E. R., chief accountant of R.^, a firm developing and producing remote- 
controlled mechanical systems for x-ray and optical applications as well 
as separate components for these systems. The firm was set up in 1991 
by four private individuals - one of whom is the current director - who 
had experience in x-ray equipment and their applications. They are 
located in a factory producing the same kind of equipment. These are 
meant only for industrial use and are made-to-order. The firm has an 
agreement with the firm which owns the factory by which the other firm 
can sell only in Russia and R. can only sell abroad except for a few 
clients in Russia, which do not make more than 5% of the total turnover. 
Their main markets are the United States, Australia, Germany and Korea
replace worn-out equipment it would be necessary to spend 120-150 million roubles each 
year (Kudriavziev, 1998; 10).
 ^The interviewee requested the name o f the firm not to be published
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and their clients are private fimis as well as universities and scientific 
centres (June and December 1998).
• the sales director of Parmalat-Russia^ (June 1998).
• Thomas Getter, a consultant working for the EBRD Small Business Fund 
(March 1998).
• Valentine Galenko, director of the Higher Economics School, part of the 
University of Economics and Finance, which organises training courses 
for entrepreneurs (December 1997).
• Alexander Kizhin, deputy director of organization at the Higher 
Economics School (March 1998 and October 1998).
• David Kerry, country director of International Executive Service Corps 
(December 1997 and October 1998), a USAID-funded organisation 
which provides consulting to small Russian firms.
• Constantin Pechatnikov, director of Business Development Centre of the 
Vyborgskii district (March 1998), an organisation set up by the State 
Committee for the Support and Promotion of Entrepreneurship to 
provide consulting to small firms.
• Constantin Eskin, deputy director of the Committee for Economy and 
Industrial Policy of the St. Petersburg administration. (June 1998).
6.1.2. STARTING UP
The firms of the entrepreneurs interviewed are old by local standards. The 
oldest was created in 1988, and the others between 1990 and 1992. The 
activities of the firms researched are connected with the previous 
occupations of the entrepreneurs. When the opportunity arose to start 
private firms they left their state occupations together with some colleagues 
and set up a new firm. In publishing, for example, many like Ms. S. H. left 
the state publishing house, Aurora, specialising in prestigious art books, to 
start their own publishing houses. Aurora, which had a monopoly on books 
on the Hermitage and other museums of St. Petersburg, has since lost much 
of its market to newcomers and survives mostly on sales abroad. Some
3 The interviewee requested his name not to be published.
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interviewees claimed to have been induced to set up a firm by the lack of 
prospects in their previous job, mainly those working for the defence sector 
(E.C. and O.L.), but most seem to have been pushed by the common desire 
to exploit new opportunities. Only one, O. L., indicated as a driving force 
the sense of frustration he and his colleagues felt because the inventions 
they were producing were not utilised in the defence sector. They wanted 
to work without public officials dictating what to do, and who were then 
unable to put their inventions to productive use.
The main deterrents perceived to the creation of new firms are the high cost 
of setting up a firm and the time-consuming procedure. In the scientific 
sphere, for example, at the beginning of 1998 the cost of becoming a legal 
entity, registering a patent, obtaining a certificate for a given scientific 
product and buying a licence to carry out a given activity was about 80,000- 
90,000 roubles ($12,000) which is prohibitive for the average citizen. For 
firms not registering patents the costs are lower, but the amount is equally 
beyond the reach of most Russians. The entrepreneur working in the 
furniture business remarked that the cost of the certificate necessary for 
each item is so high that it is hardly convenient for a small firm to operate 
in this field.
The procedure is especially complicated for manufacturing activities which 
require an array of permits from various departments of the city 
administration. In the opinion of 0 . L. and M. M. the procedure has become 
even more complicated now than in the past. The administration itself, 
according to Kerry, cannot specify all the documents required to start up a 
business venture. The entrepreneur needs to contact all the separate 
departments of the administration and find out what each committee wants. 
One is shuttled around among the different city committees, all requiring 
different things.
In retail obtaining all the necessary licences is somewhat less complicated, 
while the main constraint according to Kerry is the protection racket. Unless
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one has a “roof’ it is not possible to operate. The need for protection seems 
to affect manufacturing businesses less mainly because they are (rightly) 
considered much less profitable than trading activities and also because they 
are less visible. Such firms are usually located in small units within large 
factories, and can avail themselves of the protection afforded by their 
landlords. Racketeers visit the firms to check the accounts (the real figures, 
rather than the official records) and it is difficult to refuse. On the basis of 
this they decide how much a firm can afford to pay. In recent years there 
has been a shift from racketeering to organised protection. Some former 
criminals have now set up legitimate security firms which freely advertise 
their services. Others have been founded by former policemen and KGB 
agents. In general business relations have become more civilised after a 
period of “wild market” in the early 1990s, but in order to solve problems of 
non-payment with clients it is still customary to employ security firms. In 
the early 1990s several groups vied for the same area of influence with the 
result of frequent shoots-outs In this chaos entrepreneurs did not know 
who to pay. Now each part of the city is under the control of a single 
group. However, it is hard to say how pressing this problem is in St. 
Petersburg as entrepreneurs hardly mention the menace of criminal groups.
The exploitation of business opportunities is also hindered in Kerry’s 
opinion by the lack of understanding of the potential of forms of business 
collaborations such as franchising. The International Executive Service 
Corps has been trying to promote franchising for the last three years, but 
almost to no avail as Russians did not demonstrate any interest. They only 
managed to sell the first licence shortly before our last meeting (March 
1999).
Official statistics indicate a regular increase in the number of small firms in 
industry, although at a lower rate than service firms, a view which is 
supported by the majority of the people working for the organisations 
dealing with small businesses. Representatives of these organisations see 
small business expanding especially in the following industrial sectors:
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food, construction materials, printing and publishing. The second half of the 
1990s has seen a process by which wholesalers who have amassed a 
considerable fortune through trading have been investing in the production 
of some of the goods which they used to import from abroad. However, 
almost all agree that small business will develop slowly. In the present 
Russian conditions it is hard to find anyone forecasting fast growth in this 
sector. The same conclusion was shared also by the participants in the first 
Russian Congress of Entrepreneurs held in 1996 (Blinov, 1998: 27). The 
perceptions of the entrepreneurs are, instead, different. They have the 
impression that small industrial firms are decreasing in numbers. O.L. 
knows of many engineers who, like him, started their own firms at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but about one hundred of these have subsequently 
closed. He believes that more small industrial firms are now^ being closed 
than opened. This opinion is also shared by M. M. The reason for the 
divergence in opinion may be connected with the high failure rate of small 
businesses. Manufacturers see many of their competitors closing down and 
have the perception that small businesses are decreasing, but are less aware 
of the new start-ups. In the opinion of Oetter, 80-90% of all new 
enterprises fail within one year in Russia, and anecdotal evidence of 
industrial managers also suggests a high failure rate (see also page 112 on 
this topic).
Although there are no statistics on the matter the common perception of the 
people interviewed is that most new industrial firms are located within 
larger enterprises. According to Kerry and Oetter, new firms are mainly 
created by spinning off parts of a company or renting or acquiring 
equipment from these, rather than through new greenfield investment. 
Russian entrepreneurs try to utilise what they already have, rather than 
setting up a new company from scratch. This kind of investment is, in their 
opinion, mainly financed by foreigners. In many cases, the aim of the spin­
offs is to divide the profitable sections of a factory from the unprofitable. 
These new companies, which inherit the best equipment, start debt-free,
Now refers to the period in which the interview was conducted (June 1998).
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leaving all the liabilities and the least profitable equipment to the old 
company. All this is perfectly legal. Some of the spin-offs are, however, set 
up not because it makes sense firom an economic point of view to divide a 
big factory into several smaller units, but for more selfish reasons. Kerry 
pointed out that there have been cases in which managers have spun off a 
new firm, regardless of economic rationale, just to award themselves higher 
salaries as managers of these new firms.
Another problem mentioned in the interviews is that unpredictable events 
can occur at the very last moment and postpone the start of an activity or 
turn a seemingly profitable business into a failure. Unexpected taxes can be 
levied or tax advantages previously conceded unexpectedly revoked. Kerry 
mentioned the case of a company (presumably foreign) which wanted to 
invest in St. Petersburg, but finally decided to locate the plant in Novgorod 
because local conditions were more favourable there. However, when the 
plant was ready to start functioning, the Novgorod power company said that 
it could not supply energy because its capacity was already over-stretched. 
In another case, Coca-Cola, which has built a plant in the outskirts of St. 
Petersburg, had to postpone the launch because the fire inspectors did not 
give the go ahead^ until a fire station was built in the factory.
6.1.3. FINANCING
In a country where savings were wiped out by the hyper-inflation of 1992- 
1 9 9 3 6  and where financial institutions are very wary of financing new 
enterprises, having the financial resources to start up a firm is beyond the 
possibility for most. According to a survey carried out in 1996 by the St. 
Petersburg branch of Goskomstat just 4% of the 260 entrepreneurs surveyed 
had obtained the initial financing firom banks and 1.2% firom state
6 Russia has very complex fire regulations which are almost impossible to follow. 
Probably no industrial site fulfills all the conditions set by the fire code. The interviewee 
seemed to imply that the crux o f the matter was that Coca-Cola refused to make side 
payments to fire authorities.
6 Bank deposits were not indexed to inflation.
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institutions (Goskomstat, I996d: 5). in the opinion of Melnikov, the vice­
director of a science park, there is a considerable potential for scientific 
entrepreneurship which is not exploited due to lack of financing. All bar one 
of the representatives of the orgainisations interviewed indicated the lack of 
initial capital as the main obstacle to starting a business, a finding common 
to almost all transition countries (Dimitrov and Todorov, 1995: 67; OECD, 
1996b: 47-56; Zapalska, 1997: 115; Bohata and Mladek, 1998: 155; Bartlett 
and Rangelova, 1998: 239; CCET, 1998: 21; Smallbone and others, 1999: 
17y. Even in countries such as Poland, which has seen a very strong 
growth of small businesses, the financial sector has given little assistance to 
small business: short-term loans are very expensive and just 10% of new 
firms receive any bank financing at the start-up stage (Webster, 1999: 13).
In Russia, according to the majority of the organisations’ representatives 
interviewed, banks are not thought inefficient, but are accused of charging 
high interest rates on borrowing and of being very reluctant to concede 
loans, especially long-term loans. Ramsden, however, emphasises that it has 
become easier to receive long-term loans in recent years. The difficulty in 
obtaining loans lies in the fact that banks require guarantees which very few 
people are able to provide. A guarantor for a loan can be found at a cost, 
but, adding this to the loan makes the overall cost of borrowing prohibitive 
as interest rates in Russia are very high. On the other hand, the banks 
complain of poorly formulated business plans and the high risks of these 
ventures. Even the EBRD programme for small business tends to finance 
existing businesses, since new businesses are seen as too risky.
Two of the firms interviewed had received financing firom specialised funds 
(the two scientific-industrial companies), but none at the start of their 
activity. A common feature of these firms is the low level of investments 
carried out, as the limited cash flow does not usually allow them to make 
new investments. Due to financial constraints, Acvasviaz could market just
 ^ Dimitrov and Fedorov refer Bulgaria, the OECD refers to the Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Poland and Hungary, Zapalska refers Poland, Bohata and Mladek to the Czech
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five of the eleven products it had developed. None had the resources to buy 
new equipment. At the time of the interview one used equipment it had built 
and rented only the premises where its equipment was located (Acvasviaz), 
one rented equipment from the host factory (R.), one utilised very old 
equipment, some owned by the university and some of its own (Melp), and 
one had contracted out the production (Fitolon). The only company 
considering investments was the last company, which was looking for 
second-hand equipment, but this had been forced upon them, as the factory 
to which their production was sub-contracted had told them it was no longer 
able to do the job.
6.1.4. RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
In Russia the government is viewed as hostile, or at best indifferent, to 
small business by almost all the representatives of the organisations 
interviewed. Government programmes and laws adopted to promote small 
business were judged of little or no effect by all respondents, except one 
who recognised that some progress has been made, indicating the law on 
leasing, as an example. Very few firms on which these organisations gave 
information have benefited from any state programmes. Even in other 
transition countries it seems, however, to have been difficult to implement 
effective assistance programmes which are appreciated by small businesses 
(Erutku and Vallee, 1997: 117).
As far as St. Petersburg is concerned, being the most westernised Russian 
city has not meant that business is less affected by bureaucratic obstacles 
than in the other regions. The representatives of the organisations 
interviewed judge the attitude of local officials negatively, although no 
worse than elsewhere in Russia. Most of the entrepreneurs interviewed are 
equally very critical of the administration of St. Petersburg, which is 
accused of doing nothing for small business; by contrast they have a high 
opinion of the Moscow administration. There is a widespread belief that the
Republic, Bartlett and Rangelova to Bulgaria, the CCET to Russia, and Smallbone and
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Moscow administration cares much more about small business and that it is 
therefore much easier to receive loans, to find premises at advantageous 
terms, to lease machinery and equipment, etc. The mayor, having been the 
director of the Committee for the Support of Small Business in the late 
1980s, is considered to be very receptive to the problems affecting small 
businesses. As emphasised by Galenko, the scant consideration that small 
business receives from the administration of St. Petersburg was proved in 
the 1997 congress of the city’s small businesses in which 1,000 people, 
mostly entrepreneurs, took part. High level representatives of the Moscow 
administration attended the congress, including the deputy mayor, but 
nobody from the higher echelons of the St. Petersburg administration.
What is peculiar about Russian business is the amount of time that needs to 
be dedicated to dealing with regulatory bodies, which are a constant 
nuisance to entrepreneurs. The control exerted by the different institutions 
in charge of regulating business activities is viewed as excessive. Some 
complain of being subjected to continuous inspections by different 
authorities, which may result in the entrepreneur being obliged to make side 
payments. Corruption by official bodies is a significant problem for all the 
entrepreneurs and in the opinion of M. M. it is worsening every year. He set 
up one of the first co-operatives in St. Petersburg in the late 1980s and 
believes the situation to have been much better then than in the late 1990s. 
However, corruption is a phenomenon plaguing the whole of Russia which 
will be difficult to eradicate as long as the central government is seen as the 
prime culprit and unclear laws leave ample space for it.
In sectors such as advertising the local administration is said by one firm to 
favour well-connected firms and to require side payments. To hang a 
billboard it is necessary to obtain the approval of the territorial committee 
of the city (St. Petersburg is divided into several territories), but this 
necessitates a bribe to a local official. An official can cite faults in the 
design of the billboard (usually a small detail) and offer to make the
others to the Ukraine.
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modifications for about $50. The director of the agency interviewed was 
stunned recently when her firm was asked for $200 for "modifications", 
which is 40% of what they were charging the client.
In advertising many of the first firms to have been set up in St. Petersburg 
were started by former members of the Communist Youth Organisation, 
since at the beginning of the economic reforms they were the people who 
tended to have money and good connections. The three biggest advertising 
agencies in St. Petersburg were still at the end of 1997 owned by former 
members of this organisation. These three agencies obtained their first 
clients firom the city administration and even today if somebody asks the 
city administration for advice he will be sent to one of these firms. They 
are accused of using scare tactics to defend their monopoly positions on the 
best clients. In the past, when the agency of the interviewee was 
recommended to a Moscow bank, one of the three main agencies warned 
her not to take this client on. Because of this, the interviewee gave up this 
opportunity as she felt helpless in the situation. In her opinion it is no use to 
call the police for help, because these well-connected firms are in effect 
above the law. Apart from this incident, however, crime does not seem to 
have affected this or the other businesses, but it might be the case that the 
entrepreneurs have been reluctant to speak about protection rackets.
Problems with the city administration also stem firom its slowness in taking 
decisions. According to Kerry, public officials often purposely avoid 
making decisions because they see it as a risk, as signing a document entails 
taking on the responsibility for it. If the official leaves for any reason, his 
successor may disclaim responsibility for anything his predecessor signed, 
and the whole process needs to be repeated. The administration is also 
accused of having increased rents to a level that small businesses are not 
able to sustain and not containing utility expenses, which continue to rise. 
Indeed, according to a survey carried out among entrepreneurs the rent 
increases are considered a very urgent problem (PredprinimateP Peterburga, 
1998, no. 14: 3). However, the mass closure of small firms that these
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increases were expected to bring about, according to the entrepreneurs, has 
not taken place.
6.1.5. TAXATION
According to the representatives of the organisations interviewed two 
problems emerged predominantly as the biggest facing existing small 
businesses: taxation - not only the tax burden, but also the arbitrary 
enforcement of tax laws - and the lack of state support. Having taxation as 
the main difficulty for entrepreneurs is, however, not solely a Russian 
prerogative, as it is listed as the single most important problem in almost all 
transition countries (Dimitrov and Todorov, 1995: 67; OECD, 1996b: 47- 
56; Bohata and Mladek, 1998: 155; Bartlett and Rangelova, 1998: 239; 
CCET, 1998: 21; Smallbone and Welter, 1999: 8)%, although recent 
evidence produced by Smallbone (as quoted by Smallbone and Welter, 
1999: 13) suggests that in countries which have reached a more advanced 
stage of the transition process, such as Poland, taxation has now become 
less pressing in comparison with market-related problems such as 
competition. Two of the three main problems indicated in 1992 in Webster 
and Charap’s (1993: 4) survey of St. Petersburg - inflation and the 
ineffectiveness of the banking system^ - have disappeared from the list, 
while the other problems mentioned are broadly unchanged: lack of 
managerial skills, which is the number one problem for TUSRIF, 
unreliability of suppliers, the unstable situation in the country, and the lack 
of training, reliable market information, infrastructure and circulating 
capital. Given the above responses it is not surprising that tax reform and
 ^ Dimitrov and Fodorov refer Bulgaria, the OECD refers to the Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Poland and Hungary, Bohata and Mladek to the Czech Republic, Bartlett and 
Rangelova to Bulgaria, the CCET to Russia, and Smallbone and Welter to Belarus, the 
Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States.
 ^ In the early 1990s banks charged about $100 to open an account and required high fees 
for simple transactions (Webster and Charap, 1993: 53). This situation has now improved, 
but the losses of deposits incurred by the clients o f several o f the major private banks show 
how unreliable many Russian banks are.
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the carrying out of a programme of real support to enterprises are advocated 
as the most pressing measures to promote small business.
The defining features of the tax system in Russia are high taxes and special 
privileges, which big firms are able to obtain through their political 
influence. For these reasons every company keeps two sets of accounts: a 
real one and one for tax purposes, without which, according to the 
entrepreneurs, it would be impossible to survive. In addition to sales, assets 
are also undervalued in the balance-sheets in order to reduce taxation on 
business property. Therefore when, for example, machinery is bought from 
abroad a Russian firm usually asks for two bills, one for the tax and 
customs and one for what it has to pay. Up to now this system is working 
because there is no link between Western and Russian taxation bodies.
Another serious inconvenience is that laws may also be retroactive. A law 
approved in March may be effective from the previous January with the 
consequence that a firm has to rewrite all its accounts from January, 
otherwise it can be fined. Entrepreneurs are especially critical of the 
behaviour of the tax inspectors, complaining that each company is in effect 
dependent on their will. There is a tendency from tax inspectors to try to 
get as much as possible out of the private sector without considering the 
wealth-generating function it performs, and to interpret freely the tax laws, 
as there is no sanction against officials who misinterpret laws. According to 
the entrepreneurs interviewed some of the tax advantages for small business 
exist only on paper, because to avoid firms exploiting the tax privileges 
they are entitled to, tax inspectors, as a norm, require excessive 
documentation and make life impossible. In the opinion of entrepreneurs tax 
inspectors always strive to demonstrate that firms do not have the right to 
these advantages and it is very difficult for a small enterprise to demonstrate 
the contrary. Usually entrepreneurs try to settle this matter directly with the 
taxmen, even to the extent of bribery, without resorting to the courts, as 
they believe that in the courts they have little chance of defeating the tax
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inspectorate Due to the intransigence of the inspectorate, entrepreneurs 
see little point in switching to the simplified system of taxation and 
accounting for small firms. This system does not seem to be very 
convenient in any case, as in the opinion of the chief accountant of Slavia 
and of E.R. the only real advantage offered is the possibility of paying taxes 
at a later date. In practice, according to them, the only privileges they have 
as a small business is that they can pay the profits tax quarterly instead of 
monthly, as prescribed for larger firms, and that the profit and loss accounts 
do not need to be as detailed as for larger firms. No details are necessary, 
for example, regarding the amount of sales to each client, while big firms 
have to list their sales to each client. According to the chief accountant of 
Slavia, current tax advantages amount to 5% less than of the tax bills of 
large firms.
There is conflicting evidence as to whether the business environment has 
improved or not compared with three years ago. Representatives of the 
organisations are, as a rule, more positive or at least less negative, while 
entrepreneurs have a less optimistic outlook. Only one entrepreneur 
considers the tax system and the business environment to have improved in 
recent years. For the director of BMN, tax legislation has become clearer 
than in the early 1990s when they started their activity. This had caused 
huge problems with tax inspectors in the past, but these problems have now 
subsided. The first time the firm was checked by tax inspectors, it was fined 
on the grounds that their accounts were not kept properly. Subsequently a 
second inspector came and told them they had to do the accounts in a 
different way, so they were fined again. This has happened several times in 
the past.
There may be an element o f exaggeration in what they say. For example, in the 
arbitration court 40% of the disputes are lost by the tax bodies (Sergachev, 1997b; 15). In 
recent years judges in arbitration courts are said to have become more experienced in tax 
matters and to issue more balanced judgment based on more strictly legal interpretation 
rather than on the opinions of the tax bodies (Antel, 2000: 2).
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6.1.6. OPERATIONS
In a market where instability is the rule flexibility is essential to survival. 
For this reason, in several firms the full-time staff is limited to the bare 
minimum, just the administrative and clerical personnel, while workers are 
employed only when there is an order (Melp and Acvasviaz), or the 
industrial job is contracted out (Fitolon). The number of employees varied 
firom four in Melp and six in Acvasviaz to fifteen in R,, twenty in BMN, 
twenty-five in Fitolon and twenty-seven in Slavia.
Most of the entrepreneurs complain of the administrative burden of having 
to comply with the tax system. This means that much time has to be 
dedicated to these issues and a disproportionate share of the employees are 
accountants. A lot of tedious forms must be filled in. Slavia, for example, 
had four accountants among the thirteen employees working in the main 
office and the companies, such as Acvasviaz, which has just one accountant 
among its six employees, must use tax consultants. Every firm, irrespective 
of how small it is, had at least one accountant.
Representatives of the organisations (Kerry, Karasev and Nekludov) 
consider the lack of management skills to be one of the main problems for 
these firms. Russians are especially weak in financial management and 
planning, market research, and in developing business plans. In Kerry’s 
opinion, almost any small company in St. Petersburg would require Western 
assistance, as they often lack the capacity to find the solutions even to 
simple problems. One factor whiUi emerges is the lack of primary market 
analysis. According to several of the interviewees (Kerry, Eskin), people 
may create a company only to find out that there is no market for what the 
firm plans to produce. This is a factor which has also been underlined both 
by the executive director of the Svetlana Science Park and the head of the 
Regional Fund for the Scientific and Technological Development of St. 
Petersburg as the main fault in the business plans submitted to financial 
institutions (Pashnov, 1996: 15). That is why the proportion of projects
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approved by the funds active in St. Petersburg is very low. Specialised 
funds financing small ventures approve about 3-6% of the total number of 
projects submitted. TUSRIF approves 6 % of projects submitted for equity 
investments and 3% for loans and the Small Enterprise Equity Fund 3% 
(Borisova, 1997: 10). Marketing and sales departments are usually lacking 
or are staffed by one of the founders, despite the fact that Russian 
entrepreneurs have strong technical expertise, but are usually deficient in 
other areas. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that a marketing 
specialist can hardly be afforded by most small industrial firms, but even 
when a company has the resources marketing does not seem to be a priority. 
There may be, however, a shortage of skilled specialists, as analysis 
reported by Pechatnikov (1998: 39) showed that two-thirds of the service 
firms dismiss workers within one year of their recruitment, mainly due to 
the lack of job qualifications. In spite of the fact that the St. Petersburg’s 
population enjoys a very high level of education, the major employment- 
related problem is the lack of skilled personnel according to 30% of 
directors of enterprises. The second and the third are the difficulties in 
dismissing surplus staff and the low productivity (Strategiski Plan Sankt- 
Peterburga, 1998: 30)
6.1.7. MARKETS and PERFORMANCE
According to three of the interviewees (Haval, Paouk and Liubomirski) the 
main problem in St. Petersburg is the limited purchasing power of the 
buyers. There is a palpable resentment towards Moscow, which enjoys a 
much higher standard of living at the expense of the rest of Russia, in the 
opinion of almost all those interviewed. A constant remark is that 70-80% 
of the financial resources of the country are concentrated in Moscow^ h 
Salaries are said to be several times lower in St. Petersburg than in the 
capital.
 ^  ^ This is a widely held view indicated also in academic literature (Pimoshenko,1996; 54).
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The only data available on turnover are on Slavia, $2.5 million, Acvasviaz, 
$300,000 and BMN, the only service firm interviewed, $ 1 7 0 ,0 0 0 This 
means a turnover per employee of about $100,000 and $50,000 for the first 
two, very large by Russian standards, while BMN (the advertising 
company) had an average turnover of $8 , 0 0 0  per employee, about the 
average figure for Russian small businesses.
No figures were given as to profitability, but all complained that production 
is hardly profitable. Firms which are doing better are those which sell 
directly to the consumer or to retail outlets and have a distinct image among 
consumers, such as Fitolon and Slavia. The latter is in a specific market 
niche - prestigious art books - and for this reason Slavia publishes only very 
expensive books in order to maintain its image. Slavia did not have a 
specific market niche at the beginning of its activity. It started by printing 
books on French painters. In those years the new publishing houses were 
quite erratic in their choice of material. Since then the market has become 
very segmented, and the majority of firms have specialised in a particular 
market area. In the art field there are currently three or four publishers in 
St. Petersburg which have divided the market among themselves according 
to the price range. Slavia has focused on the top of the market, while 
another specialises in medium-priced books and the others in cheaper 
books. Slavia has several stalls in the Hermitage, having been chosen as 
official publisher of the catalogues for the exhibitions held there, a status 
much sought-after by several competitors. This was actually the turning 
point for their activity. According to Ms. S.H. the decisive factor was that 
they volunteered to publish some iiial catalogues for the Hermitage firee of 
charge. Appreciating the quality of these catalogues, the Hermitage awarded 
them the right to be their official publisher. Currently, 70% of their books 
are sold there. Around 20% are sold in the only two bookstores in St. 
Petersburg where their books are on sale: Dom Knigi, the most famous 
bookstore in the city, and their own bookshop. New bookshops are being 
opened in great numbers, but Slavia prefers to sell its books only in a few
The first two figures refer to 1997 and the last to 1996
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outlets. The remaining 10% are solu in Moscow, while in the other parts of 
Russia their books do not have a market, since their customers - the Russian 
intelligentsia and foreign tourists - are mostly concentrated in the two 
biggest cities.
Similarly, Fitolon sells only medical-preventive preparations from herbs 
patented by them and has become a well-known brand, also conducting a 
promotional programme on television. The other firms have been badly 
affected by the worsening economic situation. For some survival is heavily 
in doubt. In worst shape are those selling to industrial firms, such as 
Acvasviaz, or to budget-financed institutions, such as Melp. The turnover 
had fallen by a factor of two or three for these firms in the two or three 
years prior to the interview. Melp was late in the payment of the loan 
received by one of the Funds financing technology-based firms, despite 
obtaining the premises and part of the equipment almost free from the 
u n iv e r s i ty T h e  advertising agency was also in a deep crisis and did not 
have the money to pay the wages for the current month, as its main clients 
were in bad financial situations and had to cut costs, including advertising. 
R. is a case apart, because 90% of its market is abroad. They were, 
however, also performing poorly because the former director, who had a lot 
of contacts, has emigrated to the United States. In addition, they were 
strongly affected by the new regulations introduced after the August 1998 
crisis which are seriously penalising exporters. It became compulsory to sell 
70% of export receipts within three days at an exchange rate which is much 
lower than the market rate, while before the crisis it was necessary to sell 
50% at a rate only slighter lower then the market one.
The environment is characterised by unpredictability and firms have to face 
events which in the West would be highly unlikely. One firm (BMN) is 
resigned to having lost a substantial amount of money because a major bank 
of St. Petersburg, one of its clients, on behalf of which it had anticipated the
The founders are academics o f these university. Since they cannot afford to pay the rent 
they made an agreement with the university by which the university does not pay them the 
full wage, but the firm can utilise the university premises almost for free.
254
payment of advertising, found itself in financial difficulties and is unlikely 
to pay back the debt '^ ,^ another firm (Acvasviaz) was almost bankrupted at 
the beginning of its activity because a state institution could not pay for 
what it had ordered, not having received the funds from the budget, the 
market niche targeted by a third company (Melp) disappeared in 1995-1996 
after a few years of work because industrial clients no longer had the 
resources to spend on the ecological treatment of water and, according to 
the company’s director, resorted to throwing water away without cleaning 
it, despite this being illegal. For this reason this firm turned to the 
production of medical equipment. The problem of the lack of compliance 
with the law also seriously affects Acvasviaz which has a potentially large 
market, as the installation of anti-fire equipment is compulsory. However, 
few firms can currently afford to abide by the law, since most Russian 
industries are in a very bad economic condition, and for this reason resort to 
bribing inspectors rather than complying with the regulations.
The quality of their products is seen by the manufacturers interviewed as 
comparable to Western standards, with the advantage of being much 
cheaper. This assumption is shared by several representatives, but not all, of 
the organisations interviewed. According to Karasev, regional director of 
the U.S. Russia Investment Fund (TUSRIF), the Russian market is divided 
into three segments: cheap products imported from Asian countries such as 
China and Taiwan; reliable and durable, but unattractive, Russian products 
and expensive imported products. He evaluates Russian products as not 
inferior to foreign ones in quality, but not well designed. It also seems that 
Russian consumers, who used to have a very low opinion of domestic 
products, now have a higher regard for domestic goods, which are not 
necessarily thought worse than foreign equivalents, according to a recent 
survey carried out by the Stockholm School of Economics in St. Petersburg 
(Shcherbakova, 1999a: 9).
This happened before the financial crisis o f August 1998.
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In recent years there has been a constant rise in the penetration of domestic 
goods. The first phase of economic reform was accompanied by a flood of 
imports which squeezed domestic products out of the market in many 
sectors. Better looking, but not always of better quality, these foreign goods 
easily took the place of domestic products exploiting the novelty factor and 
having at their disposal much larger advertising budgets. This wiped out 
whole sectors of the economy such as light industry, where production 
levels are still at a fraction of the pre-reform levels. The penetration of 
foreign products reached its peak in 1995 when, according to official data, 
they accounted for 54% (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no.l: 102) of 
retail sales. Since then, a counter trend has developed. Slowly in 1996 and 
1997, and much more quickly after the devaluation of the rouble, Russian 
products have gained a larger market share. In 1998, their share of retail 
sales reached 57% (Russian Economic Trends, 1999, no.l: 102). Since 
devaluation domestic products have made large gains, as demand has 
shifted towards cheaper products and this has benefited Russian goods. For 
example, food imports are estimated to have fallen by 50% compared to the 
levels prior to August 1998 (Shcherbakova, 1999b: 1).
According to the director of Fitolon, while in 1994-1995 all the medicines 
on sale in Russia were foreign-made, the population is now (December 
1997) rediscovering Russian medicines that in her opinion are better and 
less e x p e n s i v e ^ 6_ g f i e  is convinced that there is now more room for domestic 
producers in the Russian market, but complained that the popularity of their 
medicines is being exploited by some of their competitors who use brand 
names closely resembling theirs. The weak legislative system provides few 
guarantees against this behaviour, even if the firm has patented all its 
products. Gains in the market share by domestic products have also been 
strong in the food sector, in the opinion of several of the interviewees 
(Oetter, Siling and Kerry). Oetter cited the example of a wholesaler 
specialising in the food sector, which had aheady reduced the share of
This is confirmed by a report of the U.S. Department of Commerce -  International Trade 
Administration which includes pharmaceuticals (together with foods and beverages) among
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imported produce from 70% in 1996 to 50% in 1997, and was planning to 
reduce further to 30%. According to the sales director of Parmalat’s Russia 
subsidiary, some Russian companies, which were twenty-thirty years 
behind Western firms in production and marketing, have almost caught up 
in the space of two-three years to 1998.
In sophisticated goods such as household appliances, a Russian brand can, 
however, still be an handicap, as also indicated in the Stockholm School of 
Economics’ s u r v e y ^6 The much larger advertising budgets of foreign firms 
give them an edge over domestic competitors. Lioubomirski complains that 
it is very difficult to sell his products in the shops because Russians tend to 
prefer foreign brands, while this problem is not felt with industrial 
customers, because of their quality reputation.
There are still, however, segments of the market where supply is 
insufficient compared with demand, for example high-quality work from 
typographies. There are only three typographers in Russia capable of 
printing high quality books: one in St. Petersburg and two in Moscow, but 
owing to high demand they are able to charge very high prices. In addition, 
none of them can guarantee timely delivery due to the great workload, so 
that it is necessary to order work well in advance. Because of this it is 
cheaper and more reliable for Slavia to resort to typographers in Italy or 
Slovenia. In fact, the critical factor in their success is good timing. 
Exhibitions are usually announced at short notice (i.e. two months) and it is 
important for them to have the book ready when the exhibition begins 
because it is in the initial days - wnen the new exhibition is reported in the 
local media - that most of the sales are accounted for. A delay in printing 
would mean that a great deal of the books remain unsold.
Only one of these firms export abroad, but two (Slavia and Fitolon) had 
signed agreements with foreign firms for production and sale abroad.
the sectors where local producers made more inroads even before the rouble devaluation in 
August 1998 (Bisnis, 1998: 8),
6^ The Stockholm School of Economics has a branch in St. Petersburg.
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Exporting is still very difficult, because the Russian name is synonymous 
with bad quality abroad, and because of the high cost of acquiring a foreign 
certificate and of the perceived unreliability of Russian firms. However, if it 
is true that Russians have not yet fully acquired Western working habits 
showing for example little respect for deadlines in Kerry’s opinion this 
unreliability/^ is often due to external circumstances. Russian firms may have 
very good intentions when signing a contract, but unforeseen problems, 
such as a sudden change in the customs law or a drying-up of the cash flow, 
may make them unable to fulfill the terms of the contract.
6.2. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY ORGANISATIONS WHICH 
COMPLETED THE QUESTIONNAIRE
6.2.1. METHODOLOGY
The evidence was collected in the period August 1997-June 1998. Because I 
was not affiliated with any institute in the city, it was difficult as a private 
researcher to gain access to the interviewees. In view of limited resources 
and the practical difficulties of interviewing businessmen in Russia, who are 
usually reluctant to speak about their business to outsiders and often try to 
attract as little attention as possible, it was decided to interview 
representatives of Russian and foreign organisations dealing with small 
businesses. During my several trips to St. Petersburg I met representatives 
of fifteen organisations, which included half of the foreign organisations 
working in St. Petersburg and some of the Russian ones. Each of the 
interviewee filled in a questionnaire which took at least two hours to 
complete. In a first interview I explained the aims of the questionnaire and 
tried to get some information on the selection process and on the firms they 
were working with. I asked them to respond to as many questions as they 
could, leaving out those which in their opinion would have required too 
much time to answer. The questionnaire was left in their hands so they 
could refer to their own sources to obtain data which were not readily at 
hand. In fact, it may be a painstaking work to trace data on the firms with
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which they worked. It involves going through the files where the 
application for loans are kept. For this reason not all the questions were 
answered. After I had collected the questionnaire, I would again contact the 
representative to clarify the answers which were not clear to me. 
Unfortunately not all organisations which initially promised to fill in the 
questionnaire did so. Some could not be contacted again after a first visit, or 
explained afterwards that the information I require is confidential and 
cannot be divulged to third parties. In the end seven replies were received, 
which is not a great number, but the total number of firms they refer to is 
substantial. One gave answers on the basis of just three firms, but Karasev 
of TUSRIF provided data on 328 firms. In total the seven organisations 
provided data on 624 firms. The representatives who filled in the 
questionnaire were:
• I. Karasev, vice-president of the U.S. Russia Investment Fund 
(TUSRIF) (partly funded by USAID)
• N. Ramsden, loan co-ordinator of the South Shore Bank working on a 
EBRD contract to finance small businesses
• K. Carlton, deputy director of the Innovation Centre for the production 
of clothes (funded by USAID)
• E. Danishevskaia, loan co-ordinator of the Center for Citizen Initiatives 
(funded by USAID)
• V.F. TuTvert, “main specialist” of the Innovation-Marketing Centre of 
the State Fund for the Development of Small Business in St. Petersburg
• S.A. Siling, general director of the Fund for the Development of 
Science, Teclinology and Franchising (a state organisation)
• A. Nekludov, deputy executive director of Rusnord (a non-profit 
organization, established by the Nordic Council of Ministers, the St. 
Petersburg Government, and other partners to support small business 
and assist Scandinavian businesses in Russia).
The questionnaire is divided into six sections. The first part consists of 
questions relating to the characteristics of the firms, their origin, the year of 
creation and who the owners are. The second part consists of two questions
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about the entrepreneurs, while the third part seeks to assess how small firms 
are performing, their market, their capacity to invest, their turnover trend, 
the purchases and the degree of competition they face. The last three 
sections are qualitative, comprising open questions on the business 
environment, on the policy towards small enterprises and a question relating 
to any other general comments that the interviewee would like to make. As 
one reply alone accounts for 53% of the total number of firms, the size of 
the sample for each question is heavily dependent on that reply.
The evidence collected is not an accurate picture of small business in St. 
Petersburg, as the firms covered are not a fully representative sample of the 
small business population in St. Petersburg for two reasons: a bias towards 
successful firms and a sectoral bias. Most of the replies of the 
representatives do not contain an obvious bias, as firms covered are the ones 
which were not excluded after a first screening. Firms were excluded after a 
first screening because they could not technically be considered for 
financing, either because it was not clear how they were using the finance, or 
because the business plan was not well-made, but not because they were not 
performing well. However, it can be presumed that the better performing 
firms may be more likely to apply for a loan than those whose performance 
is sub par, as the latter might think that the possibility of receiving a loan 
would be highly unlikely. Some replies, instead, refer only to firms which 
actually received the financing, but these account for less than one-third of 
the sample. There is also a sectoral bias, as firms which work mainly on a 
cash basis such as restaurants are not taken into consideration, since the 
official revenues can be just a fraction of the real ones; and there are no 
scientific firms since these tend to apply to the specialised f u n d s T h e  
evidence collected is biased towards manufacturing firms. In general, 
slightly over half of the total are manufacturing firms as the term “others” 
includes mainly service firms (see question no. 7 on page 309). As a 
comparison, in St. Petersburg industrial firms accounted for 16.5% of the 
total number in 1997. Only registered enterprises are taken into
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consideration by these organisations, juint-ventures are absent, apart from a 
few covered by the TUSRIF reply, as they are not eligible for loans from the 
these organisations.
6.2.2. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE FIRMS
There is a marked preponderance of new firms - also referred to as new 
start-ups - (94%) over privatised units (1% of the total) and former co­
operatives (5%). The question of how many firms are spin-offs from larger 
enterprises was not answered by the two respondents giving data on the 
largest numbers of firms. For this reason the sample is smaller on this 
question. On the basis of data relating only to these answers 13% of the 
firms are spin-offs from larger units, but taking into account that spin-offs 
are mainly created from industrial firms we can say that approximately one- 
quarter of small industrial firms have this origin and, therefore, considering 
new firms represent 94% of the total number, almost all the others must 
have been set up from scratches. Almost half the total number of firms were 
created in 1996-7 and only 7% in the communist period before 1992. 
However, excluding the innovation centre which is geared towards helping 
recently created firms, the foundation rate is more evenly distributed: firms 
set up in the years 1994-1995 and 1996-1997 each account for 
approximately a third of the total and firms founded in 1992-1993 for a 
quarter. This suggests that the rate of creation of new firms has been rather 
uniform in the post-communist period. Official small business statistics for 
St. Petersburg indicate a more consistent increase in total units in 1994 and 
1996, and a consistent growth in absolute numbers in the other years; so the 
results concerning these firms roughly correlate with the official figures.
Scientific firms made up 5% of the total number of firms in 1998, so their exclusion does 
not modify the picture substantially.
It might be that all industrial firms are new firms, or that all former co­
operative/leasehold and former state/municipal firms belong to the industrial sector, instead 
of the service sector, but the result would not be very different, as the latter categories 
account for only 6% of the total number of firms.
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Three legal entities are predominant in the sample: closed joint-stock 
companies, almost half the sample, and private individuals and limited 
liability firms, which account for a quarter of the total each. Slightly more 
than half the firms turn out finished products. Most of the industrial firms 
are involved in light manufacturing activities, which do not require high 
initial capital, such as dressmaking, food processing, printing/publishing 
and consumer goods production. Construction and building materials are 
under-represented, despite the boom in residential construction taking place 
in Russia. As 75% of the firms are engaged in trade and services, 
approximately half the industrial firms must also be active in this area. 
Diversification is often a means of survival given the poor profitability of 
manufacturing activities in Russia. Given their short period of existence, 
these firms are still quite small. Just 15% have more than fifty employees 
and 35% have fewer than ten. The answer regarding the turnover was 
answered only by the two USAID-funded organisations, which tend to work 
with micro enterprises, and by the representatives of the South Shore Bank 
and Rusnord. On the basis of their answers we have an average annual 
turnover per employee of $8,600^^ which, although very low compared with 
Western Europe, is not far firom the analogous figure regarding small 
businesses in Russia as a whole, whose average turnover per employee in 
1997 was about $6,000 (Russian SME Resource Centre, 1998a: 4). It must 
be borne in mind that small businesses in Russia tend to underreport their 
sales heavily as a tax-avoidance tactic.
Almost half the enterprises on which information is available are owned by 
the manager and another half by other private local investors, a possible 
sign that people who have become rich in the early transition years, 
presumably through trade, are now also investing in production. There are 
no firms set up by investors from other regions and by workers’ collectives. 
The average age of the entrepreneurs is thirty-eight. The most 
entrepreneurial age group is 30-39, which contribute half of the cases,
This is calculated by taking the median figure for each of the bands in the answers to the 
questions relating to turnover and the number of employees, and calculating a weighted
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followed by the 40-49 age group accounting for a quarter. Just 11% of the 
entrepreneurs are over fifty years old. The contribution of the 20-29 age 
group is also small. A similar picture emerges from surveys carried out in 
Russia and other East European countries (Erutku and Vallee, 1997: 114), 
even if in some surveys the 40-49 age group comes first and the 30-39 age 
group second^o. Among the older generations the idea of being engaged in 
entrepreneurial activity is to a large degree alien to their mentality, having 
lived for most of their life under a communist system, while the younger 
generation (20-29) is less inclined to set up a firm, as at that age one usually 
lacks the experience and capital to start a venture. The high proportion of 
women entrepreneurs (34%) is due to the fact that the innovation centre 
accepts only women and the Center for Citizen Initiatives by statute must 
give most loans to women. Disregarding the replies from these two 
organisations, the proportion of female entrepreneurs falls to 19%, 
somewhere in between the share detected by Webster and Charap in 1992 
(1994: 1) and the one detected by Zhuplev, Kon’kov and Kiesner (1998: 
509) in a survey carried out between 1994 and 1997.
6.2.3. PERFORMANCE, SALES, EXPORTS AND PURCHASES
The great majority of these firms are profitable, as would be expected, the 
majority having qualified to receive a loan. Just 4% are loss-making and 7% 
break-even. I have included a similar question to this concerning the 
financial situation of the firms to check the accuracy of the answers on these 
points. Comparing the replies to these two questions, it appears that in some 
replies the percentages of flm:& in “bad” conditions and “close to 
bankruptcy” is higher than that of firms incurring losses. Not all the firms 
which were held to be profitable fall into the “good” and “satisfactory”
mean. Only data from those organisations which supplied answers to both questions were 
used in the calculations.
Ivantsova (1998; 8) in a survey of small industrial firms in the Nizhegorodki region, 
found that 49% o f the entrepreneurs were aged between thirty-nine and forty-eight years, 
22% between twenty-nine and thirty-eight and 23% between forty-nine and fifty-eight. This 
was, however a small-scale survey based on only fifty-seven firms. Andreeva, Vasilenko 
and Raskutina (1997: 51) found the following percentages: aged 41-50: almost 40%; aged 
31-40: 30%; aged over 50: 13%; aged under 30: 12%.
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economic condition, but some fall into the “bad” and “close to bankruptcy” 
categories^!. Firms breaking-even were also associated with different 
economic conditions such as “satisfactory” or “bad”. Overall, however, the 
share of firms “close to bankruptcy” corresponded to the share incurring 
losses and the share in a “bad” condition to the share of firms breaking- 
even. Therefore, the share of companies in a “good” and “satisfactory” 
condition was the same as that of the firms generating profits. Among 
profitable firms three-fifths are in a “good” economic situation, while two- 
fifths are “satisfactory”. The figures on these two questions are quite 
consistent with Richter and Schaffer’s (1996: 10) results on new start-ups 
(the share of loss-makers in their sample was 11%) and not far away from 
those detected in a survey conducted by the Leontief Center (1999: 12) on 
small business in St. Petersburg in 1999^^(given the strong increase in the 
number of small businesses in the city the great majority of these are start­
ups). The share of firms in an “unsatisfactory” condition is instead much 
higher in other surveys including all kind of firms, not just start-ups^^ 
(Glisin and Rogachevskaia, 1998: 28; Blinov and Nikitov, 1995: 46). Also, 
on a national basis there is a discrepancy between the number of profitable 
firms and the number of firms which, according to surveys, are in a “good” 
or “satisfactory” condition. On a Russia-wide basis, according to a survey 
of the Russian Economic Barometer, only about 20% of the industrial firms 
described themselves as in “good” or “normal” condition in 1997, with a 
peak of almost 30% in October (Russian Economic Trends, May 1999: 6), 
while loss-makers accounted for 47.2% in large and medium enterprises and 
for 21.6% in small firms in that year (Russian SME Resource Centre, 
1998b: 4). Evidently a substantial proportion of firms making profits or 
breaking-even do not define themselves as being in a “good” or “normal”
2! For example, Danlshevskaia affirms that all forty firms generate profits, but when asked 
to describe their financial situation she indicates that one is “close to bankruptcy” and two 
are in a “bad” condition.
In this survey the share o f firms in a “critical” condition was 6% and that of firms in an 
“unsatisfactory” condition 19%.
According to the survey conducted by IPSSA between 1992 and 1994, mentioned in 
chapter three, no difference in the economic situation was, instead, detected between new 
firms and privatised ones. However, this might be due to the fact that the years 
immediately after the communist downfall are considered to have been easier due to the 
limited competition.
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economic condition. Perhaps due to the fact that not all expenses can be 
deducted in full, a profitable balance sheet may hide a difficult situation 
when all the costs are considered.
The turnover trend is very positive. Three-quarters registered an increase 
and only 13% a decrease. Twenty-six per cent of the firms had a growth of 
between 50% and 100% and 44% an increase of up to 50%. Considering 
that these companies are very young it is, however, disappointing that just 
5% managed to double the turnover of the previous year. It is interesting 
that firms covered in this study sell mainly to private counterparts, which 
might be one of the reasons why they perform well. A survey of small 
industrial firms carried out in 1997 in another region found firms registering 
turnover increases accounting for less than 20% of the sample, while for 
half it was stationary and 26% had a decrease (Glisin and Rogacievskaia, 
1998: 25). The large difference among the findings of this survey and my 
study could be a sign that the group of firms covered in this study are not 
really representative of the small business sector, but the reason may also lie 
in the different proportions of new start-ups in the different studies^^, as 
surveys of new firms also detected a positive output trend, although these 
surveys refer to a few years earlier. Richter and Schaffer (1996: 8) detected 
a positive, although modest, output trend among the new start-ups included 
in a World Bank survey, whose cumulative turnover increase was 4%, while 
a study reported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development indicated an increase in real sales of 17% in start-ups (EBRD, 
1998a: 142).
The companies covered in this study import much more than they export. 
There is, however, a large discrepancy in the replies obtained. TUSRIF- 
covered firms (half of the total) make 65% of their purchases outside the 
former Soviet Republics, while firms funded by the South Shore Bank
The proportion o f start-ups in the Glisin and Rogachevskaia sample (1998: 25) is not 
clear. They indicate that 30% are privatised firms and that more than 50% were formed 
through other methods such as the creation of new firms from scratch, or the purchase of 
an existing firm or o f a part o f an existing firm The remaining were formed through other 
additional methods.
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funded make just 20% of their purchases from outside these countries and 
70% from the local market. The other answers also give differing results, 
some similar to TUSRIF and others to the South Shore Bank. As far as 
sales are concerned, data provided by four respondents (42% of the firms 
covered) indicated that the market of these firms is largely confined to the 
city of St. Petersburg, while firms covered by TUSRIF have a much wider 
market, selling two-thirds of their output in other Russian regions. The 
reason for this marked difference is not clear. There is, however, a practical 
unanimity on the fact that the amount of exports is limited, accounting for 
between zero and 10% of the total turnover of the firms covered by each 
organisation. Only 0.2% of the firms export more than half their production 
and a further 0.5% export between 30% and 50%, while 96% do not export 
anything. The average for the 328 firms covered by TUSRIF is 5%. The 
only dissenting voice, which gives a figure of 45%, provides data on only 
three firms. Assuming that the average turnover of the total number of 
firms^s each organisation dealt with is the same, around 41% of the sales are 
in St. Petersburg, 54.5% in the other Russian regions and just 4.5% 
abroad^^. However this is a guess, rather than an accurate measure. No 
much progress seems to have been achieved since 1992 - when exports were 
found to account for 3% of the turnover of the small businesses surveyed 
(Webster and Charap, 1993: 4). A weakness of small enterprises, not only in 
St. Petersburg, but in the whole of Russia, is the limitation of their outlet 
market, as also shown in other surveys (Zhuplev, Kon’kov and Kiesner, 
1998: 508). Small firms in Moscow sold 83% of their output locally in 1998 
(Alimova: 1) and similar percentages were indicated by surveys carried out 
in other Russian regions^^ as well as in Bulgaria (Bartlett and Rangelova, 
1998: 240) and Poland (Kondratowicz, Maciejewski and Morawski, 1997:
The figures on turnover were provided just by three respondents.
These percentages are calculated using a weighted average o f  the figures in the answers 
to question twenty-four, considering the number o f firms each answer refers to. The two 
USAID-funded organisations dealing primarily with micro enterprises were excluded. A 
distinction cannot be made between the turnover sold in North-West Russia and other 
parts o f  Russia, as Karasev lumped together the figure for North-West Russia and the 
other Russian regions.
In the Nizhegorodki region the small industrial firms surveyed sold 74% of their output 
in the home region, 20% in the other Russian regions and 6% abroad (Ivantsova, 1998: 
9).
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147). The remaining output of the Moscow-based firms was sold mostly in 
the nearby regions (5.9%) and other Russian regions (8.1%). Just 3% was 
sold abroad. Moscow differs firom St. Petersburg in the lower propensity to 
make purchases abroad: 87% of the purchases made by Moscow’s small 
firms were made in Russia. This is likely to be due to the greater distance of 
Moscow from the border. On the other hand, the proximity of St. Petersburg 
to foreign markets does not result in a higher level of exports. Are the goods 
turned out by these companies of such low quality that they cannot have a 
market abroad? In surveys, when entrepreneurs were asked to evaluate the 
competitive capability of their firm, fewer than 10% thought it was “high” 
(Glisin and Rogacievskaia, 1998: 27). According to some of the 
representatives of the organisations interviewed in St. Petersburg, the main 
obstacle to exporting is the weakness of marketing skills, while there are 
divergent opinions on the quality of the firms’ products in relation to 
Western ones. Karasev, who has examined the largest number of firms, 
judges it to be lower, as do two other respondents, while two are of the 
opinion that small businesses suffer firom an image problem and that quality 
is, in fact, higher than Western perceptions. Another hurdle to exporting 
indicated by several respondents is the complicated customs formalities. 
The most utilised methods of gaining information on foreign markets are 
personal contacts, the Internet and literature such as price lists and 
magazines, while no mention is made of business organisations such as 
chambers of commerce.
Overdue payment firom customers, especially firom state enterprises, 
continues to be a pressing issue, which, according to the representatives of 
the organisations interviewed, affects not only large enterprises, but also 
smaller ones. It is therefore surprising that, according to TUSRIF, only 
20% of firms require prepayment.
Competition is growing, in the opinion of almost all the respondents. The 
share of firms with no competitors is 3%. An higher share is indicated by a 
Leontief Center survey - 9% (Leontief Center, 1999: 13). Even taking into
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consideration this latter share there is, nevertheless, a marked difference 
with 1992 when the corresponding share was one-third (Webster and 
Charap, 1993: 46), For a comparison, in Moscow it was 5.1% in 1998 
(Alimova, 1). Half of the firms in this study have as their main competitor a 
small private firm. The large share represented by these firms is to be 
expected as private firms tend to occupy new niches created by the 
transformation process and also in surveys on other countries private firms 
were found to be the strongest competitors of other private companies 
(Arendarski, Mroczkowski and Sood, 1994: 48). The number of main 
competitors represented by foreign-owned organisations is quite substantial 
(17%), as well as that represented by state firms (22%), while the small 
presence of large private firms among the list of competitors is puzzling, - 
just 8% - despite the fact that most large enterprises have been privatised. It 
is recognised that in Russia the impact of privatisation has been weaker than 
in other transition countries and it is even debatable whether it has had a 
positive effect at all. As far as St. Petersburg is concerned, Jones (1998: 94- 
5) found positive effects only for bank-owned enterprises, but, from the 
results listed above, privatisation would seem to have had an adverse 
impact.
6.3, CONCLUSION
The business environment in St. Petersburg does not seem to differ from the 
rest of Russia (except perhaps Moscow), despite it being considered the 
most westernised city in the country. While the corruption of local bodies is 
ranked by entrepreneurs among the major hindrances to their activity, crime 
does not seem to represent a major problem for small businesses in St. 
Petersburg. The success of a business is connected to a variety of factors 
which make the business environment unpredictable (bank closure with loss 
of assets, tax inspections with a predatory attitude, lack of payment even by 
the state, disappearance of market niches).
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This chapter has focused in particular on manufacturing, which in Russia is 
penalised by the more complicated procedure for setting up a firm in this 
sector, by having more supervisory bodies, and therefore being more 
vulnerable to inspections and subjected to a greater number of taxes. Despite 
this, local industries are making significant inroads in some sectors of the 
economy, increasing their market share at the expense of foreign firms. The 
majority of the firms covered in the interviews remain, however, in a very 
precarious financial position. They do not generate enough circulating 
capital to make any investment and have to utilise old and outdated 
equipment. Firms tend to have a very flexible employment structure as 
demand is not stable. Staff is usually reduced to a minimum, usually just 
administrative personnel, while industrial workers are employed only where 
there is an order. Alternatively, the work is contracted out to a larger factory 
where, usually, the problem is the converse: a surplus of workers. From 
these interviews it seems that the better-performing firms are those selling 
directly to consumers or retail outlets, while those selling to industries or 
budget-financed institutions have great difficulties surviving. It must, 
however, be said that this is not always the case, as firms producing 
intermediate inputs account for almost half of the of the firms covered by 
the questionnaire, which are largely in a sound financial condition and 
expanding production, although from a very low turnover. The results on the 
output trend and profitability of these firms - mostly newly set up firms - do 
not differ substantially from those of surveys carried out on this kind of 
firms. However, these firms’ representativeness of the new private sector 
needs to be confirmed by further surveys on the subject, as the evidence 
available on newly created firms is very limited. Nevertheless, despite 
question marks over the representativeness of this group of firms, the data 
provided can give some useful information on the small business sector in 
St. Petersburg. The fact that half the firms have as their main competitor 
another small firm testifies to the greater adaptability and flexibility of new 
firms compared with larger ones. The former have proved much more 
successful in filling the niches created by the transformation process. They 
have, however, to have a very local outlook: almost all founders are from
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the city and their sales are almost ail aomestic. Export-led growth does not 
seem an option for these companies, even if the low level of domestic 
demand acts as a severe constraint to business development. There is more 
diversity in the purchases, as many inputs are not produced locally.
Following this description of the general outlook of small business in St. 
Petersburg the next chapter analyses the contribution of the local science 
parks and innovation centres in fostering technology-based 
entrepreneurship, together with the measures implemented at national and 
local level to further the same aim.
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7. SCIENCE PARKS
INTRODUCTION
We now turn the attention to examining the closely related chapter 
concerning the development, organisation and functioning of science parks 
within the context of the development of small business. Given the 
importance of the science sector in the local economy it was deemed 
necessary to dedicate a separate chapter to the development of scientific 
entrepreneurship and science parks. The realisation of the commercial 
potential of this sector was expected to be one of the major assets of the 
Russian Federation. It was believed that there was an unexploited scientific 
talent which had so far been stifled by the planned system, but that could 
now be realised in earnest. Considering the technological backwardness of 
the country, entrepreneurship in technology-based products should be vital 
for Russia in narrowing the gap with the most advanced nations. In St. 
Petersburg, given the abundance of scientific skills, this was expected to be 
one of the main avenues of development in the transition to the market 
economy. The degree to which these expectations have been realised is 
discussed in the chapter. One of the main means of stimulating technology- 
based firms is the creation of science parks whose role in this context is 
discussed along with their various definitions. The change in the role of the 
Russian state in relation to R&D is also considered along with the 
development of science parks in Russia as a whole. A separate section deals 
with the local innovation policy in St. Petersburg. The creation of science 
parks has been one of the few measures utilised in Russia to foster scientific 
entrepreneurship, as science has ranked at the bottom of the list of priorities 
of the government. Science parks have been criticised by some authors 
regarding their success in nurturing businesses, as no significant difference 
was found between the closure rates or growth of high-tech firms based in 
science parks when compared with those based outside them (Storey and 
Westhead, 1994: 29). However, in Russia their contribution is essential. 
The establishment of science parks was a response to the need to overcome
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the lack of experience in world-wide technological co-operation and 
competition, and the lack of skills in marketing, design and financial 
management in order to assist would-be entrepreneurs in the technological 
sphere. As an example to analyse how science firms have fared, the 
performance of the science firms located in these structures is examined, 
and the nature and effectiveness of contribution of science parks and 
innovation centres in St. Petersburg to the creation and development of 
small technology-based firms is assessed.
7.1. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE PARKS IN THE PROMOTION OF 
INNOVATION
The last two decades have witnessed a change in R&D policies. While in 
the 1970s the norm was to support single technology-based projects, fi'om 
the 1980s onwards support has been increasingly directed towards the 
dissemination and utilisation of knowledge rather than towards single 
projects. The rationale of the previous policy is that without such financial 
support firms would underinvest in innovative activities, as they would be 
unable to appropriate all the benefits arising fi'om these. However, its 
weakness lies in the difficulty in assessing how much of the state funding 
received by a company represents additional expenditure rather than a 
substitution for expenditure which would have been made in any case. In 
the last two decades support has been targeted mainly at sponsoring inter­
firm and academic-industrial collaborative programmes, while financing 
single innovation projects has remained a policy option only on behalf of 
small innovative enterprises in the early development stage through, for 
example, the creation of specialised venture funds. While in the past 
innovation was seen as an in-house linear process, now innovation is 
perceived in terms of the interaction and dialogue between the various 
players (universities, businesses, individuals and public institutions). This 
should create a catalyst effect. It has been verified that the rich and varied 
interaction with the different partners, be they other firms, research centres, 
consulting services or other organisations allow firms to develop a
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competitive advantage. Science parks nave been one of the means to carry 
out this new strategy in R&D policies. As small firms are less experienced 
in collaborating with the other players, R&D policies have been directed at 
encouraging this collaboration through, among other things, the formation 
of science parks. The idea upon which science parks are based is that the 
proximity with other firms, research centres, consulting services and other 
organisations should provide a fertile environment for the development of 
technology-based firms.
The number of science parks has multiplied from the eighties onwards not 
only in Western Europe, but also in less developed countries and, after the 
end of communist rule, in the former socialist bloc. There is not an single 
definition of the term science park and similar terms like “Research Park”, 
“Technology Park”, “Business Park”, “Innovation Centre” are used to 
indicate similar developments. Macdonald (1987: 25) purported that these 
terms could be used interchangeably as long as they meant property-based 
initiatives close to a place of learning with high quality units in a pleasant 
environment. However, they often take different connotations depending on 
the interpretation of their functions. Currie (1985: 1-2) defined an 
innovation centre as a structure catering for new firms at the initial phase of 
development with subsequent exit once they have grown, while science 
parks accommodate both start-ups and medium-sized businesses and 
provide also small-scale manufacturing. In his interpretation research parks 
differ from science parks because the only manufacturing activity allowed is 
the production of prototypes.
In accordance with the definitions used in the EU programme SPRINT 
(Malara and Tosi, 1993: 120-122) these structures can be divided into 6 
categories:
• research parks are closely linked with universities or research centres 
and are involved mainly in research rather than development. Their 
main feature is the undertaking of leading-edge research in collaboration 
with universities.
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science parks are situated close to universities or research centres Their 
aim is to promote the creation and the development of technology-based 
firms and to promote technology transfer from universities and research 
institutes to the firms located in the park. They are involved in R&D up 
to the stage of commercialisation. Their activity is restricted to the 
development of prototypes, while production takes place outside the 
park. Limited production can exceptionally take place for high- 
technology products.
technology parks include a wider sphere of activities: R&D, production 
and sale. They are not necessarily linked to universities, but are often 
set up in the proximity of big high-technology firms, 
innovation centres are aimed at assisting enterprises, especially new 
ones, in the development and commercialisation of new products and 
new technological processes. This is done not only through the 
provision of managerial assistance, but also by putting them into contact 
with a regional network of financial institutions, consulting firms and 
research centres. Consulting is provided regarding possible sources of 
finance, marketing and technology transfer. The emphasis is on high- 
technology firms.
business incubators are structures which cater for new enterprises 
regardless of whether or not they are technology-based. The aim is to 
increase their chances of survival by offering managerial support, 
advisory assistance and common services (fax, computers). The 
evidence from several studies points out that approximately 70% of the 
new enterprises which fail do so because of a lack of relevant 
management expertise (D’ Andrea Tyson, Petrin and Rogers, 1994: 179). 
commercial/business parks offer a wide range of activities in a high- 
quality setting: production, assembling and sales. They do not 
presuppose a link with universities. Some technology parks which have 
not been able to attract enough high-technology firms have become 
commercial parks.
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Summing up, at one extreme are research parks accommodating mainly 
R&D companies of multinational organisations which want to be near a 
centre of excellence in research represented by the university, and at the 
other are science parks, technology parks and innovation centres which are 
expected to bring economic benefits to the local region. The same aim is 
entrusted to business incubators and commercial parks, but the profile of 
activity is broader than just technology-based firms*.
7.2. STATE POLICY TOWARDS SCIENCE IN RUSSIA
The Soviet Union had 1.5 million researchers and technicians working in 
R&D in the late 1980s, almost a quarter of the world total. Approximately 
70% of research is thought to have been oriented towards military purposes. 
On a sectoral level R&D expenditures in Soviet times were strongly biased 
towards the engineering sector, which accounted for three-quarters of total 
expenditures, considerably more than in market economies (Gokhberg and 
Peck, 1997: 97). Two-thirds of R&D plants and personnel were 
concentrated in Russia. Although they reached a level of excellence in 
several fields, the dissemination of new products and techniques was very 
limited, at least in the civilian field. In Soviet times science institutes tried 
to fulfil the requests coming from the ministries and no real links existed 
between R&D organisations and enterprises with the result that R&D had 
little effect on production.
After the fall of the Soviet Union the low priority accorded by the Russian 
government to science led to a considerable fall in R&D levels and in the 
number of research workers (approximately by 50%) between 1990 and 
1994 (Gokhberg and Peck, 1997: 96). In 1992 alone the miserable salaries 
pushed 25% of the science and research community to take up jobs in the 
private sector or abroad (Burtseva and Motova, 1996: VII). This loss has
! How to define high technology is not easy. Usually the indicators are the level o f R&D 
activity and the proportion o f scientific, engineering and technical employment in the 
company. As a rule, high technology industries are defined as industries in which the ratio 
o f R&D expenditures to sales is at least twice the average o f all industries, and/or the 
relative employment o f technology oriented workers is treble the rate o f all industries
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been particularly significant in fundamental science (mathematics, biology, 
theoretical physics) where the loss of state support can hardly be replaced 
with private sources. Budget allocations for science fell from 2.03% of 
GDP in 1990 to 1.23% in 1997, but were as low as 0.82% in 1994 
(Matveev, 1998: 1). Real financing has, instead, been much less, falling 
from 0.69% in 1992 to 0.52% in 1993, 0.44% in 1994 and 0.29% in 1995 
(Dezhina, 1996: 78). Considering that GDP has halved in this period, 
science funding has been reduced almost ten times between 1990 and 1997. 
The decrease in budget financing has obliged research institutes to find 
other means of support, as basically government support covers only wages, 
overheads and operating expenses. Many research institutes manage to 
survive only by renting out a portion of their premises to private businesses, 
and by allowing their researchers to have two jobs, as the average salary of 
the research workers dropped below the Russian average^. In 1995, 51% of 
the research institutes were leasing part if not all of their premises 
(Gokhberg and Peck, 1997: 97). Despite this, the state continued to be in the 
mid-1990s the main source of financing for more than 90% of Russian 
R&D institutes (Dezhina, 1996: 79). Meanwhile, R&D material and 
technical equipment is deteriorating because obsolete equipment is not 
being replaced. All these factors, of course, have had a detrimental effect on 
research. Especially in institutes requiring large quantities of equipment and 
materials, research has come to a standstill.
In the Soviet Union scientific research was conducted in four sectors: 
branch research institutes, the Academy of Sciences, enterprises and 
universities and technical instituLes. Branch research institutes included 
both defence and civil R&D organisations. These accounted for over 70% 
of the R&D workforce, while the Academy of Sciences accounted for 12%, 
enterprises for 10% and university for 6%. Branch research institutes 
working for the defence sector and the institutes of the Academy of 
Sciences received the largest amount of financing and attracted the best
(Aldrich and Von Glinow, 1992: 235).
 ^ In St. Petersburg it was 72% of the average salary in 1996 (The Socio-Economic 
Situation In Saint Petersburg. A  General Overview, 1997, no. 29: 10).
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researchers, but the former have fared worst following the collapse of the 
command system and have lost the greatest share of researchers. Eighty-one 
per cent of the researchers who left this sector had worked for branch 
research institutes (Gokhberg and Peck, 1997: 97). The Academy of 
Sciences has fared relatively better being able to retain an higher share of its 
budget allocation and having had only a limited outflow of researchers.
The switch to the market has entailed a new role for the state and the setting 
of a legislative framework. A number of laws were approved in 1992 to 
guarantee the legal protection of research findings. In general the Russian 
government has made considerable progress in constructing a legal 
framework to bring Russia up to world standards in the area of intellectual 
property protection, but the enforcement structure (inspection, penalties for 
fraud and infringement) is still weak.
As a rule, innovation policies pursued by governments can be broadly 
divided into three categories:
• provision of finance for innovation which can take the form of direct 
support through grants or loans for individual projects, and indirect 
support through fiscal concessions for R&D or other technology-based 
activities.
• support for networking in order to improve the collaboration between 
firms and public sector laboratories and universities.
• provision of advice, information and infrastructure through, for example, 
the creation of business centres specialising in the provision of 
technological services to small and medium enterprises.
With regard to the first point in Russia, a new system for the financial 
support of science was created in the post-communist period. This is based 
on a plurality of sources of financing, the choice of projects on a 
competition basis with the assistance of independent experts, and the 
introduction of a contract system for the realisation of state orders. Tax 
concessions and other privileges aimed at the promotion of innovation in
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industry have been introduced by the federal programme for 1997-2000 
“Research and Development in the Priority Sectors of Development of 
Science and Technology”, as before there was not any kind of privilege for 
R&D. The last two policies have been carried out only piecemeal, and only 
in the last few years following the implementation of the programme 
“Promotion of Innovation”, approved in 1997, which will be discussed 
later.
Barring bank loans which are very difficult to obtain, small technology- 
based firms can receive financing, without having to provide guarantees, 
from the Programme of the Higher Institutes of Education for the Support 
of Entrepreneurship and New Economic Structures in Science and 
Scientific, firom the Russian Fund for Technological Development, firom the 
State Fund for the Support and Development of Small Business in the 
Scientific and Technological Sphere (henceforth State Fund) and firom a 
number of funds financed by foreign sponsors. The first programme will 
not be described, as it has very few resources, while the two state funds 
created to finance innovation are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Each of them finance different stages of development of high-technology 
products and processes. However, the total financing provided by these 
funds has not been very large, when compared to the size of the Russian 
economy.
The Russian Fund for Technological Development was established in 1992 
by the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Policy to finance 
technological projects at the final stage of their development before they 
move on to the manufacturing stage. It provides 216 to four years loans of 
between $100,000 and $300,000, mainly in hard currency, with no interest 
charges.
The State Fund was founded in February 1994 by the State Committee for 
Science and Technology in accordance with a government resolution 
carried on February 3, 1994. It is financed mainly fi'om the state budget at
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the level of 1% of the state’s allocations for science (0.5% before 1996). 
Eighty per cent of the resources of the Fund are spent in granting loans and 
leasing for a maximum amount of about $100,000. The interest on these 
loans is 30-50% of the Central Bank rate. Only projects which involve new 
products/services or new technology used for manufacturing are considered. 
Financing is given on a competitive basis, mostly to buy technological 
equipment. Preference is given to firms which are already producing or 
intend to move from the production of prototypes to serial production. In 
1995, for example, the Fund evaluated 1,500 projects, of which it financed 
300 (IPSSA, 1997b; 44). About 700 leading scientists take part in 
assessments of the projects which are carried out every three months. In 
1995-96, 70% of finance provided was repaid, which the fund considers to 
be a good achievement taking into account the high level of risk in these 
ventures (IPSSA, 1997b: 44). The remaining resources went to finance the 
following activities in the first three years of the Fund’s existence 
(Begidzhanov, 1997: 23):
• creation of a network of innovation centres, 9% of the Fund’s budget
• support of consulting/training activity, 3.5% of the Fund’s budget
• financing of research, 2% of the Fund’s budget.
7.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE PARKS IN RUSSIA
In Russia the concept of science park was introduced in 1988 following the 
publication of an article in a Russian scientific magazine. The first science 
park (referred to as technopark in the Russian context^) was established in 
Tomsk in 1990 jointly by universities, scientific institutions and industrial 
enterprises, some of which had to undergo conversion. In Russia most of 
the technoparks have been set up under the state programme “Technoparks 
and Innovations” which aims to promote the scientific potential of the 
institutes of higher education. The number of Russian technoparks created 
in the framework of this programme was fifty-two out of sixty-two in
 ^ The term technopark is utilised to distinguish it from an innovation centre. The term 
science park will be subsequently utilised in the Russian context to indicate both 
technoparks and innovation centres.
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January 1996 and the number of smaii firms based in these structures more 
than 1,000 (Kudinov, 1996; 16; Lur’e, 1997: 36). This was the first state 
programme for the creation of technoparks, but very few resources were 
allocated. For this reason just a minority of technoparks have reached an 
advanced stage of development. By the beginning of 1998 the number of 
university technoparks had risen to sixty-two. Seven are considered to be 
the technopark leaders, comparable to Western technoparks; fifteen are in 
the process of catching up, while the others remain at a more elementary 
level. Fourteen of these technoparks were founded in 1997 and are now at 
the stage of incubation. In 1998, five more were in the process of being set 
up, while a further seven are planned before the year 2000.
Most of the innovation centres and technoparks in Russia are non-profit 
making organisations which, according to the statute, must reinvest any 
profits to develop its infirastructure and the services to tenant companies, but 
their financial situation is not easy given the low demand for technology- 
based products'! in Russia and the difficulties in attracting private investors. 
The vast majority are members of the national association Business 
Incubators and Science Parks Association (BISPA) which in the framework 
of international and domestic programmes has organised training courses 
for more than 200 technopark managers up to 1997. A unusual feature of 
Russian technoparks is that the vast majority of them have originated from 
institutes of higher education, despite that fact that universities accounted 
for only 6% of R&D personnel in the Soviet Union, while branch research 
institutes, where the bulk of R&D personnel was concentrated, have 
participated very little. This is because the latter has suffered much more 
fi'om the disintegration of the command system. For example, in St. 
Petersburg the sixty-six project bureaux that existed in 1990 employed 
27,200 people; by mid-1995 there were only fourteen with a total number of 
929 employees (Davidiuk, 1996: 18).
 ^ The highly technology-based industrial sectors are those which have fared worse since 
the switch to the market economy,
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One peculiarity of Russian technoparks is that not all firms are 
accommodated on site due to space limitations. Some are located in the 
nearby university or in other institutions linked to the technopark. Actually 
very few firms ever leave the technoparks. This is true also for the older 
technoparks set up at the beginning of the nineties. According to a survey 
carried out by the Free University of Berlin (Pfirmann, 1998), only seven 
technoparks out of the eighteen surveyed replied that one or more firms had 
left to settle elsewhere^. In Russia technoparks are usually dependent on 
other institutions, mainly universities. As a rule, the university provides the 
building and finances most of its current expenses, while the state usually 
finances the purchase of some equipment and the reconstruction of the 
building. Annually the state programme provides support to the existing 
technoparks, but this is rather meagre. In 1997 universities provided more 
half of the total financing, whereas the state, including state funds, provided 
less than 10%. Local bodies and financial institutions have not been very 
generous either (Lur’e, 1998). St. Petersburg will represent an exception if 
its programme for the development of entrepreneurship is approved by the 
municipal assembly.
According to an appraisal of the Russian technoparks conducted in 1997 
(Shukshunov and Variukha, 1997: 35) the main features of these structures 
are;
• the number of founders ranges from three to twenty-one. Fifty per cent 
have more than ten founders. These founders are mainly large 
enterprises, universities and local administrations.
• 93% are individual companies, while the remaining 7% are subdivisions 
of universities.
• the average number of firms accommodated is twenty.
• the great majority collaborate regularly with scientific centres, 
universities, industrial enterprises, regional and local authorities.
• 15% own the premises where they are located, while the others rent these 
from the founders on advantageous terms, often free of charge.
 ^ Survey presented at the III international congress “High technology. Innovations.
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• all provide office premises and about 60% also provide industrial 
premises.
• 65% offer management assistance in finance, marketing and business 
organisation.
• almost half do not provide assistance for technology transfer and 60% do 
not provide advice in financial management.
• 44% have also a business incubator, but none has a special building 
where the incubator is located.
• the most developed technoparks - 20% - have premises specially built to 
satisfy the requirements of the tenants.
• only 24% claim to have had an impact on the socio-economic and 
technological development of the region.
The picture of Russian science parks is, therefore, one of institutions which 
are undercapitalised with few if any assets and with a limited economic 
impact locally. Regarding the services provided, according to the director 
of the technopark of the Moscow State University (Rychev, 1998: 74) 
tenant firms appreciate most the provision of consulting services, such as 
the drawing up of business plans, marketing, joint participation at 
exhibitions, while much less interest is shown in the provision of services 
such as leasing of computer and office equipment and rental of premises 
(conference rooms).
In addition to science parks and innovation centres at the beginning of 1996 
there were more than forty business incubators in Russia (CCET, 1998: 76), 
a number which increased to fifty-eight by 1998 (Sokolovskaia, 1998a: V). 
Some of these incubators are created on the basis of technoparks and form 
part of them while others are independent. Sixteen business incubators 
reserved for young entrepreneurs had been funded by the State Committee 
for Young People, and fourteen business incubators (as of mid-1997) were 
set up in the firamework of the Morozov project. At that date the latter 
accommodated eighty-eight firms which employed a total of 758 workers.
Investments -  98” which took place in June 1998 in St.,Petersburg.
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They provide the standard services oixered by business incubators around 
the world: space that can be leased at a reasonable price and shared business 
services such as computers, fax machines and consulting. The Morozov 
project which is jointly financed by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) includes also a wide network of 
management training centres throughout Russia.
A new development since 1995 is the creation of innovation centres which 
has gained momentum since the approval in 1997 of the state programme 
“Promotion of Innovation”. The programme foresees the creation of a 
network of innovation centres in regions with high scientific, technological 
and innovative potential and the formation of a network of regional training 
centres for innovation firms’ staff. This programme is funded by two 
Ministries of the Russian Federation (the Ministry of Science and the 
Ministry of Education), by two government foundations (The Russian Fund 
for Technological Development and the State Fund) and by the regions 
willing to take part, on condition that they provide half of the necessary 
funds. The main difference between technoparks and innovation centres, 
apart from the different programmes which finance these establishments are 
that in technoparks innovation projects pass all the necessary stages of 
development until they result in a finished product, while innovation centres 
concentrate mainly on the later stages of product development. These 
centres should provide suitable and inexpensive premises for industrial and 
office use. The rents charged will be in the region of $100-$ 150 per square 
metre per year in order to cover vhe expenses of the centres, which are 
expected to become self-supporting. They are linked to a computer network 
with common access to professional databases, including a newly created 
database on research activity, know-how, product ideas and new 
technologies, which have been developed in the innovation centres and 
other R&D institutions. In order to fulfil this task an information- 
technological centre has been set up in Moscow In 1997 total financing for 
this programme amounted to eighty-five million roubles ($14.7 million)
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which led to the creation of seven new centres (Innovatsii, 1998: 94), four 
of which are linked with existing technoparks. Two of these centres were 
opened in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the others in Novosibirsk, Kazan 
and Ekaterinmburg. They are located in vacated buildings with between
5.000 to 15,000 square metres of space. By the end of 1997 the total space 
of these centres already being utilised was 14,482 square metres in which 
104 firms were accommodated employing a total number of 1,557 workers 
(Spiridonov, 1998a: 2). Total turnover of these firms was 120 million 
roubles ($20.7 million) in 1997, an average of $200,000 per firm (see table 
on page 286). This is almost four times as much as the average turnover of 
the firms located in the main technopark in St. Petersburg, due to the fact 
that this programme is aimed at firms which are already quite developed 
rather than at start-ups. An achievement of these centres is considered to 
be the fact that the amount of taxes paid in that year turned out to be almost 
a third of the state financing that they received (Spiridonov, 1998b: 2). The 
oldest innovation centres have returned the funds invested by the state in 
about two years in the form of tax payments (Burman, 1997: 26). They have 
proved to be a popular option for small technology-based firms. The 
problem of having empty spaces is rare; on the contrary there is usually a 
waiting list (Rychev, 1998: 73). At the beginning of 1998, twenty-six 
regional administrations and more than ten federal departments had shown 
interest in taking part in this programme. In the period 1998-2000 another 
20-25 centres are planned which should accommodate a total of 500-600 
small technology-based firms. In the plans of the government this should 
result in 10,000 new jobs in the sphere of innovative entrepreneurship and
25.000 additional jobs in industry, but it is not clear if these figures have 
any basis in reality (Spiridonov, 1998a: 2).
We have, therefore, two phases in the development of science parks. In the 
first phase science parks originated from universities in order to realise the 
commercial potential of research carried out by academics at a time when 
severe cutbacks in state funding obliged universities to find alternative 
means of support. The tenants, therefore, mostly consist of academics who
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continue to work in their university, and often make use of university 
equipment for their new activity. Links with local industries are tenuous. 
From an economic point of view science parks have not proved to be a great 
success due to the severe demand constraints in Russia and to the fact that 
in many cases firms were created to receive financial support from the state 
and not firom market considerations, as for firms belonging to technoparks it 
is easier to receive financial support. This point has already been 
emphasised by Batstone and Westhead (1996; 86) in a earlier analysis of 
Russian science parks. Nevertheless, the number of jobs created by firms 
located in the technoparks has been significant: 6,400 by the beginning of 
1996 (Lur’e, 1996: 57). The second phase of their development has the state 
as a promoter. The role assigned to the innovation centres is to make 
technology-based products which can be used by the local factories. These 
innovation centres are not necessarily linked with a university, but may or 
may not be linked to research institutes. Innovation centres are still in the 
initial stages of development and it is too early to judge whether they have 
been more successful than technoparks. The advantage of innovation 
centres is that they can rely on the better founded programme “Promotion of 
Innovation”, while technoparks have not been included in this programme.
Despite the great expectations, scientific entrepreneurship has had a limited 
impact on the economy. Science and technology was thought to be one of 
the main assets of the Russian Federation, the basis for an economic 
recovery once it was no more being planned centrally. It was expected that 
the wealth of knowledge bequeathed firom the Soviet Union would give rise 
to a boom in the creation of technology-based companies, and that foreign 
investment would flow in large amounts in this sector, but neither of these 
expectations did materialise. There was a steep rise in the creation of small 
scientific firms^ in the early nineties, but the majority do not seem to have 
survived long. The number of small scientific firms increased more than 
sixfold between 1991 and 1993 (firom 10,000 to 65,000), compared with a 
threefold increase in the number of small businesses. It then decreased in
 ^ According to Russian statistical bodies a scientific firm is a firm involved in R&D and
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the following years, while the total number of small businesses remained 
stable. There are no statistics on creation and closures rates, but according 
to two science parks managers, Melnikov and Ermilov (interviews), the 
decrease after 1993 is the result of the mass closure of scientific firms set up 
in the early nineties; new ones have been established, but in smaller 
numbers. The low scientific activity is emphasised by the fact that in Russia 
the registration of patents has decreased by 4-6 times^ (Alekseeva, 1997: 
17).
Judging from direct observation in St. Petersburg, many technology-based 
firms are struggling to break-even and only a small minority have 
prospered. Many of the technological innovations produced have limited 
commercial application. Even if the high academic and technological 
standards should provide favourable conditions for the development of 
innovation, business thinking is alien to many Russian researchers. 
According to the general director of the Regional Fund for the Scientific 
and Technological Development of St. Petersburg (henceforth Regional 
Fund), Fursenko, the main problem is not the lack of money, but the 
scarcity of viable projects. In his opinion the prevalent attitude is to realise 
scientific ideas within the framework of the state budget with little focus on 
commercialisation (Pashnov, 1996: 15). For this reason few technologies 
are commercially viable (Fursenko, 1998: 82). Scientists, instead, tend to 
have the opposite view. Melnikov believes that there are many people with 
good ideas, who cannot put them into practice due to a lack of finance.
Contrary to expectations enterpiises did not take over the role of the 
government in financing industrial R&D. At present the amount of 
research financed by enterprises is very limited. The share of industrial 
firms introducing new innovations has fallen from 60-70%® in the late
production which has not yet advanced to the stage of serial production.
 ^ The author does not indicate which years she is comparing. She is probably making a 
comparison between 1996 or 1997 with the years immediately following the switch to the 
market economy.
® This share seems to be very high considering the very limited technological advancement 
of Soviet industry in the 1970s and in the 1980s. It is not clear what is meant by 
“introduction o f innovation” by statistical bodies.
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eighties to 6% in 1995 and keeps decreasing (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 
1997: 19). Because of this industrial enterprises finance a decreasing share 
of total R&D expenditures, despite the collapse of overall R&D spending. 
Their share has fallen by four percentage points between 1994 and 1997, 
from 19.9% of the total to 15.3% (Kozhevnikov and Dedova, 1998: 88). 
The only positive sign is the increasingly important role being played by 
small enterprises, which in mid-1994, were found to be more active as 
buyers of new technologies than large enterprises. Over 20% of the 
purchase of new technologies in Russia came, in that year, from small 
enterprises, which is almost twice as much as their share of GDP (Avilova, 
Pripisnov and Chepurenko, 1996a: 143).
7.4. PROMOTION OF INNOVATION IN ST. PETERSBURG
St. Petersburg is the most important industrial, scientific and educational 
centre in North-Western Russia, and the second scientific centre in the 
whole of Russia. It boasts more than 390 research institutes and design 
bureaux, many of which are well-known abroad and the highest educational 
level in Russia (Lesage and Bayou, 1993: 30). About 20% of the Soviet 
R&D budget was allocated to St. Petersburg.
Due to the industrial crisis and to the severe cutbacks in federal financing, 
the scientific institutions, more than 70% of which in 1990 were still 
connected with the military industrial complex, are experiencing a serious 
crisis. The number of scientific workers decreased more than twofold 
between 1989 and 1994 (City of St. Petersburg 1994-1995: 22) and a further 
25% left between 1994 and 1997 (Goskomstat, 1998a: 9). Wages of 
scientific personnel are among the lowest of all branches of the local 
economy. The average wage was 77% of the city’s overall average in 1997 
(Goskomstat, 1998a: 12).
Nevertheless, in 1996 the city still boasted 10% of all small scientific firms 
and employed 14% of scientific workers in Russia, despite having 3.3% of
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the population (Rybakov, 1998; 6). St. Petersburg and Moscow both have 
10% of workers engaged in science and education, the highest proportion in 
Russia. For this reason St. Petersburg represents a fertile ground for the 
development of technology-based firms. Unlike Russia as a whole where 
the number of scientific firms has fallen since 1993, their number trebled 
between 1992 and 1996 in St. Petersburg. The number of scientific firms in 
St. Petersburg subsequently stalled in 1997 and 1998. A widespread closure 
and opening of new firms seems to characterise this sector (interviews with 
Melnikov and Ermilov), This, rather than a sign of vitality, is a consequence 
of the low level of development achieved by most scientific firms. The 
average turnover in St. Petersburg was just $15,000 per firm in 1997 
(Goskomstat, 1998a: 15).
The local administration accorded the promotion of scientific firms low 
priority in the early years of the transition to a market economy, The only 
source of financing for these firms came from the regional branches of the 
national funds and from a number of venture funds financed by the EBRD 
and other corporate and private investors operative in St. Petersburg.
The State Fund has been represented in St. Petersburg since 1994 by the 
company, ILIP, which managed the most important science park in the city 
up to 1998 and then an innovation centre. In St. Petersburg, the State Fund 
financed innovation projects with 1.232 million roubles ($270,000) in 1995 
and more than six million ($1.2 million) in 1996 (Kiselev, 1997a: 20).
The Regional Fund, which is a representative of the Russian Fund for 
Technological Development, but also collaborates with the State Fund, is a 
non-profit making organisation founded in 1992 to foster innovation-led 
activities in St. Petersburg and the surrounding region. The Ministry of 
Science has also assigned it the role of information-consulting centre for the 
North-West of Russia for the purpose of promoting collaboration in the 
scientific sphere between the Russian Federation and the European 
Community. In addition to providing finance the Regional Fund organises
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training courses for managers of small and medium-sized technology-based 
firms, and provides consulting to technology-based businesses on subjects 
such as marketing, insurance, search for investors, business planning, 
patents and other legal matters. Since 1998 the Regional Fund has also 
provided guarantees to banks which are prepared to lend to technology- 
based firms. Up to May 1998 seventy projects submitted by the Regional 
Fund had received financing for a total amount of $9.5 million (Fursenko 
and Nikkonen, 1998: 4). Fifty-five of these were financed by the Russian 
Fund for Technological Development, eight by the State Fund and seven 
from other sources. The number of jobs created from these ventures had 
amounted to approximately 1,200 by September 1997 (Nepomiashchaia, 
1997b: 2). Decisions on the projects to be financed are taken in Moscow on 
the basis of the recommendations of its regional representatives who assess 
business plans of applicants from a scientific and economic point of view. 
Even once credit has been granted the activity of the firm is regularly 
monitored. As declared by the director of the Svetlana Innovation Centre, 
Spivak, a project has a better chance of being approved if it is proposed by 
the Regional Fund (as well as by ILIP) because of the authority this enjoys. 
Eighty per cent of the projects proposed by the Regional Fund received 
financing.
In order to promote innovation, the Committee for Economy and Industrial 
Policy of the St. Petersburg Administration created the Innovation Council 
inside the city administration in October 1996. This council is responsible 
for drafting proposals on this subject and implementing the city innovation 
policy. The Council is comprised of the representatives of the technoparks 
and innovation centres based in St. Petersburg, the Union of Industrialists 
and Businessmen of St. Petersburg and the local administration. The 
development of a system of integrated innovation centres, technoparks, 
financial institutions and investment agencies geared to financing 
innovation is listed as one of the main objectives of the Strategic Plan of St. 
Petersburg adopted in 1997. Another measure indicated in the Strategic 
Plan to stimulate innovation is the creation of a favourable legal
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environment for science, innovation and education. A law (“On Science 
and Scientific-Technological Policy of St. Petersburg”) establishing that 
every year no less than 1% of the expenditures of the St. Petersburg’s 
budget will be assigned to finance a package of scientific programmes and 
projects has been drafted, but has been stalled by the assembly. This law 
will also introduce a number of tax breaks for scientific organisations and 
scientific enterprises.
In order to give a new impulse to this sector the strategy chosen by the city 
is to encourage stricter collaboration between industry and scientific 
centres. The city has organised a competition for the creation of ten 
innovation centres over the next few years in which it has received more 
than thirty applications. Requests to set up new innovation centres must be 
jointly proposed by industrial enterprises and institutes of higher education 
or institutes belonging to the Academy of Sciences. For the creation of the 
innovation centres the enterprise supplies the premises and also its 
equipment if it is appropriate and the scientific organisation contributes the 
researchers and the scientific know-how. The industrial enterprises chosen 
to house these centres will be given tax concessions (Eskin, 1998b: 6). The 
objective is to exploit unused buildings and equipment which lies idle in 
local factories, and to provide additional employment for the researchers 
who are often in desperate need of it. The Innovation Council, with the 
assistance of two independent expert organisations, will select the 
successful centres. The city planned to allocate financing for this 
programme in 1998-1999 on an equal basis with the participants of each 
project, but the lack of approval for the programme of small business 
support by the city assembly has delayed this. By law federal authorities 
should allocate to these projects the same amount of money as that provided 
by regional authorities. These centres, which will have an independent legal 
identity, will receive financing for repairs to the buildings on a grant basis, 
and to buy equipment on a loan basis (Viktorov, 1998: 7). Priority will be 
given to the projects which need less expenditures to be viable. Some of the 
buildings proposed for use are empty buildings which need to be
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completely restructured, while others require only minor adaptations. These 
centres will provide consulting services and training for technology-based 
firms and will be equipped with, among other things, an information 
network with access to the Internet and other international databases and 
autonomous energy supply.
In the plans of the local administration these new innovation centres will 
have strong links with the host enterprises in order to orientate their 
research towards the needs of the latter. Twenty-five per cent of the space 
should be reserved for start-ups. The objective is to produce scientific 
innovations^ which can be utlised by the host factories or by other large 
enterprises in the city. Eskin (1998b: 6), the deputy director of the 
Committee of Economy and Industrial Policy, says that the problem of the 
current science parks is that they often produce products which are not 
required by the market, even if he considers the science parks in St. 
Petersburg to be quite successful in this respect.
As of the beginning of 1998 there were two technoparks and three 
innovation centres operative in the city; the newest was set up in 1997 under 
the programme Promotion of Innovation. In addition, a technopark is at the 
stage of being set up in the Institute of Mechanics and Optics and a business 
incubator is to be opened following an agreement between the local 
administration and a French firm which specialises in the creation of this 
kind of centre. This incubator will be managed, at least initially, by French 
specialists, while the city will provide the building and equipment. There 
are also a number of organisations calling themselves technoparks, but 
which carmot really be defined as such: these cater for consulting firms or 
other non-technology-based firms. The biggest technopark in St. Petersburg, 
the Baltic International Scientific-Technological Park, was closed in mid-
1997. This technopark was created in 1993 to promote co-operation
 ^ The distinction between inventions and innovations is that inventions are “an idea, a 
sketch or model for a new or improved devise, product, process or system.... An 
innovation is accomplished only with the first commercial transaction involving the new 
product or process, although the word is used to describe the whole process" (Freeman, 
1982: 7).
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between European companies and research institutes, universities and 
defence industries of St. Petersburg and had among its founders the city of 
St. Petersburg, the Baltic State Technical University and two large Italian 
companies. However, it was mainly utilised as a commercial structure: in its 
13,000 square metres of space throughout the city just twenty-five of the 
eighty enterprises accommodated were technology-based firms (Voloshin, 
1997c: 2). Owing to bad management it was on the brink of bankruptcy at 
the beginning of 1996. A change in its management staff did lead to an 
improvement, but the city administration and the university decided in any 
case to close it one year later. This decision may have been taken in order 
to utilise the premises in a more profitable way.
7.5. SCIENCE PARKS IN ST. PETERSBURG
7.5.1. FEATURES
Among technoparks and innovation centres the oldest dates back to 1991 
while the others were set up in 1994 and 1995. One of the innovation 
centres (henceforth ICS) is located in a major factory of St. Petersburg 
named Svetlana, another (henceforth ICTU) is located in the Technical 
University and the third is based in the Electrical Engineering University. 
The two technoparks are also located in these universities. Extensive 
interviews were carried out with the managing staff of two technoparks and 
two innovation centres in St. Petersburg. The innovation centre of the 
Electrical Engineering University was not analysed as in 1998 it was in the 
process of being set up. Only one of these, the ICS, has a distinct juridical 
entity, while the two technoparks are subdivisions of two different 
universities, and the ICTU is managed by a non-profit making organisation, 
the TBH Fund, set up for this purpose in 1995, when the innovation centre 
was established. The TBH Fund, which was set up by the State Fund, the 
Technical University, a branch of the Academy of Sciences and a few 
private firms, is one of the three organisations collaborating with the city 
administration to carry out the federal programme Promotion of Innovation
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and is also involved in the evaluation and selection of the scientific projects 
to be financed by the above-mentioned State Fund. The ICS is a non-profit 
making organisation, which has been set up by the Regional Fund at the end 
of 1995 together with the government of St. Petersburg and the Russian 
Ministry of Science. It is the only one of these structures not linked with 
any university, but collaborates with industries and scientific organisations 
of the North-Western part of Russia.
The technopark of the Electrical Engineering University (this technopark 
will be subsequently called TEEU) set up in 1991 was one of the first 
technoparks in Russia and the very first in St. Petersburg. The Electrical 
Engineering University where it is located is one of the oldest in Russia and 
a renowned centre of domestic science. This park is considered nowadays to 
be the fourth most important in Russia. Two of the first three are located in 
Moscow and the other in Tomsk. The TEEU was initially named Ekopark 
because the aim was to develop technological projects in the ecological 
field, but the scarcity of projects with commercial potential led to a switch 
to the more general objective of exploiting the intellectual potential of the 
university and providing employment for graduates. A formal procedure of 
admission to the university parks does not exist as any technology-based 
firm created by academics of this university is automatically a member of 
the technopark, while outside firms are not accepted. Firms generally 
continue to be members of the technopark even if they choose to leave the 
university and find premises in the city because it is advantageous for them 
to have their name associated with the university. It inspires more trust 
among clients. The technopark of the Technical University (henceforth 
TTU) set up in 1994 is also aimed at favouring start-ups from university 
staff. Nevertheless, not all the technology-based firms created by university 
staff are members, though they would be charged less rent. In the Technical 
University there are about twenty more technology-based firms created by 
its staff which have never requested to enter the technopark, because in the 
opinion of the vice-director of the technopark, they fear that the university 
might interfere in their activity. In reality, the interference in the activity of
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the tenant firms is minimal and no information on the firm’s activities is 
required by the university. The universities are very accommodating 
towards tenant firms. Sometimes, upon request firom the firms, reductions in 
the rent can be conceded. This is usually done for firms which have just 
been set up or in cases where firms have financial difficulties which the 
technopark management believes can be rectified in the future. In the TTU 
tenants will not be evicted firom their premises, even if  they fail to pay the 
rent. In this case the university may look to alternative solutions, e.g., they 
may do some work on behalf of the university.
The innovation centres have a more commercial profile and, therefore, are 
more selective in the choice of tenants as they have to become self- 
sufficient and repay the debts arising firom reconstruction of their premises. 
The target of becoming financially independent is, however, still elusive in 
the opinion of the director of the TBH Fund, while the ICS having reached 
the target of accommodating twenty firms by July 1998, six months early, 
should have become financially autonomous. The ICTU requires firms to 
be science-based and financially secure. The director says that at present the 
centre cannot afford to accommodate new firms. Due to financial 
constraints it is necessary to ensure that these firms can pay the rent which 
is well below market value. The ICS has, instead, accepted both existing 
and new firms which have spun-off firom the Svetlana factory because one 
of the aims of the centre is to create a mutually advantageous relationship 
between the factory and the small technology-based firms. In the ICS tenant 
companies are chosen via open contests by the board of the innovation 
centre after an evaluation of the feasibility of the project. Firms must 
provide their last balance-sheet, a copy of the company’s registration and 
their business plan. The agreement between the firms and the centre 
dictates that 60-70% of the turnover must come firom high 
technology. Both innovation centres offer long-term rents (up to three 
years) which in the ICS is subsidised for start-ups and increases in 
proportion to the firm’s turnover. If a firm wants to leave the ICS and buy
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its own production premises the Regional Fund can act as financial 
guarantor.
7.5.2. PREMISES
Specifically built premises are provided by three of the four establishments 
herein considered. The TEEU has a main building of 1,000 square metres, 
built in 1994 with state financing, where research and small-scale 
production can be carried out for a limited number of firms (in 1998 there 
were twelve firms, eight of which involved in industrial production), with 
up to twenty employees. Rent is set at approximately half the market price. 
The remaining firms are located in the departments of the University. The 
total space occupied by technoparks’ firms is 4,527 square metres. In 1997 
the local administration gave the technopark another building of 1,377 
square metres, which belonged to a bankrupt state firm, to house the 
innovation centre. This building, equipped for small-scale production, has 
space for eleven small firms with up to 150 workers, which will be selected 
through open competition. The innovation centre has the status of an 
independent company, but is managed by the same firm ILIP^^ which 
managed the TEEU up to 1998 and is provided with the same support 
services. It will have a more commercial profile compared with the TEEU 
because of the necessity to repay the debts arising from its construction. For 
this reason it will house only financially healthy firms which can guarantee 
the payment of the rent. The TTU has never benefited from any state 
financing and for this reason it is rather underdeveloped. It does not have its 
own building for the tenant firms, which are scattered around the university. 
The innovation centres have, by contrast, much larger tailor-made premises.
The joint-stock company “Innovation of Leningrad Institutes and Enterprises “ (ILIP) is 
one o f the seven firms which make up the infrastructure o f support for firms belonging to 
the technopark. It offers consultation on specific business matters. It is the representative 
of the programme "Support for Small Entrepreneurship and New Economic Structures in 
the Scientific Field Operating in Higher Institutes o f Education" and o f the “State Fund for 
the Support and Development o f Small Business in the Scientific and Technological 
Sphere”. ILIP was set up by the university to commercialise university research in 1989. It 
was one o f the first firms o f its kind in Russia, at a time when a system for funding the 
commercialisation of university research did not exist.
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The ICS occupies a space of 4,500 square metres in an up-to-date 
production building inside the Svetlana factory, one of the city’s largest 
instrument-making manufacturers in St. Petersburg which was in 1998 
working at 20% of its production potential. The factory itself has a very 
run-down appearance. The ICTU was set up in 1995 in a building 
belonging to the Technical University which was heavily damaged by fire a 
few years before. Up to mid-1998 3,500 square metres had been 
reconstructed and a further 2,500 are expected to be ready for 1999. These 
were previously vacant buildings, provided by the host institutions as a 
contribution to these centres’ capital. They were then adapted in order to 
meet the engineering and technological requirements of the firms. For this 
purpose the TBH Fund received financing from the State Fund, mainly in 
the form of a ten-year loan, although a small part was on a grant basis, 
while in the ICS the capital expenditure, which on the first of January 1998 
amounted to about $1 million, was financed from a variety of sources; the 
Ministry of Science - 19% of the total - the city budget - 23% - and the 
above-mentioned Regional Fund - 58% - (data provided by the V. Spivak, 
director of the ICS).
7.5.3. CONSULTING AND SERVICES PROVIDED
Science park staff are mainly involved in managing the park and assisting in 
business planning, in the search for financing and partners for the tenants 
and in organising participation at various trade fairs, but participation in the 
management of the tenant firms themselves is very limited, unless specific 
assistance is required, usually when a firm is experiencing serious 
difficulties. An economic and technical evaluation of the business plan is 
carried out with the assistance of outside experts when a loan is requested. 
Consulting is provided by the staff of technoparks and innovation centres 
usually firee of charge, while in innovation centres these services are 
provided at a price as the centres must be financially autonomous, although 
lower rates are set for firms at the early stages which are not yet self- 
sufficient.
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Innovation centres have a larger staff because they also have to supervise 
the reconstruction of the building and prepare the premises according to the 
requirements of the tenant firms. The ICS is managed by the Regional Fund 
which has about thirteen members of staff, although they are not only 
involved in the management of the centre, but also in the running of the 
Regional Fund, while the TBH Fund, which manages the other innovation 
centre, has about ten people, and the TEEU has two full-time and eight part- 
time employees. In the Technical University there are three staff members 
whose duties relate to the technopark (the director who reports directly to 
the university administration; the deputy director who provides free 
consulting for the tenant firms and the director’s secretary). In reality only 
the deputy director is actively involved in the management of the 
technopark. The director has occasionally consulted one of the tenant firms 
on technical matters, as he is a specialist in its field, but his involvement in 
the management of the technopark is very limited. This technopark is highly 
dependent on the deputy director who despite his age - he is more than 
seventy years old - is still very active and has a wide network of contacts in 
Russia and abroad. Despite the limited amount of financing provided by the 
specialised funds financing small scientific firms, these technoparks have 
been remarkably successful in providing finance for tenant companies. Four 
of the five firms which applied had received financing in the TTU, while in 
the TEEU twenty-two projects were financed by the three main Russian 
Funds in 1995 (Innovatsii, 1996: 24),
In addition to its own staff the TEEU also has an infrastructure of support 
for small businesses made up of seven firms which provide a variety of 
services at a price set below market value for tenant firms. They offer 
consulting in business planning, accounting, marketing and transfer of 
technology in both the domestic and foreign markets, publish educational 
and scientific literature for tenant firms, certify and test scientific products 
in conformity with domestic and international standards, organise training 
for quality control managers in accordance with the IS0-9000 standard and
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management training in collabcraiion with the Catholic University of 
Louvain (Belgium). The technopark also offers the possibility to the tenant 
firms to participate in several national and international trade fairs at the 
expense of the State Fund.
The ICS and the ICTU also offer to their tenants a wide range of 
information and consulting services comparable to those provided in the 
West, but have to rely on the Regional Fund and the State Fund for the 
provision of most of the services to the tenants. A training centre is also 
operative in the ICS in which more than 200 people have been trained. Until 
now, however, in the ICTU the level of requests for consultations has been 
rather modest, as tenant firms are already quite developed. Sometimes firms 
themselves have provided consultations to the TBH Fund regarding 
technical problems in the reconstruction of the building.
All four offer shared rooms with office equipment (photocopiers, fax 
machines and computers) which are freely available for tenant firms, but in 
the TTU these services are utilised only by the firms located nearby as 
tenants are scattered around the university. Technoparks also offer the 
possibility of renting university equipment on an hourly basis, while the 
ICS offers the opportunity to make joint use of the testing and other 
technological equipment available in the centre, and even to buy this 
equipment. The ICTU, by comparison, offers few facilities, just a common 
room with some office equipment and a conference room, as almost all 
tenants are in a financial position to be able to afford to buy the necessary 
equipment themselves. For the same reason they do not rent equipment per 
hour like the firms of the technopark based in the same university. The 
equipment of the university is in any case considered to be too old to be of 
any use to these companies.
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7.5.4. TENANT FIRMS
The number of firms accommodated in these structures ranges from ten to 
forty-five. The main requirement to be accommodated in these places is that 
firms are of a scientific nature. This means they must have a patent or a 
licence to exploit a patent. There is no time limit on how long firms may 
remain in the technopark, and this seems also the case for most of these 
structures in Russia.
No real interaction exists among firms of the TTU as these are scattered 
around the university, often far from each other. This is true also for the 
firms located in the ICTU given the fact that they work in different sectors. 
This is not unusual as research has shown that science parks provide little if 
any benefit in terms of increased networking (Deakins, 1996: 166). 
Networking among firms is instead, according to the director of the TEEU, 
more developed there as there are more firms working in the same field, but 
more detailed research would be necessary to assess the benefits of this 
activity.
In the TTU the number of firms has grown from three to eleven between 
1994 and 1998, seven of which are technology-based firms, while the 
remaining four belong to other sectors and have been accommodated in 
order to cover the expenses of running the technopark. The non-scientific 
companies chose to belong to the technopark because it is advantageous for 
them to have their name associated with the university. All, but one of the 
technology-based firms of the TTU, have been set up by university staff, 
who have continued to work for the university. Eight patents, three of which 
belonged to enterprises which have closed were registered until October
1998. In the development of innovative projects the firms usually utilise 
the industrial equipment in the faculties of the academics turned 
entrepreneurs. The equipment is rather old - the average age being ten years 
- but neither the firms nor the university can afford to replace it. Budget 
allocations for the university are just enough to cover personnel expenses in
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spite of the fact that academic salaries are very low - below the Russian 
average. The turnover of these firms ranges from $10,000 to $200,000 per 
annum and the number of employees fi*om four to thirty. In total about 150 
people are employed in the firms belonging to this technopark. The low 
turnover per capita testifies to the scarce development of these firms until 
now. Now only a couple of firms are prospering, while the turnover of the 
other firms is at best stationary and at worst in decline especially for the 
producers of medical equipment, as allocations for health in the city budget 
reached a record low in 1997. Three out of the five firms which closed in 
1996 and 1997 after about three years of existence also produced medical 
equipment. In view of the limited possibilities to sell high-technology 
products domestically, the deputy director is nowadays striving to find 
clients abroad. Several contacts have been established with foreign 
companies, but only one firm actually found customers abroad (in Eastern 
Europe and China). This firm builds, reconstructs and improves the 
efficiency and environment-fnendliness of boilers in thermo-electric 
stations.
The financial situation of most of the forty-five TEEU tenants is not much 
different. According to the director fifteen firms are doing reasonably well, 
while seven have almost ceased to function and the others are keeping 
afloat. The two most successful firms had a yearly turnover of $1 million 
and $300,000 respectively in 1997, while the average turnover per firm was 
close to $50,000 in that year (Kiselev, 1998: 4). Despite the difficult 
economic environment a significant number of jobs has been created. These 
firms have provided 200 full-time positions (an average of four per firm) 
and 1,400 part-time jobs (an average of twenty-eight per firm) (Innovations, 
1998: 27). Most of the part-time workers also work in the university. All 
but a few firms have the Russian Federation as their main market. Only 5-6 
firms have been able to find a market abroad.
The average turnover of firms in the innovation centres is much larger than 
that in technoparks. In the ICS the average turnover is $140,000 (Fursenko
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and Nikkonen, 1998: 4), while in the ICTU is $250,000. The higher 
turnover compared with technoparks is due to the fact that the innovation 
centres focus on firms which are already quite developed rather than start­
ups. The average number of people employed is also much larger. In 1997 it 
was twenty-one per firm in the ICTU and twenty in the ICS, so that total 
employment in tenant firms of the ICS amounted to over 300 jobs by the 
end of 1997, plus 200 in sub-contractors. All of the twenty small 
enterprises accommodated in the ICS by July 1998 have become financially 
self-sufficient. The ICS centre was declared by the Ministry of Science to 
be the best innovation centre in Russia giving it the right to receive loans at 
favourable terms in order to realise new innovation projects. The success of
the centre is demonstrated by the fact that according to an estimation of the 
number of small firms interested in becoming tenants the centre will have to 
more than double the available premises to 10,000 square metres. The 
creation of a technopark is also forecast by the year 2002, in which five-ten 
firms will have production premises of up to 1,000 square metres with the 
right to utilise all the services provided by the Regional Fund. The only 
source of disappointment has been the weak relationship between the 
innovation centre and the factory where it is located (Eskin, 1998b: 6). This 
is despite the fact that some tenant firms were spin-offs firom this factory. 
The management of the factory hoped that the companies belonging to the 
innovation centre would provide additional work for the factory and that it 
would be possible to create joint-ventures between the factory and the small 
technology-based firms with the objective of utilising their R&D in 
production, but this has not yet taken place.
TABLE 7.1
YEAR 1997 TEEU ICS ICTU 7
Inn.Cen.*
All
University
Techno.
Number of tenant firms 45 15 7 104 1,000
No.of em ployees of tenant firms** 1,600 300 150 1,557
Total turnover of tenant firms*** 15,000 12,000 10,000 120,000 200,000
Turnover per firm in dollars 57,620 138,289 246,944 199,455 34,572
Turnover per employee in dollars 1,621 6,914 11,524 13,323
Techno.=Technopark s Inn.Cen.=Innovation Centres
* seven innovations centres participating in the state programme “Activation o f Innovation” 
** including part-time employment *** in thousands roubles
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The ICTU hosted, in October 1998, ten technology-based firms with a total 
number of 250 workers, but the objective is to accommodate twenty-thirty 
firms, once the building has been completely renovated. About half of the 
firms were created by staff of the Technical University. Two firms have left 
the centre in recent years, but this was due to financial difficulties. The 
ICTU does not have a stated profile of activity; tenant firms are all mature 
firms set up five-seven years ago which work in different sectors: software 
programming, renovation of small hydro-power stations and historic 
monuments, production of welding equipment, acoustic amplifiers, medical 
devices, etc.. Two firms are very small, one having only one employee and 
the other four employees, but the four biggest are relatively large compared 
to the usual standards of innovation centres; they have thirty-one, thirty-six, 
fifty and sixty-one employees respectively. Almost all of them have two 
different activities. These firms are characterised by their high propensity to 
export. In total six of the ten firms have some kind of collaboration with 
Western partners. Two work only for foreign clients, while the markets of 
the others include the Baltic States, the Ukraine and Belarus. The most 
successful is a firm of software production which employs sixty-one 
programmers and occupies an entire floor. It was financed by a group of 
American business angels and it works exclusively for a software house in 
the United States. Software production is one of the fastest growing sectors 
in Russia. Some of the biggest software houses in the West outsource to 
Russian companies the development of software and Internet tools taking 
advantage of the abundance of well-trained engineers.
7.5.5. AN ASSESSMENT OF SCIENCE PARKS IN ST. 
PETERSBURG
As a rule, the objectives of science parks can be divided into four categories 
(Broadhurst, 1993: 35):
• the creation of new enterprises in order to generate new jobs and wealth.
• the transfer of technology firom academic institutions to industry.
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• the commercial exploitation of existing or newly developed 
technologies.
• the realisation of income for the founders and the increase in the value of 
the premises.
The fourth point in Russia applies only to the most advanced science parks 
which offer high-quality accommodation where rent is close to market 
levels. Regarding the second point, the transfer of technology to industries 
has been weak until now. In St. Petersburg some success has been achieved 
only by the ICS whose technologies have allowed the creation of 200 jobs 
in local industries (Fursenko and Nikkonen, 1998: 4). Subcontracting of 
research to tenant firms on the part of industry is also very rare. According 
to Salov, editor of the magazine “Innovation” based at the TEEU, the major 
industrial firms might be interested in subcontracting research, but cannot 
afford to do so. Even in the few cases where research has been 
subcontracted, payment difficulties have arisen. It is very difficult to assess 
the net contribution of science parks regarding the other points as there are 
no comparative statistics on technology-based firms in and outside parks. 
We cannot judge the effectiveness of these science parks from the rate of 
surviving firms as some of them are almost inactive. In Russia, the 
mechanism for bankrupting firms is hardly ever applied. The number of 
jobs created by the technoparks’ companies has, however, been significant 
considering they are all new firms. The cost per employee has not been 
very high given the limited amount of financing provided. In general, we 
can say that these science parks have demonstrated that through their 
influence on public and private resources they have been successful in 
providing financing for tenant firms, but have not yet demonstrated an 
ability in promoting self-sustaining growth. This task is almost impossible 
to achieve considering the current economic conditions. The realities of the 
declining Russian economy mean that there is very little demand for high- 
technology products. While as underlined in a empirical study on Finland 
the main clients of new technology based firms are larger firms in different 
industry clusters of the Finnish economy (Autio and YU-Renko, 1998: 88)
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this market outlet is very limited in Russia. The number of firms which 
have reached the stage of serial production is very limited. Almost all the 
firms in technoparks would be classified as rather “soft” according to the 
Bullock m odefi, while in innovation centres they tend to be “harder” 
because they mainly accept firms which are already developed. Yet, even in 
innovation centres the average turnover per head is just $10,000.
Contacts with foreign partners have become more and more frequent in the 
last few years, since science parks have participated in several international 
trade fairs and conferences. A network abroad is already quite developed in 
the TEEU. Collaborations have been realised by the park in the fields of 
environmental monitoring with firms and science parks in Germany, 
Finland and China and in the promotion of innovative products in 
international markets with several foreign firms specialising in these fields. 
However, up to now technoparks have not been very successful in attracting 
foreign capital nor in finding markets abroad. In the TEEU there are three 
joint-ventures, while in the TTE none. This applies less to innovation 
centres because of the policy of accepting more developed firms. At present 
the sale of high-technology products in foreign markets is hindered by the 
fact that the costs of acquiring the necessary certificate and patent is very 
high for the average high-technology firm. For this reason only 1% of 
Russian patents are registered abroad (Alekseeva, 1997: 17). Another 
obstacle seems to be the lack of marketing skills which is one of the major 
weaknesses of these technology-based firms. Usually they cannot afford to 
have a marketing department and even if they can they earmark few 
resources for this purpose. It is siili not in the Russian mentality to spend
 ^^  A model explainiag the birth and development o f technology-based firms, the “soft-hard 
model”, has been developed by Bullock (1983: 11). According to this model many 
technology-based firms are set up by academics as “soft” companies. These are companies 
created with low capital outlay where the academic is engaged on a part-time basis while 
continuing to exercise his previous occupation. At a later stage when the market 
opportunities have been better evaluated the academic might decide to work full-time in 
the new company in order to render a more customised service. The third and fourth stages 
concern the manufacturing o f a new product on a limited scale - even merely a prototype - 
and full-scale production. At each stage the business becomes harder. However, the 
evidence on the validity of this model is rather inconclusive. Indeed, evidence regarding 
Great Britain has pointed out that the passage from soft to hard takes place only in a few 
cases (Monck and others, 1988: 139).
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money on marketing. For this reason they seem to give little consideration 
to the need for consulting in areas such as marketing.
In St. Petersburg science parks do not have an official advisory board as 
usual in the United States. The director reports directly to university 
administrators or to their other founders in the case of innovation centres. 
The role of the science park staff is primarily to market and manage the 
park, while business assistance to the tenant companies has been limited to 
consultations on the drawing up of business plans and on the search for 
financing, partners and markets abroad. They are usually content with 
maintaining a general interest in the activity of the tenant firms, but 
participate very little in their management. The information that they 
generally receive from tenants is confined to data on turnover, personnel 
and payment of taxes. No formal review of the firms’ performances is 
carried out at the end of the year. On the other hand tenants seem to be 
reluctant to provide anything more than the basic information required to 
external people. In general, tenant firms seem to be very reluctant to open 
their accounts even to the management staff of science parks; none of the 
science park managers mentioned bookkeeping when listing the services 
requested by tenants.
The limited degree of consulting provided is at odds with the concept of 
science parks, which is to assist new entrepreneurs, since a good proportion 
of these have a technical background and little or no management 
experience. In science parks around the world this is precisely one of the 
main reasons why companies locate in these places. However, as is the case 
in the United Kingdom the utilisation of management advice was found to 
be very limited in some science parks, even if tenant firms were 
experiencing difficulties, and in a few, it was almost non-existent (Monck 
and others, 1988: 190).
What distinguishes Russian science parks from their Western counterparts 
is the very unattractive surroundings. While Western science parks tend to
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be spacious, attractive and well-landscaped, Russian science parks do not 
look very attractive from the outside, as they are located in run-down areas 
(ICS, ICTU) or in basic-looking buildings in the university (TEEU), but 
currently this is not seen as a handicap. The entrepreneurs are more 
concerned with the infrastructure of the park. Innovation centres and the 
TEEU, for a limited number of firms, provide the possibility of renting for 
several years without the risk of being evicted at short notice, premises 
tailored to the requirements of the tenants at a price which, at least initially, 
is often below market rates. Other pluses include the guarantee of a reliable 
energy supply, a common security policy which protects tenants from 
undesirable visitors and also the supply of other facilities. Nowadays 
modem buildings and up-to-date infrastructures are a scarce commodity in 
Russia, and even if their supply is increasing most new firms find the prices 
unaffordable.
Indeed, it seems that in Russia firms might find science parks attractive not 
because the local scientific milieu is important for their operations, but 
because these places offer a range of services and good quality 
accommodation. Science parks should be seen more as service 
organisations providing a range of business support facilities to technology- 
based firms than scientific centres of excellence. Even if it was not 
necessarily the original aim of the founders of such stmctures it may 
nevertheless represent a significant contribution to the development of 
technology-based firms. It must be noted that world-wide many science 
parks can be covered by this definition having not met the most optimistic 
expectations of producing leading-edge technology (Autio and Klofsten, 
1998: 33).
7.6. CONCLUSION
With little finance from the state and a limited potential to market research 
because of the scarcity of demand, the importance of the science sector in 
the Russian economy is waning. St. Petersburg is no exception in this
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matter. There is little the local administration could have done to avert this, 
given its financial straits There is, however, scarce evidence to suggest that 
it has made any serious effort, until the late nineties following the 
appointment of Klebanov in the city administration. He brought some 
innovative ideas. For example, measures to direct research towards the 
needs of local industry have been envisaged. Russian universities have been 
actively involved in the creation of science parks. Despite the severe 
demand constraints the firms nurtured by technoparks have provided a 
distinct number of jobs for academics. It is probable that without the 
assistance of these structures many of these firms would not have been 
created and would not have been able to receive financing to continue their 
activity. The possibility of obtaining consulting does not seem, however, to 
be exploited in full. For example, marketing is seldom requested by tenants 
despite the fact that few employ specialists in this field. The weakness of 
the existing technoparks has been the scarcity of collaboration with local 
industry. The second phase has as a sponsor the state which through the 
special programme “Promotion of Innovation” has financed the 
construction of state-of-the-art innovation centres, whose aim is to make 
technology-based products which can be used by the local factories. These 
innovation centres are not necessarily linked with a university, but may or 
may not be linked to research institutes. Innovation centres are still in the 
initial stages of development and it is currently too early to judge whether 
they will be more successful than technoparks.
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8. CONCLUSION
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters cover the 
main theories on entrepreneurship and its development in Eastern Europe 
and Russia in the nineties, the business environment in Russia and the 
specific state policy towards small business with a final section on the 
factors which have led to its slower development in Russia as compared 
with the other transition countries. A critical analysis of small business 
statistics is carried out in the next chapter. The remaining chapters are on 
St. Petersburg. A macroeconomic overview of St. Petersburg in the nineties 
is provided together with an assessment of the local political situation; local 
fiscal policy and local economic policies. Next, the measures undertaken by 
St. Petersburg to promote small business are compared with those of 
Moscow to detect the factors which, in these two cities, have led to the large 
expansion of this sector. Chapter six and seven focus on the information I 
gathered in St. Petersburg (qualitative interviews, responses to questionnaire 
and case studies of science parks), which forms the empirical basis and 
allowed me to examine how entrepreneurs are affected by the business 
environment in the city.
My conclusion consists of two parts. In the first part I examine the Russian 
context of transition including the factors which are believed to have 
affected small business climate. In the second part the focus is on the 
specific situation in regard to small business in St. Petersburg.
Small business in Russia has not fulfilled expectations, either in the late 
Soviet period or since the communist downfall. Legalised in the second half 
of the eighties to improve the availability of goods which were in short 
supply in the Soviet system, it was initially expected to function within a 
system which was to remain largely planned. Instead, it might have 
exacerbated the scarcity of these goods and, by making the internal 
contradictions more evident, accelerated the fall of socialism. Similarly, the 
economic transition in Russia has been characterised by the limited
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development of small business which has been particularly disappointing 
when compared with the leading transition countries, especially Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The growth in this sector in Poland and the Czech 
Republic seems to have been an organic process once economic 
deregulation has been conceded as policy making has devoted little attention 
to the emergence of entrepreneurship despite the key role it was supposed to 
play in the economic transition. A natural question, therefore, is why Russia 
differs. Mainstream small business theory is of little help given the 
particular conditions of the transition from a planned to a market economy. 
Entrepreneurs’ personalities in Russia have been found to be quite similar to 
those in advanced market economies and the system of cultural values, 
which came into being in the last decade, is very sympathetic to 
entrepreneurship. The main reasons for the poor development in Russia put 
forward in the thesis are the following:
• historical reasons which contributes to the lack of entrepreneurial culture
• Olson’s theory about the existence of strong interest groups which shares 
common ground with Baumol’s theory on relative rewards for different 
types of economic activity.
The first explanation suggests that Russian entrepreneurs have less 
experience than their Eastern counterparts and therefore less developed 
business skills, reflected in higher failure rates. This is because, unlike 
Russia, in the leading transition countries a strong entrepreneurial sector was 
present before the communist take-over, communism lasted slightly more 
than forty years instead of more than seventy and domestic firms had more 
interrelations with Western counterparts. In addition, in two of these 
countries some entrepreneurial activity was allowed. The result is that key 
business skills such as marketing, market research, financial planning and 
budgeting are alien to Russian entrepreneurs and it will take a while before 
they are able to acquire these. For this reason, even if the new favourable 
attitudes to entrepreneurship have encouraged the creation of new firms, 
failure rates have been extremely high.
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Olson’s contention that the existence of strong special interest groups in a 
country limits its ability to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources 
as a result of changing conditions is particularly relevant in Russia where 
the strong power of interest groups has led to the concession of extremely 
favourable conditions for well-connected individuals and has strongly 
influenced economic policy. On the contrary, in the leading transition 
countries, where the political leadership has been largely replaced, domestic 
policy has been less dominated by vested interests and “rules of the game” 
have been clearer and fairer. As a result of this and of the lack of clear rules, 
the relative rewards for different types of economic activity have favoured 
the allocation of entrepreneurship to largely unproductive activities, such as 
rent seeking and organised crime, rather than to productive activities.
The phenomena described above can, to a greater or less extent, be 
identified as having given rise to the following six conditions, which have 
had a much greater impact in Russia, than in the leading transition countries, 
and have acted as a constraint to small business development:
1. high levels of corruption
2. income inequality
3. a business-unjfriendly legislative framework and the general situation of 
instability caused by the lack of clear rules
4. the scarcity of financing for small businesses
5. the precarious state of large industrial enterprises
6. a high level of crime
1. Corruption is one of the main factors indicated by the entrepreneurial 
class which adversely affects their activity. Russia has become one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world in the nineties, a phenomenon which 
was not so acute in the eighties, when its incidence was lower than in 
some East European countries. As the higher echelons of power have 
been guilty of one form of corruption or another in the eyes of the 
population and asset grabbing has been going on practically unchecked.
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their behaviour has been replicatea by lower strata of the bureaucratic 
structure. The poor salaries of state employees has also acted as a moral 
justification for their behaviour.
2. Income inequality has passed firom being very moderate at the beginning 
of the decade to becoming one of the highest in the world, while the 
variation has not been substantial in Central Europe. The large increase 
in income inequality has been particularly damaging because the new 
rich have indulged in conspicuous consumption and saved their wealth 
abroad, without investing in the domestic economy. The existence of a 
middle class with the financial resources to engage in entrepreneurial 
activity is still marginal, except in Moscow, St. Petersburg and few other 
cities. At the same time the poorer classes hardest hit by the transition 
have been hardly able to afford education, resulting in decreased 
educational attainment.
3. A complex yet deficient legislative framework is one of the features 
which has characterised the poorly performing transition countries in 
relation to the leading transition countries. In Russia the legal firamework 
is characterised by an obstructive regulatory regime, high taxation and 
conflicting and convoluted legislation. Since taxation takes away about 
80% of a company’s profits the entrepreneur is left with no other option 
than carrying out a significant proportion of a firm’s activities in the non­
regulated sector. Opening and managing a business is more complicated 
and subject to greater bureaucratic interference than in the leading 
transition countries. In Russia a clear delimitation of power among the 
bodies which can enact legislation is lacking. The result is an array of 
conflicting rules, so that for an entrepreneur it is impossible to follow the 
law. The entrepreneur is, therefore, subject to the whims of the 
supervising bodies. As emphasised by some leading authorities, favoured 
groups might have had an interest in avoiding the implementation of a 
clear legal and tax fi'amework, as their business dealings have been 
conducted on the fi-inge of the law and in order to prevent the emergence
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of new economic actors who could challenge their dominance, but no 
conclusive evidence can be provided on this point. It might also be 
argued that this is the result of the fact that historically there has been 
little respect for the rule of law in Russia. Whatever the reason for this 
(probably a combinatiyh of these two factors), after almost a decade, 
legislation seems to serve the purpose of discouraging business, rather 
than providing a framework in which it can prosper. The Russian tax 
system favours consumption over investment, being particularly punitive 
on manufacturing activities, and is therefore a serious impediment to 
growth. For years a simplification has been on the agenda with the 
enactment of a new tax code, but up to the early 2000 the enactment has 
still not been put in place.
4. Financing for small business has been extremely scarce. The banking 
sector is much smaller than in the leading transition countries and the 
quantity of loans conceded to small business is negligible. Banks have 
been very cautious in financing small businesses, especially new start-ups 
which are considered too risky, given their high failure rate. Part of the 
blame lies with the state policy which encouraged the banks to invest in 
state bonds, instead of in the real sector. Then, the state-induced collapse 
of the banking system led to a dramatic decrease in the amount of credit 
going to small businesses. Programmes intended to develop small 
business have also remained largely unfulfilled, fuelling doubts as to 
whether there is a real intention to promote it. Worse still, the limited 
resources allocated to the Federal Fund for Small Business Support were 
mostly mis-spent. It can be concluded that the abolition of the State 
Committee for the Support and Promotion of Entrepreneurship in late 
1998 has, therefore, not been greatly regretted by the entrepreneurial 
class.
5. Because of the larger output decline, industrial enterprises are in a worse 
condition in Russia than in the leading transition countries. Most 
industrial enterprises are in a precarious state (see section 2.8).
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Privatisation has not led to a signiticant restructuring. One reason put 
forward is that privatisation has not brought about a high degree of 
management turnover, e.g., as in the Czech Republic, therefore leaving in 
place the old management regardless of their business skills. However, 
the state of industry can not only be attributed to poor skills of 
managerial staff. Industrial firms in Russia are penalised both by a 
punitive taxation system and high utility prices, as well as having to 
survive while receiving less than half of the revenues in non-cash form. 
In some cases they are also bankrupted by the opportunistic behaviour of 
the management who strip them of their assets for personal gain or 
intentionally cause bankruptcy in order to buy the firm cheaply.
6. The payment of protection money is more widespread in Russia than in 
Poland or the Czech republic, but the constraint that racketeering 
evidently places on business activity has not been ranked among the 
foremost of problems identified by entrepreneurs. One reason for this 
may be a reluctance to discuss protection rackets, which makes any 
assessment of their effects difficult, but studies have generally considered 
the effects of racketeering a less pressing difficulty than those associated 
with complying with complex and contradictory legislation.
The absence of supporting networks is another reason adduced for the slow 
growth of small businesses in Russia, although on this point we do not have 
enough evidence to confirm that the situation is worse than in the leading 
transition countries. The importance of networks is well documented in the 
economic literature. In Russia, given the economic turmoil and the 
underdevelopment of market institutions, networks are likely to play an even 
greater role. These networks facilitate high trust relationships, thereby 
cutting transaction costs. In Russia formal networks reach a limited number 
of people and informal networks are poorly developed. The average 
entrepreneur tends to be isolated. The most relevant network is formed by 
the former communist nomenklatura, which is the group largely reaping the 
benefits of transition, while for new entrepreneurs with few connections
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building a network of trusted partners will take time as trust usually evolves 
slowly.
Assessing the level of development of small business in St. Petersburg and 
in Russia as a whole requires a critical analysis of official statistics, due to 
the existence of several inconsistencies. In addition, the frequent changes in 
the methodology make it difficult to compare the data across the period. The 
small business share of total employment was only 12.5% in 1997 in Russia, 
compared with proportions varying from 38.9% to 73.5% in the OECD 
countries for firms with up to 100 employees. It must be taken into account 
that Russian and Western official data on small business are not fully 
comparable, as the Russian definition of small business has several 
limitations. For this reason its contribution to the economy is understated. 
The number of firms is considered to be the most reliable figure. However, a 
question mark remains as to the continuous growth of registered enterprises. 
Is this only an effect of the non-liquidation of inactive enterprises or is 
Goskomstat underestimating their numbers? Unfortunately there is very 
little evidence on this point. However, comparing employment figures with 
survey results suggests that Goskomstat is not adequately reflecting small 
business numbers.
Officially, employment in small businesses has stopped growing since 1994. 
The increase in the number of self-employed has not compensated for this 
stagnation, as they are mostly in secondary employment. Instead, survey- 
based results point to a continuous increase in the number of people 
employed by new private enterprises suggesting that the emergence of 
entrepreneurship has been an organic process, as in the leading transition 
countries, although it has been much slower in Russia where it has been 
restrained by the various factors listed above. Currently the sector is too 
small to lead to a turnaround in the Russian economy, but it is a sign that the 
situation will probably improve in the years to come.
How do we reconcile official data with survey-based results indicating a
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constant growth in new enterprises employment? Has the growth in 
employment levels of new firms been offset by a decline in the number of 
employees of small privatised firms? How significant is the proportion of 
workers in new private firms which have grown so large so that they no 
longer qualify no longer as small businesses? Unfortunately, we have far too 
little evidence on these phenomena to allow us to reach a conclusion. We 
can only estimate on the basis of Clarke and Kabadina’s survey (see section 
3.2) that the new private sector which fits small business definitions 
accounts for between 10% and 14% of the workforce, but this is an estimate 
on the basis of data that the authors consider a generalisation with little 
analytical value, while the only clue to the first question is that a good deal 
of employment in small industrial firms is in privatised or spin-off 
companies. Taking into account the increasing dynamism of the new private 
sector, which since 1994 has become more vibrant in contradiction with 
official data on small business, we can therefore conclude that stagnation in 
employment seems highly dubious, and that an underestimation would 
appear likely, but the extent of the probable underestimation is unknown.
Although there are no official data on survival rates, small businesses in 
Russia seem to be characterised by an extremely short life-span. Many firms 
were created in the enthusiasm to exploit the new opportunities arising from 
the transformation, but often lacked a clear market analysis and therefore 
could not survive long. The low output per firm testifies to the low 
development stage reached by most firms. Even taking into account the fact 
that Goskomstat does not capture the full extent of the grey economy in its 
figures, as surveys and experts’ estimates suggest, the picture does not 
change substantially. A critical aspect of small business support is, 
therefore, not only to increase creation rates, but also to assist existing firms 
to survive and prosper. At present, a business is subject to a variety of 
unpredictable events which can cause its closure: bank failure with the loss 
of deposits; the breakdown of the banking system for an extended period, 
causing delays in all transactions; lack of payment by the state; continuous 
inspection by the tax and other departments, which can block a firm’s
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activity; freezing of its bank account by tax bodies without warning; fraud, 
against which legislation offers little protection; and considerable swings in 
the level of market demand. Even if  profits in the small business sector are 
higher than in the rest of the economy, the figure is scarcely representative 
in view of the widespread practice of hiding profits. Conflicting surveys do 
not give a clear indication as to how small businesses are faring, but the 
prevalent picture has not been very favourable for industrial firms, while for 
trading firms the picture is mixed. However, the rouble devaluation of 
August 1998 has altered the picture in some industrial sectors, even if its 
effects on the different categories of small firms are puzzling. While trade 
firms are believed to have been affected most and industry the least, there 
has been by the end of 1998 a reduction in industrial employment. 
Employment in trade firms has, instead, remained stable. The time-span is, 
however, too short to have an idea of the more lasting effects of the crisis. 
For this it is necessary to wait until data for 1999 become available.
As far as St. Petersburg is concerned, its economy has experienced the 
problems typical of defence-related cities. Few of the major military 
factories have been able to restructure and re-orient production and this has 
not been helped by the chaotic state policy towards conversion. The 
industrial sector in the city witnessed an output drop which was more 
marked than in Russia in general until 1996. However, from 1997 the 
situation has been reversed, indicating that restructuring is taking place, at 
least in some sectors. A common feature of the years 1992-1996 is that 
regions producing more sophisticated outputs were in a more vulnerable 
position. New strategies for the future of the city had, therefore, to be 
devised in the 1990s as the city lost its importance as a defence centre, 
raising fears of a progressive de-industrialisation. In the early 1990s, the 
transformation of St. Petersburg into a free economic zone with favourable 
terms for foreign investors was expected to lead to an influx of foreign 
investment. The city, it was hoped, would revert to its pre-revolutionary role 
as a centre of international business and finance. However, this project, 
including the concession of tax and customs advantages, never got off the
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ground, and the FEZ strategy was applied only to certain areas. Sobchak, 
mayor from 1991 to 1996, remained committed to the aim of making St. 
Petersburg an international centre of business and finance, but the actual 
results have fallen far short of expectations.
In view of the disappointing flow of foreign investment, the new mayor has 
paid much less attention to it, and has declared as his main objective the 
restructuring of the industrial sector. The industrial strategy was spelled out 
in the Programme of Stabilisation, but it is now clear that the results 
expected from the Programme will not be achieved, while a Strategic Plan 
has been devised to set the long-term strategy for the city economy. 
However, the Plan seems to be a collection of differing interest-group 
recommendations without a clear structure and with no apparent strategy for 
the realisation of its aims. A common feature of the post-transition years 
has been the countless plans devised by city officials. In the end, however, 
few of the measures indicated in these plans have been carried out. They can 
be considered more declarations of intent than practical policies. A 
command economy mentality still seems to be prevalent among economic 
policy makers, but this is also the consequence of the disastrous situation in 
which industry finds itself; this situation, therefore, acts as justification for 
their involvement. Active involvement to assist the industrial sector is not 
just a characteristic of the local administration of the city, but of most local 
administrations in Russia. As mentioned before, few Russian factories are 
doing well and the social cost of the unemployment that could result from 
their closure compels the local administration to listen to the cry for help of 
industrial managers. The actual measures implemented for the industrial 
sector have been the concession of subsidies to specific businesses, 
primarily in the forms of tax deferments, soft loans and reduction of tax 
rates for specific activities. The criteria for the concession of these have, 
however, not always been clear, and nor have the positive results, if any, of 
this policy. The reason for the improved performance of some sectors does 
not seem to lie with the help they received from the local administration, but 
rather the result of other factors such as foreign investment and the changing
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tastes of Russian consumers. The iast programme devised by Klebanov is 
more concrete, linking the concession of subsidies to restructuring plans 
which are based on reducing the firms’ sizes to make them compatible with 
actual production levels. One of the main features of this programme is the 
spinning off of small companies firom large enterprises. Experience firom the 
other transition countries shows that the performance of the parent enterprise 
is generally enhanced once non-essential units have been spun off, but as far 
as St. Petersburg is concerned the past results of this process have been 
mixed. This programme is only beginning to be realised, so it is not yet 
possible to detect any results. The administration of St. Petersburg has also 
retained a significant role in promoting co-operation with other members of 
the Federation, signing agreements to exchange locally-made products for 
the produce of other regions in order to assure the city an adequate food 
supply as market signals are still not working properly.
Favouritism has been rife. Despite St. Petersburg being considered a liberal 
city, mayors have behaved like dictators, trying to subdue the legislative 
assembly and dispensing favours to their “cronies”. Entrepreneurs with the 
right connections have been able to secure more advantageous conditions in 
the forms of: premises at knocked-down prices, either on rent or through 
privatisation; city orders; tax deferments; and exemption firom inspection. 
The new mayor promised to put finances in order and cut down on 
favouritism. In effect, fiscal management has made huge steps forward. The 
dramatic situation in which the city administration found itself in the early 
nineties, when the decline in budget revenues due to the severe economic 
crisis was accompanied by a widening of the responsibilities that the city 
had to take on, was finally overcome in the late nineties with the balancing 
of expenditures and revenues. Even if past deficits have left a large debt, St. 
Petersburg was one of the few Russian cities not to default on its 
repayments. Success in fiscal management has, however, not meant that 
old methods have been eradicated. Municipal tenders are still assigned 
without proper competition and the strong influence of shadowy figures in 
local government prompted the architect of financial stabilisation to resign
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in early 1999.
Despite the economic problems and the fact that the “rules of the game” 
have not been equal for all, St. Petersburg has, nevertheless, experienced a 
large growth (by Russian standards) of the small business sector since 1992, 
even if its level remains substantially lower than in Moscow. Small business 
development in Russia has been mainly centred in cities, where the 
economic resources to sustain small business activity are mainly 
concentrated. Even if we concede that data for 1992 are probably 
underestimated, the growth has been one of the largest in Russia. It is, 
however, not clear why St. Petersburg has a share of small businesses in 
total units, which is double the Russian average, including Moscow. Is it the 
result of a lower failure rate? Further analysis is required to find out why St. 
Petersburg differs so much from Russia on this matter.
Employment in the small business sector is approaching the levels registered 
in some Western countries. The much lower unemployment rate in the city 
compared with Russia as a whole, despite the widespread labour shedding 
by the large factories, can be in part attributed to the high level of 
development achieved by this sector in the city. The engine of this growth 
has been trade firms, which had only a minor role at the start of the decade. 
This is in contrast to that of scientific firms, the role of which in the small 
business sector has progressively waned. Due to the higher dislocation 
provoked by the fall of the planning system on its industrial sector the 
expansion in small business has not resulted in a better performance of the 
city economy compared with the rest of Russia. Considering the expansion 
of this sector, it is unclear why the contribution of small business to the 
local budget is limited, while in Russia as a whole and in Moscow the 
revenues provided by small businesses broadly eorrespond to their share of 
total employment. This calls into question again the reliability of these data.
This growth has taken place in the absence of a clear policy by the local 
government to promote small business. In general, entrepreneurs have been
319
staunchly critical of the local administration. The environment does not 
seem to be particularly business-friendly, and almost all the interviewees 
agree that it has not improved during reeent years. In St. Petersburg 
financing for support measures has been limited and the little financing 
provided has been usually mis-managed. The measures envisaged to assist 
small businesses have for the most remained unapplied and the specific 
legislation approved in the city has had scarce effect. Local administrations 
in Russia have a strong influence on the business environment: a substantial 
share of the tax burden is determined by local bodies, as well as the rent of 
premises, the majority of which they own. They also have considerable 
autonomy in implementing regulations. In Russia, the attitude towards small 
business has varied greatly between different local administrations. St. 
Petersburg on its part has tried to be a leader in economic reforms by 
privatising quickly, although not always fairly, and allowing enterprises to 
buy land. In addition, it has striven to create a favourable business 
environment, lowering the profit tax and cancelling the tax on educational 
institutions, but these measures alone have had little effect, as the tax burden 
remains extremely high. The taxes on total revenues are especially crippling. 
Constraints are particularly strong for manufacturing firms, which are 
penalised by the more complicated procedure for opening a business, the 
existence of more supervisory bodies and the larger tax burden.
The grievances of businessmen in St. Petersburg are similar to those in other 
parts of Russia: high taxation, bureaucratie racketeering, a predatory tax 
police, the extreme difficulty of obtaining financing, the high rents required 
by the city administration for municipal premises, etc. The administration is 
in particular accused of approving legislation without exercising the proper 
competence. They have, instead, a high opinion of the Moscow 
administration. Small businesses in St. Petersburg do not have political 
power and have been, therefore, largely ignored by the local government 
until very recently. They are mostly isolated, the majority being sceptical of 
the efficacy of joining any association. Only one business association can 
boast more than 1,000 members. Nowadays, however, the development of
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this sector has made it impossible for the mayor to ignore it, especially in 
view of the forthcoming mayoral election to be held in 2 0 0 0 .
In addition to the lack of support from the administration, St. Petersburg, 
unlike Moscow, does not enjoy a particularly high standard of living, which 
is only slightly higher than the national average. As these are usually 
mentioned as the two main factors explaining the expansion of small 
business in Moscow (especially the higher standard of living), it is 
reasonable to ask what caused small business to grow so much in St. 
Petersburg. One question mark hangs over the reliability of these figures, as 
impressionistic evidence would appear to suggest a higher standard of living 
in St. Petersburg than in the rest of Russia. Apart from this, in trying to 
answer this question, some factors can be detected which can reasonably 
explain the entrepreneurial boom in the eity. The higher levels of 
educational attainment and their more “Western mentality” make them more 
prone to engage in entrepreneurial activity. In addition, a complex of factors 
(the higher foreign investment received per capita compared with Russia, 
the presence of a relatively large middle class - by Russian standards - the 
comparatively large foreign community and the tourist industry) make retail 
spending per capita higher then in Russia as a whole. Retail trade per capita 
was 26% to 50% higher than the average in Russia between 1995 and 1997, 
and this explains why small business growth has been mainly concentrated 
in services. However, the switch of consumers’ preference to domestic 
goods in some sectors, after their initial curiosity for foreign products, 
helped by the fact that domestic products are improving their look, bodes 
well for industrial entrepreneurs. Tnis tendency has been accelerated by the 
rouble devaluation. Given the unpredictability of the environment, the firms 
interviewed tend to be very flexible, keeping a small staff and employing 
extra workers when there is demand. Better-performing firms are those 
selling to consumers or retail outlets and having a distinct image, while 
those dependent on sales to industrial firms or to the city administration are 
faring worse.
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Data collected through the questionnaire suggest that new firms are mostly 
in a sound financial condition and expanding production, a result which is 
confirmed by surveys on this sector carried out in Russia. However, the 
information available on the new firm sector is too limited to allow us to 
determine whether it is actually representative of this sector. The data 
provided by the organisations which completed the questionnaire can, 
nevertheless, provide some useful insights on small business in St. 
Petersburg. The fact that half of the firms have as their main competitor 
another small firm testifies to the greater adaptability and flexibility of new 
firms compared with larger ones. The sales of these firms tend to be 
concentrated in the local market with a negligible export component 
similarly to what was observed in surveys in other parts of Russia. There is, 
instead, greater diversity in purchases as many inputs are not locally 
produced.
A case apart is scientific entrepreneurship, which is analysed in the chapter 
on science parks. State financing has been reduced to a fraction of that in the 
Soviet period, forcing a great number of research workers to find other 
occupations or to emigrate. The idea that scientific institutions were to 
replace public funding with private funding has proved unfeasible for the 
great majority of Russian research centres. In 1997, industry was financing 
an even lower share of the total R&D expenditure than in 1994, despite the 
fall in total research expenditure. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
expansion of small business in this sector ground to a halt, after an initial 
spurt in the early nineties, and is now contracting. Small scientific firms are, 
therefore, doing even worse than the small business sector as a whole.
St. Petersburg is losing its scientific potential as more and more people leave 
the sector and the young fail to enter it. Given their budget constraints, local 
administrations can do little to avert this. The problem has, however, ranked 
low in the priorities of the city administration. Only in the late nineties was 
a more focused attention given to this sector. Local universities have 
attempted to promote the commercialisation of research through the creation
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of science parks. Most Russian science parks were founded by universities 
in an effort to keep researchers tied to these institutions, despite the very low 
salaries, by assisting them in developing their research towards commercial 
purposes. In Russia science parks can play a very important role given the 
inexperience of working in a market environment, but in the absence of 
comparative statistics it is hard to judge their contribution to the 
development of tenant firms. It may be presumed that many of these firms 
could not have survived long without the assistance of science parks in 
securing financing, and without the range of services and good-quality 
accommodation they provide at affordable prices. However, the usual 
services provided by science parks do not seem to be exploited in full. 
Managerial advice was found to be rather limited, but this is also due to the 
reluctance of the firms’ managers to provide anything, but the most basic 
information. The transfer of technology to industry has been weak due to 
the limited demand for scientific products, but nevertheless the number of 
jobs created has been substantial.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY OF SMALL PRIVATE ENTERPRISES (SPEs) IN ST. PETERSBURG
Respondents: Tulfert Carlton Danish, Slling Neklu. Karas Rams.
1) BASIC INFORMATION A B c D E F G Total
1. How many SPEs do you work with? 33 100 40 20 3 328 100 624
5% 16% 6% 3% 0% 53% 16% 100%
2. How many of these SPEs have as legal form:
1 ) Joint stock company-open 6 1 0 7 1%
2) Joint stock company-closed 13 5 12 15 155 70 270 44%
3) Private Individual 9 90 20 5 46 0 170 27%
4) Limited liability company 8 3 127 20 158 25%
5) Additional Liability Company 0 0 0%
6) Full Partnership 0 0 0%
7) Other 3 10 13 2% . . .
8) Joint venture 2 2 0%
iTotal 33 96 40 20 3 328 100 620 100%
3. How many of these SPEs were set up; Excl. B
1) Before 1992 2 10 1 2 21 5 41 7% 6%
2) in 1992-1993 9 76 38 123 20% 23%
3) In 1994-1995 15 14 2 1 112 37 181 29% 35%
4) In 1996-1997 16 90 16 18 119 20 279 45% 36%
iTotal 33 100 40 20 3 328 100 624 100% 100%
4. How many of these SPEs belong to these Industrial sectors:
1 ) Metallurgy 0 0 0%
2) Chemicals 6 1 0 7 1%
3} Engineering and Metal-working 2 1 6 0 9 2%
4) Machine building 8 3 0 11 2%
5) Wood/paper 16 0 16 3%
6) Building materials 1 24 8 33 6%
7) Light Industry 2 100 7 4 47 160 27%
8) Food processing 2 8 10 62 16 98 16%
9) Other* 13 10 1 213 29 266 44%
iTotat 33 100 16 20 3 328 100 600 100%
5. How many of these SPEs are;
1) New firms 33 97 40 10 3 301 100 584 94%
2) F o rm e r s la le /m u rlc ip a ! e n te rp r is e s  wfiich a re  now  fully p rivate 5 0 5 1%
3} F o rm e r s la te /m u n lc ip a! e n te rp r is e s  whicfi a r e  n ow  partially p rivate 0 0 0%
4) Former co-operatives/leasehold enterprises 5 27 0 32 5%
5) Other 0 0 0%
ITotal 33 97 40 20 3 328 100 621 100%
6. How many of ths new SPE s are sptn-offs from larger e n te r j  1 0 | | 1 1 S |  0 | 10 261 13% |*
7. How many of these SPEs are owned by;
1 ) Owner/manager 8 98 40 10 2 46 90 294 47%
2) Another private company 1 5 6 1%
3) Other local private Investors 25 10 267 5 307 49%
4) Other Investors outside St. Petersburg 0 0 0%
5) Private foreign Investors 15 0 15 2%
6) Workers 0 0 0%
7) Other 0 0 0%
jTotal 33 98 40 20 3 328 100 622 100%
1 ) An intermediate Input 1 2 245 0 248 44%
2) A finished product 33 100 21 20 1 83 60 318 56%
3) Other 0 0
{Total 33 100 22 20 3 328 60 566 100%
9, How many of these SPEs are engaged 
also In trade and services? I 6i 501 18| 201 3| 3281 40| 465| 75% |*
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II) THE ENTREPRENEURS A
10. How many of the entrepreneurs of these SPEs are:
B C D E F G Total
1 ) Less than 30 years old 20 3 1 21 10 55 9%
2) 30-39 years old 2 60 12 203 65 342 57%
3) 40-49 years old 9 15 15 1 77 25 142 24%
4) 50-59 years old 15 5 10 1 27 0 58 10%
5) More than 59 years old 7 0 7 1%
ITotal 33 100 40 0 3 328 100 604 100%
11. How many of them are: Excl. B,C
1) Male 32 1 15 14 3 265 80 410 66% 81%
2) Female 1 99 25 6 63 20 214 34% 19%
ITotal 33 100 40 20 3 328 100 624 100% 100%
Ill) FIRMS PROFILE
A) TURNOVER AND PROFITS
1 ) Generate profits 7 40 4 2 321 90 464 89%
2) Break-even 15 12 1 7 0 35 7%
3) Incur losses 11 2 10 23 4%
(Total 33 0 40 18 3 328 100 522 100%
13. How many of these SPEs had the following turnover In 1997:
1) Less than 1 million new roubles 100 36 40 176 72%
2) Between 1 and 5 million new roubles 4 60 64 26%
3) Between 5 and 10 million new roubles 0 0 0%
4) More than 10 million new roubles 3 0 3 1%
Total 0 100 40 0 3 0 100 243 100%
14. How many of these SPEs have an economic situation which Is:
1) Good 10 26 1 233 50 320 54%
2) Satisfactory 3 90 11 2 56 45 207 35%
3) Bad 9 2 25 5 41 7%
4) Close to bankruptcy 11 1 14 0 26 4%
{Total 33 90 40 0 3 328 100 594 100%
B) EMPLOYMENT 
15. How many of these SPEs employ full-time (officially and unofficially):
1) Less than 10 employees 12 90 30 1 77 0 210 35%
2) 11-30 employees 21 10 10 2 121 10 174 29%
3) 31-50 employees 92 40 132 22%
4) 51-100 employees 38 50 88 15%
(Total 33 100 40 0 3 328 100 604 100%
C) INVESTMENT:
16, How many of these SPEs have made any invj 15| 50| 30| I 2 | 2931 951 4851
17. Among the SPEs which have made any Investment how many have:
1) Bought new equipment 15 10 20 1 26 95 167 32%
2) Bought second hand equipment 60 5 2 142 20 229 44%
3) Leased new equipment 5 81 0 86 16%
4) Leased second hand equipment 30 12 0 42 8%
(Total 15 100 30 0 3 261 115 524 100%
D) PLANT AND EQUIPMENT
I age Is:
1) New 25 20 26 0 71 18%
2) 1-3 years old 8 8 63 0 79 20%
3) 4-6 years old 1 91 0 92 23%
4) 7-10 years old 2 112 0 114 29%
5) 10-20 years old 2 21 0 23 6%
6) More than 20 years old 15 0 15 4%
ITotal 33 0 30 0 3 328 0 394 100%
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E) PREM ISES
19. How many of th ese  S P E s have:
A B c D E F G Total
1 ) Bought their prem ises 92 25 117 19%
2) Rented their prem ises 28 100 30 20 3 236 75 492 79%
3) Other 5 10 0 15 2%
(Total 33 100 40 20 3 326 100 624 100%
F) OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
S P E s the output has:
1 ) More than doubled 5 19 0 24 5%
2) increased  by betw een 50% and 100% 2 30 5 99 0 136 26%
3) increased  by up to 50% 3 20 25 1 161 0 230 44%
4) Rem ained stable 12 15 10 20 2 11 0 70 13%
5) D ecreased by up to 30% 12 15 18 0 45 9%
6) D ecreased by betw een 30% and 50% 4 10 0 14 3%
7) More than halved 5 0 5 1%
(Total 33 100 40 20 3 328 0 524 100%
21. W hat are the main reasons  for th e se  output variations?
22. W hat do you forecast for the  next twelve months In term s of Increasing/decreasing production In S P E s  ?
G) PURCHASES
23. W hat percentage of the purchases of th e se  S P E s is represented  by :
1 ) imports from form er Soviet republics 30 20 25 10
2) imports from W estern Europe 50 30 25 10
3} imports from Eastern Europe 30 20 10 10 10
4) imports from other foreign countries 20 ? 30
5) Local market 70
6} Russia 90
(Total 0 80 0 100 30 90 100 0
H) SALES:
24. W hat percentage of the  output of th e se  S P E s Is sold In: excl. B, C
1 ) St. Petersburg 50 90 90 100 10 25 80 52.5% 41.2%
2) North-West Russia 15 10 15 20 5.7% 5.3%
3) O ther parts of Russia 25 70 0 38.4% 49.2%
4) Former Soviet republics 5 0 0.3% 0.3%
5) Eastern Europe 5 10 0 0.3% 0.4%
6) W estern Europe 25 0 0.1% 0.2%
7) O ther 10 5 0 2.7% 3.5%
(Total 100 100 90 100 70 100 100 100.0% 100%
Danish. (B) said that 90% of the  output Is sold in the dom estic market, without specyfing w here in R ussia It is sold 
25. How m any of th ese  S P E s have a s  main competitor:
1 ) No competitors 15 0 15 3%
2) Another small private firm 9 85 40 82 75 291 50%
3) A large private firm 15 33 0 48 8%
4) A state-owned enterprise 7 98 25 130 22%
5) A foreign-owned com pany 2 98 0 100 17%
6) A joint-venture 0 0 0%
7) O ther 0 0 0%
(Total 33 100 40 0 0 312 100 585 100%
26. In general, has competition for S P E s  com pared with 2 years  ago:
1 ) increased 1 1 1 1 1 5 83%
2) R em ained stable 1 1 17%
3) D ecreased 0 0%
(Total 1 1 1 1 0  1 1 6 1
I) EXPORT:
27. How m any of th ese  S P E s export the following sh are  of total output:
1)100% 0 0 0.0%
2) 80%-99% 0 0 0.0%
3) 50%-79% 1 0 1 0.2%
4) 30%-49% 2 0 2 0.5%
5) 10%- 29% 2 2 0 4 0.9%
6)1% -9% 10 0 10 2.4%
7) 0% 33 38 20 316 0 407 96.0%
(Total 33 0 40 20 3 328 0 424 100%
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28. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles faced in exporting?
29. What are the most common methods used to obtain information about 
foreign markets?_________________________________________
30. Do you think the quality of SPEs products is superior/inferior to 
Western products?____________________________________________
31. In your opinion, how burdensome are customs formalities?
32. In your opinion, how efficient are local banks in handling payments to 
or from a foreign country?
J) FINANCING
33. What are the biggest problems for entrepreneurs in financing their 
activities?_____________________________________________________
34. How many of these SPEs have been successful in getting a loan from a 
commercial bank or another financial institution ? _________________
35. In you opinion, how difficult would it be to obtain a long-term loan 
(more than 1 year):
1) Very easy________
2) Reasonable______
3) Rather difficult__________
4) Very difficult_________________
36. How many of these SPEs require pre payment before shipping their 
goods?__________________________________________________
37. How serious, nowadays, is the problem of overdue payments from the 
clients ?________________________________________________________
IV) FIRM CONTEXT
38. In your opinion, what are the main obstacles faced in starting a 
business?______________________________________________________
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39. What are the three biggest problems affecting SPEs today?
40. Is the business environment for small businesses more or less favorable 
now than it was three years ago?_______________________________
41. Do you forecast a rapid or a slow expansion of the private 
manufacturing sector in Russia?__________________________
42. How do you judge the transport infrastructure of St. Petersburg?
V) POLICY TOWARDS SPMEs
43. Do you think that the laws and the programmes enacted by federal and 
local authorities to promote small businesses have been beneficial and, if so, 
why?
44. How many of these SPEs have benefited from any special programmes 
to help small businesses?___________________________
45. Please specify which ones have been mostly utilised:
46. How do you judge the attitude of government and public officials in St. 
Petersburg towards private businesses?________________________
47. Do you think that their attitude is more or less favorable than 
elsewhere in Russia?
1) If less favorable, in what way?______________________________
2) If more favorable, in what way?.
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3) Similar________
4) Other (specify)
5) Do not know.
48. In your opinion, what should be done to promote the small business 
sector and by whom ? ________________________________________
VI) CONCLUSIONS
49. Please add any other general comments you would like to make:
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THESE QUESTIONS W ERE USED ONLY IN THE PILOT SURVEY
A B C D
How m any of th e se  S P E s  earn  the  following proportion of revenues from trading:
Total
1 ) More than 50% 3 171 174
2) 30-49% 0
3) 10%-29% 0
4) Less than 10% 0
(Total
How m any of th e se  S P E s  earn the following proportion of revenues from services:
1 ) More than 50% 98 98
2) 30-49% 0
3 1 10%-29% 0
4) L ess than 10% 3 3
(Total
How m any of th ese  S P E s reinvest a s  a  proportion of total profits
1 ) More than 80% 0
21 50-79% 0
3} 30-49% 40 40
4) Less than 30% 2 100 102
(Total
W hat proportion of the equipm ent owned by th e se  S P E s w as purchased  from:
1) The s ta te  enterprise w here the entrepreneur worked before 20%
2) A nother s ta te  enterprise | 60%
3} The co-operative w here the entrepreneur worked before
4) A nother co-operative
5) From a  local dealer of new /used equipm ent
61 From a  foreign dealer of new /used equipm ent 20%
7) O ther
(Total
W hat percent of the  custom ers of th ese  S P E s  is represen ted  by
11 S tate-ow ned enterprise 20%
2) Private entertprise 60%
3) Private shop, retailers
4) Private w holesalers
51 Foreign buyers
61 Private individuals 20%
71 S ta te  shops, retailrs
(Total
* "other" w as orginally m ean t to define other industrial secto rs, but w as interpreted a s  including any kind of firm not 
belonging to the  above m entioned sector. For this reason m ost of the  firm included in this category a re  service firms. 
** this sh are  refer to the num ber of firms covered by the organisations providing figures on this m atters 
others probanbiy include o ther forms in addition to the two he gave  the  share.
*** R am sden probably included here  all the categories except joint-stock com pany-closed and limited liability for 
which he gave  figures
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